Monday, March 9, 2026

Spoiled by Peace, Again

By Abe Greenwald

Wednesday, March 04, 2026

 

When the U.S. went to war with Iran, more Americans disapproved than approved of the decision. But two new polls, one by Fox News and the other by Politico, show the country is now split almost evenly on the question. The change isn’t surprising. American and Israeli forces have done an incredible job of targeting the regime and its weapons, and success is a sure path to popularity. But when support for a war hangs on day-to-day military fortunes, that war is only as popular as the latest developments. 

 

If Americans were down on the war from the start, and if that’s their baseline attitude, I suspect it has a lot less to do with the logical reasons for skepticism that pundits cite and more to do with feelings toward Donald Trump and ideas about America’s general safety.

 

There are, of course, many Americans who are unable to support anything that Trump does. Given that the president’s popularity has taken a big hit over the past year, I doubt he’d have made much headway with the public regarding Iran even if he and his administration hadn’t offered a confusing account of its war aims and painted a very blurry portrait of victory.

 

But beyond the public’s feelings about Trump, there’s the matter of how Americans think about threats to the country. The fact is, it’s very hard for many of us to believe that foreign actors or countries pose a threat to the United States so great as to require military action.

 

There are multiple reasons for this. One is that a massive majority of living Americans have enjoyed some or all of what’s called the Long Peace—the period from the end of World War II to the present. When your life coincides with a stretch of history during which there has been no great-power conflict, you can begin to believe that’s the norm. And if your own country—the United States—is the chief cause and guarantor of that peace, you’re even more likely to believe in it.

 

Another longstanding reason has to do with the U.S.’s unique geographical advantage. We’re protected by two massive oceans and bordered by two allies to the north and south.

 

Finally, when Americans compare their own quality of life to daily life in countries where conflict reigns, it can seem almost absurd that far-off, exotic violence might make its way to our doorstep. This is true even for those Americans who claim that we live in a terrible country. They can say what they want, but their privileged experience has shaped their attitude more than they admit.

 

But all these notions are, in the end, comforting illusions. America is extraordinarily well-protected, but not impenetrable. We found that out on September 11, 2001. And the mass shock of realization was like nothing I’ve witnessed before or since. In the days following that attack, one could feel the country transform from one type of land to another. We joined the world and first understood what vulnerability meant.

 

And the majority of Americans then believed that foreign threats were worth fighting—up until the Iraq War went off course. Soon after that, we retreated to our old illusions and took to fighting one another over politics.

 

Few today hang on to the memory of 9/11 as a reminder that the real world can pierce fortress America. Millions of American adults weren’t even alive when the attacks happened. Which is why we just went through two and a half years of Americans chanting jihadist slogans and why New York City elected a mayor who sympathizes with Islamists.

 

It takes a lot of forgetting and a lot of ignorance to get from post-9/11 New York to Mamdanitown. And it takes the same to look at the Iranian regime and determine that it might not be worth the fight, that war is merely optional.

No, Unconditional Surrender Is Not a Green Light for Rape

By Andrew C. McCarthy

Sunday, March 08, 2026

 

Man, it’s gotten stupid out there.

 

I think the Trump administration’s “unconditional surrender” rhetoric is foolish and counterproductive. Although he had an exquisite case for a declaration of war against Iran, which has waged war against the United States and has been explicitly committed to our destruction for nearly half a century, the president failed to make it. (See my weekend column.) Moreover, the president is famously “transactional,” so the thought that he would not accept something that looked like solid victory because he was holding out for unconditional surrender is laughable.

 

I’m sure the amateur psychiatrist in Trump thinks there is strategic advantage in telling the mullahs he wants unconditional surrender, but that hardly means he wouldn’t settle for less — maybe (I fear) much less, such as the survival of the regime if it promises to behave as if it’s easing up on ballistic missiles and not pursuing nukes . . . at least until the next Democratic administration comes to power.

 

But even if the unconditional-surrender bombast is real, there is nothing in the laws of war that forbids it. Much less is it, as Tucker Carlson contends, a green light to ignore the international and domestic legal prohibitions on rape, to say nothing of other atrocities against civilians and the mistreatment of enemy combatants.

 

Truly demanding unconditional surrender would merely mean that our forces would continue lawful combat operations until the enemy regime agrees to surrender without conditions. It does not mean that our forces have immunity to commit war crimes until the enemy surrenders without conditions.

 

I try to ignore Carlson’s whole “Hey, here, check out the next outrageous thing I’m saying” claptrap. I’m a conservative, my priorities are constitutional liberty, limited government, and American national security. I don’t really care about the nationalist project to rebrand as “conservatism” the adoption of statist policies and the appeasement of our enemies. I’ve stopped caring about Republican politics since Trump “populism” has taken the party in that direction. Since I’m against the project, I don’t obsess over how Carlson, JD Vance, et al. opportunistically position themselves in the fool’s errand of navigating Trump’s careens from Wilson to Reagan to Mamdani. To invest intellectual energy in this would be to suggest that there’s something about it that’s not capricious. Count me out.

 

But Carlson’s claim that “unconditional surrender means foreign troops get to rape your wife and daughter if they want” merits a response, since many uninformed and misinformed people follow him. So here: It’s psychotic.

 

The Fourth Geneva Convention, of which the United States is not only a party but the driving force, explicitly states in Article 27:

 

Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.

