Monday, November 16, 2026

We Need a Better GOP

National Review Online

Monday, November 16, 2026

 

The old Republican establishment could be out of touch, unimaginative, and too comfortable with revolving-door practices that enriched former officeholders and staffers, among other failings.

 

Beginning in 2016, Donald Trump burned this establishment to the ground and created a new one that has its own myriad deficiencies, some of which echo the failings of yore; the extremely online elements of today’s establishment, for instance, have found a whole new way to be out of touch.

 

We say this not to pine for yesterday’s establishment — parties never go back, only forward — but to make the point that every party elite reaches its point of exhaustion, and that’s where the Trump establishment is now.

 

There is a robust intramural argument on the right over how to interpret the historic loss in the midterms. We have our own views, but the most elemental need is a better GOP — one that is not beholden to the will of one man, doesn’t tolerate corruption, insists on strict adherence to the rule of law, encourages Congress to take up its allotted role in our constitutional system, rewards policy entrepreneurship on the part of officeholders, and focuses on results rather than performative provocations.

 

It’s possible to imagine any number of people leading such a national party, and it could have different ideological colorations depending on that leader and underlying circumstances. All that is TBD and should be a matter of fierce debate and competition. But unless the party moves beyond today’s establishment and renews itself, it risks subsequent devastating votes of no confidence from the American public.

 

Consider the issue of corruption, which was one of the biggest concerns of voters in the midterms. It is one thing for a party to suffer politically in the course of making progress on an important priority — say, stepped-up immigration enforcement. It is another to suffer from the perception — and, sadly, the reality — that politically connected people are engaged in untoward schemes for their own enrichment. The former is an inevitable political trade-off; the latter is a party’s elite feasting on its power and connections with no heed to the consequences for the larger cause.

 

President Trump, who has an overawing dominance over the party, is the source of many of the GOP’s current discontents. His influence is not going to drastically diminish anytime soon, and we know that many good Republicans have considered him better than the alternative, or have thrilled to his no-holds-barred assaults on the left. However one evaluates the Trump phenomenon, though, attempts to rely on the tropes that fueled his rise beginning in 2016, or ape his political style, will almost certainly fail — for the simple reasons that times change and Trump’s persona is not replicable.

 

The GOP could do much worse than look to the states, where Republican governors and legislators have cut taxes, restrained spending, pared back regulations, protected unborn children, and pursued reforms of schooling and housing. One reason that Florida constituted high ground beyond the reach of the blue wave is that it has been so well governed for so long, and it has had a series of reformist Republican governors focused on results.

 

At the national level, the GOP obviously needs a cost-of-living agenda that addresses high costs in health care, medicine, and education, and there’s much work that’s been done on these issues at the state level and among conservative policy thinkers. But arriving at a coherent agenda will require a seriousness of purpose and substantive focus that have been lacking for years now. That doesn’t mean the party should be dull and conventional — much can be learned from Trump’s zest for combat and vivid political branding — but it needs to recover a sense of institutional self-respect.

 

The new establishment, via President Trump, has worked its way back around to what were widely considered weaknesses of the old one. Republicans were once determined to make another push for amnesty after every election loss, and now, the president has floated that idea in response to the Democratic midterm victory; Republicans were once too soft on China, and Trump has been notably conciliatory in his second term; the GOP once talked a good game on deficit spending but didn’t do nearly enough to curtail it, while we are now adding to the debt hand over fist during a time of economic expansion and relative peace; the Tom DeLay–led Republican House was much too cozy with lobbyists, but prior GOP ethical lapses have been eclipsed over the past two years.

 

The old establishment had reached its expiration date and, regardless, isn’t coming back, while the current establishment is harmful to the party’s image and interests and an obstacle to change.

 

As Lincoln said, it is a time to think anew and act anew. The GOP desperately needs something fresh and different, with ideas and policies designed to meet the challenges of the day.

A Trump–Xi–Putin Summit Could Remake the World Order

By Jianli Yang

Monday, November 16, 2026

 

The proposed Trump–Xi–Putin meeting in Shenzhen this month could become one of the most consequential diplomatic encounters since the Cold War. Whatever the three leaders might negotiate concerning Ukraine, Taiwan, trade, nuclear weapons, or artificial intelligence, its larger significance would be unmistakable: The three powers most capable of shaping the international order would be gathering not primarily to defend it but to renegotiate their positions within, or against, it.

 

The irony is extraordinary. Russia seeks to overturn an order from which it believes itself excluded. China seeks to reshape an order from which it has benefited enormously. The United States, which created and sustained that order, increasingly regards its maintenance as an excessive burden. The revolutionary, the reformer, and the reluctant guardian have become, in different ways, revisionists.

 

The danger is not simply that an international order is ending. Orders have changed throughout history. The danger is that established arrangements are unraveling faster than replacements can be constructed. Breaking is outpacing building, and the breaking offers no convincing vision of the future.

 

Trump has accelerated this process, but he did not create the conditions that made it possible. The post–Cold War liberal international order contained structural contradictions that American policymakers too often neglected. Its achievements were enormous: economic integration, democratic expansion, relative peace among major powers, and unprecedented opportunities for human prosperity. But its benefits and burdens were distributed unequally, its institutions adapted too slowly to changing power realities, and its principles were sometimes applied selectively.

 

Globalization enriched America overall but devastated some industrial communities. Allies benefited from American security guarantees while often contributing less to collective defense than Washington considered appropriate. China gained access to Western markets, capital, and technology while preserving Communist Party dictatorship and developing the capabilities to challenge American predominance. China’s emergence as a manufacturing and technological superpower altered the global economic and strategic balance. Russia’s troubled transition toward democracy and market economics ended in economic dislocation, authoritarian restoration, and geopolitical confrontation.

 

The order’s central failure is not due to mistaken principles. Its architects assumed that economic integration would generate political convergence, American predominance would remain indefinitely affordable, and international institutions could adapt to changing distributions of power without substantial reform. The order needed reconstruction before Donald Trump and cannot simply be restored after him, regardless of which party governs Washington.

 

Can the emerging Trump–Xi–Putin triangle provide a viable replacement?

 

Henry Kissinger recognized that stable international arrangements require both a balance of power and a shared understanding of legitimate conduct. Based on that insight, I propose understanding international order as a sustainable equilibrium among three dimensions: the distribution of power, a mutually accepted system of rules, and a sufficiently legitimate foundation of values. Power encompasses military, economic, technological, and political capabilities. Rules establish how those capabilities may legitimately be exercised. Values provide the moral foundations that make rules acceptable not only to powerful governments but also to smaller nations and affected populations.

 

These dimensions are inseparable. Power without rules produces coercion. Rules unsupported by power become unenforceable aspirations. Power and rules without legitimacy generate resistance. A durable order requires that all three dimensions reinforce one another and adapt to changing circumstances. Diplomatic stability among powerful leaders does not necessarily establish international legitimacy.

 

The Trump–Xi–Putin triangle reflects, to a considerable degree, today’s distribution of great-power capabilities. America remains the preeminent power, combining military reach, financial influence, technological leadership, and alliances. China possesses the world’s most extensive manufacturing ecosystem and rapidly advancing technological and military capabilities. Russia, although economically and technologically much weaker, remains a nuclear superpower with substantial military capabilities, energy resources, and geopolitical influence. The triangle therefore represents a recognizable, though highly asymmetric, equilibrium. It reflects not equality of capabilities but each country’s ability to influence the strategic calculations of the other two. Yet such an equilibrium of power is not necessarily stable.

