Friday, March 6, 2026

Who Is the U.S. Actually at War With Right Now?

By Conor Friedersdorf

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

Donald Trump campaigned on the idea that electing him was the best way to avoid wars. He has referred to himself as the “peace president,” going so far as to complain that he hadn’t won a Nobel Peace Prize.

 

Yet Trump has governed as a hawkish interventionist whose approach better aligns with his neoconservative secretary of state, Marco Rubio, than with the anti-interventionists in his administration, such as J. D. Vance and Tulsi Gabbard. The United States is now enmeshed in so many conflicts that its foreign policy is closer to “world police” than “America First.”

 

The newly launched war against Iran is the most significant. Operation Epic Fury begins less than a year after the United States and Israel partnered to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. At the time, Trump declared that operation a success, and Vance defended it by stating, “I certainly empathize with Americans who are exhausted after 25 years of foreign entanglements … But the difference is that back then, we had dumb presidents and now we have a president who actually knows how to accomplish America’s national-security objectives. So this is not gonna be some long, drawn-out thing.”

 

The Trump administration has now launched a “long, drawn-out thing” in Iran with no end in sight. U.S. military personnel have already been imperiled at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, a U.S. Navy headquarters in Bahrain, and facilities in Iraq. American interests around the world are at risk of Iranian retaliation.

 

All alone, this war would make a mockery of MAGA claims that Trump is an anti-interventionist. But it is one in an extensive list of Trump-era entanglements.

 

Even as America’s military expands its focus in Iran, it launched a new operation this week against drug cartels in Ecuador. “Together, we are taking decisive action to confront narco-terrorists who have long inflicted terror, violence, and corruption on citizens throughout the hemisphere,” U.S. Southern Command announced in a press release.

 

U.S. forces in Africa have been carrying out air strikes over Somalia against the Sunni Islamist terrorist organization al-Shabaab. As recently as last month, U.S. forces carried out multiple strikes against Islamic State fighters in Syria, according to U.S. Central Command.

 

Earlier this year, the United States launched Operation Absolute Resolve, a military campaign that successfully removed the Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power. After the operation, Trump said that the U.S. would run Venezuela at least temporarily. This week, Reuters reported that Interior Secretary Doug Burgum traveled to Venezuela and met with its acting president, Delcy Rodríguez.The United States is both negotiating contracts with Rodríguez and threatening to indict her.

 

The Trump administration concluded last year with a Christmas Day attack on Islamist militants in Nigeria. Earlier in 2025, the United States carried out air strikes in Iraq, waged a roughly seven-week offensive against Houthi rebels in Yemen, and carried out the aforementioned attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This year and last, the Trump administration has been blowing up boats in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, many off the coast of Venezuela, that it suspects of drug smuggling. The boat strikes have killed at least 150 people.

 

Ukraine is the one place where the Trump administration appears to be trying to draw down U.S. involvement, though the United States has supplied the country with intelligence as it resists Russian aggression.

 

During the run-up to the 2016 election, I wrote that “if you’re a voter who believes that Donald Trump is against foreign wars and regime change, unlike the globalist elites in Washington, D.C., you have been misled.” At the time, I noted that Trump released a video in 2011 that sought to pressure President Obama to invade Libya. Trump also argued that George H. W. Bush should have ousted Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and wrote in his 2000 book, The America We Deserve, “We still don’t know what Iraq is up to or whether it has the material to build nuclear weapons.” He added, “Am I being contradictory here, by presenting myself as a deal-maker and then recommending preemptive strikes? I don’t think so.” In 2011, he urged the Navy to wage war on Somali pirates.

 

Now Trump has proved his proclivity for interventionism, without congressional approval or the support of the public. And there’s no evidence to suggest that he will stop here. If Congress continues allowing him to deploy force unilaterally, he may pursue land strikes on drug cartels in Mexico, a prospect that he raised early this year in an interview with Fox News; regime change in Cuba, a longtime dream of Rubio’s; and God knows what else. He is an impulsive man who gambles, especially when the most significant risks are borne by others. There is no way to know how exactly he will surprise Americans next.

 

Trump could even make the United States a pariah among its Western allies by revisiting his on-again, off-again threats to take Greenland by force, a move that parts of his base have been urging ever since Trump first raised the possibility, or by seizing the Panama Canal, as he has also threatened to do.

 

Had Americans known that Trump was going to undertake wars of choice and assorted military strikes all around the world, they may not have elected him. At this point, with a majority of voters opposed to Trump’s interventions, congressional action is the only way to disentangle the country from these conflicts. Until then, the list is likely to only grow longer.re

The Humiliation of J. D. Vance

By Idrees Kahloon

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

If J. D. Vance promised one thing during the 2024 presidential campaign, it was that America would not enter into a war with Iran of the kind that is currently raging. “America doesn’t have to constantly police every region of the world,” Vance told the comedian Tim Dillon on his podcast. He continued: “Our interest, I think very much, is in not going to war with Iran. It would be a huge distraction of resources. It would be massively expensive to our country.” In another podcast interview, with Shawn Ryan, in September 2024, Vance even said that a war between Israel and Iran was in fact “the most likely and most dangerous scenario” for provoking World War III.