 

Geneva IV is principally about protecting civilian populations, so there are other provisions along those lines. Importantly (because treaties are not self-executing), federal law — including the penal code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice — was amended to enforce these prohibitions.

 

The UCMJ makes rape subject to any punishment a court-martial could impose, potentially including life imprisonment, in Article 120 (codified in Section 920 of Title 10, U.S. Code).

 

The federal penal code (in Section 2441 of Title 18) includes among the war crimes punishable by life imprisonment:

 

Rape.—

 

The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force wrongfully invades, or conspires or attempts to invade, the body of a person by penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of the victim with any part of the body of the accused, or with any foreign object.

 

It also adds:

 

Sexual assault or abuse.—

 

The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in sexual contact with one or more persons, or causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, one or more persons to engage in sexual contact.

 

I have my issues with the Trump administration and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. But the suggestion that they would encourage the rape of Iranian women under any circumstances is a disgraceful smear. The implication that they would do it while we are encouraging the Iranian people to overthrow their jihadist regime and embrace liberty is lunatic.

With Iran, the U.N. Prioritizes Procedure over Principle

By Brett D. Schaefer

Monday, March 09, 2026

 

Although the United Nations Charter entrusts the U.N. Security Council with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” the U.N. was barely, if at all, consulted about the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran. And why should it have been? From Russia’s war on Ukraine to Iran’s war on its own people, the United Nations has proven itself to be impotent and irrelevant on most serious matters of global importance.

 

Almost immediately after the Iran strikes began, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres condemned the military action and demanded “an immediate cessation of hostilities and de-escalation” on the grounds that the actions violated the U.N. Charter. U.N. General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock declared that “concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, regional activities, and human rights violations must be addressed in accordance with the U.N. Charter and international law.” U.N. human rights chief Volker Turk called for de-escalation and a return to negotiations. Russia and China condemned the violation of Iran’s “sovereignty, security and territorial integrity” in the Security Council, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the resumption of negotiations.

 

This reaction is predictable, reflexive, and wholly disingenuous. The United Nations has become, on most matters of war and peace, a performative organization, where the niceties and processes take priority over accountability and just consequences.

 

Guterres never condemned Iran for violating international law or the U.N. Charter after it rejected the reimposition of U.N. sanctions when the European parties to the Iran nuclear deal implemented the snapback mechanism. Furthermore, Guterres reacted to the regime’s slaughter of thousands of Iranian protesters via an attributed statement urging “maximum restraint” and the avoidance of “unnecessary or disproportionate use of force.” A few weeks later, he sent a letter to the same Iranian government that had just killed thousands of its own citizens congratulating it on the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and, when criticized, cited protocol.

 

Baerbock did not comment when the General Assembly elected Iran as the vice-chair of the U.N. Charter Committee charged with examining proposals “concerning the question of the maintenance of international peace and security.” Nor did she intervene when Iran was elected vice-chair of the U.N. Committee for Social Development, charged with “advancing social integration,” during its recent brutal crackdown.

 

The United Nations Human Rights Council condemned Iran in a special session over the same crackdown, then welcomed an Iranian official to address the opening of the Human Rights Council a few weeks later.

 

In the Security Council, Russia and China cynically condemned the U.S. and its allies for violating Iranian territorial integrity, with no intent to occupy the country, while they seek to conquer, respectively, an unwilling Ukraine and Taiwan.

 

And this is just Iran. The U.N. regularly issues strong condemnations of Israel for supposedly violating international law and human rights norms while downplaying the responsibility of Hamas and other terrorist groups for instigating the crises the Jewish state is attempting to address. U.N. officials are conspicuously silent about Chinese human rights violations and Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea. The U.N. is quick to condemn the U.S. for blocking oil shipments to Cuba, but it rarely comments on the Cuban government’s repression of its people.

 

Pick any major threat to international peace and security, and if the U.N.’s leadership isn’t affirmatively on the wrong side, the organization will be largely impotent. Russia and Ukraine? The U.N. is not involved in negotiations. Terrorism? The U.N. does not consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization. Nuclear proliferation? The U.N. is trying desperately to preserve the Iranian regime. Pandemics? The World Health Organization made a hash of Covid. Economic development? The U.N. Sustainable Development Goals are unrealistic, off-track, and largely irrelevant to development. Climate? The U.N. distorts data and presents unrealistic solutions.

 

Ironically, it is the U.S., condemned by U.N. officials, that is doing the most to enforce the organization’s principles.

 

Donald Trump is unorthodox, but he is indisputably eager to resolve conflicts, whether between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Egypt and Ethiopia, or Morocco and the Western Sahara. The U.N. has six peacekeeping operations that have been in place for decades but have made little progress. At some point, patience with the peace process turns into enabling intransigence.

 

Will the Board of Peace usher in peace to Gaza or elsewhere? Maybe not. But the U.N. has failed to resolve these conflicts. Trying something different, even if it leaves the U.N. sidelined, is hardly outlandish.

 

The U.N. organization and the principles outlined in the U.N. Charter are not the same. The organization’s principles can be supported and defended without the procedural blessing of U.N. bodies — particularly because U.N. processes seldom uphold the principles they were designed to champion.

 

The current military action in Iran is far from a violation of the U.N.’s principles. In defending U.S. military action in Iran, Ambassador Mike Waltz pointed to extreme violence against and repression of Iranian civilians; multiple direct and indirect attacks by Iran in the territory of foreign states, which together have resulted in hundreds of deaths; the holding of civilians hostage; and multiple violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The U.S.-Israeli attack occurred only after months of negotiations failed because of Iran’s obstinacy.

