Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Alito in the Gap

By Kevin D. Williamson

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

 

Speaking at the American Enterprise Institute on Monday evening, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito offered a concise, intelligent defense of originalist jurisprudence—without originalism, the courts compel us to live under laws that lack democratic legitimacy inasmuch as the demos never voted for them—and made a related point about First Amendment free speech protections, inviting those listening to liberate themselves from the misguided belief that freedom of speech is rooted in moral skepticism, meaning, in “Who are we to say?”-ism.

 

The proper understanding is that we cherish freedom of speech—and of the press, and of religion, etc.—because we have great confidence in the moral necessity of denying to politicians the power of coercion in speech, religion, and conscience. As my colleague (and AEI fellow) Jonah Goldberg does not tire of pointing out, what is derided by populists as “procedural” liberalism is anything but morally neutral. Freedom of speech and religion comports better with human dignity than servility in speech and religion would. The point of insisting on due process and proper procedure in criminal justice matters is not to achieve some kind of aesthetic harmony in the observance of procedure but to honor the moral necessity of treating those charged as innocent until they are proven guilty by evidence that meets a very high standard. We have laws about government takings not because we value the procedure for itself but because a state that can deprive citizens of property without control is a state that can—and, almost inevitably, will—oppress.

 

The value of the First Amendment is most easily seen by looking to the examples of jurisdictions beyond its protection. I do not mean backward places ruled by inscrutable zealots, such as Afghanistan, but ordinary, decent, liberal-democratic countries such as France, which is once again threatening to jail its most important contemporary novelist, Michel Houellebecq, for saying things of which the state disapproves. The formal charge is “complicity in incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence,” and the substantive matter at hand is criticism of Islam and of the cultural attitudes of certain French immigrants.

 

Houellebecq is a provocative writer who offends the sensibilities of traditionalist imams and postmodern feminists alike, though it is worth noting that his most savage criticism has always been directed inward, at the exhausted, hedonistic materialism of secular European intellectuals such as himself. His two most-read novels in the Anglophone world, known in translation as The Elementary Particles and Submission, are, in effect, the same story: the story of the end of the world for men such as Houellebecq as their self-centered, pleasure-oriented way of life fades away and is replaced by something else—a new humanoid successor species in The Elementary Particles and a new Islamist French society in Submission. Submission imagines France as a country that could be personified by a senescent libertine from a Philip Roth novel, while The Elementary Particles (the more interesting of the two interesting novels, in my view) imagines the entire species that way.

 

Houellebecq often says outrageous things during interviews, in part because he believes outrageous things, in part because he maintains a familiar literary épater les bourgeois pose, and in part because he has been known to give interviews while drunk. The question is not whether we should feel obliged to defend the things Houellebecq says—I feel no such obligation—but the old question of whether we should feel obliged to defend his right to say them.

 

The question of legally sanctioning a novelist for what he writes or says hardly presents itself in the United States. As Alito observed at AEI, American free speech jurisprudence has been pretty good under the influence of originalism and the attitude of liberal restraint advanced by such institutions as the Federalist Society, an excellent organization that is for some strange reason a hate-totem for Democrats. But such questions do present themselves in France, in the United Kingdom, in Canada, in Germany, and elsewhere—again, these examples are not exotic totalitarian backwaters but ordinary advanced liberal democracies.

 

God bless the French: They are, at some level, still the people who managed to have a brief riot over the choreography of Igor Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring in 1913, and it speaks well of them—in a twisted sense—that they still take their novelists seriously enough to persecute them. Charles Murray, who was present at Alito’s speech at AEI, was the last American to write a book that landed explosively enough on the American reading public (a precision munition is required) to become a genuine public controversy in the United States, and The Bell Curve wasn’t a novel.

 

There are three main intellectual strains that would undermine the American free speech model. One of these is the sharia-oriented Islamist demand for laws against blasphemy, a decidedly minority tendency in the United States, though there has been the call from the occasional Michigan mosque to ban the burning of Qurans. (To be fair, the proposal in question called for a ban on burning any sacred book.) A second is the “common good” jurisprudence of figures such as Adrian Vermeule, which amounts to constitutional jihadism with Christians rather than Muslims holding the whip hand. The third and most serious threat comes from progressive illiberalism of the sort known in German-speaking countries as Streitbare Demokratie, “militant democracy,” the principle that some ideas, associations, and speech are so dangerous that liberal-democratic norms must be violated in order to protect the foundations of liberalism and democracy.

