Monday, June 29, 2026

Boko Haram, Beijing-Style

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, June 29, 2026

 

I can think of one good thing—and only one—to say about Boko Haram, the Nigerian jihadist militia: They practice truth in advertising. The Hausa word boko is simply a borrowing of the English word books, while haram is the familiar Arabic word meaning forbidden. What’s meant by the phrase is that Western education—non-Islamist education—is forbidden, but the literal meaning is something like a red interdictory circle: “NO BOOKS!”

 

The soldiers of Boko Haram look and act about like what you’d imagine when hearing the words “Nigerian jihadist militia”—a bunch of guys in camouflage fatigues and balaclava masks riding around in Toyota Hilux pickups with machine guns mounted on tripods in the bed, toting Kalashnikov rifles, raping and pillaging. But book haters come in all styles. There are even Western progressives who think of themselves as good liberals who will hoot and holler about books “banned” in the United States on Monday (there are no books banned in the United States) and then on Tuesday pressure Amazon to disappear books they do not want people to read—campaigns that often achieve shockingly easy success. (And here I will rehearse my observation, probably too often reiterated, about how easy it is to bully some of the planet’s richest men, including Jeff Bezos. What is the point of having “f—k you” money if you never say “f—k you”?) Under the constitutional principle of streitbare Demokratie, it is a crime to sell certain political books in otherwise liberal and open countries such as Austria. The practice in many European countries turns the American ideal expressed in the First Amendment on its head: While our free speech protections are principally about political speech and political publications, which, in theory, enjoy a higher level of protection than does controversial non-political expression (say, pornography), in much of Europe it is only political speech, political journals, political books, and political organizations—including political parties—that are the targets of specific prohibition.

 

Most book haters are bland little men in suits working in fluorescent-lit offices. They may not look like Boko Haram jihadists, but, ultimately, they enforce their diktats by sending out men with guns to shut down the bookstores, to stop the presses, or simply to murder those who say and write that which they do not wish to be said or written. Boko Haram and groups of that nature just cut out a lot of the middlemen.

 

The so-called People’s Republic of China once again has turned its attention to Hong Kong’s bookshops, locking up figures including Leticia Wong, proprietor of the Hunter Bookstore, for the crime of trafficking in “seditious” materials. Books considered seditious include biographies of Jimmy Lai (the businessman, newspaper publisher, and activist), as well as such classics as George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm. I can almost understand, from the point of view of purely calculating totalitarian amorality, the desire to suppress works about Jimmy Lai. But anybody with a lick of public relations sense would immediately see that banning 1984 and Animal Farm is simply a confession that the state has implemented precisely the kind of ghastly, repressive, hypocritical system Orwell was writing about: Yep, Orwell is talking about us. But, in a broader sense, the attempt to ban a book is always a confession of something: guilt, very often, but sometimes weakness. To take an obvious homegrown example: For a guy who claims not to care what the media says about him, Donald Trump sure seems to follow every adjective published in the New York Times and the Washington Post and spends a great deal of time denouncing journalists as “traitors” and “enemies of the people.”

 

(It’s a little like the emails I get from people telling me I am “irrelevant,” which I may very well be—but I don’t think the people writing me to tell me I am irrelevant think I am irrelevant. They aren’t writing to the people they think are irrelevant.)

 

Xi Jinping and his circle (to the extent that he has a circle rather than mere underlings, which is not always clear) often behave in ways that seem inexplicable and self-defeating, from petty things such as suppressing books about Jimmy Lai (not petty to Leticia Wong and others who have been jailed, disappeared, tortured, and murdered) to bigger, geopolitically consequential concerns such as Beijing’s idiotic abuse and betrayal of Hong Kong, which has, among other things, deepened the commitment of those in Taiwan resolved to resist absorption into the so-called People’s Republic. In 1997, the year of the British handover of Hong Kong, the autonomous territory was home to the wealthiest Chinese community in the world—more prosperous even than Singapore. Today, Singapore (which is about 76 percent ethnic Chinese) has a GDP per capita about 1.8 times that of Hong Kong—it is well on its way toward being twice as affluent as Hong Kong. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Beijing could have gone a long way toward effecting de facto unification with Taiwan under a “kill them with kindness” strategy based on the free movement of people, goods, and capital—if not for the fact that the Taiwanese can look to the example of Hong Kong and know that their booksellers would never be safe, that no level of prosperity, security, or fundamental political cooperativeness would ever be enough for Beijing, which demands nothing short of total submission.

 

Xi’s actions often seem perplexing and short-sighted. I am far from being an expert in these matters, but I am persuaded by those experts who argue that the key to understanding Xi’s political leadership is to keep in mind that he is exactly what he says he is: a true-believing socialist, mindful of 21st-century realities but rooted in Marxist-Leninist philosophy and committed to the principle of political control of the economy. Some of our naïve friends continue to tell us—forgive the cliché—that “real socialism has never been tried.” But that is precisely wrong: Real socialism is being practiced in China, just as real socialism was practiced in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Real socialism is here to be seen and examined—it is hypothetical socialism that has never been tried, because it is hypothetical, theoretical, and utopian.

 

Voguish American progressives make a great many arguments in favor of socialism, which is very much in fashion at the moment (not only in New York City), and almost all of those arguments amount to: “The idealized hypothetical version of my policy is preferable to the real-world version of your policy.” Indeed, a great deal of political debate is very little more than that, to the modest extent that policy per se is part of the discussion at all. Fascism is notoriously difficult to define, but probably the best way to think of it is that fascism is what people who think of themselves as fascists do when they have power, and, to the extent that the actions and beliefs of people who do not think of themselves as fascists or call themselves fascists resemble the actions and beliefs of the confessing fascists, these may be understood to a correspondent extent as fascistic or fascist-adjacent. The socialism of theoretical essays is one thing, but the socialism of history is a different thing—and reality isn’t optional.

 

Appending the word democratic in front of the word socialism serves mainly as a reminder that what the genuinely democratic socialist countries largely have in common is that they spent much of the last part of the 20th century using democratic means to drop the socialism: cf. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, etc. Countries that are both democratic and socialist generally stop being one of those things over time. That is not to say that they have, will, or should adopt the American model, which has problems of its own—there is more than one political arrangement consistent with free enterprise, free trade, property rights, entrepreneurship, etc.

 

The hated “neoliberals” were—and are—right that there exists a relationship between economic liberty and wider political liberty, even though it was not the case that the economic reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era and China’s partial economic integration with the rest of the world were in themselves sufficient to secure general political liberty for the Chinese people. The world is complex, but the relationship between economic freedom and intellectual freedom is real and lasting. Those little Hong Kong bookshops are an example of this: Without the freedom to buy and sell, the freedom to write and to speak is a relatively small and constrained thing.

