The Conservative Article Annals
Friday, November 20, 2026
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The Great Derangement
By Noah Rothman
Thursday, November 19, 2026
When it comes to their relationships with the State of
Israel and its American advocates, the two parties’ outlooks in 2024 couldn’t
have been more distinct from one another.
At its Milwaukee nominating convention in 2024, the GOP
put on a pro-Israel lovefest that would have been inconceivable in the era of
blue noses and country clubs. The Democrats, by contrast, did their utmost to
mollify their braying anti-Israel malcontents who, quite literally, tore at the
fences separating violent demonstrators from their Democratic targets.
Kamala Harris’s party failed to thread that needle.
Donald Trump won the White House, signaling at least that his party’s
pro-Israel sentiments were no obstacle to political success. Only ten months
into Trump’s second term, he and his Israeli counterpart negotiated an end to
post–October 7 combat operations in Lebanon and Gaza — a process culminating in
a United Nations Security Council resolution that the region’s Muslim-dominated
neighbors endorsed and which ratified Hamas’s final disarmament and an Israeli
military presence inside Gaza.
But nothing was settled. And as the contours of the 2026
midterm election cycle took shape, it soon became clear that issues pertaining
to Israel and the American Jewish diaspora — disparate entities with
distinctions that monomaniacal “anti-Zionist” activists so often elide — would
reshape the American political landscape.
“What is happening in Gaza is a genocide. I refuse to
take money from AIPAC or any group that supports the genocide in Gaza,” Graham
Platner, the little-known “oyster farmer” who captured the hearts of Maine’s
Democrats, insisted at the outset of his successful Senate primary campaign in
early 2025. Senator Susan Collins called those remarks “weird,” but they
signaled what was to come.
Following the Totenkopf-tattoo-sporting Platner’s lead, a
variety of other progressive Democrats raced to dissociate themselves from the
pro-Israel lobby. The far left argued that AIPAC was a “dark money” group
backed by shadowy interests that advocated “allegiance to a foreign country.”
That sounds a lot scarier than what AIPAC is: an otherwise unremarkable
lobbying shop financed and staffed by American citizens. When progressives
couldn’t attack their opponents for taking AIPAC money, because they hadn’t,
they beat them up for appealing to “AIPAC donors.” You get the picture.
Taking their cues from the progressive left, as they so
frequently do, the media threw fuel on this bonfire of sense and logic.
“Support from AIPAC has been used as a cudgel against Democratic candidates,”
the Washington Post wrote of an organization that contributed more to
Democratic candidates than to Republicans in both 2022 and 2024.
Meanwhile, the fringes of the American right wheeled
around for a rearguard action designed to weaken the GOP’s affinity for the
U.S.-Israel partnership.
Quite unlike the joint U.S.-Israel strikes on Iranian
targets during Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025, the joint U.S.-Israel strikes
on Iranian targets in Operation Epic Fury in 2026 were assailed by the
nationalist right. “It is clear that we started this war due to pressure from
Israel and its powerful American lobby,” Joe Kent wrote in his letter of
resignation from the Trump administration, in which he accused the president of
succumbing to Benjamin Netanyahu’s mesmeric wiles.
“Another insider sees what we see: no imminent threat,
just lobby pressure,” Representative Thomas Massie wrote in Kent’s defense.
Kent’s remarks reinforced the Kentucky congressman’s belief that the Jews were
out to get him, too. He called his opponent in the Republican primary a
“puppet” of a “coalition of Israel’s lobbyists and donors,” and he described his
race as “a referendum on whether Israel gets to buy seats in Congress.” When
Massie lost, he quipped about how hard it was to get his opponent on the phone
to concede. After all, who knows what time it is “in Tel Aviv.”
If only Massie’s antisemitic agitation were an outlier.
James Fishback based his moribund campaign for Florida
governor on appeals to Jew-hatred. He railed against the “goyslop” that the
nation’s cafeterias force-feed our children, the “white genocide” that Israel’s
supporters enable, and the resources sacrificed by politicians who would rather
“kiss a stupid wall” than serve Americans’ interests. Also in Florida, Dan
Bilzerian, the so-called King of Instagram, set out to unseat Representative
Randy Fine in a campaign in which he accused his opponent of being a “Shylock”
and a “Jewish supremacist” who likes to watch “goyim cattle” die — all while
asking whether we should “revisit that Austrian painter’s opinions.” In Ohio,
Casey Putsch sought the GOP’s gubernatorial nomination after mounting a
spirited effort to talk X’s chatbot Grok into rehabilitating Hitler’s image
(Grok declined). “Israel controls our politicians and our government,” former
Georgia Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene wrote six months after her
January resignation from Congress. “Trump is controlled by [Jewish donor]
Miriam Adelson and Israel.”
In their wisdom, Republican voters declined to reward
these politicians with a constituency. The same cannot be said of the
Democratic Party.
Democratic primary voters nominated and subsequently
elected more than a handful of candidates with a special animus toward Israel
and the American Jews who support its existence. Colorado’s Melat Kiros found
merit in Hamas’s massacre, calling it the “inevitable consequence of apartheid,
of occupation, decades of occupation,” and couldn’t be sure that the deadly
firebombing of a pro-Israel protester in her state was an act of antisemitism.
Pennsylvania’s Chris Rabb was pretty sure that the Islamist gunmen who murdered
more than a dozen Jews on Sydney’s Bondi Beach in 2025 “were likely Zionists
themselves.” In New York, Darializa Avila Chevalier founded an organization
that set out to “undermine and eradicate America” by converting “resistance in
Gaza” into “unrest and violence in America.”
Abdul El-Sayed’s candidacy in Michigan blurred any
distinction between the far left and far right when it came to the Jews. Even
as Kent, Massie, and Greene tried to recruit former Fox News broadcaster Tucker
Carlson to run for president, El-Sayed featured Carlson and his guests in a
campaign ad in which they heaped praise on El-Sayed’s “America First” outlook.