 

These arguments look farcical now that President Trump has chosen—months after bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities and pronouncing its enrichment efforts “completely and totally obliterated”—to join Israel in launching a war on the Islamic Republic. The ensuing conflagration now involves a dozen countries in the Middle East. Trump says that he will do “whatever it takes” militarily and that “wars can be fought ‘forever.’” Vance’s X account, normally hyperactive, went silent in the days after bombs began falling on Saturday morning. The vice president was not at Mar-a-Lago with Trump as he oversaw the attack. The administration instead released a photo of him running a secondary meeting at the White House, flanked by a can of Diet Mountain Dew and a sullen-looking Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence.

 

Vance entered the White House as a man full of ideas—about a more modest place for the United States in world affairs; a new, worker-friendly version of Republican economics; and aggressive, Teddy Roosevelt–style regulation of Big Business. Yet Iran is just the latest example of a noticeable trend: Within the Trump administration, Vance’s opinions seem to matter less and less.

 

On foreign affairs, Vance was on the isolationist end of the MAGA coalition, which now includes people, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who have previously been fervid advocates of American intervention abroad. Vance had a coherent, well-articulated theory for his beliefs: America could not fight on multiple fronts and should not pointlessly expend its scarce munitions on regional conflicts, such as the war between Russia and Ukraine, because it was competing with the rising superpower China. Yet, as vice president, he has been forced to square his stance with the administration’s January capture of the Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro—a raid that Vance defended as a law-enforcement action rather than an act of war. He has gamely taken up Trump’s desire to control Greenland, donning a parka and visiting the island.

 

In private, Vance seems more consistent with his prior positions. In Signal chats accidentally disclosed to The Atlantic last year, he registered his opposition to strikes on Houthi militants. (After he was overruled, he quickly acquiesced.) His extreme skepticism of Ukraine’s war effort—as a senator, Vance described Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s lobbying for more U.S. aid as “grotesque”—initially seemed to gain purchase within the Trump administration. In an Oval Office meeting with Trump and Zelensky, Vance berated the Ukrainian president by asking, “Have you said thank you once?” One of the few close Vance allies who secured a major administration post, Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s top policy official, was behind the decision last summer to suspend arms shipments to Ukraine.

 

Still, Trump reversed this decision within days. The president is not just allowing previously passed American aid packages to go to the Ukrainians; he is also expanding access through a new program that lets European countries pay for weapons and transfer them. America is still assisting Ukraine significantly in other ways. Its intelligence agencies are providing extensive support; the military is squeezing Russia’s economy by seizing “shadow fleet” ships that evade U.S. sanctions; the Trump ally Elon Musk deactivated Starlink terminals that Russian forces were using to guide drones.

 

The irony now is that, as Vance feared, American missile interceptors necessary to deter the Chinese military are being burned through at an astonishing rate—just not by the Ukrainians. The Trump administration is using them in a discretionary war in the Middle East.

 

***

 

Vance’s heterodoxy within conservative circles was even more marked on economic matters. The hillbilly elegist turned venture capitalist once seemed poised to remake Reaganite Republican dogma. Vance wanted to boost American fertility rates by expanding the child tax credit, perhaps to as much as $5,000 per kid. He wanted to protect American workers by expanding unionization, breaking up big tech companies, accelerating antitrust enforcement, raising tariffs, and implementing an industrial strategy. Aside from tariffs—a decades-long obsession of Trump’s, anyway—little Vanceism is discernible in the administration’s actions. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the administration’s signature legislative achievement, modestly increased child tax credits to $2,200 per child. It also created special tax-advantaged “Trump accounts” for children, but these will exist only through 2028—a mere teaser of pronatalist policy. The pillars of Hungarian-style family policy, which Vance repeatedly praised, are nowhere near codification in America. Vance once entertained grand ideas of putting workers on corporate boards, as in Germany, and letting unions negotiate across an entire industry at once, as in Scandinavia, rather than company by company. But far from taking up such proposals, the Trump administration is instead priming the National Labor Relations Board for rollbacks of prior decisions.

 

In the Senate, Vance worked with Democrats on legislation to claw back compensation from bank executives and remove tax breaks for corporate mergers. But his past antagonism toward corporations is not apparent in Trump’s policies. Vance’s former policy adviser Gail Slater recently lost her job as the Justice Department’s head of antitrust enforcement, in an apparent power struggle with Attorney General Pam Bondi. Roger Alford, a Slater deputy who was ousted before her, alleged in a speech last year that “MAGA-in-Name-Only lobbyists and DOJ officials enabling them are pursuing a different agenda” and are seeking to “enrich themselves as long as their friends and supplicants are in power.” You seldom hear the slogan “Drain the swamp” from this administration anymore.

 

The Trump administration’s embrace of an all-out culture war, particularly in its aggressive campaign against Ivy League institutions, does echo some of Vance’s favorite themes. So does its castigation of Europe as being so enthralled by multiculturalism that it faces, as the 2025 National Security Strategy put it, “civilizational erasure.” But these moves are also in line with the views of Stephen Miller, the president’s deputy chief of staff for policy, who appears to exercise far more power in the White House.

 

Vance seemed poised to be a serious policy maker on artificial intelligence after he delivered a major speech in Paris last year, in which he argued against “excessive regulation of the AI sector” and pledged to “safeguard American AI and chip technologies from theft and misuse.” Yet the Trump administration has gone the other direction by, in December, granting export licenses of advanced chips to China in exchange for a 25 percent cut of the proceeds, and last month by trying to hamstring Anthropic, the frontier AI company, over failed negotiations with the Pentagon. He remains the White House’s best television surrogate, and is valued for his loyalty. But when policy views clash in the White House, it is hard to see where Vance is triumphing.