 

Again, I do not say that everyone has to do things the American way. Vienna is not some totalitarian hellhole, even if the Austrians do not have a First Amendment or free speech rights that are as expansive as those we enjoy here in the United States. And here in the United States, it is always necessary to keep an eye on our property rights, which is where those who would restrict our speech tend to focus, the First Amendment itself being a mighty bulwark against the traditional kinds of formal censorship. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, we have heard no end of lamentation about the supposed corrupting influence of “money in politics.” But do you know what the Citizens United case was actually about? The question was whether a political group could show a film critical of a major-party presidential candidate before the election. During the course of the oral argument, the justices inquired as to whether the same line of thinking that could empower the government to forbid the showing of a film could be used to forbid the publication of a book or a pamphlet, and the government affirmed that yes, indeed, that was the case. The government in that matter was represented by Elena Kagan, then-solicitor general and now on the Supreme Court. Many of my colleagues over at Advisory Opinions and SCOTUSblog are great admirers of Kagan’s, but I remain suspicious of her. Some things really must remain non-negotiable. I do not put Elena Kagan in the same class as Xi Jinping—obviously, no more than I put today’s German book banners in the same category as the German book banners of 90 years ago. But it remains the case that the regulation of commerce is regulation of writing, speaking, and publishing—it always has been and always will be.

 

I myself would prefer to live in a world in which no boko is haram. Bookshops are civilized and civilizing places. Which is why they always eventually come under the bootheel of those who prefer bayonets to arguments.

 

Words About Words

 

I have been asked to weigh in on this several times, but I don’t think I can improve on Evelyn Lamb writing in Scientific American:

 

There is a phrase, or a type of phrase, that instantly causes me to feel like I’ve stumbled into Wonderland or some other topsy-turvy dream world. “X is n times less than Y” is the basic formulation, where X and Y are quantities that can be compared and n is some number, usually (but not always) a whole number.

 

Most recently, I encountered it in an article that stated that Spain’s maternal mortality rate is five times less than that of the USA. I don’t want to pick on that article alone, both because I don’t want to trivialize the problem of maternal mortality and because I see similar phrases everywhere. Actual growth of energy demand is three times lower than Duke Energy estimates. Graphene paper is six times lighter than steel. Relative risk ratio for immunological graft rejection is 15 times lower than DSEK (whatever that means). YouTube runs five times slower on Chrome than on Firefox. When I read one of these phrases, I can almost feel my brain rejecting it like an ill-fated transplant, perhaps one that used DSEK instead of an immunological graft.

 

 

When I first noticed my negative reaction to this type of phrase, I thought I just needed to think through the situations carefully, but I’ve come to the conclusion that my rejection is wholly warranted. Please, stop writing “three times less than” or “six times lighter than” or “twenty times thinner than.” Think of your long-suffering, literal-minded math writer friends and rewrite! “Steel is six times as heavy as graphene paper.” Thank you. Now I can continue my day without a pesky brain reboot.

 

People get funny about numbers, particularly when trying to communicate relative scale or importance. The desire to write something that sounds dramatic leads the clumsy writer astray. For example, you’ll read about a car collector who “owned more than 28 cars.” More than 28? Like, 29? Or like 2,849,999,431,291, which also is more than 28. Check my English-major theoretical mathematics here, but I think there is a whole infinity of numbers more than 28.

 

In Other Wordiness …

 

After? Must have been a heck of a bad day!

 

A woman in her 70s was critically injured after being shot while waiting at a bus stop in Orange County on Monday, according to the Orange County Sheriff’s Office.

 

I wonder what happened between the time she was shot and the time she was critically injured.

 

The New York Times writes that photographer Nancy Sheung “traveled across Hong Kong and East Asia” for her work. Well. I am not sure that traveling across Hong Kong was much of an accomplishment. For one thing, Hong Kong is only 24 miles long from north to south. You can travel across it pretty easily on a bicycle. For another—she lived in Hong Kong. I know what they meant to communicate—that she was a gallivanting free spirit. Just a weird way to write it.

 

In Closing

 

I don’t think I have particularly good manners, but I think about manners a fair bit, because I think they are important. There are two ways to have good manners: One is the kind of easy, natural grace that comes to people like my wife and other natural aristocrats—people who knew William F. Buckley Jr. well remarked about his easy, unshowy cordiality, his way of putting people at ease without making a show of it. The second way of having good manners—which can, for a certain kind of person, be at odds with the first—is knowing and following formal rules of etiquette and conduct. These are enormously important both for the person observing the rule and for the person to whom courtesy is being offered: Having agreed-upon expectations and rules saves us all the stress and anxiety of having to improvise these things in the moment.

 

I think of it like dancing: Whether it is square dancing in Arkansas or waltzing in Vienna, having set steps and forms and rules is, to my mind, vastly preferable to the kind of improvisational, make-it-up-as-you-go nightclub dancing that is what we mostly mean when we talk about dancing now. I think more people probably would dance, and would enjoy dancing, if the dancing were structured and they knew what to do. Certainly that is true for self-conscious types such as myself.

 

(I have square danced; I have never waltzed in Vienna or anywhere else, but I stand by my assumption.)

 

As I wrote above, it is the case that formalism can get in the way of the more genuine kind of courtesy. Allow me to introduce a touchy subject and a possibly unpopular opinion: I think that white people—especially middle-aged white men wearing suits, which is fully me on some days and at least partly me every day—should be like 11 percent more courteous than their baseline when interacting with black people they do not know. Is that condescending? Maybe. Probably. There’s a kind of stereotypical nice liberal who says, “I don’t see race.” I do. Do you know who else sees race? Every single black person I’ve ever asked about it. Admittedly, that’s a limited data set. I don’t think that’s necessarily a good thing or a bad thing—just a thing. A social reality. A little courtesy, gracefully deployed, can go a long way.

 

Many of you will have heard stories from black Americans about being trailed through shops as though they were suspected shoplifters or being treated badly in restaurants, finding it difficult to hail a cab back when hailing a cab was a thing, that sort of stuff. Allow me to introduce another related subject and an even more likely-to-be-unpopular opinion: I don’t think all those stories are true. Not all of them. But they are not based on nothing, either. There are certain social tensions that are simply a fact of life when it comes to race, and it is easy for misunderstandings to happen on either side of an interaction. Conversely, you will sometimes hear white people complain that some black person was rude or intentionally unhelpful to them in some social or commercial setting and that they suspect that race had something to do with this. And maybe they are right, at least some of the time, too. I think that being a little extra polite in such situations is a good idea: Err on the side of making people feel like they’re being treated with respect.

 

I don’t know that I need to rehearse my whole social résumé here, but suffice it to say that I have probably about the kind of racial psychological baggage that you would expect from a conservative white man born in the 1970s in the South (to the extent that West Texas really counts as the South) and had a lot of the characteristic experiences of that time, including being bused to a majority-black school in the third grade as part of a federal desegregation program. I try to be a person of goodwill and to treat people decently, and, of course, I think racism per se is both backward and evil.