El-Sayed’s plan to redirect to UNRWA — despite (or, perhaps because of) the
participation by the employees of that supposed relief agency in the October 7
massacre — the 0.05 percent of the U.S. budget that’s now earmarked for aid to
Israel would seem a rare species of “America First” politics. At least, it
would to those who don’t believe that Israel invited, tacitly or even
deliberately, the slaughter of its own citizens on 10/7.
El-Sayed is heading to Washington despite his tendency to
evaluate terrorist attacks from the attacker’s perspective, his belief that
Israel and Iran are commensurate threats to U.S. national security, and his
willingness to surround himself with allies who blame Jews for the price of
bananas and who described key Jewish neighborhoods in Michigan as bastions of
hate on par with the Ku Klux Klan. “I think it’s time for us to realize that
Israel is not actually our friend,” El-Sayed said in the closing days of the
campaign. “I don’t think an ally who uses you as a shield in war is actually an
ally.”
Almost as soon as the polls closed and the scale of the
Democratic Party’s routing of the GOP was clear, Vice President JD Vance
offered a diagnosis that dovetailed with that of El-Sayed. “The reason we lost
is the war,” he wrote in a lengthy essay posted to social media. The only
remedy, as Vance saw it, is for the GOP to put “America First” once again and
“change our relationship with Israel.”
These diagnoses have their currency because of the
prevalence of the hoary trope of the hidden Jewish hand manipulating events
behind the scenes and engineering the world’s misfortunes. It’s one of the
oldest expressions of the world’s most enduring conspiracy theory. In 2026,
American politics demonstrated that antisemitism had lost none of its appeal
over the centuries. Indeed, it’s won over a disquieting number of converts.
Trump, Xi, and Putin: The Three Caudillos
By Kevin D. Williamson
Friday, November 20, 2026
When Donald Trump entered American politics in a more
serious way in 2015-16 (he had sought the Reform Party nomination in 2000), he
made a good deal out of being an “outsider” who was “not a politician.” Donald
Trump has never been an outsider, of course—he was born an insider by
dint of his father’s position in the New York City business milieu—and, like
every other real estate developer and would-be casino magnate, no matter how
miserable a failure, he had long been a kind of politician. But however we
characterize Trump’s career before 2016, a decade plus later, he can no longer
say that he is not a politician.
He is a bad politician.
Trump is entering the Emmanuel Macron stage of his
political career: Finding domestic politics too dispiriting and too depressing,
the hope of fiscal improvement and entitlement reform too forlorn, he is
looking for other things to do. Macron has long focused on the world
stage—foreign policy, European affairs, international gatherings of different
kinds, etc. Macron is the epitome of Davos Man. France is, to French consternation, only a minor
player in world affairs these days, while the United States is the most
important player—dangerous, chaotic, undisciplined, unreliable, corrupt,
misgoverned, violent, and fickle, to be sure, but still the biggest kid on the
block. It is easy to imagine why Trump might want to have a meaningless summit
with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin—the big brother and the kid brother of the
latest axis of evil—if only to escape the torture of watching James Talarico
make fun of him on Saturday Night Live.
Trump showed up at Shenzhen with no agenda and, in that
sense, he got what he went there for: nothing. Xi and Putin had agendas, and
they, too, got what they went there for.
Xi got to demonstrate his implicit convening power,
hosting the summit as an act of graciousness toward Trump, who had pressed for a meeting in the wake of his
humiliation in the midterm elections. For the cost of a few dinners and a
stroll up the tarmac, Xi was able to project, almost convincingly, the image of
that which he aspires to be but is not yet: the boss of a country that is the
equal of the United States. Putin got to remind the world that it is no use
trying to make a pariah of him when he has the president of the United States
of America hanging from his jockstrap.
Putin seems to enjoy making a fool of Trump, and so he
had Russian forces launch another brutal fusillade on the women and children of
Ukraine as he and the Chinese caudillo and the American caudillo celebrated a
four-point “declaration toward peace,” all four points of which serve
Putin’s interests: The empty talk about nuclear weapons does not restrain him,
expanding the production of fossil fuels enriches him and his war machine,
browbeating the International Criminal Court and the United Nations leaves the
world for him to bustle in, and the insistence that “respect for immunities of
State officials are of paramount importance” is a nice thing for a murderous
gangster—or three of them—to have in the ol’ back pocket.
A few years ago, I had a memorable lunch with a cardinal
who was an adviser to Pope Francis. When another member of the party asked why
the pope seemed like such a commie on economic questions, the cardinal—a man
who obviously liked and admired the pope—laughed and said that the simple
answer was that the holy father didn’t know the first thing about the subject,
had never read a serious book touching such matters, and resolutely refused to
keep up with his briefs on the subject. People who like and admire Donald
Trump—and, inexplicably enough, there are such people—sometimes say the same
thing about the president in private, though the public statements are—or
were—about 4-D chess and all that nonsensical fantasy horsepucky. One cannot
help noticing that the number of abjectly self-abasing Trump apologists is
being trimmed. As Jay Nordlinger put it in his low-pH mode: “I have noticed
something in the aftermath of the midterm elections. More people—many more
people—have always been anti-Trump than I was formerly able to perceive. … In
coming years, there may be as many people who were always anti-Trump as there
were members of the French resistance.”
The Shenzhen summit made some people think of Yalta. But
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin were serious men—FDR
may have been seriously wrong, Stalin seriously evil, and Churchill seriously
drunk half the time, but serious. Trump, on the other hand, remains what
he always has been: a jumped-up game-show host entirely out of his depth.
The amateur is the ideal type of Olympic competitor—the
amateur is not the ideal type of politician.
The Replacement
By Nick Catoggio
Thursday, November 19, 2026
We don’t need to spend much time today on fascist Yalta.