 

Streitbare Demokratie, rooted in the experience of the Weimar collapse and the rise of national socialism, is the theory under which Germany and Austria may ban certain political books, political speech, and political parties. A version of that exists in the United States—it is the impetus behind demands for “hate speech” laws and speech restrictions based on the notion that some unpopular speech is inherently harmful. This reaches idiotic extremes pretty quickly and in utterly predictable ways, e.g., the notion that it is an act of actual violence to refuse to comply with the baroque etiquette, practically Habsburg in its complexity, demanded by gender ideologues. A French version of Streitbare Demokratie, in this aspect oriented toward the protection of minority groups, provides the political basis for the prosecution of a controversial novelist.

 

What stands between Americans’ civil liberties and European excesses such as the trials of Michel Houellebecq? Samuel Alito. Clarence Thomas. Neil Gorsuch. John Roberts. Brett Kavanaugh. Amy Coney Barrett. Elena Kagan, on the other hand, as solicitor general represented the government’s case in Citizens United, maintaining that the state has the right to ban the showing of a film critical of a political figure as a matter of civic hygiene. The same principle would empower the government to ban books and pamphlets, too, Kagan’s team argued, though Kagan, sensing that she was losing the court, tried to walk back the claim that the government can ban political books on the grounds of “campaign finance” regulation. It was not the high point of her career, and I, for one, still do not trust her with our freedom of speech, as admirable as she is in some other contexts.  

 

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” etc. It is a good thing we write these things down. An originalist judge is one who understands, as Justice Alito does, that we write these things down for a reason.  

The New York Times Tries Again to Read the Second Amendment Out of the Constitution

By Charles C. W. Cooke

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

 

At Reason, Jonathan Adler rips the New York Times apart for once again trying to read the Second Amendment out of the Constitution. This time, the Times is pretending that a key part of the Heller decision, penned by Justice Antonin Scalia in 2008, was predicated upon a misquote. As Adler — and others — have noted, the Times is simply wrong. Scalia did not make the claim that the Times insists that he did, and, by all accounts, the Times knew that when it went to print. Now, instead of acknowledging its error, the Times is using its PR department to go after those who have pointed it out. Classy!

 

The details of this particular mistake are quite complicated, and, if you wish to dig into them, Adler’s piece is instructive. But what interests me more than the particulars is that, after all this time, the enemies of the right to keep and bear arms are still trying this absurd game. As I have written many times, the notion that Heller “invented” the Second Amendment — either perniciously, or by mistake — is the legal equivalent of moon-landing trutherism. I daresay that, by this point, a good number of left-leaning people have come genuinely to believe in that trutherism. But it is trutherism nevertheless.

 

In 1989, Sanford Levinson wrote in the Yale Law Journal that:

 

the best explanation for the absence of the Second Amendment from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that component found in the legal academy, is derived from a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even ‘winning,’ interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation.

 

Fortunately, this tendency proved no match for the sheer weight of the historical evidence, which shows that, without a shadow of a doubt, the Second Amendment (like the 40+ state-level equivalents that existed prior to Heller) protects an individual right to bear arms, and always had. Writing a year before Heller, the Times’ own Adam Liptak observed that the now-crumbling revisionist case that the gun-control movement had developed in the mid-20th century had:

 

reflected received wisdom and political preferences rather than a serious consideration of the amendment’s text, history and place in the structure of the Constitution.

 

In 2008, the Supreme Court ignored all that, and, having seriously considered the amendment’s text, history, and place in the structure of the Constitution, ruled correctly that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” meant . . . well, “the right of the people keep and bear arms.” Its case was unanswerable. And yet, as the Times’ latest attempt shows, we are all still at the mercy of a bunch of ridiculous die-hards who remain desperate to find that elusive One Weird Trick that will finally remove part of the Bill of Rights.

 

That trick does not exist. One can not find it by butchering the preamble, or by pretending that Antonin Scalia wrote something that he plainly did not, or by falsifying the historical record, or by redefining the word “militia,” or by pretending that originalism works in ways that it does not. If the Second Amendment is to be excised out of the Constitution by judges, it will be not be achieved by scholarship, but by the exercise of raw power. The Times’ erroneous piece arrived a few days after the Democrats won a big political victory. Coincidence? I think not.

Trump’s Ukraine-War Realpolitik Isn’t Realistic

By Rich Lowry

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

 

There’s a place for realpolitik in American foreign policy, but it needs to be based on a correct appraisal of our interests.