 

In some sense, Vance is suffering the typical fate of the vice president, who is forever on display but seldom listened to. This is a major comedown from the role he once seemed likely to fill. Vance’s nomination as vice president was not a concession to the Republican Party of old, but a promise of the Republican Party to come, of Trumpism after Trump. Instead, he has receded in importance in the past year, less essential to economic policy than Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, less influential on immigration than Miller, less persuasive on foreign affairs than Rubio and the special envoy Steve Witkoff. That may help explain why, after the Iran strike, Vance ended up alongside not Trump but Gabbard, who like the vice president seems out of sync with the administration’s policies. (During her 2020 presidential campaign, Gabbard sold T-shirts emblazoned with the logo No War With Iran.)

 

Vance came to public attention as a resounding critic of Trump who could nonetheless explain his appeal among heartland Americans to coastal elites. Before his Senate campaign in Ohio in 2022, he emerged as the personification of national conservatism—the new populism-inflected strain of thought that was becoming dominant in America and Europe. He angrily rejected the so-called forever wars of the George W. Bush administration—disillusioned from his experience as a young soldier deployed to fight them. Reinvention is obviously possible for a man who has reinvented himself before. But if he seeks the Republican nomination for president in 2028, he may find himself bound to an unpopular series of policies that the 2024 version of Vance would oppose.

 

 

Madmen at the Helm

By Paul D. Miller

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

Doing foreign policy analysis in the age of Trump is like being a theater critic in Washington, D.C., in 1865. Yes, there’s a play to talk about, but one gets the sense that more important things are going on. Does anyone remember, or care, what play Lincoln was watching?

 

The war against Iran is important. The tenuous “peace” between Israel and Hamas is important. The war in Ukraine, tensions with China, and the impact of artificial intelligence are all very, very important. But these are now treated as little more than plays enacted on the world’s stage for a fickle audience of one man who believes himself the director.

 

The larger fact is this: The commander in chief of the world’s most powerful military seems to alternate among madman, buffoon, and authoritarian. That fact is not more important, but it is more consequential because it affects every other war, crisis, and development in the world.

 

How will the war in Iran play out? I have no idea—because Trump has no idea. He seems to have taken the nation to war with a vague end-state and underdeveloped plan—a venerable presidential tradition—but also with shifting justifications and shockingly little effort to win public or congressional support.

 

Most American wars start out popular as the public rallies around the president and the troops. This one was deeply unpopular from day one, which will severely restrict Trump’s options the longer the conflict lasts.

 

Trump has called on the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow their government. That surely would be the ideal scenario. Yet Trump’s grasp of strategy seems drawn less from Clausewitz or Thucydides than from South Park’s Underpants Gnomes:

 

Step 1: Bomb Iran.

 

Step 2: ??

 

Step 3: Regime change!

 

The goal is laudable. The United States has been locked in cold war with Iran for a half-century. It burst into hot war in 1983 in Beirut, in the 1988 “tanker war” in the Gulf, in 1996 at Khobar Towers, and from 2003 to 2011 in Iraq.

 

Iran is an international scofflaw, the chief state sponsor of terrorism, the main threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and, as we were reminded last month, butcher of its own people. Iran probably murdered more of its own protesters than China did at Tiananmen Square. That is an impressively difficult achievement in tyranny.

 

The American people forgot or never knew the history. But the American State Department never forgot the humiliation of the 1979 hostage crisis. The American military will never forget that much of its misery in Iraq was at the hands of Iranian-backed militias. The CIA has long wanted justice for the 1984 kidnapping, torture, and murder of its Lebanon station chief at the hands of Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah.

 

That is why the American national security state has spent decades planning this war, why it unfolds with cold precision, and why Trump is likely to declare victory, sooner or later, over the smoking ruins of Iran’s military, its nuclear program, and the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

 

But neither Trump nor anyone else has spent the equivalent time planning for the day after. The agencies that had a mandate to think about such things—the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development—are precisely those most damaged by the DOGE-induced self-lobotomy of the federal bureaucracy last year.

 

The U.S. military, as usual, will be left holding the bag. But the military’s last postwar occupation—in Iraq—does not inspire hope.

 

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has repeatedly insisted that the U.S. will not get involved in a protracted war. He explicitly disavowed nation building. Like his predecessor Donald Rumsfeld, he wants to avoid a commitment of ground troops, even though the White House refused to rule them out. Hegseth seems intent on using this war to prove his theory of why the last wars ended poorly.

 

In so doing, Hegseth is a textbook perfect illustration of an old adage by Robert Jervis: Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it, but those who remember history are doomed to make the opposite mistake.

 

Hegseth thinks he is being sophisticated, learning history’s lessons by avoiding the mistakes of the last war. And so he will make all new mistakes, the predictable effect of overinterpreting the recent past. That may be what Trump’s base wants, but the endless oscillation between extremes is no way to run a war.

 

Trump and Hegseth are likely to get their way and avoid all taint of postwar responsibility. But if there is to be no nation building, no postwar plan, no orchestrated effort to build something in place of the regime in Tehran—what then? What, exactly, is the plan?

 

Without one, Trump is not waging a war of regime change. Change implies that there is a direction and purpose to the transformation being wrought in Tehran. There is none. Trump is waging a war of regime collapse. In that, he may be successful, should the war kill enough of the senior leadership and the military. It is a war of pure destruction, a war to tear down the old without any thought to build anything new.