 

Their interests overlap tactically but diverge strategically. Vladimir Putin seeks Russian predominance in his neighborhood and relief from Western pressure. Xi Jinping wants to displace American predominance in East Asia while preserving globalization’s benefits. Trump seeks to reduce American burdens while retaining the advantages of global leadership. These objectives permit temporary accommodations but provide no dependable foundation for lasting cooperation. Moreover, neither Moscow nor Beijing can assume that personal understandings with Trump will survive his presidency. Congress, American institutions, and future administrations may pursue different policies. The triangle suffers from a succession problem as well as conflicting interests.

 

In the dimensions of rules and values, the triangle’s deficiencies are even more fundamental. An international order requires more than agreements among powerful governments; it requires mutually accepted restraints on how power may be exercised, especially when those restraints conflict with immediate national interests. Yet Russia claims a privileged right to determine its neighbors’ security arrangements, China seeks regional predominance while reserving the option of force against Taiwan, and Trump’s revived Monroe Doctrine suggests an expansive conception of American authority in the Western Hemisphere. Their common inclination is to treat power as a source of entitlement rather than as something subject to common rules. Worse, each seeks restraints on its competitors that it is reluctant to accept for itself. Such selective rules cannot provide the predictability and reciprocity necessary for a stable international order.

 

The problem of values runs deeper. A legitimate order cannot rest solely on the satisfaction of great-power ambitions; it must command sufficient acceptance from other states and the peoples whose futures it determines. Washington, Beijing, and Moscow do not share a conception of legitimate political authority, individual freedom, or national self-determination. More important, any understanding that divides regional influence among them would subordinate the rights and aspirations of other nations to the preferences of three governments. Ukraine is not Russia’s property, Taiwan’s future cannot simply be negotiated between Washington and Beijing, and American predominance does not confer unlimited rights over neighboring countries. Europe, India, Japan, and other consequential actors would have neither a compelling reason nor a moral obligation to accept arrangements made at their expense. Their resistance would make such arrangements unstable even if the three leaders were to reach perfect agreement among themselves.

 

Thus, the triangle might achieve a temporary accommodation of power while failing to establish either legitimate rules or a shared normative foundation. The likely result would be competitive disorder: institutions and agreements persist, but their authority erodes as governments increasingly test the limits of coercion. Smaller states seek stronger deterrents, regional arms races intensify, and nuclear proliferation becomes more attractive. Artificial intelligence further increases the dangers of miscalculation. A settlement among three powers that creates insecurity for everyone else is not a new international order; it is a recipe for recurring crises.

 

Nevertheless, diplomacy among the three powers remains indispensable. Nuclear weapons and AI offer a limited opportunity for constructive cooperation. A standing trilateral dialogue on AI and nuclear strategic stability could result in safeguards for nuclear command systems, establish better crisis communications, and ensure meaningful human authorization over the control of nuclear weapons. Such cooperation would neither legitimize territorial conquest nor resolve geopolitical disputes, but it could demonstrate that competitors can establish rules against shared dangers.

 

This points toward America’s role in building Liberal International Order 2.0: a more realistic, adaptable system that reconciles the constraints of power with the liberal purposes of peace, human dignity, freedom, and human welfare. Its architecture should have two layers. A universal minimum framework would protect sovereignty, prohibit territorial conquest, preserve freedom of navigation, establish humanitarian norms, and facilitate peaceful dispute resolution among different political systems. Within it, liberal democracies could pursue deeper cooperation on human rights, trade, technology, and security. This would demand neither that China and Russia democratize before peaceful coexistence becomes possible nor that Western countries abandon liberal principles. It would combine realist restraint with liberal purpose.

 

A sustainable equilibrium also requires peaceful adjustment to changing power realities. India, African countries, and other emerging powers deserve greater representation in international institutions. Strategic consultations among major powers should include relevant regional actors and complement, rather than replace, existing institutions. Great powers may consult one another about the world, but they cannot legitimately dispose of it. Countries whose sovereignty is at stake must participate in decisions that affect their future.

 

America’s responsibility is to lead this reconstruction, not dictate it. This requires that the United States renew alliances while distributing defense burdens more fairly, maintain credible deterrence while diplomatically engaging adversaries, and apply the same fundamental rules to itself that it demands of others. It also requires rebuilding American strength at home. Manufacturing revival, AI leadership, dollar credibility, and democratic vitality are foundations of international leadership. America should promote freedom principally through example, education, open information, and voluntary cooperation rather than coercive regime change. Its constitutional democracy must remain a source of attraction rather than merely a political system invoked against authoritarian competitors.

 

Above all, America must restore international trust. Power gives Washington the capacity to lead, but credibility persuades others to follow. Reliable commitments, consistent rules, and respect for other nations’ independence would make American leadership more valuable than coercion alone could achieve.

 

The United States should neither attempt to resurrect the unipolar order of the 1990s nor accept a world governed by bargains among three powerful leaders. It has a historic opportunity to guide the world toward a sustainable equilibrium of power, rules, and values — realistic enough to accommodate geopolitical change, principled enough to restrain coercion, and legitimate enough to inspire voluntary cooperation.

How the Iran War Exposes Cracks in America’s Foundation

By Jonathan Ruhe

Friday, November 13, 2026

 

As President Donald Trump and his administration weigh a renewed military campaign against Iran, it’s worth taking time to consider how the conflict—regardless of its ultimate outcome—affects us beyond the near term in the Middle East. The war has expanded cracks in the foundation of America’s superpower status and brought our adversaries closer together. Fortunately, it also highlights how we can address such fundamental problems.

 

In his final speech, days before dying in the opening strikes of the war, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the United States as “an empire heading toward collapse.” After suppressing mass protests and surviving foreign attacks, Khamenei’s successors and Iranian state media declared that America was “no longer the superpower it claimed to be” and had “entered the beginning of its imperial decline.” Accordingly, “The world is moving [on] from the period of U.S. hegemony.”   

 

Their obvious political motives aside, these claims overlook what makes American power exceptional. Rather than being just one among several great powers, the U.S.  is the only country in modern history with an uncontestable preponderance of military and economic power over all of its neighbors combined. This absence of nearby rivals leaves us “free to roam,” projecting power overseas to prevent anyone replicating such predominance that would, in turn, enable them to intrude in our neighborhood. Tellingly, while there have been a dozen great-power wars in Europe and three in Asia, there have been zero in the Western Hemisphere since U.S. independence. Trump’s national security strategy emphasizes that remaining the sole regional hegemon is vital to homeland and hemispheric defense.

 

Damaging as it would be, losing a war to Iran would not single-handedly undo this singular accomplishment. The Western Hemisphere would still be unipolar. The United States would remain the only great power, anywhere, with a nuclear monopoly and collective security pact governing its entire region. Nor would victory against the United States, by itself, make Iran a Middle Eastern hegemon. Iran’s economy, war industries, and internal cohesion are far too fractured and fragile for it to dominate the region.

 

The Iran war matters for American superpower status because of the broader global competition in which it is taking place. Even before the war, China and Russia sought predominance in East Asia and Europe, respectively, through tighter cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and each other. Helping Tehran prolong a costly and desultory conflict—one that dissipates and distracts U.S. power—now leaves Beijing and Moscow freer to pursue their goals. This “simultaneity problem” also serves Iran’s interests by forcing America to spread resources and attention across a wider and tougher playing field.  