 

What truly offends the U.N. is that the U.S. is exposing this pretense. America decided to act in defense of the self-determination of the Iranian people and to confront a decades-long threat to international peace and security. It is this difference — the idolatry of bureaucratic process, reflexive moral equivalence, and a persistent opposition to American leadership — that explains why the U.N. is held increasingly in contempt. And deservedly so.

The Jobs Miss

National Review Online

Monday, March 09, 2026

 

Investment gurus generally say that it is a mistake to put too much stress on one month’s numbers — not that that stopped stock markets’ taking another hit on the release of the latest job numbers. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, these showed a drop of 92,000, well below expectations (an increase of 50,000) and last month’s surprisingly strong increase of 162,000.

 

The shortfall had little effect on the unemployment rate, which has been moving up, but at 4.4 percent, it is not yet a cause for serious concern. Most troubling, perhaps, were the continuing job losses within the information sector, which have been running at around 5,000 a month for a year. Could they be evidence that AI is beginning to take a toll?

 

There are other signs that Friday’s numbers are part of a broader trend extending beyond IT or the shrinking federal government. Average monthly job gains in 2025 were the lowest in any non-recession year for two decades. That said, the picture brightens a little when looking at the prior week’s number for initial jobless claims, an unthreatening 215,000.

 

Some of the weakness in the labor market may reflect the lingering effects of a post-pandemic shakeout and the fact that the official unemployment rate had sunk so low that there was only one direction it could go. But any account of the softness must include the blows inflicted indirectly and directly upon business by “liberation day” and its chaotic aftermath. Tariffs were always going to hit company profits, the end customer, or both. Bad as those effects were always likely to have been on job creation, they will have been made worse by continuing uncertainty over where tariff rates — buffeted by negotiations, renegotiations, retaliation, legal uncertainty, and their use as a political weapon — would end up. We still do not know. That is not an incentive to invest, spend, or hire. Consumer confidence has been declining, and U.S. business sentiment (as measured by the OECD) has been depressed, although the latter had shown some recovery in the last couple of months, a period before war intervened.

 

Given the recent controversy over interest rates, an obvious question is what the Fed should do now. The general assumption of late has been that there would be no more rate cuts until the fall. However, until as recently as last week, disappointing employment numbers would have increased pressure for an earlier rate cut, however mistakenly. Inflation is still comfortably above the Fed’s so-called target rate (2 percent), and the consensus forecast for real GDP growth has been respectable, a possibly too cautious 2.2 percent (about the same as 2025).

 

The renewed fighting in the Middle East and, above all, the inflationary threat posed by higher oil and gas prices has strengthened the case for the Fed to keep rates where they are, despite the evidence of a weaker labor market. Last week, yields on ten-year treasuries rose on the news from Iran, reflecting, at least in part, increased inflation fears, although they remain well off 2026 highs. Mortgage rates may rise, and consumers are already seeing higher prices at the gas pump. When it comes to energy costs, however, Americans will fare much better than their European counterparts, who may (again) be headed for serious trouble. This will be bad news for the U.S. companies that sell to them, just one example of many of how a war can both depress economic activity and increase prices.

 

Much, obviously, will depend on how long this conflict will last, and that’s not something to which we have an answer. For now, however, we see no convincing reason for the Fed to cut rates. We continue to believe that doing so prematurely would send a disastrous message to the markets, not something we can afford given the state of our national balance sheet. There is also something to be said for keeping interest rates at a level that leaves enough room for dramatic rate cuts in the event that a financial crisis — never an impossibility at a time such as this — gives rise to a need for them. Of course, there could be a time when the economy shows enough signs of a slowdown to make a rate cut the right response, but that time is not now.

 

The best ways to help the economy remain the pursuit of energy abundance, the securing of supply lines, deregulation, and, of course, far lower and infinitely more predictable tariffs.

A Brief Message for Sen. John Cornyn

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, March 09, 2026

 

A brief question for Sen. John Cornyn: What, exactly, is the point of you?

 

You’re not Ken Paxton, true. Paxton, the corrupt imbecile who serves as the attorney general of Texas and your opponent in the upcoming Republican primary runoff, is pretty gross: He is an adulterer, a chiseler, an abuser of his office. Donald Trump, whom you are satisfied to serve as the most abject and obedient of lackeys, also is an adulterer, a chiseler, and an abuser of his office. On top of that is the fact that he attempted to overthrow the government of these United States in January 2021 after losing the 2020 presidential election to Joe Biden—and you voted to acquit him in his impeachment after that attempted coup d’état. President Trump has launched an unconstitutional war against Iran, has carried out wanton massacres in the Caribbean, has overthrown the government of Venezuela, has dispatched U.S. special forces to Ecuador, and in none of these instances has he so much as nodded in the general direction of Congress—the branch of the U.S. government in which you serve, Sen. Cornyn, and the branch entrusted by our Constitution with the power to declare war. You have been exactly as faithful to your vow to uphold the Constitution as Ken Paxton was to his wedding vows—and, with all due respect to the blessed institution of marriage, your infidelity to the Constitution is more consequential than Paxton’s infidelity to his wife.