Nearly everything I have to say about it was said in
other recent editions of this newsletter. This morning’s summit “appeared to
achieve little,” CBS News observed, which is no surprise given that Xi
Jinping’s trip to Washington earlier this fall also achieved little. In both
cases, the president’s interest in diplomacy had nothing to do with resolving
disputes and everything to do with luxuriating in the prestige he feels
whenever some A-list tyrant greets him as a peer.
“The point of the meeting is the meeting,” I wrote
in September of Xi’s visit. “Trump palpably envies the autocratic power
[leaders like Xi and Vladimir Putin] have accrued and admires the ruthlessness
with which they wield it.” Rubbing elbows with them gives him a contact high.
As if to prove it, he took care to remind
the two at this morning’s meeting that they lead three of the world’s largest
nations, that their decisions affect the entire planet, and that they were
“making history” by gathering.
For the president, the essential thing about this
conference of the modern “Big Three” was its bigness. That’s him all over.
Last week, in a separate newsletter, I speculated
on why Trump reportedly did nothing upon being told that the head of Nvidia was
literally in bed with a Chinese intelligence asset. Wasn’t he worried that the
company’s most advanced chips, the key to America’s advantage in the race to
develop artificial intelligence, would fall into Beijing’s hands?
Probably not, I argued. He regards both Jensen Huang and
Xi Jinping as “friends,” and we all trust our friends, don’t we? “The president
seems to believe that America’s best defense against the threats it faces are
the personal relationships he’s cultivated with influential people,” I said of
Trump’s approach to foreign policy. In his mind, “the better his personal
relations with an adversary are, the less threatening that adversary is to the
United States.”
Fast-forward to this morning. Upon encountering the
butcher of Ukraine, a visibly delighted Trump declared “he’s my
friend” before shaking Putin’s hand. (“God, protect us from such friends,”
Polish Prime Minister Donald
Tusk lamented afterward.) Later, addressing Xi at a meeting, the president told
his host, “You’re my friend, and we have a very special relationship. As long
as you and I are in charge of things, we’ll never have a problem.” QED.
After 10 years, nothing about this is shocking or even
very interesting. No one blinks anymore when Trump responds
to a question about Putin’s conduct in Ukraine with “I think he could be
tougher. I think he could be a lot tougher, frankly.” He is who he is, and
Americans knew it when they reelected him.
The only surprising thing this morning was seeing Marco
Rubio seated next to Trump as the president cooed about Xi. Our wildly
overrated chief diplomat normally doesn’t involve himself heavily in
important diplomacy, as you may have noticed in Iran, Ukraine, and Gaza. Yet
there he was, passive as usual as his boss humiliated the United States by
schmoozing with two illiberal enemies eager to usurp American power.
What was he supposed to do, tackle Trump? Rubio’s
apologists will reply. Of course not.
What he was supposed to do was resign in protest after
any one of the dozen or so previous disgraceful foreign policy chapters of the
president’s second term. The reckless gutting of USAID by DOGE, the inhumane
rendition of illegal immigrants to an El Salvadoran dungeon, the NATO-breaking
power play to annex Greenland, the rapacious collusion with Delcy RodrÃguez’s
despotic regime in Venezuela, the strategic foolishness of war with Iran, the
Putin-esque threats about swallowing Canada, the horrendous treachery of taking
sides with Russia against Ukraine, and the gross negligence of failing to
intervene in what Jensen Huang was up to: If any of it bothered Marco Rubio,
the alleged adult in the room in this administration, it didn’t bother him as
much as it should have.
That’s why I’m inclined to take seriously the new rumors
that Rubio might be supplanting J.D. Vance as the president’s preferred successor.
The secretary of state may not have sold as much of his soul as the vice
president has, but he’s surely sold enough of it to lead this party.
The gravest sin.
It’s absurd that Rubio’s political stock is rising as he
goes about doggedly defending an unpopular war while Vance’s is falling because
he hasn’t, but that’s life in a personality cult.
Although Trump hasn’t attacked his VP publicly the way he
typically does when he feels betrayed by a deputy, it’s obvious that he resents
Vance’s postelection statement blaming
the war for the GOP wipeout. In the days since, the president has observed
that “a lot of people didn’t like [Vance’s] comments,” has removed the vice president from his role leading U.S.
negotiations with Iran, and called the failed peace deal that Vance brokered
this past summer with Iran “a waste
of time” in an interview yesterday.
In the same interview, he said he thought the VP should
have made clear in his statement that, in spite of everything, war with Iran
was the right choice. As if the whole point of the statement wasn’t to reassure
prospective 2028 voters that a Vance administration would not have
chosen it.
The grumbling has continued behind the scenes, allegedly.
Last week the Wall Street Journal claimed that Trump groused to
deputies that Vance’s defunct deal with Tehran, in the paper’s words, “gave
Iran critical time to regroup and rake in oil revenues before the U.S. imposed
a naval blockade.” And the New York Times reported yesterday that “Mr. Trump
has grown increasingly frustrated with how his vice president framed his
assessment of what went wrong, complaining to aides and allies that Mr. Vance
should have made a point of saying the president made the right decision in
going to war with Iran.”
Failing to defend the president against his detractors is
one of the gravest acts of disloyalty a Trump crony can commit, a true mortal
sin in the MAGA faith. Vance is now guilty of it. But you know who isn’t? Per
the Times:
Mr. Trump has
continued to praise Marco Rubio, his secretary of state, in private
conversations, and has suggested that he could be a strong presidential
candidate, according to the people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to
describe discussions going on behind closed doors. Mr. Trump’s allies have
noted that Mr. Rubio has repeatedly said the president’s move to attack Iran
was essential for the country’s national security.
