By Graeme Wood
Sunday, March 01, 2026
Celebrating or calling for the deaths of others is wrong,
and bad for the soul. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed yesterday by
Israel, did so just about every time he spoke in public for 37 years. He handed
out Death to Americas and Death to Israels the way other people
would say Yo! or How you doin’? The one time I saw him in
person, at Friday prayer at Tehran University in 2004, he ended his sermon with
these chants and then drove off literally seconds later in the back of an
armored sedan, passing so close to me that I could see his car had recently
been waxed. Many, many Iranians, as well as Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, and Ukrainians,
wish Khamenei could be brought back to life for just one minute, so they could
give him the finger, or maybe the whole fist. I missed my chance.
He was the enemy of many. But he was also an enemy to
himself, one of the Iranian regime’s points of vulnerability. During the past
two years of conflict with Israel and the United States, Iran experienced a
total failure of leadership. It has not experienced failure in every domain.
The regime’s missiles partially deterred Israel. Its institutions held fast and
didn’t collapse. No units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have
defected. But the leadership—that is, Khamenei and his tight circle of loyalists—have
performed shambolically.
Khamenei negotiated with President Trump in a way that
suggested he knew nothing of the current president’s vanity, or contempt for
multilateralism. Khamenei and his close advisers behaved, as Robert Conquest
used to say, as if controlled secretly by their enemies. They made blunders,
such as the decision to sit in a room together for a secret meeting, where they
could conveniently be killed in one go, and in the first hours of the war, by
an Israeli bombing raid. Israel and the U.S. somehow knew where everyone was,
as if they had a listening device implanted in Khamenei’s hearing aid, and
trackers installed in the Fitbits, Apple Watches, and artificial pacemakers of
every member of the Iranian high command. This intelligence achievement was not
only technological—the penetration of devices. It speaks to the basic failure
of the Islamic Republic, and of Khamenei himself, to provide a state worth
fighting for, rather than selling everyone out. Someone must have been
squealing. Khamenei probably appointed the people who betrayed him, and they
did so in large part because the regime he represented deserved betrayal.
Jaber Rajabi, whom I
interviewed before the war, was one such true believer in the Islamic
Republic who betrayed it after he smelled the rot. He was naive enough to
believe that he could fix the rot by reporting it directly to the supreme
leader. Instead he was swatted away, he told me. And if you imagine the small
failure of command that Khamenei’s response represented—and then remember that
there are probably many others like it—the infiltration of Iran’s top
leadership will be less mysterious.
Rajabi had, by 2015, come to doubt Iran’s policies in
Iraq. He had been part of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, and he said he
fought on their side because he favored the establishment of a Shiite theocracy
that resembled the one in Iran. He was perplexed to find that goal not
supported but in fact thwarted repeatedly by Iran. Iran wanted Iraq to remain
weak and submissive, and in the meantime, corrupt Iranian officials could suck
its resources, profit personally, and leave the country an impoverished mess.
Rajabi did not rise up through the normal means—and that
meant that he lacked some of the backroom knife-fighting skills that
distinguish other, more bureaucratic types. He therefore approached the issue
frontally. “I decided to take my proof of these activities directly to the
supreme leader,” Rajabi told me. (At this point I am obliged to note that the
story he told me is impossible to verify, but certain details make me think it
is nonetheless true.)
His previous acquaintance with Khamenei had been in
passing only: He knew Khamenei’s son Mojtaba because they periodically went to
Qom together for religious study, and the supreme leader knew him, if at all,
as one of his son’s friends. Rajabi was therefore reduced to meeting Khamenei
by ambushing him after evening prayers in his compound. Jaber says he brought a
dossier of incriminating documents. In the receiving line after prayers, the
supreme leader first addressed Rajabi by the wrong name (“Jabri”). After this
inauspicious beginning, Rajabi handed over the dossier. “I was shaking,” Rajabi
said. “I was so nervous.”
What happened next is predictable to students of the
dynamics of authoritarian rule. If you are supreme leader, admission that
corruption exists is a sign of incompetence, because you are responsible for
everything. There is, moreover, always incentive to promote incompetents,
because competent people eventually might get competent at removing you. The
incentives all work against the repair of broken systems and against efficient
management of hiring and promotion.
Khamenei was known to be displeased when asked to referee
disagreements between subordinates. He rapidly scanned the document’s executive
summary, Rajabi said. “Normally if you hand him something, he hands it to his
assistant.” This time he kept the document to himself, and tucked it under his
leg. That was the whole interaction. Within weeks, an acquaintance in Iraq told
Rajabi that Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force and the most
powerful general in Iran, had heard about the document and wanted Rajabi dead.
Over the next few years, Rajabi told me, he suffered multiple assassination
attempts, the last of them a poisoning that nearly succeeded.
Well, that’s one way to manage down. No one familiar with
the Islamic Republic will be surprised that the whole system was riddled with
people who believed in nothing but their own enrichment and survival, and who
achieved their exalted positions through mediocrity. Iran’s leadership was a
soft target.
The ironic twist in this tale of human resources gone
awry is that Khamenei was himself a talented leader in other ways. He looked at
first like a nonentity, a caretaker to stand in for his much more charismatic
and religiously accomplished predecessor. Instead he outlasted almost every
dictator of his generation, and he created a network of proxies so ferocious
that no enemy of Iran dared disturb it, until Israel decided it had no choice.
He fended off challenges, including popular uprisings, in part because he came
to power in a popular uprising of his own and knew instinctively how to
neutralize them. And now he’s dead, and all of those accomplishments are
crashing down, because the best-planned defenses don’t count for much if the
people you trust to run them are ready to sell you out.