 

If Texans must have a man without honor, without any sense of his constitutional obligations as a senator, a man without any sense of duty as a citizen—why you instead of Paxton? Because we can remember a time when you were a different sort of man and a different sort of senator? If anything, that makes your current situation a little worse: Paxton is what he is and always has been that, but you, Sen. Cornyn, have been degraded. Your degradation is a scandal not in the common sense—you are well beyond that now, it seems—but in the Christian sense, i.e., a destructive example that tends to lower respect for important institutions and to corrode the public’s moral sense in general.

 

Why not stand up on your hind legs, act like a man, and demand that Congress do its duty in the consequential matter before you? You literally have nothing to lose—no future political prospects, no standing, no reputation. Even if you get reelected, you’re finished—well past the apex of whatever it once meant to be Sen. John Cornyn. On the other hand, you have much to gain. Redemption and reconciliation begin with penance. Now is the time—not after the election, not when things have calmed down, not when it seems Trump’s influence is once again waning—now. You do not have to wait on anybody: not Trump (who withheld his endorsement in part because he wanted to publicly humiliate you), not the voters, no one—only your own conscience. So pull the trigger, already.

 

If you will not do your duty, then you should resign.

 

And so I repeat my question: What, exactly, is the point of you?

 

Economics for English Majors

 

You have heard the expression: “It is an ill wind indeed that blows no one some good.” The phrase often is used in a way opposite to its meaning, to announce an “ill wind” that is an unalloyed evil. What the phrase actually is meant to communicate is something more like the proverb holding that “every dark cloud has a silver lining,” One man’s loss is another’s gain, etc. Seemingly catastrophic developments often end up being good for someone.

 

A little simple economics is enough to illustrate that: The Trump administration’s illegal war in Iran has sent oil prices higher, and that is almost always treated in the press as a self-evidently bad thing. The press is very funny about prices: Rising gasoline prices are bad, rising house prices are good until they aren’t, rising labor prices are pretty much always good, etc. But rising oil prices and rising natural gas prices are very, very good for many Americans: The U.S. energy industry is the world’s No. 1 producer of both oil and natural gas. The energy industry is pretty sophisticated about pricing: Unlike some industries with a more short-term view of the world, U.S. oil and gas keep their eyes on a pricing sweet spot: Prices high enough to keep their producing assets very profitable, but not so high as to lure new producers into the marketplace or to provide a spur to change consumer behavior.

 

Things that are good for the energy industry are not only good for a couple of fat-cat executives at big companies with names you have heard of. They are good for all sorts of people—white-collar, blue-collar, engineers and finance guys and truck drivers—and all sorts of communities from Texas to New Mexico to Pennsylvania. I remember a sign at a restaurant serving fracking crews in Pennsylvania advising customers not to worry about their dirty boots: “No mud on the floor, no cash in the drawer.” Of course, other Americans will howl at relatively high gasoline prices, and the guys who sell F-350s will experience some customer hesitancy at the margins if that $100 fill-up goes to $140.

 

Trade-offs! As Thomas Sowell says, “There are no solutions, only trade-offs.”

 

Words About Words

 

We first come across that “ill wind” business in The Proverbs of John Heywood, though one assumes, from the retrospective nature of that work, that the phrase had been around for some time. The proverbs are worth reading on their own, but I especially recommend this edition with a very entertaining foreword by Julian Sharman. Sharman describes the struggling state of English literature under the French-speaking Normans—“Norman yoke” and all that—who sought to suppress the language: “Antiquity was dead, but not without issue. Already patient monastics had begun to embalm the decaying Saxon saws and sentences in hideous cerements of rhyming Latin.”

 

“Hideous cerements of rhyming Latin” etc.—what a sentence.

 

Heywood’s Proverbs (a work originally bearing the title “A dialogue conteinyng the nomber in effect of all the prouerbes in the englishe tongue compacte in a matter concernyng two maner of mariages, made and set foorth by Iohn̄ Heywood”) is full of good and interesting stuff beyond that ill wind.

 

But you, to cast precious stones before hogs,

 

Cast my good before a sort of curre dogs.

 

And sawte bitches. Whiche by whom now deuoured,

 

And your honestee amonge theim defloured,

 

And that ye maie no more expence afoorde,

 

Nowe can they not afoorde you one good worde.

 

And you theim as fewe. And olde folke vnderstood,

 

Whan theues fall out, true men come to their good.

 

Whiche is not alwaie true. For in all that bretche,

 

I can no ferthyng of my good the more fetche.

 

Nor I trow theim selfes neither. If they were sworne.

 

Lyght come lyght go. And sure sens we were borne,

 

Ruine of one rauyn, was there none gretter.

 

For by your gyfts, they be as little the better,

 

As you be muche the worse. And I cast awaie.

 

An yll wynde, that blowth no man to good, men saie.

 

Wel (quoth he) euery wind blowth not down the corn

 

I hope (I saie) good hap be not all out worn.

 

I will nowe begyn thryft, whan thrifte semeth gone.

 

The “ill wind” proverb shows up in Henry IV Part 2:

 

FALSTAFF  What wind blew you hither, Pistol?
PISTOL  Not the ill wind which blows no man to good.

 

If ever I start a breakfast restaurant, I will call it The Norman Yolk.