As it happens, since the election more than one major
news outlet has alleged that Vance is wavering about whether to run for president in 2028. As it also happens, a
CNN story published on Wednesday claimed that Rubio has
begun “more seriously weighing a 2028 run.” He’s no longer insisting that he
won’t run if Vance does whenever he’s asked about the next cycle, and he’s
“grown vaguer in private as well about his post-State Department plans,”
according to CNN’s sources.
If you want to tell yourself a story about what might be
happening behind the scenes, it isn’t hard. As it becomes clearer that the
president is more inclined to endorse his ever-loyal secretary of state over
his anti-war vice president, both men’s calculations about succeeding him have
changed. Vance can’t win the nomination without Trump’s support and his future
prospects probably can’t survive a snub by the boss, so he’s begun concocting a
pretext to bow out of the race on his own terms before the president knifes
him. He wants to spend more time with his family, perhaps—until 2032, when the
GOP will be licking its wounds after a likely defeat in 2028 and possibly eager
to give a true “America First” candidate a try.
And as Vance is stepping back, Rubio is stepping forward.
With Trump and the right-wing donor class behind him and the vice president out
of the race, Rubio would be a heavy favorite in the next primary despite the
antipathy diehard postliberals feel for his Reaganite/neocon (and Hispanic)
pedigree. Don’t kid yourself that because Tucker
Carlson dislikes him, so must the grassroots GOP: Two new polls out today
have Rubio ahead of Vance in the coming primary, in one case by
double digits.
Loser vibes.
Part of the reason that some Republicans have soured on
the vice president surely has to do with his dovishness toward Iran and his ambivalence
toward Israel. (Another subject on which the wider Republican base and its
postliberal faction disagree, by the way.) But I think Vance has also
contracted a fairly severe case of “loser vibes,” in the words of one Dispatch
colleague, from this month’s epic electoral drubbing. The magnitude of the
Republican wipeout raises an obvious question: Is Donald Trump’s inexperienced,
less charismatic running mate really the right choice to win an election
in a country that’s grown to hate Donald Trump?
As a proponent of the Iran war and an enemy of Carlson’s,
Ben Shapiro might be biased against Tucker’s buddy
Vance—but even so, I find it hard to argue with his analysis of the VP’s
presidential chances:
Does he do better
with Hispanics than Trump did in 2024? There’s no way. Does he do better with
blue-collar white voters than Trump did? There’s an outside argument, but is it
possible to do better with blue-collar white voters than Trump did in 2024? Very
difficult to imagine that. Is he going to do better with married women?
Probably not. Is he going to do better with single women given many of his
comments? I think probably not. Is he going to do better with college-educated
people because he’s steered so hard into sort of the populist online right? I
think it’s going to be very difficult for him to pull that out.
An “America First” platform shorn of Trump’s second-term
failures could win back some of those groups, especially blue-collar whites.
But therein lies the problem: Vance, uniquely among Republicans, will wear
those failures in the next cycle. He’s free to go on putting out statements
distancing himself from them, but as the president’s right-hand man, voters
will hold him accountable for Trump’s mistakes regardless. And every time he
tries to wash his hands of them between now and 2028, the resentment that the
president and some of his devotees feel for his “disloyalty” will grow.
Until two weeks ago, the vice president’s great asset in
a primary against some refugee from the pre-Trump GOP was that he was entirely
a creature of the Trump era, having first sought public office as a
loud-and-proud postliberal in 2022. Someone like Rubio or Ted Cruz could never
be fully trusted by the base by comparison because they spent years as members
of “the uniparty,” converting to postliberalism only belatedly. As Sarah Longwell once put it, to the average populist
Republican, the Trump revolution of 2016 was “Year Zero.” Anyone who was part
of the ancien regime was suspect.
The remarkable irony of this month’s landslide is that it
may have flipped that calculus on its head. Because Republicans now have no
choice but to prioritize
electability, figures who built a political “brand” independent of Trump
suddenly may seem more appealing as candidates than the “Year Zero”
crop. Figures like, say, Marco Rubio, a man who’s never fully disgorged his
Reaganite identity but has worked hard and cagily to try to synthesize it with
Trumpism (unsuccessfully).
That probably explains why the public perceives Rubio but
not Vance as meaningfully distinct from Trump even though it’s Rubio, not
Vance, who’s defending the president unreservedly on the radioactive subject of
the Iran war. Politically, the president is a wet gremlin
and the vice president is a furball that spawned off his back. Rubio, who spent
five years in the Senate before Trump entered politics, is different.
His tone is different too, and it matters—and that, too,
is ironic. The astounding scale of the blue tsunami suggests a degree of
hostility to Trumpism that might run deeper than policy, extending to the type
of politics that the president has mainstreamed in America. If voters go to the
polls in 2028 desperate to move past this ugly era, Vance—who spends his time hurling insults at opponents and demagoging
immigrants and minorities—-will not be a viable choice for Republicans. A
better choice would be someone who’s restrained, professional, even a minority
himself. The sort of figure whom millions of college grads who’ve drifted left
over the past decade might listen to and think, “This guy’s different, more my
speed.”
That’s Rubio, not Vance. Imagine it: After 10 years of
treating politics as pro wrestling and celebrating ruthlessness as a cardinal
virtue, the president and his party might now be pivoting to one of the few
figures left on the right who can still credibly affect a sense of dignity in
public. Sure, the secretary of state has spent two years as the chief
diplomatic henchman in a fascist project to dismantle the post-war American-led
global order, but fair is fair—he seems darned statesmanlike as he goes about
it.
Pitfalls.
I do hope that Rubio usurps Vance as the presumptive
Republican nominee and not just because I find him considerably less obnoxious
personally and marginally less obnoxious politically. In a few ways, I think
his candidacy would be amusing.
