By Alan Jacobs
Tuesday, August 11, 2026
Those who deny the Myth of the Good War—the belief,
described in my
previous essay in this series, that World War II is a distinctively,
perhaps uniquely, good war—fall, I think, into four broad categories.
One: A Plague on Both Your Houses. The serious
writers who say explicitly that there is no moral difference between the Allies
and the Axis are few and far between. The more common view may be illustrated
by A. C. Grayling’s 2006 book Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the
WWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan. Grayling argues that
such bombing was a grievous moral crime, but he also, right from the outset,
says:
It is
unquestionably true that if Allied bombing in the Second World War was in whole
or part morally wrong, it is nowhere near equivalent in scale of moral atrocity
to the Holocaust of European Jewry, or the death and destruction all over the
world for which Nazi and Japanese aggression was collectively responsible: a
total of some twenty-five million dead, according to responsible estimates.
Allied bombing in which German and Japanese civilian populations were
deliberately targeted claimed the lives of about 800,000 civilian women,
children and men. The bombing of the aggressor Axis states was aimed at
weakening their ability and will to make war; the murder of six million Jews
was an act of racist genocide. There are very big differences here.
Similarly, in his recent Scorched Earth: A Global
History of World War II (2025), Paul Thomas Chamberlin argues that the war
brought about the functional demise of colonialism but was effectively a
comprehensive victory for imperialism—imperialism with two distinct and
mutually hostile wings, the American and the Soviet, but imperialism all the
same. Nevertheless, Chamberlin says in his introduction, “Nazi Germany stands
as perhaps the most abominable regime in human history. The Axis powers
committed many of the vilest atrocities the world has ever seen. And no serious
scholar laments the defeat of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan.”
Explicit claims of moral equivalence are rare; but it’s
not hard to find moral equivalence strongly implied, though with room built in
for plausible deniability. See, for instance, Nicholson Baker’s Human Smoke:
The Beginnings of World War II, the End of Civilization, which takes the
form of a series of historical snapshots, such as this one:
Winston Churchill
published an article in the Evening Standard called “How to Stop War.”
It was June 12, 1936.
Fine speeches were
useless, Churchill said, and platitudes were a crime. There was only one way to
stop war, and that was through military might. “Safety will only come,” he
wrote, “through a combination of pacific nations armed with overwhelming power,
and capable of the same infinity of sacrifice, and indeed of the ruthlessness,
which hitherto have been the attributes of the warrior mind.”
And:
The German Consul
of Cleveland went to Henry Ford’s birthday party in Detroit. Ford was turning
seventy-five, and the German consul had a gift for him from Adolf Hitler. It
was a big gold-and-white medal with four gold eagles and four little swastikas
on it, and with it came a wide red silk neck sash that stood out dramatically
against Henry Ford’s white suit. It was July 30, 1938.
The snapshots are presented without commentary; readers
are free to draw their own conclusions. But the book’s subtitle is telling, is
it not? And in an Afterword Baker writes, “Was it a ‘good war’? Did waging it
help anyone who needed help? Those were the basic questions that I hoped to
answer when I began writing.” The last words of that Afterword, and therefore
of the book, are:
I dedicate this
book to the memory of Clarence Pickett and other American and British
pacifists. They’ve never really gotten their due. They tried to save Jewish
refugees, feed Europe, reconcile the United States and Japan, and stop the war
from happening. They failed, but they were right.
Readers are free to draw their own conclusions, but
Baker’s own conclusions seem straightforward: the leaders of the nations that
fought the Second World War brought about “the end of civilization,” and the
only people not responsible for that are the pacifists. To his pair of key
questions, the answers are that it was not a good war and it did not
help anyone who needed help. Of course, Baker might well reply, “I didn’t say
that!” He’s got wiggle room.
Two: Say What You Want about the Tenets of National
Socialism, Dude, At Least It’s an Ethos. (Come on, you know the source.)
Here we get to the people I really don’t want to talk about, but must. The
obvious example is Darryl Cooper, a podcaster and self-proclaimed historian
whose Substack page
is, as I write, the bestselling one in the site’s History category—he’s about
15,000 subscribers ahead of Adam Tooze—and whose podcast has occasionally been the top one on iTunes, ahead of Joe
Rogan. The dude is making bank.
Cooper essentially flips the Story of the Good War—the
one I said in my previous post is widely endorsed, not the extreme version
Elizabeth Samet believes in—on its head. As far as I know—I can’t see what’s
going on behind his paywall—he doesn’t say Hitler was a hero or that the Axis
powers were paragons of virtue. He just says that they were a lot better than
the alternative, i.e. the postwar liberal order that the defeat of the Axis
made possible.
