Deterring Russia’s Threat to the Baltics

National Review Online

Monday, August 17, 2026

 

For years now, Russia has waged a shadow war against the West. It has used methods from sabotage to jamming airplanes’ GPS that fall within the “gray zone,” or below the threshold that would trigger an armed response, if only, in some cases, because it has been impossible to identify or catch up with the culprits. In recent months, the pace and the intensity of this campaign have been ratcheted up, as shown by the failed drone attack at Germany’s Leipzig airport last week.

 

Russian gray zone aggression has become more visible, partly to intimidate, but also to test. Moscow wants to see how far it can go without retaliation, but also to gain what intelligence it can from the shape and the speed of any retaliation. And there is something else. By accustoming NATO to gray zone assaults, Russia might be able to buy itself some valuable minutes (or more) of uncertainty in the event that Moscow launches an attack that goes beyond the gray zone. After years of relatively minor incidents, NATO’s defenders may initially be inclined to regard a larger drone incursion or cyberattack as yet another chapter in the history of Russian provocation. After all, on the night of September 10 last year, nineteen Russian drones flew into Poland.

 

It is worth paying attention to the ever-louder warnings from Western security services and elsewhere that a sterner test is on the way. There is growing concern that Russia might move out of the gray zone soon, perhaps by seizing — and retaining — a sliver of NATO territory. Such a move would be a powerful demonstration of Western weakness and, in particular, evidence that the collective defense arrangements set out in Article 5 of the NATO treaty are at best unreliable and at worst useless; Article 5, and the U.S. backing contained within it, form the glue that holds NATO together. If its deterrent power were to be significantly eroded, the result would be a blow to the cohesion of the Western coalition backing Ukraine. It would also bring Russia closer to its goals of reestablishing its sway over Eastern Europe and disrupting the Western European relationship with the U.S. Such a change would not make us any safer.

 

There are a number of candidates for a Russan landgrab. The two most likely, Narva and Daugavpils, are in the Baltic states, countries that are vulnerable because of their geographical position, small size and (unwanted) historical connections with Russia. Narva, Estonia’s third largest city, has an overwhelmingly ethnically Russian population and is located just across a river from Russia. Daugavpils, Latvia’s second largest city, also has a large ethnic Russian majority. It is only about fifteen miles from Belarus, a Russian ally, and is less than a hundred miles from the Russian border. Looking on the brighter side, Narva and Daugavpils are much better defended than in the past and their populations would be unlikely to welcome “liberation” by Russia.

 

There has been speculation about Russian operations against Narva, Daugavpils or both for years, but the reasons to think that they might come under attack in the near future go beyond Russia’s increasingly aggressive gray zone operations. The most important may be the way that transatlantic tensions, stoked by President Trump’s foolhardy campaign to grab Greenland and attacks on our NATO allies, have already weakened Article 5’s deterrent effect. On top of that, however paradoxical it may seem, Russia’s struggles in Ukraine and the increasing cost to it of Ukrainian counterstrikes may tempt the Kremlin to open a potentially useful “second front” in the West. Putin may also sense a window of opportunity. The U.S. is entangled in the Iran war, and stocks of some of our key munitions are running low. Meanwhile, although Western Europe is rearming, that process has a long way to go. It should be said that the Baltic states already spend 5 percent of GDP on defense, a total that is set to rise.

 

If Russia attempts an incursion into the Baltic states or anywhere else in NATO, the Western response should be broad and robust (Ukraine is one obvious pressure point). To accept even the loss of a small amount of territory would set a terrible precedent. It would be an invitation to far greater disaster, and not just in Europe.

 

But the U.S. should do everything it can to deter any such Russian adventurism before it is even attempted. That will be best achieved by unambiguously reaffirming our commitment to the Atlantic alliance. Any planned withdrawals of American military personnel or materiel from Europe should be stopped. Boosting our presence and that of other NATO states in the Baltic area would be prudent. We should maintain or increase our support for Ukraine.

 

NATO should also toughen its defenses against gray zone operations, operations that can, incidentally, take place in this country too. Picking nonsensical fights with our European allies (Greenland comes to mind) obviously should be avoided. We should continue to “encourage” the Europeans to take more responsibility for their own defense. That they are starting to do so (something for which Trump can take considerable credit) is overdue and welcome.

 

And both the U.S. and the EU should accept that a tough battle over trade should not be allowed to undermine our joint struggle against a dangerous enemy at a very dangerous time.