 

But collapsed regimes tend to lead to anarchy, civil war, and new forms of tyranny. It’s unclear how any of that would serve U.S. interests. Failed states export chaos to the world. We could, for example, envision fragments of the IRGC—the world’s most professional terrorist organization—devoting themselves to revenge against the U.S., Israel, and Europe, for decades to come—perhaps with dirty bombs made from Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium.

 

Or maybe not. Trump might stop the bombing tomorrow, content to hand over the country to the next authoritarian in line—Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the late supreme leader, is apparently alive and gaining support—in which case it will not be regime change but regime rotation, as in Venezuela, hoping the next in line will be cowed into submission. That might work for a few years, until the effect wears off and Iran reverts to business as usual.

 

It is impossible to say, because Trump does not need reasons for his actions. There is no reason for anything in the madcap carnival of the era, save that the carnival must swirl and center around one man. It is an illustration of how demagoguery undermines intellectual life, because under demagogues the world is not run by reason. Persuasion is pointless when the world is run by power and whim.

 

Amid the carnival, the military will do its job and retain its professionalism. The cause is reasonably just insofar as the regime in Iran has brought this on itself through decades of murder and tyranny. But the outcome is frightfully uncertain. It is very hard to see any justice, peace, or conciliation emerging through the fog of this particular war.

 

Within weeks or months, Trump is likely to declare victory and walk away. Behind him will lie a smoking ruin and the seeds of future conflict. His supporters will cheer because nations will be cowed, and they think that is what victory is supposed to feel like. That is what has become of American power in the age of Trump.

Broken ‘Pottery’

By Nick Catoggio

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

I’ve never felt more vindicated about something I’ve written than I have this week, watching Pete Hegseth try to perform leadership at briefings on war with Iran.

 

The secretary of defense is a poseur, knows he’s a poseur, and knows that the people he commands know he’s a poseur. He tries to compensate with cringey feats of strength, corny patriotic apparel, and endless babbling about how lethal our military is, as if enough raw bravado might make up for his lack of qualifications.

 

He means to project toughness in all things. But what he actually projects is fragility, a callow insecurity about his fitness for the job so palpable and oppressive that it seems to surround him like a fog. I find it excruciating to watch him, more so than even the president. He’s LARPing in one of the most influential government positions on Earth.

 

Which is to say, since the war began last Friday, he’s behaved precisely as I described in this newsletter from October.

 

Hegseth was in fine form on Wednesday when he addressed a crowd of reporters handpicked by the Pentagon because of how eager their outlets are to propagandize for Donald Trump. “Death and destruction from the sky—all day long,” Hegseth said at one point of the U.S. campaign in Iran, pausing with dramatic relish between each of the last three words. ”We’re playing for keeps. Our warfighters have maximum authorities granted personally by the president and yours truly. Our rules of engagement are bold, precise, and designed to unleash American power, not shackle it.”

 

Zero substance, lascivious ruthlessness: That’s Hegseth all over. That he felt obliged to congratulate his department for “playing for keeps” during a major war embarrassed me so much that I had to turn his press conference off.

 

A good thing, too, as it spared me from having to see him analogize the conflict to a football game.

 

One comment he made was significant, though. When the subject of the six U.S. service members killed in action came up, Hegseth didn’t offer the usual boilerplate about mourning every loss. He treated the topic as a matter of … media bias.

 

“This is what the fake news misses,” he seethed. “We’ve taken control of Iran’s airspace and waterways without boots on the ground. We control their fate. But when a few drones get through or tragic things happen, it’s front-page news. I get it, the press only wants to make the president look bad. But try for once to report the reality.”

 

Let me stress again that most of “the press” in the room with him was credentialed by the Pentagon only because their employers don’t want to make the president look bad. That’s what I mean when I say that Hegseth is fragile: Even before a crowd of otherwise friendly reporters, he couldn’t refrain from collapsing into “Fox News weekend host” mode, reflexively whining about the liberal media and demagoguing inconvenient facts that undermine a right-wing political priority as part of a deliberate conspiracy to destroy morale.

 

What made his remark significant, however, was how effortlessly it dismissed the moral stakes of the war. It’s one thing to argue that the benefits to the United States in disarming Iran’s regime exceed the cost of American casualties, a calculus that’s intrinsic to any military conflict. It’s quite another to treat concern about that cost as illegitimate, something only a journalist with an axe to grind against Trump would dwell on, amid the glorious death and destruction being rained on Iran from the sky.

 

America’s government doesn’t do morality anymore. Certainly not at home, and now no longer abroad.

 

The ‘Pottery Barn’ rule.

 

It was Colin Powell, then America’s secretary of state, who warned George W. Bush before the invasion of Iraq that the United States would be responsible for that country’s fate if it decapitated the ruling regime. You break it, you own it, he told the president, borrowing a familiar concept from retail.

 

That became known as the Pottery Barn rule of foreign policy. If you choose to smash some other nation, you assume an obligation to rebuild it.

 

There were practical and moral components to the Pottery Barn rule. Practical: Destabilizing a country by demolishing its law enforcement institutions risks all sorts of horrendous outcomes—civil war, a refugee crisis, famine, the collapse of the health system, hyperinflation, economic calamity, etc. A cataclysm of that magnitude will spread beyond the country’s borders in ways that are hard to predict. American interests might suffer.

 

Moral: The sky’s the limit when trying to guess how much human misery might result. People will die, potentially in great numbers. Starvation, disease, and wanton factional bloodletting are all in the offing when an intact nation dissolves into a failed state. Depending on how bad things get, its neighbors could be destabilized by the economic shocks next door or be sucked into the conflict themselves, multiplying the misery.

