By Kevin D. Williamson
Monday, February 16, 2026
To the surprise of no thinking person, economists at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York last week released a study finding that the economic burden of Donald Trump’s
imbecilic—and, let us not forget, unconstitutional—tariff regime falls
almost exclusively on Americans rather than on foreign firms that export goods
to the United States. For the period of January-August 2025, 94 percent of the
tariff burden fell on Americans; in September and October it was 92 percent,
and in November it was 86 percent. One way of looking at that is that for most
of the year, firms exporting goods to the United States absorbed $6 (in the
form of lower prices) for every $100 collected in tariffs, with the other $94
being paid by U.S.-based importers.
Some of that $94 is passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices (one reason
inflation remains well above the 2 percent target) but that is not a
straightforward thing, inasmuch as buyers and sellers both have a say in the
marketplace, and firms have other options when passing on costs to consumers is
difficult, i.e. passing on costs to their employees in the form of lower wages,
a strategy that often takes the less visible form of raises or new hires that
never happen rather than the more visible form of actual pay cuts or layoffs.
Firms may also seek to recoup costs in other ways, such as reducing payments to
vendors and service providers or forgoing certain investments or spending. A
tariff that adds $10 to the price of a tire does not necessarily mean that the
price of a tire in the shop goes up $10, but it may mean that there are no
tire-shop employee bonuses at the end of the year, that employees are expected
to take on additional work at no additional pay, or that the tire store owners
decide to wait another year to have the shop painted and the parking lot
resurfaced. The guy who owns the local restaurant that used to be a favorite of
the tire shop manager will not be conscious of the fact that a tariff schedule
is the real reason the manager takes his family to dinner there once a month
instead of two or three times a month—and that the commercial painter and the
guy who owns the asphalt company are not making up the difference but instead
are cutting back, too—but he will notice that it is a little bit harder to come
up with the money to send his kids to summer camp this year.
The near-term effects of the tariffs are very bad for
some firms and industries, but they are not in the main catastrophic and should
not be expected to be—because, for all the Sturm und Drang attending the
trade discussion, we are not talking about very much money here. Total tariff
revenue for 2026 probably will run something like $200
billion, though it is difficult to say because Donald Trump treats tariffs
as a form of personal psychotherapy, for instance, by jacking up tariffs on
Switzerland because his feelings were hurt by a lady he identified as the prime
minister of Switzerland, which does not have a prime minister.
That $200 billion sounds like a great deal of money, but
it is something on the order of 0.6 percent of U.S. GDP. In 2025, total federal
revenue was about 17 percent of GDP (spending was 23 percent of GDP, hence the
huge deficit), and, to put that tariff revenue into context, we typically see much larger
year-to-year variations in corporate income tax revenue, which is itself a
relatively small source of federal income. Revenue produced by the personal
income tax routinely swings by more
than 2 percent of GDP over short periods. Tariffs are a stupid policy for
10,000 reasons, but we have a large, robust, and sophisticated economy that can
absorb a great deal of stupidity, especially when the price tag is relatively
low as a share of GDP. Given that regulatory
compliance costs are estimated to run as high as 12 percent of GDP, the
administration’s regulatory
reform agenda, imperfect though it is, may provide real economic savings
that exceed the cost of its destructive trade policies.
(Emphasis on may: The great problem with the Trump
administration is that even when it stumbles into the right policy, reform is
by necessity entrusted to incompetents and sycophants, with the entire
enterprise subject to the minute-by-minute whims of the president, who is
profoundly corrupt and possessed of a toddler’s self-control and attention
span. So, who knows?)
The real long-term cost of Trump’s anti-trade tantrum is
not the $200 billion or so a year in higher taxes on American consumers and
businesses. We’ll get through that. But there are other costs: There is the
misallocation of capital as tariffs, a product of artificial advantages for
less efficient producers and handicaps on more efficient producers; there are
new inefficiencies built into the trade system; because trade deficits are the
mirror image of capital surpluses, there is less investment capital flowing
into the United States than there would have been (U.S.-bound foreign direct
investment fell 21
percent in the first quarter of 2025 and has been declining
in the longer term), meaning that some kinds of capital will be harder to
secure and more expensive to access, a boon to U.S.-based banks and
private-equity firms and other allocators of capital but a burden for
start-ups, small businesses, and growing American enterprises that would
benefit from readier access to capital.
The Trump administration offers a lot of grandiose
promises and the occasional press release about how his tariff agenda is
bringing back something like the factory economy of the postwar years, but, as
with the case of Foxconn’s supposed $10 billion investment in Wisconsin (which
turned out to be about 93 percent baloney), there is a great deal of
fanfare but not much else. The main result of Trump’s trade policy has not been
a replacement of Chinese imports by U.S.-produced goods but a replacement
of Chinese imports by Mexican and Vietnamese imports, as well as a shift
away from goods and services offered by those nefarious ... Canadians. Japan’s
share of U.S. imports is down a little, and the Republic of Korea is up a bit
over 2017 but down a bit vs. 2024.
Hurray for Mexico.
I don’t hate that outcome, inasmuch as I feel a lot
better about buying Pendleton shirts made in Mexico than I would about buying
Boot Barn shirts made in China. (I am not much of a “Made in the US of A!” guy,
but I am a little bit of a China-avoider.) But that’s a $200 shirt—not everyone
can afford such principles. (Think how much better the world would be if the
so-called People’s Republic had been Hong Kong-ified rather than Hong Kong’s
having been abandoned to socialism.) I am all for building up Mexico and
Canada—anybody with a proper understanding of the actual national interest
of the United States would see, without too much trouble, how much better off
our country would be with a rich and stable Mexico next door rather than a
struggling, sometimes unstable, middle-income Mexico next door. Call me a
snoot, but I’d rather have Australia next door than Pakistan. And while Canada
is doing just fine, if our northern neighbor were as prosperous as the
Netherlands or Denmark, the United States would stand to benefit
enormously—more than any nation in the world other than Canada itself. This is
all pretty obvious stuff, but not obvious enough for the Trump administration,
which is a nest of rage-monkeys, dimwits, and cynical operators who make their
living milking rage-monkeys and dimwits.