 

But I will not claim to be so enlightened as to be free from sneaky little racial assumptions, one of which showed itself in an amusing way last week. (I know this story will not reflect well on me, but I tell unflattering stories about lots of people.) I was staying in a hotel in Baltimore and went to the elevator to go downstairs and get some coffee. A middle-aged black woman approached the elevator from the opposite direction wearing a blue smock and matching pants, kind of like scrubs, with her name printed on the front. I did not pay much attention. I stood aside at the elevator, said “After you,” and let her go in first. Tiny little act of courtesy, the sort of thing one does without really thinking about it. My brain registered that woman as hotel housekeeping staff, which I like to think had more to do with the uniform—the untucked top with the name printed on the front, etc.—than with her race. But, again, who really knows? Anyway, she steps onto the elevator, and there is a young white man wearing the same blue smock and scrub-ish pants who suddenly stands up very straight and says:

 

“Good morning, admiral!”

 

Who knew an admiral’s workaday uniform could be so casual?

 

I thought about that admiral for the rest of the morning. And what really stuck in my head wasn’t the question of race or sex—as important as these obviously are in American life—but the uniform. I don’t have any idea what her life has been like, but I’ll bet it was not easy to rise to that rank. I’ll bet she did some real hard things. If I had put in the work and the years to become an admiral, I’d probably dress like Cap’n Crunch. But that is not what her day called for. And, of course, the important stuff—service and sacrifice and honor and all the rest of it—isn’t in the epaulets and the fruit salad, and surely it is the case that an excessive interest in martial plumage and display—as in the case of Pete Hegseth, the secretary of thirst—speaks poorly of a military leader, the ideal type being not the showy and strutting George Patton but the modest, supremely capable Dwight Eisenhower.

 

(One can take that too far, as with the tech moguls who affect a college sophomore uniform of T-shirts and hoodies, albeit $500 T-shirts and $10,000 hoodies. The Silicon Valley sumptuary code is complicated and weird.)

 

I do think that our national racial anguish is often exaggerated, but, then, I don’t know what it looks like, how it feels, on the other side of that line. I know there is a line, and the brute fact of the line matters a great deal as a social reality. (“Thinking of a key, each confirms a prison.”) But I do know how it looks from over here, where, if I’m not paying very close attention and haven’t had my morning coffee, I might mistake an admiral for a housekeeper. There isn’t a thing in the world wrong with being a housekeeper, and a housekeeper is no less deserving of respect and courtesy, but different things are different things.

 

And there is something enviable in military manners: The rules are the rules, everybody knows what the rules are, uniforms are called uniforms for the reason of uniformity, and there is no obligation to pretend that there isn’t a hierarchy. It is an excellent thing to have reasonably well-thought-out rules.

 

And maybe a Cap’n Crunch hat would help out a few of us bleary-eyed and oblivious civilians.

Pete Hegseth’s Warped Vision for the Military

By Mike Nelson

Monday, June 29, 2026

 

In June 2014, Iraq’s second-largest city fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in a disastrous rout of the Iraqi army, condemning the residents of Mosul to three years of brutal occupation. By the fall of that year, the black banners of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s ISIS fighters were a mere eight miles from Baghdad after having marched through most of Anbar province.

 

Across the border, the last holdouts against the ISIS conquest in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish Peshmerga that would later form the core of the Syrian Democratic Forces, had been pushed into a besieged salient in the city of Kobani.

 

Things were dark and growing darker—and while a friendly government in Iraq allowed for a return of U.S. forces to advise there, Syria was much more complex. In the midst of a bloody civil war, and with an American enemy in Damascus and a risk-averse administration in Washington, American options were limited. Time was growing short for the Peshmerga, and with them, any hopes of an American partner to fight ISIS.

 

In an urban engagement that raged for longer than the Battle of Stalingrad, the Kurdish fighters stopped the ISIS advance, held the line, and fought off the invaders in bloody and brutal block-to block fighting. While the Peshmerga’s victory in March 2015 was in no small part due to their valor (the word Peshmerga literally translates as “those who face death”), it was also the result of ingenuity and determination from an American special mission unit that found a way to influence the fight despite substantial limitations and complications. Coordinating airstrikes against an enemy they couldn’t observe to help a partner they couldn’t accompany, the special operators saved hundreds of Kurdish lives while taking out thousands of ISIS fighters. The Kobani breakout was the first bright ray of hope in an otherwise bleak outlook for the Syrian portion of the fight against ISIS—thanks to the skill and dedication of a unit commanded by then-Col. C.D. Donahue.

 

This wasn’t the only time the United States would call on Donahue, now a general, to respond to a no-fail mission during a national crisis. When Kabul fell to the Taliban in August 2021, Donahue deployed his command element of the 82nd Airborne Division for the thankless and seemingly impossible mission of coordinating the evacuation of Americans and Afghans with Special Immigrant Visas from the chaos of Hamid Karzai International Airport. For two sleepless weeks, Donahue coordinated the operation to evacuate more than 120,000 people from Kabul and, famously, was the last American soldier to leave, marking the end to America’s longest war.

 

Just four months later, Donahue, then the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, would deploy again to meet another crisis, this time acting as the point man to lead America’s coordinated response with our allies to deter further aggression and defend Poland after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

 

By any measure, Donahue has more practical experience leading American forces in the most difficult and complicated circumstances with the greatest strategic impacts to the United States than almost any other serving officer. Before any of his aforementioned accomplishments, Donahue had been a company commander in the 2nd Ranger Battalion and served as a troop, squadron, and unit commander in one of the most secretive and capable formations in the military—one of the most secretive and capable formations in the military. He is, by any objective criteria, the embodiment of the “lethality” upon which Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth places such a high premium. As the hyperbolic expression goes, “The guy’s killed more people than cancer.”

 

It might come as a surprise, then, that a secretary who has told us, in canned catchphrases delivered ad nauseam over a year and a half, that he cares so much about “lethality” and “joint warfighting,” has also ordered the retirement of Donahue just halfway through his time as commander of Army forces in Europe and Africa.Ironically, the crises Donahue reacted to were caused by same predecessors to whom Hegseth likes to point when complaining about the state of the military he inherited. When the Obama administration turned a blind eye to the rising threat from ISIS after the withdrawal from Iraq, or when the Biden administration failed to prepare for the evacuation of Americans and Afghan allies in the lead-up to Kabul’s fall, and fumbled attempts to deter Russian aggression, Donahue became the poster boy for the dedication and valor of the American military bearing the brunt of democratic failures. The missions he deployed to accomplish were prime examples of American service members reacting to and mitigating the foreign policy failures and fecklessness of Democratic presidents that Hegseth and his boss like to rail about.