 

So before we do something silly like breaking someone else’s pottery, we had better have a plan to put it back together quickly.

 

The Pottery Barn rule is obviously derived from America’s Marshall Plan, nation-building’s greatest success, which converted fascist Germany and Japan into durable liberal democracies after World War II. Powell’s formulation was an adaptation for the war on terror: We “bought” and rehabilitated the Axis powers after we broke them, and we could do the same for Afghanistan and Iraq.

 

Except we couldn’t. Despite our best efforts, Iraq became a hell-on-Earth failed state before emerging as a shaky democracy. Afghanistan never turned the corner and is back under Taliban control. We broke them and we bought them, at a stupendous cost in lives and money, and cataclysm ensued anyway.

 

Donald Trump’s “America First” ethos in 2016 was essentially a response to the Pottery Barn rule. If “you broke it, you bought it” is an inviolable rule of U.S. foreign policy, then, for the love of God, let’s stop breaking things.

 

It was a shrewd message for a candidate who was facing a Bush in the presidential primary and a Clinton in the general election. It was also well-timed, coming less than a decade after the 2008 financial crisis reoriented voters’ priorities toward the economy and domestic concerns. The disappointments of Afghanistan and Iraq were certain to cause an electoral reckoning eventually; Ron Paul tried to trigger one as a presidential candidate in two different cycles, but it was Trump, probably for reasons of celebrity and charisma, who succeeded.

 

By 2024, the Pottery Barn rule was a zombie, alive and dead at the same time. The practical and moral cases for it remained intact, but nation-building had become a sufficiently dirty word in both parties that the rule was no longer necessary. America had quit its habit of breaking pottery, making the consequences of breaking it irrelevant.

 

Until now.

 

The Donald Trump of 2016 treated most norms of American government as a given, and so he accepted the Pottery Barn rule on its own terms: If breaking a country meant buying it, then we wouldn’t break it. But the Donald Trump of 2026 believes that norms of American government exist only insofar as he’s willing to tolerate them, and he’s no longer willing to tolerate the Pottery Barn rule.

 

“You break it, you bought it”? Says who?

 

What we’re seeing in the war he just started is an attitude we’d expect from a guy with a history of bankrupting casinos: The United States may have broken Iran, but we’re not going to “buy” it by trying to preserve order there. Why should we? Who’s going to stick us with the bill if we refuse?

 

Trump will do what he likes and leave someone else holding the bag, the same amoral worldview that’s served him well his whole life. That view is now U.S. policy.

 

How will Americans react?

 

Someone else’s forever.

 

Maybe better than we think.

 

With voters exasperated by the cost of living and America trillions of dollars deeper in debt than it was in 2003, Trump’s Jacksonian approach to flattening Iran and walking away makes more sense politically than Marshall Plan 3.0. It makes more sense logistically, too: The Pentagon is having trouble intercepting Iran’s Shahed drones and is reportedly burning through its most sophisticated missile defenses in a war of attrition with the Iranian regime to see which side runs out of ammunition first. This conflict won’t go on forever because it can’t.

 

We’re simply not in a position to buy the pottery we break anymore. Now that Iran’s is broken, Americans will need to get comfortable with the idea of Uncle Sam running away from the “store” as the shopkeeper yells at him to come back and pay his debt.

 

The White House’s approach to Venezuela might make it easier. In that case, Trump did observe the Pottery Barn rule: He could have destabilized the country by ordering an all-out attack on the Maduro regime, but instead kept much of its leadership in place to maintain order. Iran is different, he might say, because the danger it poses to the United States was so great that he had no choice but to act. In other words, he accepts the principle of “you break it, you bought it” per his handling of Caracas. But if an enemy threatens America’s security, he’s not going to refrain from breaking it just because we can’t afford to buy it.

 

I suspect many voters will find that logic defensible—appealing, even. If Bush had taken the same approach to Saddam Hussein, how many U.S. soldiers—and Iraqis—would be alive today? Having tried nation-building and failed multiple times, Americans are primed for an experiment in lighting something on fire and seeing what happens when we let it burn.

 

I am very curious to see how they react if, having now dispensed with the Pottery Barn rule, a moral catastrophe unfolds in Iran. Which it might.

 

“Tehran an ‘apocalypse’ of hospitals in flames and children buried beneath rubble,” screamed a headline in Britain’s Daily Telegraph this week. The Telegraph isn’t a far-left rag, and its sources for the piece weren’t exclusively Iranian officials with an incentive to propagandize against the war. “They are striking buildings where families live,” one Tehran resident told the paper. “After each explosion, people rush to help—and then another bomb hits the same area.” Hospitals are allegedly overwhelmed, families are rationing food, and the elderly are hunting for medication, all predictable consequences of pottery-breaking.

 

The administration’s strongest moral justification for the war has also quietly been backburnered. On Saturday, Trump told the Washington Post that freedom for the Iranian people is all he wants, but that wasn’t on the list of war objectives that the White House released on Tuesday. The president did say in an interview today with Axios that the country’s next leader must be “someone that will bring harmony and peace to Iran,” but he also said that “I have to be involved in the appointment, like with Delcy [Rodríguez] in Venezuela.”

