By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Speaking at the American Enterprise Institute on Monday
evening, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito offered a concise, intelligent
defense of originalist jurisprudence—without originalism, the courts compel us
to live under laws that lack democratic legitimacy inasmuch as the demos
never voted for them—and made a related point about First Amendment free speech
protections, inviting those listening to liberate themselves from the misguided
belief that freedom of speech is rooted in moral skepticism, meaning, in
“Who are we to say?”-ism.
The proper understanding is that we cherish freedom of
speech—and of the press, and of religion, etc.—because we have great confidence
in the moral necessity of denying to politicians the power of coercion in
speech, religion, and conscience. As my colleague (and AEI fellow) Jonah
Goldberg does not tire of pointing
out, what is derided by populists as “procedural” liberalism is anything
but morally neutral. Freedom of speech and religion comports better with human
dignity than servility in speech and religion would. The point of insisting on
due process and proper procedure in criminal justice matters is not to achieve
some kind of aesthetic harmony in the observance of procedure but to honor the
moral necessity of treating those charged as innocent until they are proven
guilty by evidence that meets a very high standard. We have laws about
government takings not because we value the procedure for itself but because a
state that can deprive citizens of property without control is a state that
can—and, almost inevitably, will—oppress.
The value of the First Amendment is most easily seen by
looking to the examples of jurisdictions beyond its protection. I do not mean
backward places ruled by inscrutable zealots, such as Afghanistan, but
ordinary, decent, liberal-democratic countries such as France, which is once
again threatening to jail its most important contemporary novelist, Michel
Houellebecq, for saying things of which the state disapproves. The formal charge is “complicity in incitement to
discrimination, hatred or violence,” and the substantive matter at hand is
criticism of Islam and of the cultural attitudes of certain French immigrants.
Houellebecq is a provocative writer who offends the
sensibilities of traditionalist imams and postmodern feminists alike, though it
is worth noting that his most savage criticism has always been directed inward,
at the exhausted, hedonistic materialism of secular European intellectuals such
as himself. His two most-read novels in the Anglophone world, known in
translation as The Elementary Particles and Submission, are, in
effect, the same story: the story of the end of the world for men such as
Houellebecq as their self-centered, pleasure-oriented way of life fades away
and is replaced by something else—a new humanoid successor species in The
Elementary Particles and a new Islamist French society in Submission.
Submission imagines France as a country that could be personified by a
senescent libertine from a Philip Roth novel, while The Elementary Particles
(the more interesting of the two interesting novels, in my view) imagines the
entire species that way.
Houellebecq often says outrageous things during
interviews, in part because he believes outrageous things, in part because he
maintains a familiar literary épater les bourgeois pose, and in part
because he has been known to give interviews while drunk. The question is not
whether we should feel obliged to defend the things Houellebecq says—I feel no
such obligation—but the old question of whether we should feel obliged to defend
his right to say them.
The question of legally sanctioning a novelist for what
he writes or says hardly presents itself in the United States. As Alito
observed at AEI, American free speech jurisprudence has been pretty good under
the influence of originalism and the attitude of liberal restraint advanced by
such institutions as the Federalist Society, an excellent organization that is
for some strange reason a hate-totem for Democrats. But such questions do
present themselves in France, in the United Kingdom, in Canada, in Germany, and
elsewhere—again, these examples are not exotic totalitarian backwaters but
ordinary advanced liberal democracies.
God bless the French: They are, at some level, still the
people who managed to have a brief riot over the choreography of Igor
Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring in 1913, and it speaks well of them—in a
twisted sense—that they still take their novelists seriously enough to
persecute them. Charles Murray, who was present at Alito’s speech at AEI, was
the last American to write a book that landed explosively enough on the
American reading public (a precision munition is required) to become a genuine
public controversy in the United States, and The Bell Curve wasn’t a
novel.
There are three main intellectual strains that would
undermine the American free speech model. One of these is the sharia-oriented
Islamist demand for laws against blasphemy, a decidedly minority tendency in
the United States, though there has been the call from the occasional Michigan
mosque to ban the burning of Qurans. (To be fair, the proposal in question
called for a ban on burning any sacred book.) A second is the “common good” jurisprudence of figures such as Adrian
Vermeule, which amounts to constitutional jihadism with Christians rather than
Muslims holding the whip hand. The third and most serious threat comes from
progressive illiberalism of the sort known in German-speaking countries as Streitbare
Demokratie, “militant democracy,” the principle that some ideas,
associations, and speech are so dangerous that liberal-democratic norms must be
violated in order to protect the foundations of liberalism and democracy.
Streitbare Demokratie, rooted in the experience of
the Weimar collapse and the rise of national socialism, is the theory under
which Germany and Austria may ban certain political books, political speech,
and political parties. A version of that exists in the United States—it is the
impetus behind demands for “hate speech” laws and speech restrictions based on
the notion that some unpopular speech is inherently harmful. This reaches
idiotic extremes pretty quickly and in utterly predictable ways, e.g., the
notion that it is an act of actual violence to refuse to comply with the
baroque etiquette, practically Habsburg in its complexity, demanded by gender ideologues. A French version of Streitbare
Demokratie, in this aspect oriented toward the protection of minority
groups, provides the political basis for the prosecution of a controversial
novelist.
What stands between Americans’ civil liberties and
European excesses such as the trials of Michel Houellebecq? Samuel Alito.
Clarence Thomas. Neil Gorsuch. John Roberts. Brett Kavanaugh. Amy Coney
Barrett. Elena Kagan, on the other hand, as solicitor general represented the
government’s case in Citizens United, maintaining that the state has the
right to ban the showing of a film critical of a political figure as a matter
of civic hygiene. The same principle would empower the government to ban books
and pamphlets, too, Kagan’s team argued, though Kagan, sensing that she was
losing the court, tried to walk back the claim that the government can ban
political books on the grounds of “campaign finance” regulation. It was not
the high point of her career, and I, for one, still do not trust her with our
freedom of speech, as admirable as she is in some other contexts.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press,” etc. It is a good thing we write these things
down. An originalist judge is one who understands, as Justice Alito does, that
we write these things down for a reason.