 

Hegseth, as the duly appointed and confirmed leader with constitutional civilian control over the uniformed military, is well within his legal rights and authorities to fire or relieve the officers within that military. Typically we've been able to count on defense secretaries to exercise some kind of reasoning and judgment in such decisions. Hegseth, however, has exercised that authority at a rapid clip and demonstrated a profound lack of judgment. From his initial purge of senior leaders starting with the previous chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Army Chief of Staff Randy George, Hegseth seems to be enamored with his power to upend the chain of command based on nothing more than personal dislike.

 

Hegseth’s recent personal involvement in removing names from one-star promotion lists in the Navy and Marine Corps has drawn accusations of discrimination based on race or gender, given the disproportionate numbers of women and ethnic minorities removed—something first suggested after the initial firings of former Chairman Gen. C.Q. Brown, a black fighter pilot, or former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti.

 

The small numbers involved—both of general and flag officers and the minorities represented among them—make it impossible to draw a conclusion with statistical significance, but the removal of a greater percentage of minorities or women from these ranks has raised eyebrows. Hegseth’s defenders have pointed out, to counter these claims, that he has promoted some African American officers—the military version of the “some of my best friends are black” defense to accusations of racism.  

 

Assuming Hegseth’s choices are made out of some kind of racial animus, especially without proof, is a distraction. What we can conclude is that Hegseth is on a mission to remove those who he believes don’t belong—in his words: the woke, those who were not promoted through merit (as he defines it), or those who were too willing to fulfill the orders of the Biden administration (something that would have been, quite literally, their duty at the time).

 

But if Hegseth’s sole focus is just clearing away the woke distractions (“no more dudes in dresses,” he repeats in case any audience hadn’t heard any of his previous 20 utterances of the phrase) and returning the military to the lethality he craves, why is he eliminating the former special mission unit commander who was reforming the Army in Europe to meet the threats of the next war (Donahue), or a man who was a key leader in the last combat parachute jump by conventional paratroopers (Randy George), or the former 2nd Ranger Battalion commander who led from the front to the point he was gravely wounded in a booby-trapped house in Afghanistan (David Hodne), or the former long-range surveillance commander who was also wounded in a suicide attack as a brigade commander (James Mingus)?

 

Hegseth is literally firing the men who represent what he wishes to portray himself as, who have the experiences (in far greater measure) he likes to exaggerate from his own biography, and who bring the vision, skills, and excellence he claims are a priority.

 

He is not, as he claims, elevating excellence and merit focused on warfighting but rather attempting to reshape senior military leadership into a cadre of pliant sycophants. He is doing the very thing he claims occurred under the Biden DOD—trying to create a military leadership structure whose primary criteria are devotion to and willingness to implement a cultural and political vision. And these criteria are of greater importance than the readiness and lethality he claims to value.

 

While the general and flag officer removals and promotions have received a great deal of attention, Hegseth’s vision of reshaping officership in the Trump era extends beyond generals. He has hired senior advisers and empaneled task forces charged with purging the senior service colleges of wrongthink and reviewing how officers are promoted and selected for command. The people hand-selected to run these initiatives run the gamut from officers previously relieved with an ax to grind to social media influencers who demonstrate ignorance about the topics in which they claim expertise and sycophants who spend their days posting slavish defenses of the secretary and partisan attacks against anyone who criticizes him. One can see anecdotal examples of the impacts already, with active-duty officers praising Hegseth on social media in what seem to be desperate attempts for attention and demonstration that they are exactly the kinds of yes-men Hegseth can trust.

 

A secretary of defense can and should ensure that military commanders are capable, competent, and prepared to lead American service members in the highest of stakes. Several of Hegseth’s defenders have pointed to Gen. George C. Marshall’s wide-ranging leadership changes in the Army prior to and during World War II. But Marshall used objective criteria, measured against the coming threat, and explained his rationale. Hegseth removes the very leaders trying to adapt the military to better address the changing face of warfare, including David Hodne, the general who had been leading the Army’s command charged with transformation. He has never explained the rationale for firing these leaders, neither to the public, to leaders in Congress trying to exercise oversight, nor, lacking the masculine directness he likes to portray, to the officers themselves.

 

I see no reason to give Hegseth the benefit of the doubt that these decisions are being made for legitimate reasons. Hanlon’s razor suggests one should avoid ascribing to malice what can be explained by incompetence. But in Hegseth’s case, I’m not sure it’s important to determine which is the cause of his decisions. While either could be the root of most of Hegseth’s actions, neither is a trait we should want in a leader, let alone one trusted with America’s warfighting might. And Hegseth is a walking brew of both incompetence and malice.

 

The whole effort is indicative of the broader Trumpist play at faux masculinity. Actual war heroes are degraded by has-beens and never-weres as woke or Marxists or traitors simply because Hegseth either doesn’t like them or because they represent a threat to his frail ego.

 

I never served with Donahue directly, but I did see the very real effects of what he accomplished when I was the future operations director of the interagency task force for Syria during the same period he and his operators were America’s only effective effort to stall the ISIS onslaught in that country. And since his announced retirement, my phone has been blowing up with texts, emails, and posts from friends who did serve with him, some of them huge fans of Trump and generally supportive of Hegseth, expressing shock and outrage at the sudden ouster of one of the greatest leaders of the generation that fought the global war on terror. As a friend of three decades who served in combat with Donahue in a special operations task force told me, “Gen. Donahue represents the very best of our profession. His record speaks for itself, but in the years I’ve known him, his defining characteristic has always been his unwavering commitment to people. Despite catch phrases to the contrary, leaders of his caliber are effectively irreplaceable.”

 

While our military is designed to absorb and adapt to the sudden loss of leaders—a grim reality of the business of warfare—these preparations are done to mitigate the risk of complete collapse after an enemy action. The fact that we are willingly choosing to remove many of the best leaders among us is only doing our enemies a favor and making our military less effective, all to meet the delicate sensitivities of a man playing at machismo. And while we can absorb the loss of a few leaders, the widespread reshaping of the military’s leadership, across the breadth of the services and reaching down to echelons within the next generation of emerging commanders, does have the ability to reshape the military—not as something more agile and lethal, as Hegseth claims, but as a hollow shell of the force that defeated the Nazis, deterred communism, and crushed the ISIS caliphate, motivated primarily by sycophancy, patronage, and toadyism. That is exactly what a small, petty, insecure, sensitive, and paranoid cosplay warrior would want. Hegseth’s designs have the potential to do generational damage to our warfighting capabilities at the very time storm clouds gather around the globe.

Mamdani’s Disastrous Rent Freeze

National Review Online

Monday, June 29, 2026

 

By a 7–1 majority, New York City’s euphemistically named Rent Guidelines Board approved freezing rents in both one- and (this has never occurred before) two-year leases on Gotham’s million or so rent-stabilized apartments. Mayor Zohran Mamdani can now boast that he has delivered on a key campaign promise. A member of the board picked to represent the interests of property owners — after all, that is who landlords are — resigned ahead of the vote. The board, she said, had “stopped being a fact-finding body” and had been rebuilt “to deliver a rent freeze.” Operating behind the hollowed-out façades of more legitimate structures is something the hard left likes to do.