 

Many experts note how this axis of “aggressors” and “upheaval” is producing a “new normal of rising conflict” without parallel since World War II. Indeed, “axis” aptly recalls one of America’s prior contests of collective deterrence and industrial attrition against aspiring peer rivals. But today’s adversaries are better at coordinating, sustaining, and exploiting one another’s belligerence than we are at countering them. This certainly was not the case in either of the World Wars or the Cold War.  

 

Today’s axis collaborates in halls of power, on factory floors, and on battlefronts. At the highest levels, China’s decades-old insistence on territorial integrity and nonintervention has been replaced with support for Russia’s maximalist aims in Ukraine. China also stopped insisting on freedom of navigation once Iran started attacking commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Following U.S. attacks last year on Iran’s nuclear facilities, China and Russia ended their longstanding support for U.N. Security Council efforts to compel Tehran’s compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The more that U.N. and U.S. sanctions have been imposed on Russia, Iran, and China, the more closely the three work together to reduce shared economic vulnerabilities and undermine America’s global financial clout. Pointedly, President Xi Jinping equates his “No Limits” partnership with Russia to Sino-Soviet cooperation against fascism in World War II.  

 

These three countries also enable each other’s military resilience and readiness. Russia’s munitions output and pummeling of Ukraine are reliant on Chinese and Iranian raw materials, dual-use technologies, and weapons components. China helped Iran’s ballistic missile program recover surprisingly quickly from Israeli airstrikes in 2024 and 2025. Since Operation Epic Fury began, Beijing and Moscow have sent billions’ worth of military hardware, explosives, and dual-use items to relieve Iran’s hard-hit defense industries.

 

Mutual assistance flows directly to and from battlefields, too. In exchange for high-end weapons, North Korea reinforces Russia’s front lines in Ukraine with thousands of combat troops and millions of artillery rounds. Combined exercises and military exchanges grow as China and Iran absorb Russia’s experiences fighting Ukraine’s Western-armed and -trained forces. Data and U.S. weapons captured in that war improve Iran’s projectile attacks. With an eye to future high-intensity conflict, China is studying Iran’s air and naval war against the United States and Israel. In that war and elsewhere, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian intelligence sharing enhances tactical proficiency, interoperability, and preparedness for all three. In all these ways, they make life more costly and complex for the United States and its partners everywhere.

 

Prior hegemonic challengers never worked this concertedly and cohesively to overpressure and outlast the United States and its allies. World War I’s Central Powers came closest, albeit on a smaller scale. As that war dragged on, Germany took control of military planning and operations, supplying munitions and raw materials, and setting terms for peace on all fronts. This enabled the Central Powers to win more battles than they otherwise would have, but it also exposed the coalition’s fundamental frailty and abject reliance on Berlin’s operational expertise and industrial output. Additionally, the United States faced only one aspiring regional hegemon, and we geared up for all-out war only after Germany, its satellites, and their economies were bled white by three other great powers for four years.

 

America faced simultaneous bids for regional hegemony in World War II, and it joined the war as its enemies’ combined might was trending upward. Yet on the whole, the Tripartite Pact—the Axis—always amounted to less than the sum of its formidable parts. Its members never meaningfully coordinated their parallel assaults on Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Axis forces surprised one another as much as their enemies with bold gambits that directly influenced the war’s course and outcome for all of them. Mussolini’s Mediterranean push and Hitler’s Russian invasion each dragged in the other, diverting precious troops and supplies from higher priorities. Berlin and Tokyo failed to synchronize their total wars against America and the Soviet Union—the two primary threats to their ambitions and, ultimately, their survival. And like the Central Powers, Axis members were resource-poor and geographically susceptible to blockade by the Allies.   

 

In the Cold War, the Soviet-led bloc dominated Eastern Europe and, for a time, threatened to overrun East Asia. At drastic economic cost, this bloc competed in conventional and nuclear arms races with the West. But Moscow’s Eurasian imperium was encircled closely by U.S. military alliances, and its partnership with Beijing lasted barely a decade before devolving into outright hostility, which invited Washington to play them off one another.

 

In each historical example, moreover, the United States provided the hard power to prevail. Long before the country entered World War I, American munitions, metals, food, energy supplies, and loans enabled Britain and France to mobilize their societies and empires for industrial war. These supply lines were so important that Germany gambled on unrestricted submarine warfare to sever them, even at the risk of U.S. military intervention. While doughboys fought on the Western Front in 1918 largely with French and British weapons, our World War II “arsenal of democracy” supplied allies with prodigious numbers of ships, planes, tanks, air defenses, bombs, machine guns, and even entire factories. We carried this defense industrial base into the Cold War, with major downsizing coming only in the 1990s.

 

Particularly in World War II and the Cold War, the United States also coordinated armaments production and distribution effectively with allies. Restoring this leadership is even more critical for meeting the challenge posed by today’s axis, since America cannot be the arsenal of democracy—or “freedom”—that it was in the 1940s, even with reforms underway. Our industrial base requires too much overhaul, our adversaries work together too efficiently, and they control too many critical resources to be sustainably deterred or reliably defeated by America’s industrial might alone.

 

The Iran war is a microcosm of this situation. Munitions shortages created by Operation Epic Fury have constrained further U.S. military options against Tehran while also limiting the availability of those munitions for use by American and allied forces in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. These shortfalls then feed our adversaries’ opportunism by undermining our collective deterrence and preparedness. Regardless of its direct merits and immediate effects, resuming major military operations against Iran will aggravate this larger concern.

 

The specific bureaucratic, legal, and financial fixes to our defense-industrial crisis are well known. Successive U.S. administrations, Congress, and allies have started working toward these ends. Trump also is right that everyone must do more for shared defense. Yet, the problem’s global scale and interconnectedness mean that solutions must be bigger than just reviving “a golden age of American manufacturing, where supply chains are coming home [and] production’s coming home,” in the words of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. They also require direction and leadership that reflect our enemies’ unprecedented cohesion. This element is sorely absent from American statecraft, particularly with Trump’s open courting of Vladimir Putin and deep public undermining of the transatlantic alliance.

 

In this new great power competition, the United States cannot meaningfully defeat Iran if Russia retains a path to victory over Ukraine and China feels emboldened to support both. By the same token, any inability of our partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to arm and defend themselves threatens us equally in all three regions and, thus, our hemispheric security as well. Part of the solution is expanding America’s defense industrial base and making it more resilient through greater and more urgent coproduction with Australia, South Korea, Japan, Europe, and overlooked places like Israel. This is necessarily a broader-based arsenal of freedom than that which helped win World War II.

 

Protecting America’s superpower status also requires us to look even more broadly and leverage a key benefit of that status—one that our adversaries cannot yet match. Our unique capacity for diplomatic and economic leadership, if properly applied, can help allies and partners work together more effectively to meet shared global needs and reduce burdens on our own defense industry. Some of this occurs ad hoc, as our partners scramble for alternatives in the absence of clear direction or incentives from Washington. But as our adversaries close ranks and wars in Europe and the Middle East overlap, we cede a key advantage by failing to coordinate defense-industrial buildups among Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, our formal allies in NATO and Asia, and our Abraham Accords partners.

 

Unparalleled global challenges call for unparalleled global measures. Winning the latest contest for hegemony requires America to harness its superpower like never before.

The Pincer Attack Against American Jews

Commentary Magazine

Monday, November 16, 2026

 

There’s been a lot of talk in recent years about the “horseshoe theory”—the notion that people and ideas on the political extremes end up being pulled toward each other almost magnetically, thereby threatening to leave the non-extreme center little more than an isolated chasm. If we look through history, Jew-hatred has been among the most reliable examples of this phenomenon, as erstwhile ideological rivals always seem to find a way to set aside their differences when they see the Jews as a common problem.