Damaging U.S. trade relationships around the world will
cost Americans bigly, but not always in the obvious, easily quantified ways
that can be derived easily from month-to-month or quarter-to-quarter data. And
that should be fairly obvious, too: Trade policy consists of doing various
invasive things to prevent people from making the economic exchanges that they
would have made left to their own devices and based on their own understanding
of their own interests. As long as he is not standing in a voting booth or in
front of a television camera, the average American is a pretty bright fellow,
more than capable of deciding for himself whether to buy the $30 jeans made in
China or the $300 jeans made in the United States, the Corolla or the Tundra or
the F-250, the 2,000-square-foot house with a 20-year mortgage or the
3,500-square-foot house with a 30-year mortgage.
Trade policy, like industrial policy and other forms of
economic steering, is a politician saying, “I don’t want you to do what you
think is best for you—I want you to do what I think is best for me.” Call me
cynical, but that’s really the whole thing.
Words About Words
A friend sent me something he was writing with a question
about the “third-to-last paragraph.” There isn’t anything wrong with
“third-to-last,” of course, but when a chance to use antepenultimate presents
itself—seize it, I say.
Penultimate is one of those words like epicenter that
gets used the wrong way because people who don’t know better think that the
prefix is an intensifier: There’s the center, and then there’s the center
center we really mean it center! that people mean by epicenter, which does
not mean center at all but refers to an imaginary point above the center of an
earthquake. Penultimate does not mean super-duper-ultimate but second
to last, and antepenultimate is whatever comes in the series before
the penultimate, the word of in the case of this sentence.
Ante- is a funny prefix in that when we speak of
the antebellum era, no one has to guess which war it is we are talking
about: Antebellum means before the Civil War in much the same way
that postwar period or postwar economy refers to the period right
after World War II. There are many wars to choose from (too many) but those
words came into being, or into current usage, in reference to those particular
wars.
In Other Wordiness
Some Slate headlines over the past few days:
A New Version of Woke Is Coming.
Conservatives Aren’t Going to Like It.
Why a Floppy-Haired 27-Year-Old
Olympic Skier Is Making Conservatives So Very, Very Angry
Conservatives Are Terrified That
People Like Me Are Buying Guns Now.
Do you see the theme there?
There is a line attributed to Adolf Hitler asserting that
the genius of totalitarian systems is attested to by the fact that they cause
their enemies to imitate them. H.G. Wells, in calling for the development of a
scientifically planned global state, called for the progressives of his time to
become “liberal fascisti” and “enlightened Nazis.” (I
read that in a book.) Appreciating the energy and the apparent solidarity
of the fascist movements of the first part of the 20th century, many
progressives and nationalists in the liberal democracies—including Franklin
Roosevelt, who was both a progressive and a nationalist, arguably a bit more a
nationalist—found themselves experiencing a good deal of jackboot envy. In the
current era, when right-wing rhetoric amounts to very little more than sneering
and bullying—“liberal tears,” “cry more,” etc.—it should be no surprise to see
our friends on the left arguing that if x discomfits or hurts
conservatives, then x must be good, which is the subtext of those Slate
headlines. But I do not think that this sort of thing is really a reaction to
the Trumpist style, inasmuch as it precedes the emergence of that style as the
dominant form of expression on the right. “Your uptight Christian parents are
going to hate this!” is a very, very old marketing ploy, one part “Banned in
Boston!” and one part “Republicans pounce!” Incidentally, I spent a lot of time
with right-wing gun nuts, and I have yet to meet one who is upset that nice
suburban liberals are buying firearms—and the Slate report has not
convinced me that these fearful conservatives actually exist beyond the
anecdotal level.
And Furthermore ...
A few years ago, many conservatives—myself
included—practically gave ourselves hernias from harrumphing so hard when the
executive editor of the New York Times, Dean Baquet at the time,
confessed that his writers and editors didn’t really understand Christianity
and the role it plays in American life. Journalism at large is culturally
weird, and the New York Times is more culturally weird than the average
outlet, for all sorts of reasons. I chuckled a little when the New York
Times announced that it had hired a new Austin-based reporter to cover
politics, whose LinkedIn bio describes her as focused on gay rights and
implores readers to “ask
her about her wig collection.” I’m sure she is a fine reporter and will do
good work covering the very interesting stories of Texas politics (as, indeed,
she already
has), but if the Times were looking to really underline its cultural
weirdness, it could hardly do better than sending a wig-collecting gay-rights
crusader to talk tariffs with the Texas Soybean Board in Lubbock (and Lubbock
is more liberal than much of Texas) or to talk with some rural border sheriff
about transnational crime. Ask her about her wig collection!
Granted, there was a time when a man such as myself would
have a collection of hairpieces—but that’s beside the point!
It is interesting to see the Times investing so
much in Texas—but Texas is one of the places where they’re putting the new in
the news, while New York City and its new mayor are busy exploring the freshest
economic and political thinking of the 1840s.
In Closing
The Trump administration is winding down its theatrical
display of brutality in Minneapolis with nothing to show for it other than
millions of dollars in economic damage and two dead Americans, shot down by
agents of their own government. I suppose that from the outside it looks like a
lot of fun being right all the time but, I promise you, it
isn’t.