 

President Trump’s policy toward the Ukraine war has the trappings of realism yet is too personal and too hostile to an embattled ally to constitute a true exercise in hardheadedness.

 

Trump has been a chameleon on plaid regarding the conflict. At times tough on Ukraine, at times tough on Russia, at times sick of the whole thing, he’s lately settled on an unsympathetic line against Ukraine and an accommodating one toward Russia.

 

Morally, this is perverse, since Vladimir Putin is the one who launched a brutal war of territorial aggrandizement against Ukraine. He has done everything he can to wreck the country and freeze and starve out its civilians during the coming winter.

 

Through pluck and technological ingenuity, Ukraine has found ways to hit back, targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure. Concerned with bringing down energy prices ahead of the midterms, Trump tried to broker an “energy cease-fire” and inveighed against Ukraine for its continued attacks on Russian refineries.

 

These strikes, though, are a chief means that Ukraine has to exact pain from its invader. Positing an equivalence between Russia and Ukraine regarding infrastructure attacks is preposterous; it brings to mind the old William F. Buckley line about the insanity of condemning both a man who pushes an old lady into the path of an oncoming bus and a man who pushes her out of its path for shoving old ladies around.

 

Ukraine has done everything it reasonably can to accommodate Trump, and Europe has stepped up in providing aid, just as we wanted. Still, we’ve yanked Ukraine’s chain by slowing down Starshield — the SpaceX-developed satellite service that Ukraine uses for its drone warfare — and reportedly ceased intelligence-sharing for a time.

 

Why? Trump considers Putin a big-time player and is meeting together with him and President Xi Jinping during his Asia trip. He clearly likes the idea of being part of a Big Three, the most exclusive club on the planet, strong leaders of powerful countries.

 

If he had his druthers, he’d probably enjoy breaking out his red pencil like Churchill in his 1944 meeting with Stalin where they allotted postwar Soviet and Western influence over Eastern European countries based on percentages (it’s known as the Percentages Agreement).

 

Zelensky, on the other hand, is surely a weak supplicant in Trump’s view. Besides, he played an (unwanted) role in Trump’s first impeachment, and he’s liked by all the wrong people. Admired by the Western media and European leaders, Zelensky might as well be a less-fashionable, Eastern European version of Justin Trudeau.

 

Trump must also think of the Ukraine war as an annoyance, something he inherited that has been the source of nothing but frustration despite his hopes of forging a quick peace deal.

 

Trump’s administration also has a vision of detaching Russia from China in a Nixon-Kissinger-type play from the Cold War. This probably underestimates the common anti-Western animus of Russia and China and their intertwined economic interests. Russia gets goods from China that it once acquired from Europe, while China gets energy, with no one caring about promoting democracy or advancing human rights.

 

Perhaps above all, Trump believes in his capacity to make deals. He’s always valued personal relationships and imagines he has one with Vladimir Putin. But he’s ignoring his own lessons about how to establish leverage. As long as Russia thinks Trump might dump Ukraine, or at the very least that it can string him along, it has every reason to keep trying to grind down its beleaguered neighbor.

 

The Ukraine war is unlikely to end soon, certainly not on terms that should be acceptable to the West. But there’s no need to overcomplicate what’s going on based on geopolitical bank shots or personal animosities. As Churchill once said, “I decline utterly to be impartial as between the fire brigade and the fire.”

JD Vance’s Shaky Tightrope Walk on Iran

By Philip Klein

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

 

Last week I laid out the political case for JD Vance to sit out 2028 given how difficult it will be for him to distance himself from President Trump. His interview on Laura Ingraham demonstrates just how difficult the Iran issue in particular will be for him to navigate.

 

Ingraham asked if there was any daylight between him and Trump on Iran, and Vance said there was not. “The President of the United States, he makes decisions,” Vance explained. “And obviously within the administration we have debates and discussions about what exactly to do. When the president makes a decision, he is owed a cabinet that helps implement that decision. And I think there’s no daylight between the president and any other senior member of the administration.”

 

Here, Vance is speaking to two audiences. He trying to argue that there is “no daylight” between him and Trump for the purposes of placating Trump and his supporters, while simultaneously signaling that he privately opposed the war.