 

What happens when those forces move from the fringes to the mainstream? The results of the 2026 congressional midterms are unfortunately offering us a possible answer to a question we wish we didn’t have to ask.

 

From the moment the polls closed, the Jewish state and its supporters became targets, simultaneously demonized by the winning side and scapegoated by the losers. This is a new political moment, and U.S.-Israel relations and Zionism itself are facing a new kind of peril.

 

Indeed, there is a real possibility that the only bipartisan consensus during the final two years of the Trump presidency will be an agreement in principle that Israel asks too much, gets too much, delivers nothing, and deserves to be punished.

 

The Democratic Party has been traveling down this road for more than a decade. Ordinarily such a journey would be met with countermeasures by the opposing party’s vanguard, but Jews always represent a special case whose antagonists play by special rules. The force that believes itself to be the vanguard of the right is mirroring, matching, and in some cases exceeding the hostility of the left toward Israel and the Jews.

 

Democrats like Senators-elect Abdul El-Sayed and Troy Jackson along with Representatives-elect Darializa Avila Chevalier, Claire Valdez, Adam Hamawy, Melat Kiros, and Chris Rabb helped provide their party with sizable majorities in both houses of Congress—which will give Democrats an opportunity actually to enact anti-Israel legislation they could only have dreamt of just months ago. At the same time, Vice President JD Vance’s prospective presidential candidacy appears to be built on a foundation of scapegoating the Jewish state and its American supporters.

 

Vance “felt negative going into Tuesday,” he wrote in a post-election statement released 16 hours after the polls closed. An unnamed pollster had told him that “Trump 2024 voters were angry and planning to vote for Democrats.” The only way to get these right-leaning voters back to the GOP was with a four-point plan:

 

1) End the war

2) Focus on cost of living/inflation

3) Put America First

4) Change our relationship to Israel

 

Three of those four are either direct or oblique references to Israel.

 

It is not the first time Vance has signaled his intention to travel this byway. In June, the vice president lashed out at critics of the diplomatic outreach he conducted with Iran that led to the “memorandum of understanding,” which brought the yet-to-be-won war to a screeching halt. He directly pointed a finger at the Israeli government:

 

“I guess my message to them would be twofold. Number one, Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time. And he happens to be the head of state of the world’s superpower. If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world.”

 

Number two, Vance added, was a reminder to Israelis that “over the last three months, two-thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected your homeland have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars.”

 

The following month, Vance complained to podcast king Joe Rogan that Israel and a former administration staffer were behind “a literal foreign influence campaign being funded to tank the very deal [with Iran] that I was pursuing.” His message to them: “Go to hell.” What Vance said was patently untrue. There was a paid-influencer campaign, but its intent was to improve Israel’s image abroad, not to attack the Iran talks or anything about the administration’s statements, actions, or policy.

 

While Vance is preparing the ground for 2028, progressives will be in position to legislate the end of key parts of the U.S.-Israel relationship. They’ve been laying the groundwork. In November 2024, Senator Bernie Sanders put forth several “resolutions of disapproval” of arms sales to Israel. None had the support of more than 19 Democratic senators. Two years later, one of Sanders’s arms-restriction bills received the support of 27 Democrats.

 

In April, the embargo garnered the support of 40 Democratic senators, including leading 2028 candidates such as Georgia’s Jon Ossoff. Come January, there will be as many as 56 Democrats in the Senate, significantly raising the odds that these bills will get a full floor vote and pass. (Though they would likely be vetoed by President Trump.)

 

This was made all the more significant by Trump’s surprise announcement on November 3 that he had reached a deal with Israel to end U.S. military aid after this year instead of in 2028, when the current memorandum of understanding is set to expire. Trump might have been trying to take a campaign issue away from the anti-Israel progressive base, but he likely just moved the ball further down the field for the anti-Zionists.

 

If military aid to Israel—which consists of grants that Israel must spend on U.S. manufacturers, thus actually serving as a domestic price support for the American weapons industry—is ending, Democrats in Congress are likely to simply move on to the next step in the process of undoing U.S.-Israel relations. As incoming Representative Chevalier, an acolyte of New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, said: “Ending military aid is not enough. We need to end U.S. taxpayer funding for Israel’s war crimes, a full arms embargo, and the Palestinian right of return.”

 

Many on the left share that goal. El-Sayed and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the New York congresswoman and likely 2028 presidential candidate, are among those who have voiced opposition even to purely defensive, life-saving tools like Iron Dome missile defense. Out-and-out progressives will surely back a full U.S. government arms embargo and attempt to outlaw private defense-contractor sales to Israel as well. In the past few years, Democrats have put forth bills, resolutions, and amendments to label Israel a genocidaire, to undo planned U.S.-Israel military and technology cooperation, to restore funding to UNRWA (the UN Gaza agency found to be riddled with Hamas members and sympathizers and that shared facilities with the terrorist group during the war), and to require U.S. government investigations into law enforcement in Judea and Samaria. Any and all of these could get a fresh hearing after the new Congress is sworn in.

 

Unfortunately, the more politically conventional Democratic leadership has put up almost no resistance to its anti-Zionist left flank. That might be because they haven’t had to: Without control of Congress, Democrats couldn’t enact any of this legislation. Now they can.

 

The Senate majority leader will be Chuck Schumer, a human doormat when it comes to left-wing anti-Semites. Presumably Schumer would rather not organize a legislative attempt to treat Israel as a rogue state—but if he has a plan to prevent that, he hasn’t shared it. Instead, he has facilitated the elections of El-Sayed, Jackson, and others who have made their intentions plain.

 

In the House of Representatives, incoming Speaker Hakeem Jeffries is in a similar position. Jeffries has already voiced support for some Israel-critical legislation. He is a co-sponsor of the West Bank Violence Prevention Act, which would establish a sanctions regime for alleged Israeli misbehavior in Judea and Samaria. The bill could apply not only to hilltop hooligans but to Israeli government officials and institutions (banks, for example) deemed enablers of the misbehavior.

 

It would open the door to the U.S. treating Israel the way the U.S. treats Iran. El-Sayed himself has suggested viewing both countries as threats to America.

 

Moreover, Jeffries’s bill would fail to sate the anti-Zionists in his coalition. It will only whet their appetites. They’ll pocket Jeffries’s sanctions bill and move right along to the next item on their agenda.

 

All of this would be prelude to a hypothetical Democratic president’s chance to finish off in 2028 whatever was beyond Congress’s purview, or to sign into law any such legislation that Trump vetoes.

 

If the next president is Vance, these Democrats in Congress will find surprising common ground with a politician they otherwise revile. Vance appears to have been methodically establishing the arguments he will use to reverse the case he made only two years ago for Israel’s status as an American ally. In May 2024, two months before he was announced as Trump’s running mate, Vance gave a major foreign policy address to the isolationist Quincy Institute. There, before an audience of Israel skeptics, Vance explained why he supported Israel but not Ukraine.

 

“I certainly admire the Ukrainians who are fighting against Russia, but I do not think that it is in America’s interest to continue to fund an effectively never-ending war in Ukraine,” Vance said. In contrast, allying closely with Israel can “actually give us missile-defense parity. That’s a very important national security objective of the United States of America, and that’s something we’re working with one of the most innovative economies in the world to accomplish.”

 

The basic question, Vance said, is this: “Do we want clients who depend on us, who can’t do anything without us? Or do we want real allies who can actually advance their interests on their own with America playing a leadership role?”