It would be amusing if the president endorsed him for the
explicit reason that he’s been a loyal apologist for the Iran war as that’s the
last thing Rubio would need in the general election, knowing what an albatross
the subject is likely to be. He’s spent the last nine months doing what he can
to keep his fingerprints off the mission, letting Vance and figures like Jared
Kushner and Steve Witkoff take the lead on negotiations with Tehran. It’d be
funny if all of that went up in smoke because Trump insisted on giving him the
kiss of death: The one guy who never had second thoughts about Iran was
Marco.
It would also be amusing to see the president, after
rewarding Rubio for his loyalty by crowning him heir apparent, have to cope
with watching his secretary of state try to distance himself from Trump’s
unpopular policies in the general election. Vance’s statement blaming the war
for the GOP’s midterm rout may have been foolishly hasty, but it wasn’t
incorrect on the political merits; whoever succeeds the president as nominee
will have no choice but to disown toxic Trump failures like Iran, tariffs, and
letting ICE run wild.
Rationally, the president understands that, I’m sure, but
as I said earlier, he is who he is. Trump anointing Rubio as his successor and
then predictably blowing a gasket when Rubio panders to voters by sharing their
misgivings about Trump’s agenda will be tons of fun.
Most amusing, though, will be watching the chaos in the
GOP field unfold amid a shocking new reality in which Vance is out of politics
and Rubio is Trump’s chosen successor.
One compelling argument for the vice president’s
candidacy, I’ve always thought,
is that it could dissuade “America First-ers” from mounting a primary challenge
that could make real trouble for the party. Vance is postliberal enough to
satisfy most postliberals and well-credentialed enough as vice president to
satisfy most normie Republicans, making it difficult for both the far right and
center right to gain traction against him. His value proposition as a potential
nominee is that he might win a primary more or less uneventfully, keeping the
right more or less united heading into the general election.
But if Vance is out and Rubio is in, there will be
a postliberal challenger in the field and possibly a formidable one. Maybe
it’ll be Carlson, maybe Rep. Thomas Massie, or maybe someone who’s not on anyone’s radar
yet. (Expect Ron DeSantis to start sounding more like Tucker if Vance bows out
and the postliberal “lane” in the race opens up.) But it’ll be someone, because
the thought of Trump’s movement being inherited by one of the conventional
Republican candidates whom he trounced in 2016 will infuriate devout “America
First-ers.” As will the prospect of postliberalism losing control of the GOP to
a guy who once supported legalizing illegal immigrants.
Nominating the secretary of state would be a supreme test
of the decade-long Republican
hostage crisis, in other words, a sort of dare to the far right to boycott
the 2028 general election. And they might: A Rubio defeat due to lower
Republican turnout would show the rest of the party that it can’t win without
appeasing postliberals, a perfect set-up for Vance’s big comeback attempt in
2032.
But a Rubio victory, especially one driven by college
grads and Hispanics returning to the GOP as the party turns the page on lowbrow
populism? That could be the end for Vance and his ilk. If you’re looking for a
reason to root for a Rubio presidency, that’s the best I can do.
Vance’s Political Losses Are Rubio’s Gains
By Noah Rothman
Thursday, November 19, 2026
Those who invested in JD Vance’s political stock — perhaps even
literally — may be looking to offload their holdings. The vice president’s
brand is not what it once was, and he largely has his own wanting judgment to
thank for that.
Like all vice presidents, Vance’s fortunes are
inseparable from his boss’s. So, it was a foolish choice to implicitly lay the
blame for the GOP’s disastrous midterm performance at Donald Trump’s feet,
claiming that the president had “lost” a war that he was still prosecuting. Accordingly,
Trump is reportedly withdrawing his previous support for Vance’s
succession — an imprimatur the vice president’s allies believe he needs if he
is to win the 2028 primary.
Those same allies have spent the weeks since the election
flooding the zone with stories indicating that the vice
president is rethinking his plans. In their telling, however, Vance is a victim
of circumstance. He is a young man with a young family, they say. A
presidential run would put his children through hell. And the political
environment in 2028 is not likely to be conducive to a Republican victory. The
GOP presidential nomination may be a poisoned chalice for whoever takes it.
Better to wait, regroup, and take another run at the White House in 2032.
Perhaps he can be drafted into a race for his old Ohio Senate seat! Whatever he decides, his boosters
insist, Vance has options.
Yet, even as Vanceworld conditions the environment for
the vice president’s retreat from politics, the chatter around Secretary of
State Marco Rubio’s presidential prospects is growing. What’s more, Rubio
himself no longer seems to mind.
With Republicans “trying to coax him off the sidelines,” CNN reported, “There have been increasing signs that he’s
weighing a run.” Yes, their enthusiasm is attributable to “fresh doubts” about
Vance — particularly the vice president’s apparent determination to engineer a
schism within the MAGA movement. “Some Rubio supporters noted more fallout over
Vance’s postmortem could be coming, anticipating a potential confrontation with
Trump,” the report continued. But their openness to a presidential run by Rubio
is also fueled by his own increased interest in another campaign for the White
House:
The 55-year-old
has grown vaguer in private as well about his post-State Department plans, two
sources familiar with those conversations told CNN. It’s a marked departure
from earlier in Trump’s presidency, when Rubio insisted to allies that he had
no intentions to run and instead wanted to pursue a lucrative private-sector
job, according to two sources familiar with those previous remarks.
Rubio faces plenty of obstacles, any one of which might
dissuade him from seeking the presidency. He has his eye on Cuba, and “his supporters in the Cuban
community will expect to see progress on that front,” CNN noted. The Iran war
is just one of the “president’s most pressing political challenges” that Rubio
would prefer reach a reasonably satisfying resolution before he even considers
a presidential campaign. Some of Rubio’s supporters believe he would only pull
the trigger if Trump “effectively cleared the field” for him. That isn’t
likely.