 

At another point, he blasts “neoconservatives”:

 

[Trump] is not going to let this become a forever war. And the people who want it to become a forever war can attack me all they want to, because we signed up not to do this. We told the American people we would do no more forever wars. Yes, the president felt he had to destroy the nuclear program. And yes, the Iranian nuclear program is a threat to the United States of America. But we are not going to allow this to become a 10 or 15 year commitment or frankly even a two-year commitment, despite the fact that a lot of neoconservatives and a lot of other people want us to stay there forever. We promised we wouldn’t. And I have full confidence the president will get us out of this thing with great results for the American people.

 

Yet this is a straw man. Nobody is actually arguing that we need to remain in Iran forever. Trump is the one who just called off Vance from negotiations with Iran and claimed we don’t need a deal with the regime. He is the one who is pursuing an indefinite naval blockade of Iran. What’s happening here is that Vance feels pressure from his anti-war base who view Trump’s attack on Iran as a betrayal. Here, Vance is relying on the nebulous “forever war” term to maintain a kinship with them while claiming that Trump-Vance didn’t actually violate any promises. That they didn’t promise no wars, they promised no “forever wars.” This reminds me of when I was a child and my older brother bet me “100 doll hairs.”

 

It’s one thing to make this argument in an interview when you aren’t a presidential candidate. It’s something else entirely to do so in the thick of a race.

 

Vance can’t count on being such a prohibitive favorite that he’s able to skip debates as Trump did in the 2024 primaries. And if he gave an answer like he just did during an actual debate, he would be hit from one side, by people who give full-throated support to Trump’s Iran policy, and from the other side by those who view him as complicit for claiming “no daylight” with Trump and for parsing “war” from “forever war.”

 

It doesn’t matter if those candidates don’t necessarily win the nomination. Sometimes no-hope candidates can damage the candidacy of those seen as legitimate contenders. Chris Dodd drew blood from Hillary Clinton in 2008 over her flip-flopping on driver’s licenses for illegal immigrants; Chris Christie helped take down Marco Rubio in 2016 over his canned answers; Tulsi Gabbard did a number on Kamala Harris’s prosecutorial record in the 2020 cycle. So a lower-polling candidate with nothing to lose could expose weaknesses of a higher-polling candidate, creating space for somebody else or, at the minimum, creating a greater vulnerability in the general election.

 

Also, it’s worth marking down Vance’s “two-year commitment” timeline. Because if Iran is still in conflict by the time the presidential election heats up, that, too, could come back to haunt him.

Midterms Offer Conservatives a Silver Lining

By Jonah Goldberg

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

 

On CNN this weekend, Mississippi Sen.-elect Scott Colom said that his recent victory suggests we’ve made a lot of progress “in the journey to have people judged by the content of their character and not the color of their skin.”

 

Colom is the state’s first Democrat to win a Senate seat since 1982, and the state’s first black senator since Reconstruction. That statement was a symbolic win for conservatives.

 

Of course, I mean actual conservatives, and not some racist cranks on the fever-swamp right. For decades, conservatives have infuriated the ideological left by arguing that a colorblind policy on race was consistent with Martin Luther King Jr.’s call to judge people by the content of their character and not the color of their skin. Now a newly elected star Democrat concedes the point, at least rhetorically.

 

That’s not all Colom conceded. He’s praised President Donald Trump for securing the border, and he supports Second Amendment rights.

 

We’ll soon see whether his rhetoric matches his votes, but the simple fact is that Colom needed to say these things to get elected in a conservative southern state. I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt on his sincerity, but if Colom deviates wildly from his stated positions, he’ll have a rough time getting reelected.

 

But this piece isn’t about Colom. It’s about the political dysfunction of the last 25 years, which has been fueled in no small part by the activist bases of both parties. The hardcore left and the fanatical right have convinced themselves that the way you win elections is to capture the party’s nomination and then try to force your nominee on the broader electorate.

 

This strategy works in regions of the country under one-party rule. The Democratic Socialists of America successfully turned many blue districts, cities, and some states even bluer by winning the nomination. In places like New York City, Los Angeles, or Boulder, Colorado, if you have a D after your name, you win. Until this month at least, in Texas, Kansas, and, of course, Mississippi, if you had an R you won.

 

A version of this strategy has dominated most presidential contests as well. Win the nomination by capturing enough of the base and then work like hell to secure a narrow victory by turning out your base. The Democrats’ massive victory in the midterms broke that pattern.