 

The result was a win for Mamdani, but it will be a loss for the city over which he presides. The disastrous consequences of rent control have been known for a very long time. In 1971, the Swedish economist Assar Lindbeck, then a member of his country’s center-left Social Democratic Party, described it as “the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city — except for bombing,” and he was far from the first to come to a similar conclusion. A rent freeze is rent control on steroids.

 

Rent control, which can come in different forms of which New York’s rent stabilization is only one, is a recipe for social and economic disaster, but it can be a  political success. Regulating — and even more so, freezing — so many rents can be used to buy (and hold) the loyalty of a valuable and voluble constituency and, indeed, induce them to stay in place.

 

As Arpit Gupta, the lone dissenter on the Rent Guidelines Board, has pointed out, rent stabilization should not be regarded as a form of poverty relief. It attaches to apartments of varying types and is unconnected to tenants’ incomes. According to Gupta, some 30 percent of households in rent-stabilized housing earn six figures. When it is convenient for the left’s objectives, such people become “the rich.” Not this time.

 

Under certain circumstances, such tenancies can be transferred in a fashion that effectively creates property rights within someone else’s (the landlord’s) property. This adds to the incentives for existing tenants to stay on in apartments that are, to borrow the language of the density crowd, “too big” for them and pushes up prices for those who have not won the rent-stabilization lottery. Perversely, this will probably work well for Mamdani politically. The mayor’s rise owes a great deal to high rents. For as long as he can persuade unhappy voters that the blame for the cost of their rent rests with capitalist greed rather than municipal socialism, he will continue to reap a rich electoral return.

 

In a market less dysfunctional than New York City, higher rents would attract builders of new rental apartments. Instead, the thought that on top of New York City’s routinely oppressive tax and regulatory burden, their owners might also at some point have to contend with harsh rent controls is an additional disincentive to the construction. Buildings that should have been built will not be built, putting more upward pressure on those outside the rent-stabilized bubble.

 

For some would-be builders, this is no mere theoretical possibility. The price of securing certain property tax abatements on new construction is including a number of rent-stabilized apartments. Applying for such abatements is the builders’ choice, of course, but their choice may be not to build at all.

 

Meanwhile, those unlucky enough to be landlords of a rent-regulated property in New York City are in for a tough time. Typically, theirs is already a low-margin business. Landlords have to employ and hire people to maintain and repair buildings, and pay for supplies and materials — all of which are subject to inflationary pressures. Mamdani is not in a position to freeze many of the rising costs they face even if he had any interest in doing so, which in the case of a class enemy is unlikely. But he is likely to increase those costs that he can affect. There will be no freeze on property taxes.

 

The resulting squeeze on landlords is likely to reduce the value of their buildings, which, among other malign consequences, makes it more difficult to use them as collateral to finance repairs. It doesn’t help that in the past few years landlords have been barred from recouping the cost of refurbishing a rent-stabilized apartment before new tenants move in.

 

It is no coincidence that nearly 60,000 rent-stabilized apartments are vacant in New York City. In some buildings, making up for those missing revenues and other non-covered costs will mean that the rents of apartments that are not rent-stabilized will have to rise. Other buildings may simply deteriorate. If the money is not there, the money is not there.

 

Mamdani has not been shy about his interest in the idea that the city should take over rental properties. In some cases, the inability of landlords — caught in a vise between rising costs and frozen rents — to maintain buildings to the necessary standard will result in their falling into such a state of dereliction that the city will be able to seize them, giving Mamdani the chance to turn the  political fortress he is constructing into something more than a metaphor. This will hurt countless renters, would-be renters, and the city that Mamdani is meant to serve, but omelet, eggs — you know how it goes.

Is Scott Wiener Still Queer?

By Rich Lowry

Monday, June 29, 2026

 

Scott Wiener is in the uncomfortable position of being an enemy of the people.

 

The ludicrously progressive California state senator running for Nancy Pelosi’s House seat is being harassed in public for insufficient alacrity in condemning Israel for supposed genocide in Gaza.

 

It’s not as though Wiener, who is gay and Jewish, is a Likudnik. He declined to characterize the Israeli war in Gaza as a genocide at a debate forum, then quickly backtracked and released a video saying that, sure enough, it is a genocide.

 

For this, he’s been subjected to the worst struggle-session-style public humiliations since those of Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey in the wake of the death of George Floyd.

 

Wiener, who has been accosted at a bar and at a trans march, doesn’t respond to the harassment.

 

Instead, he stays silent and looks at his assailants with sad eyes.

 

Wiener clearly knows that his interlocutors are lunatics but realizes he can’t make a wrong move or say the wrong thing in reply, lest he put his career at risk.

 

Scott Wiener, a U.S. Congressional candidate, faced harassment from a Free Palestine activist due to his changed stance on Israel.

AI-generated content may be incorrect.

 

 

The vibe is a little like that of an office worker who’s hoping to avoid eye contact with an aggressive mentally ill panhandler while walking down a city street.

 

The vitriol directed at Wiener is another sign that the issue of Gaza has now taken a place at the ideological core of the left. Demurring from using the word “genocide” is tantamount to saying that the police were okay during the Black Lives Matter protests, or saying that boys can’t be girls.

 

That Wiener, a radical on gender issues, is a target for such abuse puts the new status of Gaza in stark relief. This is the guy who championed the push to make California a “refuge” for transgender youth and promoted sundry other boundary-pushing items on the trans agenda.

 

If Wiener thought this record would shield him from being denounced and intimidated in public by his own side, he was sadly mistaken.

 

In the latest incident, Wiener was swarmed by people shouting at him about Gaza as he was trying to attend, true to form, a trans-led “Pride Shabbat” service in connection with a San Francisco trans march.

 

One of his harassers notably brayed at him, “You stopped being queer the moment you started supporting Israel, you piece of sh**.”

 

Superficially, this statement doesn’t scan; it’s the equivalent of telling someone he stopped being straight when he opposed the U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

 

The connection between queerness and Palestine would seem attenuated or even perverse given that — as is often pointed out — Hamas is not famously supportive of LGBTQIA+ rights.

 

But Wiener’s tormentors surely conceive of queerness as a revolt against an oppressive order and think of Hamas the same way. In this schema, Israel is Western, white, and settler-colonialist, making it as bad as the gender binary.

 

For the left now, it makes as much sense to be woke and pro-Israel as it does being woke and pro-apartheid-era South Africa.

 

Moreover, implicit in the verbal assault against Wiener is that he may no longer be queer, but he is assuredly still a Jew, a suspect status owing to its association with the morally abhorrent State of Israel.

 

This reflects a change in the valence of Jewishness in the left-wing worldview. It no longer betokens outsider and victim but rather insider and oppressor; it’s no longer an identity at the outskirts of Western civilization but at the very center of it, representing its worst colonizing and racist tendencies.