Nevertheless, interest in a Rubio bid is peaking —
perhaps too early — as Republicans are increasingly concluding, with all
requisite evidence, that the levers on which Vance would have to pull to win
the presidency are no longer functioning. In 2024, Trump and Vance both
expertly exploited an American political milieu uniquely favorable to their
respective styles.
Much has changed. Provoking for provocation’s sake no
longer has the cachet it once did. The New York Times’ reporting on the ouster or
self-imposed exile of MAGA staples from Congress — outgoing or former members
like Nancy Mace, Marjorie Taylor Greene, and Lauren Boebert — illustrates that
phenomenon.
The big-name podcasters on whom Vance would rely to reach
the low-propensity voters who buttressed Trump’s winning coalitions are shying away from politics. The politicians who sought
office in 2026 have returned the favor. This year, they kept their distance from the alternative broadcasters who
held the political world on a string just two short years ago.
“I’m not MAGA,” Elon Musk told the Times this week, admitting his nine-figure
investment in the GOP’s candidates this year felt “pretty foolish” in
retrospect. Burnt by his experience with DOGE and as a high-dollar donor, the
world’s richest man may be out. Perhaps he will take his Silicon Valley allies
— those who aren’t scrambling to curry favor with ascendent Democrats, at least
— with him.
Vance has defined his constituency so narrowly that all
this represents an existential threat to his political fortunes. Rubio is not
similarly constrained. “People just have a sense that he’s more mature,” Newt
Gingrich told CNN. “he’s a broader personality and that he would reach out to a
much wider constituency.”
Which is to say that Vance’s problem isn’t his family,
the president, or the foreboding mix of political circumstances that will
conspire against the GOP in 2028. The problem is JD Vance. The secretary of
state may stumble, too. But he’s been a far better steward of his own political
trademark. And if the party still decides, well, it sounds like it’s
already decided.
The Problems with the Trump Administration’s ‘Golden Age’ Claim
By Jim Geraghty
Friday, November 20, 2026
In the most
recent issue of the print magazine, as part of our review of the 2026
midterms, I argued President Trump took on reality . . . and reality won. He
kept telling Americans that inflation had been defeated, the Strait of Hormuz
was open, and gasoline would soon be below $3 per gallon. That, more than
anything, explains how the midterms turned into such a debacle for Republicans:
Over the past
year, the gap between Trump’s rosy picture and Americans’ day-to-day lives grew
too wide. Trump kept insisting that things had gotten better and that even
happier days were just around the corner. Americans looked in their wallets and
bank accounts, at their grocery bills and at the number on the gas pump, and
disagreed. After a while, they concluded that Trump didn’t know what the heck
he was talking about or that he was just another used-car salesman willing to
promise anything.
On Election Day
2026, Trump’s war against reality suffered its most devastating defeat.
I mention all this because it appears the administration
hasn’t learned a darn thing from losing nine U.S. Senate seats, 46 U.S. House
seats as of this writing (Democrats lead in three more races that have not been
officially called), six gubernatorial offices, and control of twelve state
legislative chambers.
At 6:05 p.m. last night, the Office of the Vice President
put out a
post on X using images of Donald Trump and JD Vance in the style of the Grand
Theft Auto game series, declaring, “The Golden Age is now.”
I mean, I suppose if you’re a Democrat, it may feel like
a golden age kicked in on Election Day.
I’ll start with the administration’s strongest argument.
One of the images in Vance’s post is that of Border Patrol agents walking past
the border wall.
Now, indisputably, the change at the U.S. southern border
since Trump’s second term began is like night and day. In October, the U.S. Border Patrol encountered just 11,443
individuals attempting to cross from Mexico into the United States. A year
earlier, in October 2025, that figure was about the same: 11,703. In October
2024, the final months of the Biden administration, it was 106,316. The year
before that, October 2023, it was 240,927.
But when it comes to border wall construction . . . it’s
not quite the same sterling success story. The border between the U.S. and
Mexico runs 1,954 miles. Before January 20, 2025, the U.S. had 644 miles of existing primary wall that met U.S.
Border Patrol operational requirements and 75 miles of secondary wall. While it
may have always been unrealistic to have a wall running the length of the
entire border, that left 1,310 miles with no barriers.
Nearly two years into President Trump’s second term, the
construction efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Department
of Defense have indisputably made progress. About 100 miles of new
wall have been built, 48.5 miles of replacement wall have been installed, 82
miles of water barriers are in place, and 133 miles of secondary border wall
have been built. Assuming the water barriers and border walls don’t overlap,
that adds up to 230 more miles covered. (Secondary barriers do not count as new
miles covered.) But . . . we’re still left with 1,080 miles without barriers.
Nearly six years into Trump’s presidency, 55 percent of
the U.S.-Mexico border has no manmade barriers.
The administration plans to build 1,418 miles of “primary smart wall,” with “approximately
536 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border without barrier will be covered by
detection technology “due to unfavorable terrain or remoteness of location.”
In August, a CBP spokesman declared, “Border wall construction is
planned for completion in 2028.” Considering how it has taken two years to
build 100 miles of new wall, it is a tall order to complete 386 miles in the
next two years.
Turning to the economy, over the past year, the nominal average weekly wage grew
3.6 percent . . . while the inflation rate was 3.7 percent. Until May 2026, the
administration could at least boast that year-over-year wage growth was in the
3.3 percent to 4.3 percent range, while the inflation rate bounced between 2.3
and 3 percent — not great, but at least keeping the head above water. But in
the last few months, even that minor success story has evaporated.
From
a year ago, gas is nearly 37 percent more expensive, computer software is
25.9 percent more expensive, and postage and delivery service prices are up
almost 16 percent. Ground beef is 5 percent more expensive. Eggs are almost 27
percent cheaper, though!
Similarly, the stock markets are still having a good year
overall, and some degree of deflation of the artificial intelligence bubble was
just about inevitable. But the S&P 500 peaked at 7,819 on October 6, and yesterday it closed at 7,175. It is
still up about 10 percent, a pretty good year, but for a while it was looking
like a great one.