 

Rodríguez hasn’t brought freedom to Venezuela. Trump likes her because she’s a compliant puppet for the United States. It’s plausible that Iran’s new head of state will be some revolutionary regime remnant who’s similarly morally compromised, willing to do Washington’s bidding on matters like oil production and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for shipping, but otherwise gung-ho to keep Iranians under his boot. The president can live with that. Can Americans?

 

Or things might go the opposite way, with Iran crumbling into civil war—with encouragement from the U.S. government. The latest cockamamie regime-change idea from the White House is to arm Iranian Kurdish paramilitary groups, some of which are based in Iraq, in hopes that they’ll wage war on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and clear the way for a wider popular uprising. The New York Times’ sources foresee a new Bay of Pigs, though, warning that those Kurdish groups are no match for Iran’s forces, have received only small arms from the United States, and are unlikely to be greeted as liberators by the country’s Persian majority.

 

The ploy also has enormous potential to draw other regional powers into the war. Any uprising by local Kurds is destined to enrage Turkey, which is forever worried about armed insurrection from its own Kurdish population. Turkey, a NATO member, could end up aligning with Iran’s government to crush the threat—potentially pitting it against Israel.

 

Shiite militias based in Iraq might cross the border to defend the regime against a Kurdish offensive or even attack Kurdish forces in their own country to try to squelch the threat there, widening the conflict. “Any attempt to arm Iranian Kurdish groups would need support from the Iraqi Kurds to let the weapons transit and use Iraqi Kurdistan as launching ground,” CNN explained. “[It’s] very dangerous, but what can we do? We cannot stand against America,” an anxious Iraqi Kurdish official told the outlet of the White House’s plan. “We are very frightened.”

 

Killing, turmoil, and deprivation, quite possibly across multiple countries: The United States will have broken Iran, but we won’t have bought it, as our military assets are likely to be long gone from the region as all of this plays out. A Dispatch colleague summarized the president’s de facto position as “No more forever wars … unless it’s someone else’s forever.”

 

How much will Americans care if this turns out to be someone else’s, i.e. Iranians’, forever war but not ours?

 

Post-moral.

 

I’d usually have some half-clever answer to that question, but in this case I don’t.

 

My instinct is to say “they won’t care much, if at all,” as that’s been my read on the American people since Election Night 2024. (Even before that, honestly.) Reelecting a figure as sinister as Trump after he proved on January 6 what he was capable of amounted to a quasi-formal renunciation of moral responsibility by the electorate. Going forward, our politics would be post-moral. And there’s no room for the Pottery Barn rule in a politics that’s post-moral.

 

If I’m wrong about that, then I’ll probably be wrong because of the rule’s practical component, not its moral one. It won’t be Iranians dying by the truckload in a Trump-started war that Americans find too costly; it’ll be the hit they’re about to take on gas prices. They elected the president to fix inflation, yet here he is, bombing his way into a new inflation crisis. They’re fine with him refusing to buy a country after breaking it, but they won’t be fine with him sticking them with a new bill.

 

Still, I concede the possibility that I’m underestimating the people’s capacity for moral outrage. Trump’s Iran adventure is so far removed from his “America First” isolationist posturing that many voters are bound to feel conned by him; the anger they have about that could plausibly mushroom if his con job leads to atrocities committed against Iranians, for whom virtually everyone feels sympathy. And the right-wing toadies charged with spinning this campaign in the media will do him no favors as they veer from stupid assertions that a massive air attack doesn’t amount to “war” to smug pronouncements that oppressed Iranian women might be better off dead.

 

The White House itself is posting sizzle reels of the conflict on social media that meld the bombing of Iran with a literal video game. Americans have developed a nearly sociopathic tolerance for callousness in politics, but perhaps not a limitless one.

 

And so, while it feels strange to say it, Pete Hegseth might actually be the right man for the job. His snide attack on media coverage of U.S. casualties reportedly so shocked the friendly press at yesterday’s briefing that a hush came over the room until one person muttered, “That was one of the most insulting things I have ever heard.” He’s amoral, he’s unqualified, and he practically glows with spiteful pride on both counts: Who better to represent the Trump White House at a moment as fraught as this?

 

 

America and Israel Remind the World How Wars Are Fought to Victory

By Noah Rothman

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

To hear administration officials tell it, the objectives it hopes to achieve in Iran run the gamut.

 

The White House wants to put an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions for all time. It seeks to neutralize Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and their potential to deny Western military forces access to the Middle East. It intends to arrest Iran’s support for terrorist groups throughout the region. “All I want is freedom for the people,” Donald Trump told the Washington Post, introducing the promotion of liberty abroad as yet another goal of this conflict.

 

Each of these objectives would accompany the implosion of the mullocracy in Tehran. The Trump administration is wary of saying outright that regime collapse is its true goal, but the Israelis aren’t.

 

Jerusalem’s objective is to “create the conditions” for regime change, according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Toward that end, one Israel-based security expert told the Financial Times, Israel is attacking “the pillars of this regime” and “everything that holds it together.” But what will follow the Islamic Republic? That’s tomorrow’s problem. “If we can have a coup, great,” the analyst added. “If we can have people on the streets, great. If we can have a civil war, great.”

 

Israel is fighting this war as it has fought every conflict it has waged since October 7, 2023, with the goal of achieving tactical victories at the lowest possible cost in blood and treasure. The full flourishing of the Iranian people would be nice. And who wouldn’t welcome the establishment of a durable and placid social contract throughout the Middle East? Those are fine outcomes, but the IDF has a narrower agenda: break the back of the Iranian regime and rid the world of its terror masters once and for all while putting its soldiers at as little risk as possible.