 

In Other Wordiness

Some shameless pedantry here: Press materials for a new movie about the Second Punic War related that Denzel Washington will play the role of “Hannibal Barca.” There was no such person as Hannibal Barca—the Carthaginian general known to history simply as “Hannibal” was the son of a man called Hamilcar Barca, but “Barca” was a cognomen (a nickname, really) meaning “lightning,” owing to his speedy military maneuvers. Think of the Roman examples Scipio Africanus or Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus, each bearing a cognomen referring to a famous victory. The elephants-in-the-Alps Hannibal belongs to a family sometimes called the Barcids, after Papa Hamilcar’s nickname. Wikipedia reports: “Modern historians occasionally refer to Hannibal’s brothers as Hasdrubal Barca and Mago Barca to distinguish them from the multitudes of other Carthaginians named Hasdrubal and Mago, but this practice is ahistorical and is rarely applied to Hannibal.”

 

But, of course, there are times when it is important to know which Hannibal one is talking about.

 

Image 3-6-26 at 1.39 PM

 

Also, a potentially touchy subject: Hannibal was an African, but he was not black. I myself do not much care about the largely phony social-justice nonsense issue known as “representation” in Hollywood casting—and Denzel Washington is going to be great, because he’s pretty much great in everything—but the Carthaginians were a Semitic people who looked more like modern Arabs or Greeks. Denzel Washington also has been cast as Macbeth and Don Pedro, Prince of Aragon, in Much Ado about Nothing, roles that were not written with black actors in mind. Mix it up, I say.

 

The story of how certain Hollywood conventions arose over the years—why Romans and space emperors all have British accents—is surely an amusing one, and I assume that 10,000 linguistics dissertations have been written on the subject. (If not: Get to work!) The notion that characters with X characteristic must be played by actors with X characteristic is dumb and always has been. Scarlett Johansson had it right when she said, “I should be able to play any person, or any tree, or any animal,” and wrong when she reversed course. (As a writer, I am professionally obliged to hold the opinions, judgments, and unscripted words of actors in comprehensive contempt, and I do, but even actors sometimes get it right in spite of themselves.) I like Mel Brooks’ Yiddish-speaking Indians, but I like even better his response to an admirer who told him, “You couldn’t make Blazing Saddles today.” Brooks, a very wise man, replied: “You couldn’t make it then.”

 

And Furthermore ...

 

I’m a gun guy, and I don’t make any apologies for that, but I do get why it creeps some people out and causes the occasional eye roll. From my inbox today: “We’ve Got an AK-47 for Every Budget!”

 

I’m sure you do, buddy. I’m sure you do.

 

I’m also a little bit of a watch guy, and I suppose it is time to reiterate my maxim that, in a democracy that maintains way too much of a cult of egalitarianism, public figures who wear Rolex watches are pretty much in for trouble. So long, Kristi Noem—it takes a lot to stand out as an embarrassing vulgarian in Donald Trump’s orbit.

 

My recommendation: Wear Vacheron Constantin instead. It’s the old The Devil Wears Prada issue: The kind of characters Lauren Weisberger wrote about in her novel do not actually go in all that much for logo-forward brands such as Prada and Gucci, but you want to use a brand name in the title that the proles will recognize, so it’s The Devil Wears Prada instead of The Devil Wears the Row or Satan Has a Thing for Loro Piana or Beelzebub Really Prefers Oni Selvedge Denim or whatever. The kind of people who get mad about other people’s conspicuous consumption know what a Rolex is and what it means. Maybe get a Roger W. Smith (if you have that kind of money) or a Nomos Glashütte (if you don’t want to spend the price of a pretty nice house on a timepiece) or something. A Rolex is just asking for trouble.

 

The author William Gibson once described the U.S. $100 bill as “the international currency of bad s--t,” and it isn’t the dollar value—it’s the symbolism. The devil pays with C-notes.

 

In Closing

 

I do not think I would agree with James Talarico about very much when it comes to politics. I wonder about religion. I have met progressive Christians whose faith is more progressivism than Christianity, and, of late, many more of a practically identical kind among conservative Christians. It is interesting to me that in our time right-wing Catholics and right-wing Protestants feel—not without reason—that they have more in common with one another than either has with more liberal or progressive members of their own religious communities. It is difficult to place myself mentally in the kind of world where T.S. Eliot could write, without embarrassment: “Reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable.” But I do believe that our more liberal social attitudes are the result of a hollowing-out of our religious faith and religious orthodoxy rather than the more desirable kind of liberalism that might come from a deepening of these.

 

From Dorothy Day, whose politics could not have been more disagreeable to me:

 

When I came home from the hospital to St. Joseph’s house on Chrystie Street I was filled with gratitude for having a house of hospitality to come to. We were one of those hospices the Holy Father was praying for. Up on the top floor Nelly Lampkin, as she told me her name was once years ago, tho she is generally known as Nelly Post, is failing. She is over eighty and for many years has lived on the Bowery. She was one of the sights at Sammy’s Bowery Night Club (it is hard to see Jesus in such people as go slumming in such a night club, enjoying the wrecks around them) and she was in and out of our hospice for many years. A few years ago she came home for good, and was anointed only to go out again with fresh vigor. Now she cannot leave her bed, though she tries to keep bright. When she got news of Tom’s leaving for Paris she said pertly, “Now he’ll be finding another little lady and forget all about me.” She weighs about sixty pounds and when she had to go up to Bellevue recently for a treatment, Isidore could easily carry her up and down the four flights of stairs. (P.S. Nellie died a week after this was written.)