And there are some ominous rattles in the economy. The
average mortgage rate on a 30-year mortgage is 7.28 percent. Credit card debt is at an all-time high. A low-hire,
low-fire economy — which has been in place for three years — feels alright if
you have a job but is deeply frustrating if you’re looking for one.
The tariffs were supposed to generate an explosion of new
manufacturing jobs. In January 2025, the U.S. had
12,693,000 manufacturing jobs. In October 2026, the U.S. had 12,681,000
manufacturing jobs, a slight decline.
The Tax Foundation calculates that tariffs will increase taxes by an average of $820 per U.S. household.
That is a major tax increase, despite the president’s insistence that other
countries are paying them.
The administration will point to the national average
price of gas declining from $4.60 in late September to $3.94 per gallon last
week (Energy Information Administration numbers here). But it’s
November, traditionally a time of lower demand. At this time a year ago, it was
$3.19. Two years ago, it was $3.16. Three years ago, it was $3.41.
If you want to change the perception of something, you
must change the reality of something. You cannot convince people that they’re
doing better than they actually are. This administration can churn out memes
about the “golden age” as much as it wants, but it’s not going to change
people’s perceptions about the administration or the economy until the economic
reality on the ground actually changes.
The U.S. Is Now on Russia’s Side, Part 2,345
From the Daily Telegraph, over in London:
Donald Trump told
European leaders to withhold funding from Ukraine in an angry phone call
after his summit with Vladimir Putin.
The U.S. president
dialed into a meeting of the coalition of the willing in Berlin from Air Force One
and launched what was described as a “tirade” against NATO allies.
Sources said Mr.
Trump had told European supporters of Ukraine to stop talking about sending
emergency financial aid and focus instead on his controversial peace plan.
Two insiders
described the U.S. president’s remarks as “a tirade”, saying he criticized
plans by the EU and Ukraine’s other international supporters to help cover the
country’s €70bn (£62bn) financing gap for 2027.
(Interruption from Jim: In U.S. dollars, Ukraine’s
projected deficit for 2027 is $81 billion. That might sound bad, but at the
current pace, the U.S. government runs up $81 billion in new debt every twelve
days.)
Mr. Trump’s call
was made via the phone of Jared Kushner, the U.S. special envoy who attended
the coalition of the willing summit in Berlin along with Steve Witkoff, another
US peace envoy.
The US president
was travelling back from China, where he held an unprecedented trilateral summit with Putin and Xi Jinping, the Chinese
leader, that was called “Yalta 2.0”, referring to the post-World War Two
meeting between Winston Churchill, Franklin D Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin.
Mr. Trump also
held a private one-on-one summit with Putin, who appeared buoyed by the talks. Putin said the meeting had gone “even better
than expected”, and the Kremlin said his mood was “excellent.”
Dan Foster, a regular contributor to The Editors
podcast, is correct. This administration no longer merely wants
Europe to take a larger share of the responsibility for its own defense against
Russia; this administration wants Europe to stop helping Ukraine, period. The
president believes ending all international aid to Ukraine will lead to peace,
based upon Vladimir Putin’s promises. If it does lead to peace at all — an
extremely dubious assertion — it will end with a peace that is on Putin’s
terms.
Back in March 2025, this newsletter declared, “The U.S.
government has effectively switched sides in the war.” I was told that was
hyperbolic and premature.
In just the past few weeks, we’ve seen President Trump issue waivers to the Lindsey Graham Act sanctions on Russia and
its trading partners, purchase Russian oil that no company based in the U.S. wants to take, review the lifting of additional sanctions on Russia’s
sovereign wealth fund, call Putin “his friend,” and invite Putin to the G-20
summit. Oh, and a Trump appointee ordered that a giant Russian flag be draped over an Atlanta landmark.
Six Takes on the GOP’s Midterm Drubbing
By Charles C. W. Cooke
Thursday, November 19, 2026
The morning after the Republicans’ disastrous midterm
drubbing, I got in my car and drove from Florida to Texas. Because I wanted to
do a little sightseeing along the way, I chose a route that took me through
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana. My journey
afforded me the opportunity to sample the many election-related billboards that
had been installed along the highway in the previous months. It also gave me a
chance to think, uninterrupted, and without others proffering their own
theories, about what had just happened, and thus, as my mood shifted, to come
up with a set of competing “takes” on the debacle. Here, for your delight,
distaste, approbation, or ridicule, are those varied — and often contradictory
— judgments.
The obvious take. It was gas prices in particular
— and prices in general. Those billboards I mentioned? They were the same in
every state. (Literally. They shared a design.) None of them mentioned the
party affiliation of the Democratic candidates on offer. Instead, the top half
of the board said something like, “The price of gas, rent, and groceries has
gone up $2,400 in Georgia this year,” and the bottom half said, simply, “Jon
Ossoff supports lowering costs.” How? That wasn’t explained — and probably
couldn’t be — but it doesn’t seem to have mattered. Another billboard I saw in
a few states reminded voters that Donald Trump promised to lower prices on Day
One, and instead, he embarked on a ridiculous tariff agenda and then started a
war without explanation or warning. Bad.
That the “Jon Ossoff supports lowering costs” message
seems to have worked may strike you as right out of Idiocracy. But if
so, what ought we to make of Trump’s similar vow? Or of his total failure to
follow through? Trump won in 2024 because Joe Biden was associated with
inflation and profligacy, and Trump’s party lost in 2026 because he came to be
associated with inflation and profligacy. There were other factors, sure —
people don’t actually like Trump, and his corruption has been grotesque — but
it was prices that suppressed Republican turnout, shifted independents, and
energized Democrats. If economic factors change between now and 2028, the
political environment may, too. If it doesn’t, Katy bar the door.