 

The U.S. has joined the IDF in that enterprise, but Americans have not seen their military fight that kind of war in a long time. For some, it is a disorienting experience.

 

The United States Navy is the subject of withering criticism, for example. CENTCOM seemed rather proud of itself when it revealed that a U.S. attack sub used a heavyweight torpedo to break the hull of an Iranian frigate — a first for U.S. submariners, according to Pete Hegseth, since World War II. But this “cowardly attack,” according to a detractor, disregarded the fact that the Iranian warship was “uninvolved in the war.” In addition, according to the “historian” Craig Murray, the attack amounted to a crime of war. “Despite there being no threat of any kind, the US submarine sailed away with no attempt to pick up survivors, leaving them to drown,” he wrote.

 

“Literal Nazi behavior,” the British journalist Richard Medhurst said of the U.S. Navy for executing that attack “in international waters” well outside “the combat zone.” Contrary to those who have convinced themselves that the Iranian ship was no threat to U.S. forces, however, the IRIS Dena, one of Iran’s newest warships, “was armed with heavy guns, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles and torpedoes.”

 

Naturally, every platform that allows Iran to project power is a legitimate target in this war, and the advanced American attack sub didn’t surface because that would expose its position to the enemy. These are best practices in combat if the objective is to defeat an enemy force.

 

For some, the U.S.-Israeli air campaign is just as vexing as the war at sea. “They are just carpet bombing a place more dense and crowded than New York City,” Black Lives Matter activist Shaun King said of the attacks on Iranian regime targets in Tehran. We can at least comprehend King’s ignorance. He just doesn’t understand what he’s looking at.

 

King doesn’t seem to know that the vertical pillars of smoke erupting from these strikes are indicative of penetrating ordnance (the column shoots upward because it is funneled in that direction by the crater the munition had just made). Nor is he apparently aware that virtually all of America’s gravity bombs are fitted with Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits that transform them from “dumb” bombs — the sort once used in “carpet bombing” raids designed to level a discrete area — into precision-guided weapons.

 

Indeed, the whole operation is “a war crime,” according to “human rights barrister” Geoffrey Robertson. “There can be no peace without justice, whatever happens to any future government,” he wrote, gesturing impotently in the direction of “international law.” The “warmongering powers” America and Israel “should have no say over a set of rules that should instead reflect the values of decent democracies,” he declared.

 

But the U.S. and Israel will have not just “a say” but unrivaled influence over the direction in which a post–Islamic Republic Iran progresses, because that is the spoil they will have won for themselves on the battlefield. Have we forgotten? That is how wars work.

 

What we’re witnessing is an informative exhibition of how complex military engagements are actually won — through the application of overwhelming and ruthless force.

 

Moreover, this demonstration of Western power has had a sobering effect on America’s adversaries. In much the same way that Chinese military analysts were clearly impressed with the tactical acumen the U.S. armed forces displayed in Venezuela in January, the People’s Republic’s thinkers are giving the American military credit where it’s due. As one Chinese analyst confessed, America’s power-projection capabilities are limited by its “will.” Contrary to the happy narratives bandied about in Beijing, “the U.S. retains formidable economic strength and possesses unparalleled military power globally.” Even Trump’s antagonism toward U.S. partners and allies seem not to have mattered much. Washington’s “diplomatic influence remains significant,” another Chinese observer admitted.

 

But what we’re seeing is not the result of diplomatic overtures. Diplomacy is not what united the Gulf states against the Iranian regime as it lashes out in all directions. Diplomacy did not convince the Lebanese government to, miraculously enough, outlaw the Iranian terrorist group Hezbollah and begin to finally crack down on its militants. And diplomacy is not crushing the Islamist regime in Tehran, which is already coming apart at the seams. “Israeli intelligence sources suggest that there are signs of Iranian soldiers, police officers and IRGC members failing to show up for duty,” The Economist reported Wednesday.

 

This is all quite bewildering for those who believe that any exercise of U.S. military power is illegitimate, and for whom defense is not a priority — not when we could be shoveling U.S. taxpayer dollars into the insatiable maw of America’s ever-expanding entitlement liabilities. And yet, while this confusion is explicable, it is not excusable. Theirs is a cultivated ignorance — a benightedness encouraged by policymakers who, for decades, convinced themselves that wars can be lost but never truly won.

 

That was a paradigm Washington occasionally forced on Jerusalem, but not today. This war is being fought with the aim of ensuring that the Islamic Republic is not only defeated but that its agents and sympathizers know they have been defeated. That sounds quaint. It’s not supposed to be how wars are fought anymore, if they are fought at all. “Every new war reopens an enormous question,” the left-wing journalist Robert Koehler wrote. “How do we evolve beyond this?”

 

If you see the application of Western military power against a malign force already at war with the West as an evolutionary cul-de-sac, a vestigial trait the enlightened among us long ago sloughed off, you’re likely to be hopelessly confused by events. But what we’re watching is not at all confusing. Rather, it’s exquisitely simple, albeit rare: We win, they lose.

Suddenly, It’s America That Needs the Kurds and the Ukrainians

By Noah Rothman

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

The United States, while dominant in the skies over Iran, is not without the need of support from its partners and allies. And we’re not talking just about NATO or Israel. Even America’s most embattled partners abroad, some of whom the president’s allies were willing to cast off as so much deadweight just months ago, are finding America shuffling up to their doorstep, hat in hand.