 

Day’s politics were at times naïve and at times something worse than that, partly because she was part of a circle that was heavily influenced by such figures as I.F. Stone, a supposed progressive journalist who was, in fact, a Soviet agent.

 

But that part about it being hard to see Jesus in people who take human suffering and degradation as entertainment? She was right about that. And about much else, I expect.

The Iranian Regime Played 3D Chess—and Lost

By Emanuele Ottolenghi

Monday, March 09, 2026

 

For years, Washington pundits bemoaned Western diplomats’ shortcomings with their counterparts from the Islamic Republic. Iranian negotiators would routinely blindside them, buying time for their nuclear program. They sowed discord among adversaries. They deployed plausible deniability. They played arsonists while winning praises as firefighters. They were masters of tridimensional chess, bamboozling their interlocutors with drawn-out games they routinely won hands down.

 

Yet, since October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, massacring more than 1,200 Israelis and taking 250 hostages back to Gaza, the ayatollahs and their proxies keep losing their kings and queens in a series of unforced errors that reveal monumental misjudgment. Worse, as President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu make their queen’s gambit, Iran has already foolishly squandered many of its pawns—its fearsome regional proxies—that it patiently built up for decades to serve as its nuclear program’s and the regime’s very first line of defense in case of direct conflict with Israel and the United States.

 

Tehran lavishly invested in a robust buildup of terrorist organizations that shared common enemies, embraced its ideological worldview, and advanced its imperial ambitions. For a time, it seemed as if its proxies and their successes would make Iran’s regional power grab unstoppable. By the eve of October 7, Israel was encircled. Hezbollah ruled over South Lebanon, amassing an awesome missile arsenal and a fierce, battle-hardened militia, while blackmailing that country’s government into subservience. Bashar al-Assad’s truncated fiefdom, Syria, depended on Iranian military might and largesse to stay in power and in return gave Iranian forces unfettered access to its southern border, whence they could threaten Israel. In Iraq, Iran’s influence over the political system and its bankrolling and training of local Shiite militias guaranteed a land bridge to feed Iran’s allies with weapons and funding. At the far end of the Arabian Peninsula, the Houthis gave Iran the ability to permanently pester Tehran’s archrivals, the Sunni powers of the Gulf, while casting a spell over the Bab El Mandeb gate—together with the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most sensitive waterways in the world for energy supplies and global maritime commerce.

 

image (17)

Map by James Hilston for The Dispatch.


 All told, this was a formidable force, a veritable deterrent that could mount fierce resistance against anyone who dared to threaten the king and queen of Iran’s chessboard. Over the years, Iran’s pawns did occasionally sustain fire, but never took a severe enough beating that they were lost. Confrontations typically ended in drawn-out contests that left them standing and, thanks to Iranian solicitude, able to resume their roles. This strategy could have paid off handsomely on October 7, 2023, had every proxy simultaneously opened fire against Israel once Hamas broke through the Israel-Gaza border. Instead, the proxies hesitated. Left in the dark about the timing of Hamas’ invasion, they belatedly started shooting at Israel—Hezbollah’s opening salvo came the next day—and even then, they never went all in. From Tehran’s standpoint, this was a fateful mistake. The proxies were a nuisance but never overwhelmed Israel when the Jewish state was vulnerable and still reeling from the horror of October 7. What it did, however, was to change Israel’s calculus. Jerusalem’s prior restraint vanished, leading to increasingly daring and brazen responses that left Iran’s proxies more bamboozled than the Western diplomats Tehran supposedly took for endless, joyless rides for years.

 

Israel’s relentless campaign against Hezbollah took out hundreds of mid- and high-ranking operatives between October 2023 and July 2024. Its air force also went after Syrian air defenses, senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard officials in Damascus, Hamas and Houthi leaders and military infrastructure—slowly and methodically crippling Iran’s proxy line of defense. Iran, too, was hit when it tried to retaliate twice in 2024, showing that Israel had both superior intelligence and the ability to reach escalation dominance against the Islamic Republic and its extensions.

 

The signs of Iran’s weakening hand were on the wall. On July 30, 2024, Israel eliminated Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah military official, in a Lebanon strike. The next day, it killed Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political leader, in Tehran. Yet it wasn’t until September 2024 that it became obvious that Iran’s proxies had brought a spoon to a knife fight. Israel’s devastating pager attack on September 17, followed by the elimination of Hezbollah’s top leadership a few days later, was the opening salvo of a two-month campaign that left Hezbollah in tatters, with Tehran and its proxies unable to come to their rescue. Israel did not just focus on Lebanon. It systematically demolished Iran’s second defensive ring in Syria too, crippling Assad’s regime to the point where, in early December, it simply collapsed.

 

In one fell swoop, Iran lost Syria and its ability to prop up a battered and bruised Hezbollah in Lebanon. The regime could no longer easily replenish its proxy’s stockpile at the same time Hezbollah’s political clout in Beirut was eroding dramatically. The terms of the January 2025 ceasefire allowed Israel to continue its drip-drip campaign of targeted eliminations of Hezbollah operatives. And when, in June 2025, the IDF—and later the U.S.—launched a dramatic air campaign to strike Iran’s nuclear program and its senior leadership, Hezbollah sat out the fight it was created to spearhead.