 

All of this means that Wiener is an appropriate target for the full mob treatment. (Back in 2024, by the way, pro-Palestinian protesters showed up at his annual Halloween pumpkin-carving event for kids.)

 

One of the people yelling at Wiener at the march implored him to redeem himself by saying something on the spot to denounce Israel. (The guy who shouted at him at the bar did the same thing.) This is typical of left-wing mobs, which tend to demand ritual acts of obeisance, whether it’s taking a knee during the BLM riots or wearing a cockade during the French Revolution.

 

Someone also asked how Wiener could have done this to San Francisco, as though his  political crime of not condemning the Jewish state in lurid enough terms had done concrete harm to a city that is 7,500 miles from the Gaza war.

 

Wiener put out a statement appropriately calling out his treatment. In his rapid change of opinion on the question of genocide in Gaza after the primary debate, though, Wiener tried to appease the mob. As a Jew with a suspect record on a litmus test issue for the left, he’s going to have to pander more or surely face continued bullying and intimidation.

Russian Lawmaker: We Still Have Enough Equipment to ‘Blow Up Half of Finland’

By Jim Geraghty

Monday, June 29, 2026

 

Earlier this month, the parliament of Finland, the newest member of NATO, voted to change its laws to allow nuclear weapons to be deployed on its soil; Finnish Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen declared via X, “the amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act was confirmed today at the presentation of the President of the Republic. The act will enter into force on 1.7.2026. [July 1]. A historic reform of security policy, with which we strengthen the security of Finland and NATO.”

 

There are no formal plans to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on Finnish territory, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb said Finland does not expect to host any other country’s nuclear weapons in peacetime. (Approximately 100 U.S. nuclear warheads are stored across five NATO nations: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey.)

 

But the change at least makes it theoretically possible that if NATO detected potential Russian territorial aggression toward Finland, they could deploy nukes as a deterrent. In recent years, Russia has increased its military activity near the Finnish border; more details on that here.

 

The Russians are not taking the news well. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, today called the vote “a vivid, yet deeply troubling, picture of blind Russophobia which firmly entrenched in Finland over the past several years prevailing over the pragmatic common sense that we had always believed to be characteristic of the Finns.” She continued:

 

Given that Finland’s senior  political leadership and the country’s competent authorities have repeatedly issued official statements that Russia poses no direct military threat to Finland, this decision appears all the more unfounded. It creates genuine threats to Russia’s national security, and will require additional political and military-technical response measures on Russia’s part. Make no mistake such measures will be taken in a timely and effective manner. In this regard, the Finnish people should ask themselves whether this decision by their country’s political elite will make Finland safer. [Emphasis added.]

 

One Russian lawmaker went even further. Aleksey Zhuravlyov, first deputy chair of Russian State Duma Defense Committee, told the pro-Kremlin Russian news outlet Gazeta.Ru on June 27, “They continue escalation, trying in every possible way to anger Russia. We, of course, will not succumb to provocations, but we will strengthen our defense on this very significant section of the border. Even now, I assure you, we have enough military equipment concentrated there to blow up half of Finland.”

 

Nothing says “we are not a threat to you” like declaring that your military could blow up half of the country you’re addressing.

 

Now . . . if the war in Ukraine were going well, would a pretty solid majority of the Finnish parliament — 125 for it, 61 against it — vote to make a move certain to antagonize Russia?

Sunday, June 28, 2026

The Great Relearning Begins Anew

By Marian L. Tupy

Sunday, June 28, 2026

 

The novelist Tom Wolfe gave us the phrase in a 1987 essay about the hippies of Haight-Ashbury, who decided that hygiene, monogamy, and other rules of polite society were bourgeois inventions. They threw them out, moved into communes, and were visited by afflictions that modern medicine had not seen in generations. Doctors at the free clinics started teaching sanitation lessons that Victorian housewives once took for granted. Wolfe called that the Great Relearning: Civilization that discards its hard-won knowledge does not leap ahead to utopia but is dragged back to the starting line.

 

We are living through a Great Relearning of our own.

 

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, a set of propositions seemed settled beyond dispute. Central planning had impoverished half of Europe while markets enriched the other half. Prices were not arbitrary impositions but signals carrying more information than any ministry could gather. The right to own a business, to keep the fruits of one’s labor, and to trade freely across borders had lifted more human beings out of poverty than every charity in history combined. They were the conclusions of an experiment run across a continent, with a control group on either side of a barbed wire line.

 

A generation later, those conclusions have been forgotten. Voters in wealthy democracies, and the young above all, are electing self-described democratic socialists who promise to repeal economics by decree. In New York, a democratic socialist won the mayoralty in November on a platform of frozen rents, city-owned grocery stores, and an expropriation of someone else’s wealth. The voters in Washington, D.C., are all but certain to elect a similar candidate. The 20th-century socialists buried hecatombs of corpses. Yet it is the intellectual corpse of socialism that is being revived.

 

What are the lessons that the voters have forgotten? Free trade is desirable because it lets Vietnamese seamstresses and Iowa farmers prosper by doing what they do best, while protection taxes a nation’s own citizens for the privilege of buying less. Rent control is ruinous because a price pinned below the market ensures that fewer apartments are built and maintained. Public ownership of factories fails, because the managers risk no money of their own and answer to no customer free to walk away. A municipal grocery cannot serve you, because a shop that is forbidden to fail has no reason to stock what you want. Confiscatory taxes defeat themselves, because capital, unlike the wage earner, has feet. Chronic deficits and the inflation they summon are cruelest of all, for they levy a tax that no legislature ever votes on and that the poor can least afford to dodge.

 

None of that should surprise us. We are not blank slates onto which empirical argument permanently writes. We are the descendants of small bands of chimpanzees who survived by raiding neighbors and dividing a fixed supply of meat. The zero-sum intuition that one man’s gain must be another’s loss is older than agriculture and far older than Adam Smith. Markets are recent and counterintuitive. Human nature does not change, and so the case for liberty must be made afresh in every classroom of every generation.

 

Which is precisely where the chain has broken. When you stop teaching a lesson, you guarantee its repetition. In 2024, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression found that on college faculties, the far left outnumbers the far right by 16 to 1. Self-described Marxists and socialists now outnumber self-described conservatives on the American faculty. In fields like history and sociology, a conservative voice has become a near-mythical creature. A student may pass four years hearing the case for markets only as a caricature to be refuted. The post–Cold War cohort was never taught why the Wall fell and is now relearning it the slow way.

 

The dearth of academics and public intellectuals willing or able to defend sound economics is also wreaking havoc on the right, aggravated by a president whose populist “solutions,” including tariffs and nationalization of shares in publicly traded companies, permit no commitment to principles or long-term thinking. Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump’s opposite, thought differently. Freedom, he warned in 1961, is never more than one generation from extinction. It must be fought for to be passed on.