 

Vance’s post-midterms statement was a point-by-point refutation of this case for Israel. The war with Iran has apparently demonstrated, to Vance, that Israel can’t and won’t always fight alone. This drains American resources and flies in the face of an “America First” strategy. Therefore, we must “change our relationship to Israel.”

 

Yet this raises a question: Throughout his career, Vance has been willing to adapt his principles to match whatever has popular support on the right. Polls show a majority of Republican voters still believe that Trump’s level of support for Israel is right where it should be. Why would Vance stake out a position on the other side?

 

The answer is that Vance chooses policy stances not by their popularity but by their usefulness to his own career advancement. The two are not always the same. Vance envisions a race for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination in which supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance will already be backing a different candidate. His ambition therefore would naturally lead him to jettison his grudging, utilitarian support for our alliance with Israel. To win the nomination, however, he’ll have to convince enough Republicans to follow suit.

 

How might he seek to do this? Not only by blaming Israel for decisions his administration made, but by taking a page out of anti-Israel Democrats’ playbook and exacerbating the existing divides within American Jewry.

 

Vance’s wing of conservatism is populated by NatCons—the National Conservatives. As Naya Lekht writes elsewhere in this issue, the NatCons advocate a form of blood-and-soil nationalism for the American right. They recently held a conference in Jerusalem where several speakers exhorted Israelis to tell U.S. Jews to stop complaining about anti-Semitism. The message: American Jews are ruining it for Israel. This is a right-wing version of the Democrats’ ongoing campaign to convince American Jews that Israelis are to blame for all their woes.

 

Thus are American Jews presented with the following demand: They need to renounce the parts of Judaism that extremist political demagogues find distasteful and disassociate themselves from the Jews who won’t follow suit.

 

“Judaism and the Jewish people are not the same as Israel and AIPAC. They’re not the same,” El-Sayed said in August. He’d said the same thing three weeks earlier on Meet the Press: “I love and revere Judaism and the Jewish people…. But they are not the same as AIPAC and Israel.”

 

AIPAC, of course, isn’t Israel. It is an organization of Americans who support the U.S.-Israel alliance. El-Sayed’s comments are a reminder that Israel’s enemies see American Jews as a direct threat to their agenda. It’s a sentiment shared by numerous progressives, who will now have the wind at their backs—and an unlikely cheerleader in JD Vance who hopes to replicate their success.

 

This is more than a horseshoe. It’s a pincer attack, and attacks must be foiled or the attackers will simply continue to advance. Many American Jews—the majority in Michigan who voted for el-Sayed, for example—have decided they are not going to fight, or are going to accept some illusory deal whereby they will be left alone if they go along to get along. The Jews throughout history who try to buy off those with deadly intent against them either end up no longer being Jews or learning too late the cost of their appeasement.

 

The rest of us, unable to retreat into illusion, are going to have to fight the pincer attack for them—not because these contemptible Jews deserve to be fought for, but because it is the battle for our children and grandchildren, who do.

With Witkoff and Kushner, Trump Has Privatized American Foreign Policy

By Eric S. Edelman & Franklin C. Miller

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

 

In normal times, the secretary of state of the United States is responsible for managing American foreign policy and should be deeply involved in the great international and national security issues that confront the United States. That has not been and is not the case with the Trump administration and the issues of Gaza, Iran, nuclear arms control, and Ukraine. These critical matters are handled not by Marco Rubio, who is both secretary of state and national security adviser, but on a part-time basis by a duo of presidential confidantes—Trump’s friend and occasional business partner Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. They have no expertise in the subject matter, shun formal briefings from the intelligence community and expert support from the State and Defense Departments, frequently make pronouncements at odds with traditional U.S. policies, and are apparently not required to inform anyone except Donald Trump what they have agreed to in their secret diplomacy.

 

To make matters worse, suspicions have arisen that the deals Witkoff and Kushner have tried to arrange would result in significant financial gains for their families. After two years of their amateur-hour performance, the United States and its allies have been deeply disadvantaged, and our credibility with friends and foes alike has been damaged. Let’s examine four critical areas in which they’ve been involved.

 

Gaza.

 

As the Trump administration was preparing to enter office, the outgoing Biden team was hard at work attempting to secure a Gaza ceasefire and return of Israeli hostages (including some American citizens). To his credit, Witkoff, who had been designated by Trump as the point person for the effort, worked closely with the Biden team, and shortly before the 2025 inauguration the Netanyahu government and the Arab intermediaries negotiating with Hamas reached an agreement. After the first phase of that agreement was completed with an exchange of Israeli hostages released by Hamas and Palestinian prisoners released by Israel, the ceasefire collapsed and fighting resumed. But even before the collapse and return to warfare, Trump announced that the U.S. would take over Gaza and turn it into a Middle Eastern Riviera. That was the cue for Witkoff and Kushner to try to give form to the president’s inchoate vision for a peaceful Middle East.

 

Along the way, they managed to violate standing U.S. policy by engaging in direct talks with Hamas representatives. They also concocted a 20-point peace plan with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that was later enshrined in U.N. Security Council resolution 2803. That resolution welcomed the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” and the Board of Peace that Trump had established to oversee the economic reconstruction of Gaza and a political transition there that would create an ultimate path for Palestinian statehood.

 

A year on from the flashy announcement of a $10 billion U.S. contribution to the fund, a $1 billion buy-in price announced for other countries, and suggestions that the board might look to solve other conflicts as well, where do we stand? Little progress has been made. It is unclear where the $10 billion in U.S. government funding will come from, and even with contributions from other governments, the board has not raised anything near the estimated $70 billion cost of recovery and reconstruction. The second phase of the plan, which entails disarmament of Hamas and full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, is hung up in arguments over sequencing. While 70 percent of the population of Gaza has been displaced, recovery plans remain hampered by the wariness of donor countries to operate until the security situation is resolved. The International Stabilization Force that was meant to provide interim security arrangements until an indigenous non-Hamas Palestinian security force was trained up has been continually postponed. Even MAGA faithful Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee has suggested the Board of Peace is failing.

 

Meanwhile, both Kushner and Witkoff are awash in financial conflicts of interest while representing the U.S. government. Kushner’s venture capital firm, Affinity Partners—in addition to raising money from Gulf countries’ sovereign wealth funds—has a major investment in Phoenix Financial, an Israeli company with stakes in defense contractors that could profit from the proposed Gaza security arrangements. Witkoff, of course, co-founded World Liberty Financial (along with the Trump family), a crypto firm in which UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoon has a 49 percent stake.

 

Iran.

 

In their copious spare time, the Laurel and Hardy of American diplomacy were also involved in U.S. negotiations with Iran. In April 2025, Witkoff met repeatedly with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on the contours of the Iranian nuclear program. Witkoff, lacking expertise in the intricacies of nuclear proliferation and the technical details of uranium enrichment, was operating with a 60-day deadline announced by President Trump. Witkoff apparently offered Iranians the ability to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent until he was countermanded by higher authority and announced that “zero” enrichment was an inalterable U.S. “red line.” Although Trump said in late May that an agreement appeared to be close at hand, Israel launched air strikes on Iran on. The U.S. joined in, executing Operation Midnight Hammer with B-2 bombers deploying the massive ordnance penetrator bomb against targets associated with the Iranian nuclear program and had “obliterated” it in the president’s words.