 

With its proxies decimated, its air defenses crumbled, and much of its nuclear program buried under collapsed concrete, Iran’s regime could have licked its wounds and sought to patiently reenergize its web of regional assets while rebuilding its defenses at home. It might have learned a thing or two about how Israel almost immediately gained air supremacy over Iranian skies during the 12-Day War. It might have sought to patiently stake out the deep web of enemy intelligence inside Iran that successfully penetrated the regime all the way to its scientists’ bedrooms. Instead, Iranian leaders seemingly chose to simply believe their own narrative: The Israelis begged for a ceasefire at the end of the June 2025 war; the Americans have no staying power; the world is rallying behind the resistance; Trump is a bluffing buffoon whose mediators can be bamboozled like their predecessors. And when ordinary Iranians rose to challenge the regime, the regime thought it could slaughter tens of thousands with impunity, even as an armada the likes of which no one had seen since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was gathering at its doorstep.

 

When U.S. and Israeli air forces targeted the compound of Iran’s supreme leader on February 28, the regime and its proxies were still far from having recovered their strength. Yet the regime could still play some cards. It could seek to sow discord among U.S. regional allies that were ambivalent about war and regime change in Tehran. It could exploit the nearly universal unease America’s historic allies had with President Trump’s style of diplomacy by trying to create an obstacle course. It could play victim and ride out the storm. Instead, blinded by rage, the regime started shooting at everyone in sight. It unleashed its Iraqi Shiite militias, whose goons had just been deployed to Iran to help the regime drown protests in blood, to attack U.S. targets. By the third day of the war, it let loose Hezbollah, at its peak weakness. By the fourth day, even the usually shy European Union was openly supporting regime change in Tehran.

 

Days before the war began, Israel sent a message to Hezbollah’s leadership: Sit this one out. It did not. With most of their pawns down, the Iranians sent their queen charging forward, vulnerable and exposed. The king and his court, meanwhile, lay dead under the rubble of his own compound. The Israeli air force conducted a daring raid, flying thousands of miles across unfriendly terrain in broad daylight. Only arrogance and a misreading of the map could have left Khamenei so exposed.

 

Iran and its proxies are down but not out. They can still hit and hurt. They are targeting civilians across the region, and they are temporarily disrupting maritime traffic and global energy supply chains. They can resort to terrorism. The more they do, the more bridges they burn, while the methodic destruction of their regional terror network and their domestic repressive apparatus continues. Their conduct for the past two years speaks of a monumental misjudgment. Say what you wish of the Islamic regime’s proverbial shrewdness. Tridimensional chess masters, they are not.

 

 

Shia Islam Without Ali Khamenei

By Arash Azizi

Sunday, March 08, 2026

 

The assassination of Ali Khamenei by the United States and Israel wasn’t just a massive event in modern history of Iran. It was also a massive event in the history of Shia Islam.

 

Sitting atop Iran’s strange political system, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei was both the head of state of the world’s pre-eminent Shia-majority country and a ranking authority for the global Shiite community, one of the about 30 clerics carrying the title of marja’ or “source of emulation.”

 

His death would have been consequential in any case, but the fact that it came violently and as part of a broad war makes it ever more so. Shiite grand ayatollahs often live to a long age and die peacefully (the oldest current one, Vahid Khorasani, is 105.) The last instance of a marja dying a violent death that I can think of is that of Mohammad Sadr, whose shadowy assassination in 1999 is often blamed on Iraq’s then-president, Saddam Hussein. A bete noire of the country’s Shiite majority, Hussein had also executed Mohammad’s cousin, Grand Ayatollah Baqir Sadr, a marja in his own right, in 1980.

 

Khamenei’s dramatic death is even more remarkable because he almost seems to have welcomed it. Knowing full well that he could have been a target of American-Israeli strikes, he didn’t hide but was in his home office when he was assassinated alongside a few members of his family, including his young grandchild. Ominously, he hadn’t taken precautions to save the lives of his family members either, perhaps preferring an emblematic martyrdom tale, hoping he could be compared with Imam Hussein ibn Ali. The third Shiite imam died in an Islamic civil war in Karbala, Iraq, in 680, setting the standard of Shiite martyrdom. Since then, with Shiites being a minority sect of Islam and thus often persecuted, there have been many Shiite martyrs. The dispute between Sunnis and Shiites is rooted in the days after the death of Prophet Muhammad, when early Muslims fought over who should succeed him. Sunnis regard the arrangement that separated political and religious leadership as just whereas Shiites believe it unduly deprived the prophet’s family from their right to rule as charismatic religious leaders. Shiites have thus long had an oppositional bent, ready to battle the status quo even at the cost of martyrdom. Khamenei, who knew he had little life left on this earth anyways, perhaps couldn’t resist the temptation of joining these hallowed ranks.

 

Unsurprisingly, Shiites across the globe have reacted dramatically to Khamenei’s demise. In Pakistan, home to the world’s second largest Shiite population after Iran, the U.S. Consulate in Karachi was attacked by protesters and at least 26 people died as protesters clashed with the police. A Shiite digital activist who organized a vigil to mourn Khamenei called him “our representative … like our pope.”

 

In Malaysia, where a tiny Shiite community exists alongside the overwhelming Sunni majority, Khamenei has been hailed by many in the community, with one figure calling him “our imam and rahbar,” using the Persian word for “leader.” In 1996, a fatwa issued by a federal religious committee declared Shiite teachings to be deviant and yet top authorities such as a federal mufti and leader of Malaysia’s main Islamist party have commemorated Khamenei. Their respect seems to be due not to his religious role but to his role as an anti-Western state leader who died fighting the U.S.