 

My hope is modest: that the young will relearn the affordable lessons before they reach the final, expensive one. Friedrich Hayek explained it in 1944: Socialism, whether implemented by the left or the right, is unstable, because when its promises collide with arithmetic, a government must choose between abandoning the program and abandoning the voters who object. The choice may not be as obvious to those in power as it should be.

The Democracies Can Still Triumph

By Simon Sebag Montefiore

Sunday, June 28, 2026

 

There is such a thing as too much history. Although this may be a strange reflection for a historian who has just finished a world history in a time of European and Middle Eastern war, the fetishistic obsession with curated versions of nations and empires in the past can blind one to the present and what really matters: how people and their families today wish to live. Yet history is a deathless arsenal of stories and facts that teaches us how humans lived and also sometimes how we should live. In our post-religious era—in which, beneath the cloak of secular humanitarianism, righteous religiosity and virtuous crusading remain as potent as ever—history has attained the authority, authenticity and prestige that religion and its prelates once possessed. Politicians deploy its propulsive power to justify their deeds and appetites. And that is why history matters and why it has to be right—or at least, as close to what happened as we historians can manage.

 

The Ukrainian war and the wars that followed October 7 in the Middle East marked the end of an exceptional period: the 70-Year peace, which was divided into two phases, 45 years of Cold War, then 25 of American unipotency. If the first era was like a chess tournament and the second like a game of solitaire, today is like a multiplayer computer game, a tournament of power in which many new smaller and middling contenders compete for power alongside the mega powers, some of them like India on the verge of superpowerdom, others that are suddenly planetary or at least continental players, and a few tiny but rich enough to deport themselves like mini-empires. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was not a new way of exerting and expanding power. Its flint-hearted ferocity was a return to what the dynasts of the past—warlords, kings, and dictators—would find routine. Normal disorder has resumed, but in a new realm of kinetic speed and inexorable interconnectivity that I call the Ultraworld. And there is no laboratory of technical ingenuity so fast and so rich as war.

 

Democracies won the 20th century on the battlefield as well as in the marketplace and the war of ideas, resulting in a world order made in their own image. But they did not prepare for or predict the resurgence of autocracies, nor the way that the postcolonial states—and the supranational institutions they now controlled—would, after many decades, reject the liberal democratic world order. The autocracies are surging, and democracies ebbing. It is impossible to define exactly what causes one state to fall and another to rise, but Ibn Khaldun identified asabiyya, the cohesion essential for a society to thrive: “Many nations suffered a physical defeat, but that’s never marked their end. Yet when a nation becomes the victim of psychological defeat, that marks the end.”

 

Control states—autocracies that combine traditional menace and digital surveillance— disdain but also fear and envy the gaudy, outrageous, inventive, clamorous mess (part fairground, part farmyard) of the democracies that deliver freedom in the open world. Dictatorships move faster and plan bigger, and can even be formidable and majestic under experienced leaders. But they are also weaker: violence, corruption, coercion, and control are wired into the closed world. Virtually all contemporary dictatorships are cosplay democracies with term limits, elections, and legislatures—the few ruling, as Amos Perlmutter put it, in the name of the many. The rigidity and delusions of tyrannies are incorrigible; their purity spirals end in executions, not just cancellations; their adventures end in devastation and slaughter. When autocrats fall, they take the state and the people down along with them. The only leaders more buffoonish and lethal than the fairground hucksters elected in our failing democracies are the omnipotent clowns of tyranny.

 

Democracies are built on invisible trust: Over and over again, when anomie strikes, trust disappears, and so does openness. “As soon as any man says of the affairs of state, What does it matter to me?” Rousseau wrote, “the state may be given up as lost.” The lesson of recent years is that the gains and values that were taken as won after the atrocities of 1939–45—making racism and anti-Semitism taboo, the legal structure that defined and banned crimes of genocide and war-making, the right to abortion and the other triumphs of the great liberal reformation of the 1960s—have to be fought for again.

 

The so-called rules-based order was degraded not just by the fecklessness or cynicism of U.S. presidents but also by its own ideological stagnation—as demonstrated in all manner of scandals and outrages, but perhaps best demonstrated in January by the failures of the United Nations and humanitarian NGOs to condemn the massacre of Iranian protesters by the Islamic dictatorship. In spite of their original values of humanitarianism and neutrality, these organizations have been morally debased from within, using the language of human rights and international justice yet deploying it on behalf of autocracies and against the liberal democracies that created them. They need to be reformed, or they will become impotent. And we may all live to greatly miss Western humbug in the decades ahead. Meanwhile, the very vocabulary of humanitarianism and antiracism has become so selectively applied or debased as to be meaningless. We need to develop a new vocabulary.

 

Now let us turn to the crisis of democracy. Open societies are slow, their leaders amateurish, their policies inconsistent, but when they mobilize they are flexible, efficient, and creative. Technology can undermine democratic solidarity and aid tyranny and conspiracism, yet it also advances openness and justice. Its very facility means that atrocities and wars can be instantly recorded and viewed everywhere in our new virtual-arena world. But the multiheaded, indestructible Hydra of social media is an unpredictable power center, competing with elected, parliamentary, civic, and media institutions to complicate and distort already polarized societies.

 

I no longer use virtual for online life, because its effects are only too real, even visceral. It grants power without responsibility or consequence. Moral panics and witch hunts are built into human nature and feature frequently in history. But they end. Online, the inquisitions follow one another seamlessly. The once-vaunted values of public life are now reduced to the lower standards of private life—venality, vulgarity, rudeness, incontinence, and ignorance. A society that diminishes the value of knowledge is at risk. The internet has promoted emotion over knowledge and memes over books, and it has created a crisis of literacy, leading sophisticated societies to embrace conspiracies and myths—a trend that could be fatal to the success of democracies but invaluable for despotates.

 

The immediate challenge is to learn to manage our new technologies, to control their addictiveness and surveillance and the lack of inhibition they encourage while enjoying their benefits. The invisible power of the unelected despots of data and tech lords must be diminished; if families cannot control the disaster of digital addiction, states will have to legislate for them. Artificial intelligence will replace many jobs globally but in the comfort democracies—those legacy states, once imperial powers, overstretched by welfare promises, legal entitlements, and executive paralysis—it will hit middle-class digital mediators who moved data around an onanistic internet economy. If things go wrong, the overqualified graduate activist class could provide the revolutionaries of the future. AI, too, would certainly be a dangerous tool in the hands of overmighty states just as it could be invaluable in the right hands.