 

Whether the Democrats seize the opportunity bequeathed to them by Trump’s staggering unpopularity remains to be seen. If they overread the returns and overreach—by trying to pack the Supreme Court or abolish the filibuster, for example—expect the GOP to recover far more quickly than the “extinction-level event” rhetoric suggests.

 

It boils down to a failure of imagination. The red and blue zealots have internalized the idea that the parties are vessels for their ideological purity. I still chuckle at a 2021 fundraising email I received from the No Excuses PAC—founded by former staffers of Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—promising that if they could just beat centrist Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin in the West Virginia primary, they would be able to deliver “the next AOC” in West Virginia. That state was no more going to elect an AOC-style candidate in 2022 than Mississippi was in 2026.

 

South Dakota Sen. John Thune knows how to read election returns. He recently said that if the GOP is to recover, “We’ve got to start talking to independent voters.” The response from Kevin Roberts, president of the Trumpified Heritage Foundation, was to lambaste Thune for his “swamp talk.”

 

“Running to the middle is not what got Trump popularly elected in 2024,” Roberts jeered, “but it is what got Republicans crushed in the midterms. Bold conservatism is what will attract independent voters and win elections.”

 

Actually, Trump got 49.8 percent of the vote in 2024 and would have lost without independents.

 

What partisan purists miss is that ideological victory isn’t synonymous with electoral victory. The point of ideological movements isn’t to win elections, but to win arguments. The surest sign your side has won an argument—even temporarily, as most victories in politics are temporary—is when the other side agrees with you.

 

That’s the irony of the midterms: Die-hard Republicans have virtually nothing to cheer for, because they measure success in electoral victories. But for principled conservatives, there’s a silver lining. Democrats in red states won by moving their parties rightward. Conversely, progressives should reflect on what it says that their margin of victory came at the expense of Democratic candidates distancing themselves from their ideological priorities.

 

Obviously, Democrats still have much to celebrate. But when the celebrations are over, it will be time to make arguments. Because that’s what politics is about.

UBI Breeds Dependence and Restricts Opportunity

By Joshua Bandoch & Kevin Corinth

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

 

Democrats seized control of Congress, in part by focusing on affordability and the economy. An AP-NORC survey conducted just before the election found that both were ranked top issues for registered voters, outpacing the next most important issue, health care, by about 15 percentage points.

 

The new Democratic Congress will presumably pursue policies that are advertised as ways to reduce the cost of living. One idea they should reject is universal basic income (UBI). Leftists have long pushed for UBI, and the idea is gaining stream among tech leaders. It’s a policy that would backfire by reigniting inflation and ultimately harming those it attempts to help.

 

In 2025, Representative Bonnie Watson Coleman (D., N.J.) reintroduced the Guaranteed Income Pilot Act, which would give 10,000 participants a monthly cash payment equivalent to the rent for a two-bedroom home in their zip code. In parts of New York City, that could be over $4,400 per month. Coleman’s federal proposal takes a page from over 120 pilots conducted over the past decade across the United States and one permanent program.

 

The impulse to expand these programs is fueled partially by forecasts of dire labor market scenarios brought on by artificial intelligence. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei predicted that AI could wipe out half of all entry-level white-collar jobs by 2030. While many economists argue that a dramatic transformation of the labor market would take longer to play out, workers increasingly worry their jobs could eventually be automated.

 

In light of their predictions, it’s no surprise that Amodei and other AI leaders (such as Elon Musk) have been supportive of UBI. Democrats and tech leaders could potentially form an uncomfortable alliance on it.

 

The stated goal of UBI is to help low-income people by providing a basic floor of financial resources, and to protect people of all income levels who might suffer in the wake of mass job displacement. However, history tells us that UBI-type policies encourage dependence and stunt upward mobility.

 

One of us analyzed 122 pilot UBI programs carried out across 33 states and the District of Columbia from 2017 to 2025. The pilots with the largest sample sizes — those with a treatment group of at least 500 participants — showed that program participants experienced an average decline in employment of 3.2 percentage points. One pilot, by OpenResearch, showed participants’ annual earnings fell by $1,900 as a result of dropping out of the workforce and working fewer hours.

 

It’s harder to climb the economic ladder when you’re incentivized to step down, or step completely off. When someone leaves the workforce, their skills depreciate, a gap opens in their resume, and their professional networks weaken.

 

The harmful consequences of reduced employment are also passed on to future generations. Benefits conditioned on parental work have a stronger track record of improving long-run child outcomes than unconditional benefits. Entire communities are better off when adults work. A UBI that reduces employment could inadvertently stunt upward mobility among children.