 

Khamenei might indeed be remembered as a martyr both among most strands of Shia Islamism and the broader anti-Western strands of Islamist politics. But what will be his legacy as a religious leader, and what will Shia Islam look like after his demise?

 

The most important consequences of his death have little to do with the image of “martyrdom” or his own station as a religious authority but with the system of governance in Iran. The Islamic Republic is organized around the principle of velayat-e faqih or Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, an eclectic and unprecedented reading of Shia Islam, devised by Khamanei’s predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Based on the system, much of political power in the country belongs to a preeminent jurisprudent who acts as a guardian to the nation. Khomeini’s main stated inspiration in devising this system was Plato’s concept of philosopher-king. In the original 1979 constitution, the supreme leader had to be a marja, the highest ranking Shiite status, attained by few clerics. But when Khomeini died in 1989, it was very clear that no other marja had the political credentials to ascend to the position. The more eligible candidates would have been more political clerics like Khamenei (then serving as president) who lacked the religious credentials. The Islamic Republic thus changed its constitution, allowing non-marja clerics to serve in the position.

 

With Khamenei’s death, it is quite likely that this strange position—vali faqih or the supreme leader—with its unusually intimate mix of religion and politics, will go through another transformation, if it survives at all.

 

For generations, Shiite clerics boasted significant social power, playing a key role in political events such as the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 in Iran and the Iraqi revolt of 1920. Founders of the Islamic Republic defined themselves in this tradition, but the clerical state they built ironically defanged the clerics. Previously, Shiite clerics had boasted an independent base that allowed them to play such a crucial moral and political role. But by making them all wards of the state, the Islamic Republic has done real damage to the independent standing of the clerics. It even organizes a Special Clerical Court whose job is to prosecute clerics who stray from the regime’s official reading of Islam. Most governments in Iranian history couldn’t have dreamt of such an affront to the independent stature of clergy. Assumption of state authority also means massive unpopularity for the clerical class, which is being blamed for problems of Iranian society.

 

On an international level, too, the Iranian state has flexed its muscle, attempting to convert Muslims and non-Muslims around the world to the Shiite faith, spending billions of dollars in sponsoring Shiite institutions. In doing so, Tehran has usurped one of the key functions of marja who’ve long had their own independent global networks, usually anchored in hubs such as London. It is hard for the marja to compete with Iranian state resources, while the Iranian taxpayers have come to despise the resources their government spends on these activities.

 

Under Khamenei, the Iranian state also became the sponsor of paramilitary Shiite politics, helping to sectarianize Middle Eastern politics in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Thus emerged the informally named Axis of Resistance, the coalition of mostly Shiite anti-Israel and anti-Western militias led by Iran. But the demise of the Axis preceded Khamenei’s. In the past two years, the Axis has become a shadow of its former self, crushed under dissidence of Shiite communities in the Arab world, Israeli strikes, and the fall of its second main patron: the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Shiites now have to get used to a world without Khamenei, without the Axis, and maybe without velayat-e faqih.

 

Another model of Shiite political leadership has long emerged to stand as a contradistinction to Khamenei’s: that of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a cleric of Iranian origin who is based in Najaf, Iraq. He has played a key political role in Shiite politics in Iraq, intervening at crucial moments. One such moment arrived in 2015 when his fatwa called for armed mobilization of Iraqis (not just the Shiites) against the rise of the Sunni jihadist Islamic State.

 

What makes Sistani distinct, however, is an aversion to assumption of state authority and avoidance of stooping down to the level of partisan politics. Sistani continues to enjoy his own powerful networks, independent from the Iraqi state and with significant global reach, while he also maintains unparalleled moral authority among Shiites in Iraq and elsewhere. While the Iranian state, led by Khamenei, has furnished Iraqi Shiite militias with arms and financial resources, Sistani operates on another level, his religious authority unsoiled by quotidian realities of governance and state sponsorship.

 

Astoundingly, Sistani is accepted as marja by many more Shiites than Khamenei. By some estimates, 80 percent of the global Shiites accept him as the marja. Khamenei’s well-known lack of scholarly credentials and Sistani’s long life partially explain that phenomenon. But it is also a stinging rebuke of the Khamenei model. Even with billions of dollars at his disposal and the symbolic position of leading the world’s main Shiite state, Khamenei had not attracted as many religious followers compared to the old man in Najaf who barely appears in public.

 

The future of the Islamic Republic, and with it the future of velayat-e faqih, is still very much in the air. The ferocious American-Israeli war on Iran might yet overthrow the republic or deeply transform it. But it’s clear that the future of the Shiite world will be in flux. Khamenei is gone and Sistani, at 95 years of age, will be gone sometime soon too. Without their sponsor in Tehran, Shiite political parties will have to embed themselves differently in their national contexts. Lebanon’s decision this week to ban the military activities of Hezbollah, once the jewel in the crown of the Axis of Resistance, is telling.

 

Shiites will thus have to live in a world with two new realities: transformation and perhaps overthrow of the Islamic Republic, which has fundamentally rearranged the Shiite world since 1979, and, soon, the passing of the world’s leading marja, Sistani, without a clear successor.

 

It will be a period of decentralization and experimentation for Shiites—and an opening for existing and newly emerging marja to offer a different model of spiritual and political leadership to the devout.