 

After massive protests broke out over inflation and the cost of living in Iran in December 2025 and January 2026 and met with massive repression reportedly leading to the death of some 30,000 Iranian citizens, Trump promised “help is on the way.” It is not clear what he meant by that, but he did send out Witkoff, this time accompanied by Kushner, to engage in additional rounds of indirect talks on nuclear issues, mediated by the Omanis. Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, had been deeply involved in nuclear negotiations with U.S. administrations for a decade. Witkoff and Kushner—again, barely conversant with the technical issues surrounding enrichment and proliferation—appeared to disregard what expertise was still extant in the Department of State. Even though the Omani mediator believed the sides were making progress, the two American negotiators, operating once again on a deadline (this time 10 days) set by the president, appeared to make non-negotiable demands. Two days before the deadline was set to expire, Trump launched Operation Epic Fury.

 

Despite these ongoing diplomatic failures and the distrust sown between Iranian negotiators and their American counterparts, a ceasefire was reached in early April 2026, followed by negotiations to reach a more permanent arrangement. Those direct talks in Islamabad, which included Vice President J.D. Vance and other U.S. officials broke down after 21 hours. The U.S. announced a blockade of the strait, and outside mediating parties—Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, Turkey, and others—began working on a memorandum of understanding to guide the two sides toward a negotiated end to the conflict. Six weeks of intense diplomacy yielded a memorandum of understanding that was widely seen as a capitulation to Iranian demands, in particular, its claims to control the Strait of Hormuz. That deal collapsed in a few weeks amid recriminations over bad faith, periodic exchanges of fire between U.S. forces and Iran, and Trump’s declaration that he wanted a deal that was better than the MOU.

 

Diplomatic contacts have continued for months among the Qatari and Pakistani mediators, as well as U.S. and Iranian mediators, amid persistent suggestions that the American parties were leaking false reports of progress to manipulate markets. Just as in Gaza, it is impossible to disentangle Kushner and Witkoff’s business interests with some of the key parties to the dispute from the national interest they are meant to be advancing.

 

Mediators continue to work to secure a return to the negotiating table, and Vance has written a letter to Supreme National Security Council Chairman Mohsen Rezaei in hopes of breaking the stalemate and avoiding a military escalation of the conflict. The escalatory path, which Trump has repeatedly threatened, would potentially create even more destruction to Gulf region energy infrastructure and the global economy. Although there is plenty of blame to go around for American policy failures on Iran during this administration, the best one can say about Witkoff and Kushner’s diplomacy is that it has deepened the already profound mistrust that Iranian officials harbor toward this team.

 

Nuclear arms control.

 

In 2011, in the midst of the bromance between Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, the United States and Russia ratified the “New START” treaty limiting strategic (i.e., intercontinental) nuclear systems. In those halcyon days, Russia was considered a rival rather than an enemy, and China’s behavior and extremely small nuclear force essentially ruled out its consideration as the Pentagon determined the size of the U.S. strategic deterrent. By its own terms, “New START” would be in force for 10 years, after which it could be extended for another five years by mutual agreement. Biden hastily and unwisely accepted Putin’s proposed extension in 2021, despite the fact that the international landscape had changed for the worse: Putin had violated numerous arms control treaties, attacked Ukraine by occupying the Crimean peninsula, built several exotic nuclear weapons and a large force of other arms not governed by New START, and brandished his nuclear forces in attempts to intimidate the European members of NATO. In addition, China’s nuclear buildup and Xi Jinping’s aggressive foreign policy had significantly altered the deterrent situation in the Pacific.

 

A U.S. strategic force designed to meet the relatively benign environment of 2011 is too small to address the dual threats from Russia and China, particularly if both countries act together either in coordinated aggression or an opportunistic move by the second if we are attacked by the first. And indeed, relatively inexpensive steps using existing weapons from the U.S. stockpile to grow the force once New START expired in February 2026 have been identified and suggested to the Trump administration. None of these have taken place, however, without any explanation from the Pentagon. What we do have, however, are press reports from a February 5, 2026, meeting Kushner and Witkoff had with senior Putin aides in Abu Dhabi. While the purpose of the meeting was ostensibly to discuss Ukraine, apparently the negotiators agreed that both countries would continue to abide by New START despite the treaty’s lapse. Neither Witkoff nor Kushner coordinated this with the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, or the State Department. Kushner and Witkoff did not make official comments about continuing to abide by New START limits. On the other hand, Putin’s spokesman allowed that an “understanding” had been reached respecting the treaty’s limits. Both the White House press secretary and the assistant secretary of state for arms control denied any knowledge of the arrangement (the latter commenting publicly “it’s in the president’s hands”). Neither the Senate Foreign Relations Committee nor the Senate Armed Services Committee, the committees of jurisdiction, have been briefed. Their House counterparts, more broadly responsible for U.S. strategic force and U.S. foreign policy, have not been briefed. And yet the United States is apparently still locked into 2011 force levels inadequate to the current environment.

 

Ukraine.

 

Vladimir Putin famously remarked that the breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century (quite a statement when one considers the events of that epoch). When he re-assumed Russia’s presidency in 2012, he invaded and occupied half of Georgia and maintained a Russian army unit in Moldova. The Baltic states remain a target, but they are protected (at least for now) by their membership in NATO. Ukraine, however, was to be the crown jewel in Putin’s plan.

 

With the USSR’s demise, Ukraine became one of the four new independent post-Soviet states with nuclear weapons on its territory. Under intense pressure from the Clinton administration, Ukraine agreed in 1994 to return the nuclear weapons to Russia on the condition that it was provided with assurances that it would receive economic compensation and that its territorial integrity would be respected—a condition codified in the December 1994 Budapest Memorandum in which Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom were prohibited from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine. In February 2014, Russia violated that commitment by invading, occupying, and annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. Eight years later, in February 2022, Putin launched his all-out invasion of the rest of Ukraine, which has given Russia control of approximately 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. The result has been between 1.2 and 2 million civilian and military casualties. Russian forces have attacked residential structures, carried out rapes and summary executions of civilians, kidnapped thousands of Ukrainian children, and forced resettlements of Ukrainian citizens to Russia.

 

The Trump administration has gradually withdrawn assistance to Ukraine and has pivoted to support Russia. In July 2025, Trump assigned Witkoff and Kushner as his agents to end the war. Since then, both men have tried to coerce the Ukrainian government to accede to Russia’s demands, including surrendering sections of its territory that contain key defensive positions. While doing so, both have committed the ultimate form of diplomatic malpractice: assuming that Vladimir Putin shares their objectives. Witkoff and Kushner believe the prospect of improved economic ties between the United States and Russia will create an economic boom that will satiate Putin’s expansionist desires.

 

In reality, Putin is interested only in eliminating Ukraine as an independent state and reincorporating it into a “greater Russia.” Putin, however, has correctly understood Witkoff and Kushner’s overriding hunger for economic arrangements with Russia (many of which, according to press reports, will enrich the Kushner and Witkoff families or their associates). One of their most recent proposals, following Putin’s lead, would be to make the major strategic mistake of renewing NATO countries’ dependence on Russian gas, something the alliance has worked hard to overcome.

 

Witkoff and Kushner are particularly vulnerable to Putin’s blandishments: They have spurned briefings from the U.S. intelligence community on the state of the war and on Putin’s objectives; they have not involved U.S. government experts on Ukraine and Russia in preparing for their meetings with Putin or in supporting those meetings; in a sharp departure from standard diplomatic practice, they have allowed Putin’s interpreter to translate for them; they have misinformed Trump as to the progress of the war and the fact that Russia is not winning the war on the ground. Witkoff recently humiliated himself and the United States by lauding Putin as a “humanitarian” precisely one day before the Russian dictator unleashed a torrent of missiles and drones aimed at civilian targets in Ukraine.

