The Roots of the Ceuta Crisis

National Review Online

Tuesday, August 04, 2026

 

The massive (if largely temporary) incursion of about 70,000 illegal migrants out of Morocco into Ceuta, a Spanish city of 80,000 people on the North African coast, has set off a debate that, to say the least, has been wide-ranging.

 

We will start at the beginning. Ceuta has been under Spanish or Portuguese rule since it was taken by the Portuguese in 1415, almost 40 years before the fall of Constantinople. Asserting that it is unacceptable to have a Spanish city on the African mainland is a variant of blood-and-soil nationalism that, if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that Turkey should quit East Thrace and Istanbul.

 

Self-determination is the better principle. Ceutans are Spaniards who want their city to remain Spanish. That wish should be respected. Ceuta juts into Morocco, which argues that Ceuta (and Melilla, its “twin”) are part of its patrimony, a claim without any legitimacy. If there is any substance behind recent hints of discreet U.S. support for Morocco over this, it is evidence of appallingly misguided thinking. Spain’s hard-left prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, is profoundly and dangerously anti-American, but his time will pass. The U.S. should not confuse Spain with Sánchez or, for that matter, Morocco with reliability.

 

Much of the controversy over the influx into Ceuta revolves around Sánchez’s responsibility for it. Earlier this year, his government forced through an amnesty for illegal immigrants. About 1 million people applied, roughly double the official, but widely disbelieved, estimate. Eventually, family reunification provisions may increase the total admitted or regularized to, on some estimates, between 2 and 3 million. After, typically, five years of legal residence, they will be able to settle elsewhere in the EU. Unsurprisingly, the news of this amnesty horrified many in a bloc already wrestling with the consequences of mass immigration and badly scarred by the Merkel debacle a decade ago. Thanks to the EU’s rules on free movement within its borders, an immigration problem in one member-state can easily spill over into another.

 

The amnesty sent a signal to would-be immigrants. It was not the first in Spain, and there was no reason to think that it would be the last, Moreover, just weeks ago, the Spanish Supreme Court had opened a loophole in the special immigration regime in place for Ceuta and Melilla. Under this, asylum-seekers can be turned back at the border but, the court ruled (for reasons that are now being addressed), not if they swam there.

 

People respond to incentives, whether real or imagined. Some sort of surge was foreseeable. Indeed, there are claims that Madrid was warned that one was on the way. The government’s response has ranged from denial to the somewhat more credible position that it was given no warning of the size of any incursion. Whatever the truth, no new steps were taken to deal with a surge, a negligent coda to a reckless amnesty.

 

The sheer size of the crowd that overwhelmed Ceuta’s inadequate defenses and poured into the city has understandably given rise to suggestions that the incursion was organized. But by whom?

 

The most obvious suspect is the Moroccan government. Not only does it claim that Ceuta is Moroccan, but also, some argue, it was angered by a recent visit by Sánchez to Algiers during which he described Algeria as a “strategic partner.” Morocco and Algeria do not get along. Under the circumstances, for Morocco to take advantage of the opportunity created by Madrid to demonstrate Ceuta’s vulnerability would make a lot of sense. There are reports that the Moroccan government encouraged the exodus, and there are others that suggest something more complex. If only, perhaps, for diplomatic reasons, Sánchez has distanced himself from the accusations against Rabat and cast some of the blame on people-traffickers and, one way or another, social media.

 

Sánchez was, however, enraged by criticism from some EU countries (above all, Italy, which also introduced temporary checks on non-EU citizens traveling directly from Spain) and their supposed lack of “solidarity.” However, in a letter sent on Saturday, 22 EU prime ministers (the EU has 27 member-states) made clear what they thought of Sánchez’s solidarity. They stressed the importance of working jointly against illegal immigration, an approach that included “addressing all policies that can serve as pull factors, such as the regularization of [a] very large number of irregular migrants.” Ouch.

 

In an attempt to defuse matters, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EU Commission, has praised the speedy resolution of the Ceuta crisis (even if more migrants remain there than was first claimed). She is calling for tighter external border controls, something that obviously makes sense. These would, however, have done nothing to stop Sánchez’s amnesty. So, what to do? We would recommend offering member-states a choice. If they want to preserve their prerogative to unilaterally pass such measures, they should agree to withdraw from the EU’s border-free Schengen Area. This is unlikely to happen, though, and Schengen will limp on until it collapses.