The depressive take. Whatever caused it, this is a
catastrophe. Democrats now have 56 Senate seats, which means that the
Republicans will be unable to retake that chamber until at least 2032 — if
then. This will prevent them from appointing judges — including Supreme Court
justices — even if, somehow, they were to win the presidency in 2028. But,
obviously, the Republicans are not going to win the presidency in 2028. The
Democrats are possibly heading for a trifecta, including another bunch of
Senate seats. This was 2006, and next comes 2008.
That means disaster. “Living constitutionalists” will
gain a majority on the Supreme Court and set about reversing the achievements
of the current originalist set. The Democrats will pass another entitlement, Ã
la Obamacare, that will never be repealed. And, depending on the size of their
win, the system itself could be overhauled. Institutional progressivism is
already talking about abolishing the filibuster and the Electoral College,
packing the Supreme Court, ordering a mass amnesty, and adding new states. Once
added to the current political trends — evidently, Arizona, Georgia, North
Carolina, and Texas are all getting bluer — these maneuvers could lock the
Republican Party out of power for a couple of decades, such that, when it
finally recovers, it will do so in a country that looks very different indeed.
The optimistic case. What rot! Politics moves fast
in America. This election has been compared to 1974. Well, six years after
1974, the Reagan revolution began. Just two years elapsed between Bill
Clinton’s generational loss in 1994 and his comfortable reelection in 1996. Barack
Obama prevailed in a landslide in 2008, then got clobbered in 2010, then won
again in 2012. Yes, this year, Republicans lost in places such as Mississippi
and Kansas. But in 2009–10, the Democrats lost Illinois and Massachusetts.
These things happen.
And hey, the problems that led to this wipeout are
fixable. Higher interest rates and gridlock in Washington, D.C., could fix
inflation. The end of the Iran conflict could bring gas prices down to normal.
The economy — which has problems but isn’t actually bad — could explode. Nobody
saw 1984 and 1996 coming, but come they did.
Oh, and those Democratic Senate seats? It’s pretty bad
that the Republicans lost Mississippi. But look at who won it. A
pro-gun, pro-border-security moderate. This isn’t just a numbers game. As of
next year, the Democrats will have 56 seats. But they won’t have 56
California-style seats. There would be a political price for abolishing the
filibuster, packing the Supreme Court, or whatever else they want to do, and it
is not at all obvious that the new senators from Kansas, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Mississippi, and Alaska will want to pay it.
Certainly, the Democratic Party romped. But look at the
state-level referenda. Almost everywhere, the results were conservative.
Florida reduced its property taxes. North Carolina reduced its income taxes.
Colorado and Washington State kept men out of women’s sports. Even California
rejected a wealth tax. All that, to put it lightly, is not the sort of
sentiment that translates into support for constitutional vandalism and a push
for single-payer health care.
The condescending take. The voters are a bit
stupid, no? I don’t say this because they voted against the Republican Party —
or, more accurately, against Donald Trump. I say it because they’re shallow and
fickle. Through both the last year of Biden’s presidency and the past two years
of Trump’s, they have convinced themselves that the economy is much worse than
it is. (Some polling shows that people are more unhappy with the economy now
than they were in 2009 — that’s ridiculous.) And they have no idea what the
government can and can’t do about it. In the space of just two years, we’ve
been through two massive shifts in preferences — first toward the Republicans
in 2024, then toward the Democrats in 2026. Why? Because the electorate seems
to think that it can vote its way to immediate gratification.
It can’t. Especially when the problem is the voters
themselves. Look at any issue polling and you’ll find that the public wants it
all ways. It wants taxes to go down but spending to go up. It wants to increase
Social Security outlays while reducing Social Security contributions. It wants
inflation to go away but for interest rates to return to the historically
abnormal rates that were caused by the financial crash. It likes the idea of
bringing manufacturing back to the United States but reacts violently to
tariffs and is busy trying to ban data centers. It wants more money spent on
schools but for its property taxes to be slashed. And, above all else, it wants
deflation — not for the price of a sandwich to stop rising but for it to
go back to what it cost in 2019. Of course our politics is chaotic. It’s being
driven by a bunch of drunks.
The “I was right about everything” take. Well,
wasn’t I? This repudiation of Donald Trump was inevitable because Donald Trump
is unfit for office. That’s not to say that, having won, Trump shouldn’t have
been evaluated rationally rather than opposed reflexively or supported in all
circumstances. But he should never have been nominated in the first place — and
he especially should not have been nominated in 2024. Does anyone think that
Ron DeSantis would have made the mistakes that precipitated this landslide?
That he would have been so brazenly corrupt? That he would have fixated on
ballrooms and portraits of autopens? That he would have so badly misread his
mandate? I certainly do not.
And isn’t the case for Trump looking a little shaky in
general? The argument, back in 2016, was that Republicans had failed by
refusing to get the debt under control, by prioritizing wars in the Middle East
over domestic problems, and by flirting with amnesty for illegal immigrants.
Well, we have a president who has been horrible on spending and the debt, whose
party just got wiped out in the wake of a Middle East war that it failed
utterly to sell to the public, and whose first instinct after the loss was to
tell 60 Minutes that he might want to work on an amnesty bill. So what
was the point of Trump? Any Republican president would have cut taxes
and nominated Federalist Society judges. Would any other president have been
such a liability while he did it?
The actual take. Ay, there’s the rub. What is my
actual take? The honest answer is that I’m not yet sure. One of the key
mistakes that both sides have made in our politics in recent years is that each
has sought to push through to an ultimate and glorious victory instead of
understanding that free nations tend rather to muddle through. In all
likelihood, the next few years will prove all five of these takes correct in
one way or another, as well as remind us of Harold Macmillan’s enduring
insight: that, ultimately, all politics comes down to events, dear boy, events.