Overviews of the controversies surrounding Cooper may be
found here and here, but the best summation of Cooper’s position may be a
tweet that he later deleted, in which he juxtaposed an image of the drag queen show at the Paris Olympics that looked a whole lot
like the Last Supper with a photo of Hitler’s procession through a
conquered Paris and said that the latter was “infinitely preferable in every
way.” If I may risk a second comedy quote, this reminds me of Larry David:
“One thing about Hitler that I admire is that he wouldn’t take any sh-t from
magicians.”
But of course if you’re going to say that—by which
I mean not (a) Hitler took no sh-t from magicians but rather (b) Hitler’s
conquering France is “infinitely preferable” to a blasphemous drag queen
show—you will require a very different interpretation of the events leading up
to World War II than Americans have tended to endorse. Thus Cooper’s repeated
insistence that Hitler was a man of peace whose hand was forced by the
warmonger Winston Churchill, and that while the Holocaust did indeed happen, it
was essentially a great big accident, never planned but resulting from a
chaotic Nazi response to Churchill’s aggression. (Whoops!)
I am not here to refute, but merely to describe—however:
the Myth of the Good War may be selective in its use of evidence, but virtually
every claim Cooper makes can be not only questioned but straightforwardly
disproven: See detailed and quotation-laden critiques by Niall Ferguson and Andreas
Koureas.
Three: Just Asking Questions. This group arises in
response to the previous group. It’s a diverse body of folks: For instance,
Tucker Carlson, after interviewing Cooper, said, “I think you are the most
important popular historian working in the United States today,” and added,
“People can certainly take issue with any factual claims you’re making. I
assume they’re all right.” This is Carlson agreeing with Cooper but also,
shrewdly enough, leaving himself an escape hatch: he “assumes” that Cooper is
correct—but of course assumptions can be overturned and in any case the
issues are worth exploring—so many think, not just Carlson.
Often the people exploring are more circumspect than
Carlson was: Elon Musk listened to the Carlson interview with Cooper, linked to
it, and commented (in a since-deleted post): “Very interesting. Worth
watching.” This stance has become widely known as Just Asking Questions, though
Joe Rogan, who also interviewed Cooper, calls it “Just
talking to people.” But in both cases it might better be called: Just Listening
to People At Great Length. Cooper got many hours from Carlson and Rogan alike
to make his case against the Myth of the Good War, with virtually no pushback.
And maybe that’s how it should be. Who am I to judge? Hey, I’m just asking
questions.
Four: Are You Offended Yet? In this category come
the trolls, for instance Nick Fuentes, who cheerfully admits that 6 million Jews
were killed by the Nazis—“cookies in an oven,” he calls them—but also, when
asked by Piers Morgan whether he regretted saying that “Hitler is really f—ing
cool,” asked, “Regret saying a fact? No, no, that’s absolutely true.” He went
on:
And I’m tired of
pretending it’s not, to be honest … . It’s just cool — the uniforms, the
parades, it’s cool. As a guy, you look at World War II, and it’s fascinating,
and it’s interesting, and it’s compelling, and it’s cool.
And throughout this section of the interview Fuentes sees
himself as a representative figure: “The thing is, my generation, we’re just
done with the pearl-clutching.” When reminded that there are people still alive
whose parents were killed by the Nazis, Fuentes says simply, “I dont care.”
Fuentes here presents World War II as an aesthetic (cool vs. uncool)
rather than a moral (good vs. evil) phenomenon, and if people are
outraged by that, it’s a sign that they Just. Don’t. Get. It.
So these are the four primary ways to reject the Myth of
the Good War, the story that has made World War II so central to the American
imagination: by seeing the combatants in the war as morally equivalent—or at
least not greatly distinct; by seeing the Axis powers as more admirable
than the allies; by disavowing commitment to any particular narrative in favor
of “just asking questions”; and by redescribing the war as an aesthetic event,
with no interest in the morality of any side.
If you’re an American who thinks of the war as the
comprehensive defeat of totalitarian regimes and the emergence of your own
country as the world’s regnant superpower, or a Brit who sees the war as a
nearly miraculous triumph of the plucky underdog, or even a German or Japanese
person who sees the end of the war as Stunde Null (Zero Hour),
an opportunity to start over and build your country anew, then World War II
might seem to you an event of unique meaning—an event upon which to build a
society-governing story.
But perhaps you see the war as a scene, in Matthew
Arnold’s famous lines, “Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
/ Where ignorant armies clash by night.” Perhaps for you the war meant the
collapse of Western society into militarism or rudderless liberalism or
whatever your most-hated -ism is. Perhaps it’s something you observe only in
order to deem it cool or uncool. And perhaps you just don’t know what you think
about any of it. Those are very different situations, but what they all have in
common is a decentering of World War II: It is no longer an event you
interpret in order to anchor your sense of social meaning and purpose. Instead,
it’s just something that happened, like the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act or the War
of 1812.
Is that where we are now?
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