 

The fiscal consequences of UBI are equally concerning. Giving all 342 million people living in the United States a relatively modest $500 per month would cost over $2 trillion annually. A recent American Enterprise Institute report calculated that a more generous $2,000 monthly per-person check that phases out for higher-income households would cost $6 trillion per year, almost doubling total federal spending. These costs are in addition to the estimated $1.6 trillion the country already spends on social welfare. And they don’t account for how a nationwide UBI program would worsen inflation.

 

The best way to expand opportunity, while keeping the cost of living in check, is to ensure people have the incentives and skills necessary to thrive through work.

 

Our safety net should encourage work. When benefits from multiple programs phase out together, they effectively operate as a high marginal tax rate because each dollar is largely offset by the loss of program benefits. In extreme cases, earning more can make a family worse off due to benefit cliffs, which occur when a small increase in earnings leads a family to lose eligibility for benefits to the tune of hundreds (or even thousands) of dollars per year. Congress should provide states flexibility to flatten benefit cliffs across major federal benefit programs. Meanwhile, work requirements and time limits can mitigate work disincentives, while still providing benefits to families experiencing temporary setbacks. Recent expansions of SNAP and Medicaid work requirements are a major step in the right direction.

 

America also needs a career-first education system that equips students with the skills and experiences necessary to get hired, particularly in the age of AI. States should adopt a “one door” approach to integrate their workforce, education, and other human service programs so that workers can more easily get the help and skill development they need. Apprenticeships are an appealing strategy, with the average starting salary upon completion at $86,000. Apprenticeships aren’t just for blue-collar jobs. A wide range of white-collar jobs in fields like finance, technology, and health care are fit for recruiting and training new employees through apprentice-style programs.

 

The new Democratic Congress should walk away from the destructive path of UBI. They should instead seek out bipartisan pro-work alternatives that keep inflation in check, protect against financial hardship, and strengthen upward mobility.

A Big, Smoldering Metaphor for Putin’s Folly

By Noah Rothman

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

 

Vladimir Putin planned to waltz into the upcoming trilateral summit between him, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump armed with confidence, real or feigned, that his war with Ukraine would invariably end with a Russian victory. Instead, he has been humiliated.

 

The Ukrainian strike that collapsed the Kerch Strait bridge may be one of the most consequential actions Kyiv has executed in this war. It has been lobbing missiles at the span that connects the Russian Federation with the occupied Crimean Peninsula since Ukraine developed long-range strike capabilities (an invention of necessity that it did not possess prior to 2022). Those strikes had disabled the bridge, but the damage was reparable. This is not.

 

The destruction of this key bridge will have strategic and psychological effects.

 

First, it illustrates Kyiv’s increasing battlefield acumen. This sophisticated operation involved hundreds of drones that distracted Russian air defenses in advance of clinical strikes by ballistic missiles on the bridge’s structural weak points. That’s not an operation that Kyiv could have mounted three years or even one year ago. Ukraine’s capabilities are improving.

 

Second, the bridge’s failure further isolates Crimea. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is basically no more. Its merchant marine cannot operate safely in the Black Sea, and now, it cannot even escape the Sea of Azov — the only route out being presently blocked by the bridge’s remains. There will be no repairing the damage during active hostilities, either. That will make it far harder for Russia to supply its forces in Crimea with fuel, ammunition, weapons platforms, and personnel, to say nothing of providing for the peninsula’s civilian population.

 

Russians transiting to Crimea must now rely on either ferries or overland rail and road routes that transit through occupied Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts, both of which are deadly warzones. Crimea isn’t exactly cut off, but the peninsula has already struggled with shortages — including a fuel shortage over the summer that crippled its tourism-dependent economy. It will be a hard winter for average Crimeans.

 

But it will be tough for Putin, too. Much like Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes on Moscow, which compelled Putin to limit his public appearances, this strike demonstrates that Ukraine can not only reach out and touch its targets, but it can do so with devastating effect.

 

And this wasn’t just any target. This was the glittering jewel of Vladimir Putin’s expansionist project. Built after his 2014 invasion of Crimea, the nearly $4 billion bridge represented the physical manifestation of Russia’s hold over that territory. Its destruction is a metaphor, too. Its smoldering ruins represent the Kremlin’s impotence in the face of Ukrainian defensive operations and the impermanence of Moscow’s territorial claims outside its borders.