By Jonah Goldberg
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
In 1788, Virginia convened a convention to debate the
ratification of the new U.S. Constitution, promulgated in Philadelphia the year
before.
The pardon power proved to be a sticking point for some
delegates. George
Mason, the primary author of Virginia’s own constitution, was among those worried that the unchecked ability to unilaterally pardon
criminality could lead to abuses of power. What if the president “may
frequently pardon crimes which were advised by himself”?
James Madison acknowledged that this would be a serious
abuse, but argued there was a remedy.
“There is one security in this case to which gentlemen
may not have adverted,” Madison said, “if the president be connected, in any suspicious
manner, with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will shelter him,
the House of Representatives can impeach him; [and] they can remove him if
found guilty.”
This episode has gathered fresh attention in the wake of
the January 6 riots, and the impeachment trial it ignited. President Trump was
impeached but not convicted.
That was a mistake in my opinion. But I’m not here to
relitigate it. I want to be forward-looking.
The British statesman Edmund Burke famously argued that
one of the “fundamental rules” of a decent society was that “no man
should be judge in his own cause.”
For the Founders, this insight informed the logic of the
entire constitutional project. Burke’s observation was so universally agreed
upon it often came up—sometimes without attribution— in debates at the
Constitutional and ratifying conventions.
Madison invokes the idea in Federalist 10, in the
context of faction and the need to have separation of powers. “No man is
allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly
bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”
Alexander Hamilton cites it in Federalist 80 as
the reason why federal courts should adjudicate disagreements between states—it
was assumed that state judges might be biased toward their own side of the
dispute.
This idea lurks behind all of Congress’ powers and
responsibilities, including advice and consent, the sole authority to tax and
spend, the power to declare war, and, of course, impeachment. Presidents are
not arbitrary rulers. They are stewards, with defined and limited powers.
On Monday, President Trump settled a $10 billion lawsuit brought by himself. In his
first term, Trump’s tax returns were illegally leaked. When Trump returned to
the presidency, he filed suit against the Internal Revenue Service. So, as a
constitutional matter, Trump is suing the executive branch he runs for a crime
committed by the IRS back when he ran it in his first term.
Realizing that the courts might find this too cute to
countenance, the Justice Department and IRS—both, again, run by
Trump—compromised by creating a $1,776,000,000 fund (that “1776” before all the
zeros is a play on the country’s 250th birthday) that Trump will
control. Its primary function would be to compensate the January 6 rioters, all
of whom he has already pardoned.
On Tuesday, the
DOJ announced that Trump, his family and business will be functionally exempt
from IRS audits or prosecutions from any past tax returns, literally placing
him above the law.
The president recently said that if China invades Taiwan,
he alone will determine whether the U.S. will defend Taiwan. “Me. I’m the only
person,” who decides. Last summer, Trump told The Atlantic that the difference between his
first term and his second was that he didn’t have anyone in his administration
to hinder him. This time, “I run the country and the world.” Congress and the
courts don’t enter into it.
After Trump unilaterally replaced at gunpoint the
president of Venezuela with a pliant satrap, without the approval of Congress,
the New York Times asked if there were any limits on his will: “Yeah, there is
one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.”
I began with a discussion of the pardon power and
impeachment for a reason. Contrary to thousands of hours of impeachment legal
punditry going back to the Nixon administration, a president doesn’t have to
commit a crime to be impeached. As Hamilton writes in Federalist 65,
impeachment involves “the misconduct of public men” and “the abuse or violation
of some public trust.” Impeachments are “POLITICAL” (Hamilton’s all-caps)
because they injure “society itself.”
It may, in fact, be legal for the president to be the
judge in his own cause and create a taxpayer-financed slush fund for him to
reward cronies and henchmen on a whim. It is already clear that presidents can
launch wars without Congress or the courts unduly getting in the way. But I
struggle to think of hypothetical scenarios that would be more likely to arouse
in Madison and his contemporaries the—now misplaced—reassurance that
impeachment was an available remedy.