 

According to public reporting, the United States has been cultivating Kurdish elements for months, with the goal of introducing them into northwestern Iran to foment insurrection and tie down Iranian domestic security and armed forces. “Trump was clear,” one official told the Washington Post of a call between the president and a Kurdish militia. “He told us the Kurds must choose a side in this battle — either with America and Israel or with Iran.”

 

Likewise, the president has suddenly become quite solicitous of Ukraine.

 

While U.S. and Israeli air defenses have been effective against Iranian ballistic missiles, its low-cost drones have managed to evade anti-air networks, striking targets across the Gulf region. The Ukrainians have ample and unenviable experience being on the receiving end of the Iranian Shahed drones that have supplemented Moscow’s stockpiles.

 

Volodymyr Zelensky has heard the call:

 

 

What a difference a war makes.

 

Last month, the administration was happy to abandon the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces — a key partner in the fight against the Islamic State and the custodian of thousands of ISIS militants — to the Turkish-aligned government in Damascus. We don’t have to review the fraught course that the Trump administration’s relations with Ukraine followed throughout much of the first year of the president’s second term. Suffice it to say that the president’s outlook toward Kyiv was summarized neatly in the scolding to which he treated Zelensky in the Oval Office: “You don’t have the cards right now.”

 

America’s foreign policy hasn’t changed. The president has merely joined fights that he had hoped to avoid. America’s frontline partners have always been impressively adept, inventive, and dogged in their resolve. The president has merely recognized it, belatedly.

 

In the future, Trump should reconsider the value of the advice he gets from those in his orbit who have tried to convince him that America’s partners abroad were a drag on it and a liability in the pursuit of its interests. They were wrong.

The Democrats’ Iran Gamble

By Noah Rothman

Thursday, March 05, 2026

 

It’s not just the progressive activists in Congress who are seeking advice on how to approach the politics of the Iran war from the most unreliable narrators in America. It seems that the Democratic Party, broadly, has concluded that the roughly 120-hour-old campaign is a disaster that the public is destined to despise.

 

New Mexico Senator Martin Heinrich told Semafor, “This seems like a really stupid f***ing idea.” Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez agreed. “I, of course, personally, substantively, and vocally oppose war with Iran,” she said. This positioning aligns with the advice the progressives are getting from the likes of Islamic Republic lobbyist Trita Parsi and foreign-affairs hobbyist Ben Rhodes.

 

But the left’s outlook is not out of step with that of the Democratic Party’s moderates. “I do not see a scenario by which, in 2028, what Trump has done here is popular,” said Third Way President Jonathan Cowan — certainly not “popular enough among swing voters” to “decide the 2028 general election.” Everyone seems to be on board with the view expressed by Senator Bernie Sanders’s foreign policy brain trust, Matt Duss: “I don’t think any Democrat can credibly claim to lead the party or the country without opposing Trump’s reckless, lawless war,” he asserted. “Honestly, it shouldn’t even be a tough call.”

 

Democrats are betting on post-war chaos in the region. There’s ample reason to worry they could be right. As I’ve written, though, chaos will have a harder time taking root in the region in the absence of its foremost chaos agent. Indeed, almost all the region’s worst malefactors, from Saddam Hussein and Ali Khamenei to Hassan Nasrallah and Yahya Sinwar, are dead and gone.

 

If the war looks by 2028 like a qualified success, Democrats may attempt to take their pessimism back — if only to steal some credit for Trump’s successes. (For an example of what such a cravenly opportunistic messaging campaign would look like, review how Biden administration alumni attempted to claim Operation Midnight Hammer.)

 

But that assumes that Democrats can disown the remarks they’re making today. That may be a heavy lift.

 

Take Gavin Newsom. The California governor can read a poll as well as anyone. And his reading of the Democratic landscape tells him that his party’s presidential primary voters detest Israel and all its works — even those it undertakes alongside the U.S. in a joint effort to neutralize a shared enemy soaked in American and Israeli blood. So, the governor is frequenting on edgy left-wing podcasts in which the hosts refer to Israel, not Iran, as a “terrorist state,” and he’s laying down his own markers meant to establish his anti-Israel bona fides.

 

“We’re talking about regime change?” Newsom marveled during a Tuesday book tour event. “For two years, they haven’t even been able to solve the Hamas question in Israel.” Newsom appeared to drop the “deep reverence” he had expressed for Israel way back in September of last year. Instead, he entertained the prospect that it had become in the intervening months “an apartheid state.” That would be news to the Israeli Arabs who speak their own language, have all the civil rights that attend citizenship, and represent their own communities in the country’s parliament. But Newsom’s line is not meant to describe the world as it is. It is designed to flatter the prejudices fashionable among Zohran Mamdani fans.

 

The Democratic Party will be an anti-Israel party, if it isn’t already. Its voters will make sure of that. But those same constituents may be dragging the party’s representatives into a position that will not age well.

 

The U.S. and Israel are going for the head of the snake — the locus of terror and destabilization in the Middle East. If there was ever a “forever war” to which America was committed, it is the nearly 50-year armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. Victory speaks for itself. And if the U.S. and Israel engineer a victory for the West in Iran, Democrats will have to spend 2028 arguing that voters should not believe their lying eyes.

 

The Democrats are betting on failure, and they may be right. If they are, we’ll have bigger problems than the Democratic Party’s political achievements. But if they aren’t, Democrats will regret having to argue that the world was better off with the Islamic Republic of Iran.