 

They have not briefed Congress in either open or closed sessions on their activities. And they have clearly not comprehended the requirements of the Budapest Agreement, the history of the conflict, or the geopolitical implications and consequences of allowing Russia to threaten and invade its neighbors. Instead, they are now supporting the idea that Trump, Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping should meet to settle the conflict without including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This is reminiscent of the shameful 1938 Munich Conference in which Britain and France (without Czech government involvement) agreed to Hitler’s occupation of Czechoslovak territory—a betrayal that led one year later to World War II. They also appear unaware that a Trump-Putin-Xi meeting to divide up the world is eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s novel 1984. Sadly, Witkoff and Kushner are now scheduled to meet with Russian and Ukrainian delegations in mid-November even as preparations for the trilateral meeting at the

 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit continue apace.

 

The bottom line.

 

This track record of diplomatic pratfalls and tomfoolery would be amusing were the results not so disastrous to U.S. standing in the world and were the stakes not so high as the U.S. faces the most daunting array of adversaries it has faced since World War II. It is probably too much to expect that in the wake of this devastating record of grievous diplomatic dereliction and carnival of self-enrichment, Trump and Rubio would consign these clownish, minor-league Metternichs to the sidelines and take up the responsibilities for which the Senate confirmed the secretary of state. But the sad tale surely serves as an object lesson that populist denigration of professionalism and expertise comes at a real cost, that diplomacy is a real vocation, that knowledge of history and technical issues is fundamental to success and that amateurs, no matter how successful in other endeavors, are unlikely to navigate the vagaries of international negotiations without careful staffing by real experts—that the “blob” or “deep state” actually have their uses in the real world. It is a lesson that the opposition—should it succeed in regaining control of the executive branch in 2029—ought to take seriously to heart.

Does the Body Really Keep the Score?

By Matthew Loftus

Monday, November 16, 2026

 

There’s a popular story about trauma and stress you’ve probably heard over the past few years. “Toxic stress” causes cells in your body to die, and social or cultural ills as broad as racism or sexism can be responsible for this cellular-level toxicity. People who experience trauma—and just about anything bad that happens to you can be considered a trauma if you think about it hard enough—store this trauma in their bodies until it causes a “trauma response” that’s uncontrollable. If they’re kids, trauma might cause them to act out at school or engage in other negative behaviors. Few works have helped to promulgate these ideas more than Bessel van der Kolk’s The Body Keeps the Score, a 2014 book that has remained on bestseller lists for more than a decade.

 

When I first read The Body Keeps the Score, it felt like a revelation: I’d wished that I’d had those insights while I was in my medical training to help me understand and help my patients who had been traumatized. Those patients often acted in ways that sabotaged their own wellness, and van der Kolk’s book was helpful in understanding those frustrations. They often had chronic pain and other difficult-to-treat conditions that seemed to obviously be the result of emotional pain manifesting as physical symptoms. I drew on The Body Keeps the Score as I taught medical learners and helped start a mental health clinic in rural Africa.

 

Over time, though, as I read more of the scientific literature, I saw that van der Kolk was presenting one side of a complex debate rather than sharing a balanced perspective on the research around trauma.

 

The idea of psychological trauma, from the Greek word for “wound,” has undergone more than one transformation over recent decades. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, now in its fifth edition, initially limited the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to people who had undergone “an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone.” The fourth edition changed this to events that were life-threatening, and the fifth edition now says that a person can develop PTSD after learning about a trauma that their close friends or relatives have experienced.

 

This expansion of PTSD’s definition is just one example of medicalization: taking nonmedical problems and making them medical, adding a clinical dimension where once there was none. In my new book, Resisting Therapy Culture, I show how medicalizing normal life experiences and judging institutions by their perceived mental health impact lead to a loss of agency as people define themselves by diagnoses and view their entire lives through the lens of being mentally ill. The idea of trauma is particularly pernicious because the definition of trauma is flexible, a “trauma response” is considered involuntary, and trauma is often alleged to be stored in our bodies in ways that are beyond our control.

 

Let’s start with the settled science: PTSD is a disorder of memory. People with PTSD can have a variety of symptoms, but some of the most prevalent are intrusive thoughts related to the trauma they experienced, nightmares, unwanted and unexpected reactions to having a memory of that trauma brought up (sometimes through benign triggers like loud sounds or even scents), hypervigilance, and feelings of guilt and depression related to their trauma. Many of these symptoms are related to the sympathetic nervous system—the “fight-or-flight” response that is designed to help us respond to acute dangers but causes problems when overstimulated or never turned off. Many of these immediate reactions are involuntary, making PTSD a difficult illness to treat. In this sense, people with PTSD do have a body “keeping the score” and causing chronic problems long after the trauma has passed. Still, there are many different therapies that help people with PTSD “restore” their memories in ways that decrease their symptoms, from trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy to eye movement desensitization and reprocessing therapy.

 

We also know that traumatic experiences can be bad for us physically. People who live through adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) such as sexual abuse, living with a parent addicted to drugs, or severe neglect are more likely to develop a variety of health problems like heart disease or chronic pain. The first wave of studies on ACEs in the late ’90s looked to individuals’ choices as the mechanism by which these traumas were responsible for physical issues—such as women who overate and became obese in response to sexual abuse so that they would be less likely to be victimized. Since people who use drugs or engage in risky sexual behavior are more likely to report a lot of ACEs in their past, this is a plausible explanation. However, some researchers felt that these theories were incomplete or “stigmatizing,” and the field shifted to a greater emphasis towards a less accusatory explanation: the toxic stress or “allostatic load” model.

 

Whenever we are in stressful situations, our bodies release stress hormones like cortisol and adrenaline that allow us  to respond more effectively. Toxic stress theory takes this observation and argues that these stress hormones are “toxic” when they are too highly concentrated, or when the body is exposed to them for too long (that is, when the “allostatic load” is too high). This fits into the idea of “the body keeps the score” even as it expands it: Anything traumatic enough can cause toxic stress, which then causes long-term cellular damage in our bodies and brains or modifies gene expression through epigenetics. (Epigenetics also allows for explanations in which trauma can be “passed down” from one generation to the other.) Taking it a step forward, some people argue that any negative feeling or behavior can be understood as a “trauma response” similar to the symptoms that PTSD sufferers experience, and since some of those responses are involuntary, any behavior can be viewed similarly.

 

The challenge is that none of these assertions have been proven. There’s a lot of conjecture about how toxic stress could possibly cause physical damage, but no one has ever done a study that measures brain structures in healthy people and then observes what happens to them after they’ve been traumatized. Likewise, research about ACEs shows that while people with more physical and mental illness issues are more likely to recall traumatic events, we can’t use ACE scores to predict who is going to have more problems as they grow up.

 

Dr. Michael Scheeringa’s 2024 book The Body Does Not Keep the Score discusses the scientific evidence in much greater detail, but the gist is that certain people seem more vulnerable than others to developing mental illnesses like PTSD in response to trauma. Their brain structures, hormone levels, predisposition to heart disease, predisposition to autoimmune disease, or anything else we can measure may look different because of their underlying genetics—and thus they look different from controls.

 

But as important as arguments over how to interpret scientific research are, the larger problem with pop theories of trauma has to do with misapplications of that research and outright misinformation. You may have seen ads, videos, or blog posts proclaiming that procrastination is a trauma response, a statement with no basis in scientific research but still accepted easily because it’s far easier to let go of one’s guilt over procrastination if it’s linked to trauma. The Canadian physician Gabor Maté argues that most mental illness is somehow linked to trauma—another baseless assertion that is nonetheless very popular.