 

Because everyone will have access to the same information, AI will accentuate the value of personal connections, again promoting lineages and networks that at their most extreme may appear to be sinister establishment conspiracies. The Ultraworld not only accentuates the effects of technology but also enables traditional systems. We live in a time of resurgent family power—from neo-monarchies such as North Korea, theocratic Iran where the Khamenei dynasty seems to rule, and many states in Asia and Africa to the demo-dynasties of the West—which proves surprisingly compatible with transactional politics and autocratic systems. Meanwhile foolish, faddish governments have promoted new technologies and made their societies more dependent on internet systems to the point that military catastrophes and the breakdown of entire cities or even countries will be inevitable—and lethal, given that most city dwellers have lost the most basic skills of craft and survival. In the case of massive grid sabotage, AI could compound the chaos and lead to a starvation of city-dwellers unthinkable in modern times. But AI will also, after two centuries of long days in factories and offices, contribute to new health advances and ways of working, and time for family and pleasure. Ironically, the loss of many white-collar jobs will raise the importance and prestige of artisans and craftsmen—the skilled people who can actually make things—and farmers who grow food. In the AI world, they, not men and women in suits, will be highly rewarded and even revered.

 

The peril for comfort democracies is that they can no longer satisfy the entitled demands of their citizens, nor assuage their popular, fearful rage against decline, poverty, and immigration. Meanwhile, the traditional markers of Western success—legal codes, civic institutions, bureaucratic processes, the guardianship of a cozy ruling caste and the pious but unrealistic orthodoxies of privileged patriciates—are in danger of becoming obstacles to governance and to individual freedoms, if not actual engines of paralysis. The sociologist Max Weber foresaw the paralysis of this bureaucratization that is now unleashing a rising fury against democracy itself. The cycle can probably only be broken only by the election of iconoclastic radical politicians. The selection of leaders who can dynamically solve the issues of the electorate is what democracy is meant to do to forestall collapse and revolution, though the danger with such radical governments is that they tend to break more than they solve, and move toward cults of personality and authority. The balance is delicate; the peril is one that only dedicated citizenship can prevent; the prize is democracies that again reflect the wishes and trust of their electorates.

 

A parallel crisis is the conundrum of how comfort democracies can fulfill citizens’ expectations of social services and health care ’til death, a challenge exacerbated by aging populations, without such punishing taxes that they strangle their own golden geese. America and Europe have been immeasurably enriched, culturally and economically, by the arrival and absorption of immigrants from all over the world. Yet a new much larger immigration deluge is likely imminent, posing a dilemma for democracies that believe they must choose between virtue and survival. Political parties and leaders who do not legislate for this, nor discuss and confront factions and sects that are opposed to free speech and open societies due to ideological zeal—and fear of small groups of illiberal activists—will place democracy itself in danger by making it appear obsolete, unworkable, or corrupt.

 

The almost magical ability of smartphones and digital markets to deliver curated products to consumers has had unforeseen consequences. Even the richest emperors of the past did not have the ability to satisfy their whims that is now possessed by any student in Chicago or Berlin or Kinshasa. Yet these easy luxuries have simultaneously raised the entitlement of citizens and their expectations of largesse from their underfunded, over-bureaucratized, overpromising governments, which are left seeming slow and inept. Unsuitable leaders are chosen on irresponsible promises and then tossed aside in favor of new brazen or naïve overpromisers. This only encourages the distrust, fury, and conspiracism now raging through our societies. These digital technologies have also created an echo chamber of self-confirming views, which has contributed to an unreal, simplified view of a nuanced, messy world.

 

Magical capitalism has likewise changed private lives. As education and prosperity rose, well-off people married later and had fewer children, and women had more choices and higher standards. Gender-selective abortion in East Asia led to a disproportionate amount of male children, who are adults today. In this century, a combination of prosperity, women’s rights, and smartphones has wrought unexpected changes. Couples started to meet online, but the curation that catered to personal tastes raised people’s expectations of dating, sex, and marriage, just as digital entertainment and powerful algorithms—offering gaming, news, and pornography—presented an initially thrilling but ultimately solitary life at home.

 

Not everyone is lonely; some women, no longer obliged to marry, are probably happier and freer. But in many cases, what I call algorithmic companionship—which doesn’t require empathy or sympathy for others—has replaced the real sort. The result is an epidemic of solitude, if not loneliness; a dramatic drop in fertility; and a romantic famine across North and South America, Europe, and China. Yet as the populations there shrink, populations are booming in less prosperous and less secular regions, including Africa and the Middle East. This epoch of new middling and continental powers should be Africa’s moment. Treasure-states such as Nigeria and South Africa, with their mineral resources, should be emerging as world powers. But if instead they continue to fail, migrants will move north to enjoy the benefits and safety offered by the comfort democracies. Migration has always been the engine of history.

 

Identities are evolving too; younger generations may no longer embrace the nation as their prime identity. Comfort Democracies face a crisis that is a symptom of success: their grants of entitlements, of free education and social liberties, and luxurious lifestyles,  all unequaled in human history, have empowered highly educated activist cadres of the young who exploit those values and rights while rejecting the legitimacy of democratic states that some even regard as historic criminal conspiracies fit only for destruction.   Such movements as we see today may play out, and others will arise. Active citizenship can defeat intolerant ideologies in debate and at the ballot box. But in turbulent times, small, impassioned groups can capture or paralyze states, as has happened often in history. In what I call the war democracies—Taiwan, Israel, Ukraine—the stakes are so clear and society is so awakened that this is not a problem. But one wonders if young citizens of any of the comfort democracies—especially the fuddled legacy powers such as Britain and France—would now be willing to give their lives in conscript armies to defend supposed national interests, and if human-rights activists would actually allow a struggle such as the Second World War to be fought today at all.

 

Capitalist democracies have inbuilt inequalities, but their inconsistency is also their strength: They are adaptable. To restore the trust, magnanimity, and asabiyya essential to democracies, they will need to address those inequalities. Companies and data panjandrums will have to share AI’s profits and protect the poor. In foreign policy, too, the democracies need to regain self-confidence—and back democratic allies against forces that threaten our systems and values. Liberal democracies need to show they can win—without destroying their own values from within. That is how democracy triumphed after 1945—and why it is now under threat.

 

However unsettling these jactitations appear, the open world remains the happiest and freest place to live. Population growth and climate change can be solved only by either catastrophic population decline—pandemic, natural disaster, thermonuclear war—or cooperation on a planetary scale. “The real problem of humanity,” said Edward O. Wilson, “is we have palaeolithic emotions, medieval institutions and godlike technology.” To navigate the looming tempests of chaos, humans will seek not only the consolations of family but also some sort of religiosity, even God, to fill a void unfilled by political orthodoxies and unsatisfactory plenty, and to explain not just the unstoppable virtuosity of our own technologies, but the half-monstrous, half-seraphic nature of we who created them.

 

Just because we are the smartest ape ever created, just because we have solved many problems so far, does not mean we will solve everything. Human history is like one of those investment-warning clauses: Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Yet the harshness of humanity has been constantly rescued by our capacity to create and love. The family is the center of both. Our limitless ability to destroy is matched only by our ingenious ability to recover.