 

Expanding the definition of trauma can be powerful because it gives people a story that explains how they got to where they are—regardless of whether or not that story is true. We can’t always draw a hard-and-fast line to say “this is psychological trauma” while “that is just a very stressful experience” because stress and trauma are more of a continuum than two distinct categories. However, what we see now is an attempt to maximize the number of things considered as trauma, even using the language of “microtrauma.”

 

***

 

There’s a strong social component to today’s trauma narratives. As the writer Freddie deBoer argues in his new book All in Your Head, having a mental health diagnosis has become a status symbol in some cultures, particularly among young people. More importantly, though, medicalization and diagnosis-as-identity give people a sense in which their pain is legitimate and legible to others, especially in contexts where mental health disorders are romanticized. If a teenager notices that supportive online communities cluster around people with diagnoses of depression or PTSD, they may self-diagnose so that others can affirm that their emotional turmoil is real, even if that turmoil doesn’t meet the definition for any mental disorders. As one commenter described her experience in OCD forums:

 

Hope for recovery, real recovery and not just partial improvement, was considered naïve. And it seemed there were benefits to holding on to the diagnosis: identity, community, an explanation for bad habits, and sympathy from others. Why give all that up? Thanks to modern therapy culture, mental illness had become almost cool. People seemed to, for lack of a better word, enjoy their suffering.

 

Medicalization, therapy culture, and the misuse of trauma studies are harmful because they encourage people to think of themselves as helpless victims, defining their entire lives through the lens of a mental illness and using the language of “trauma response” (alongside a great deal of other therapy-speak) to avoid accountability. Olga Khazan of The Atlantic even reported that some couples therapists are sick of people picking up concepts and language from social media and then weaponizing those concepts in their relationships.

 

These ideas and practices also hurt people who really have PTSD through linguistic inflation—if I say that working under an obnoxious boss or being a part of a legalistic church is the psychological equivalent of repeated sexual abuse or growing up with an alcoholic parent, that demeans the experiences of people who have suffered genuine trauma. When people who don’t really need therapy or psychiatry clog up the patient rolls, it becomes harder for people who are suffering from serious mental illnesses to get the help that they need.

 

How do we make this better? The first step is getting rid of mental health awareness programs in schools. More and more evidence is accumulating that these programs actually make kids psychologically sicker by encouraging them to reframe their normal experiences as symptoms of a mental illness. In conversations about Resisting Therapy Culture, I’ve had American educators tell me that more and more kids these days are saying, “I have [X mental illness], so I can’t do [Y],” and that attitude is destructive to a flourishing life, no matter one’s limitations.

 

Second, we should stop telling people to “go to therapy” for everything. People who are having mental health symptoms that cause severe disruption to their lives should still be referred to a professional clinician for evaluation and treatment, but rather than making medicalization the first response to every emotional difficulty, we should ask what kinds of self-driven changes someone can make in their life to improve their mood before reaching for expert treatment. The best therapy is going to focus on those self-driven changes anyway, and a lot of problems that people go to therapy for can be fixed with good sleep, vigorous exercise, and deeper friendships.

 

Third, we should read better research about trauma. I now recommend Dr. Joel Paris’ book Myths of Trauma as an alternative to The Body Keeps the Score because he has a much fairer summary of the evidence and a balanced understanding of how therapy culture has shifted so much in the past decade. (Other books that I would recommend on mental health can be found here.) New theories are challenging our understanding of what PTSD is and how it might work.

 

Finally, we should actively reject any psychological framework that encourages people to diminish their own agency. Good therapeutic practice for any mental illness aids suffering individuals by helping them see how they can change their own thoughts and responses to whatever is happening to them. Time-tested therapeutic practices like cognitive-behavioral therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy are designed around accepting that while we cannot change what others do, we can accept reality and modify our own behavior in order to feel better. A worldview that tells people they can’t push themselves to overcome or mature through suffering is a worldview that will make people less capable of flourishing.

 

Does the body really keep the score? I certainly still see patients whose symptoms reflect unresolved emotional turmoil, chronic stress, and unhealed trauma. However, I’m far less likely now to go digging around for traumatic events in those patients’ pasts because I’m not sure that will help me fix the problem, and I’m more cautious to interpret experiences in my own life as traumatic because I know that doing so could make me less willing to change and overcome the trials I face. PTSD is absolutely a real condition that usually needs professional help to fix. Self-diagnosing as “traumatized,” on the other hand, is usually a recipe for people making themselves sicker.

Democrats Have the Electoral College in Their Sights

By John Fund

Sunday, November 15, 2026

 

The blue wave washed over a slew of state legislative chambers and six new governorships. Next year, a majority of Americans will live in a state with a Democratic governing trifecta. One of the biggest dangers of Democrats’ new political clout is that they will now push to override the Electoral College and effectively force the country into a nationwide presidential popular voting system as early as 2028.

 

Their vehicle is called the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, an agreement among states to award their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, no matter which candidate carries each state. The compact was born after former President George W. Bush’s narrow Electoral College victory in 2000, and it was turbocharged following Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite his losing the popular vote. The District of Columbia and 18 states have joined, accounting for 222 electoral votes.

 

The compact takes effect only if its members’ electoral votes total 270: the number needed to win the White House. This year’s midterm elections gave Democrats a governing trifecta in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Nevada. If all five join, the compact would cross the 270-vote threshold.

 

“National popular vote will be something that we’ll prioritize early in the session,” says Kelda Roys, a Democratic lawmaker in Wisconsin who points out that Virginia joined the compact as soon as Democrats won full control of the state government there in 2025.

 

But approval is not a sure thing. Some Democrats oppose the compact out of concern that it would dilute their state’s influence in presidential campaigns. Michigan refused to pass it when it was previously governed by a Democratic trifecta, from 2023 to 2024. And in 2019, Nevada’s Democratic governor vetoed the measure.

 

Moreover, should the compact cross the 270-vote threshold, there will likely be a slew of legal challenges. “The argument would be that it’s unconstitutional because it changes a fundamental structural part of the Constitution without going through the constitutional amendment process,” Hans Von Spakovsky, a former member of the Federal Election Commission, told me. “I think the Supreme Court would say you can’t do that.”

 

There are also practical objections. The change would likely incentivize election fraud, as political machines focused on heavily populated urban areas would be encouraged to turn out votes for their preferred nominee. “A national popular vote would reward with influence, and thus incentivize, any state that encourages the maximum number of votes, whether it’s by legalizing non-citizen voting or stuffing ballot boxes,” writes Inez Feltscher Stepman in National Review. “It would set off a registration arms race and punish, with less influence over national elections, any state that tried to put in place anti-fraud protections.” As an inevitable result, postelection litigation and disputed vote counts would become the norm in any close contest.

 

Chris Stirewalt, the politics editor of NewsNation, warns that a national popular vote would “breed more populism and more angry-mob politics.” Indeed, “If you haven’t enjoyed Trumpism and the idea of $5,000 bonus checks, you would most certainly not enjoy the America of a national popular vote.”

 

There is a reason that our Founding Fathers made it so difficult to change the Constitution. They wanted to ensure that any amendment to it would represent a real consensus of opinion in Congress as well as the states. By sneakily circumventing that vision through the scheme of a national popular vote compact, partisans are only exacerbating the tensions that increasingly dominate our politics.