Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Apocalypse Adjourned

By Abe Greenwald

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

In 2022, a geography professor named Matthew T. Huber published a book titled Climate Change as Class War: Building Socialism on a Warming Planet. In another age, it might have been strange for an actual scientist to write a book about exploiting his field of study to foment a global socialist revolution. But this is the age we live in. 

 

On Saturday, Huber published an essay in the New York Times arguing that campaigning Democrats should drop the whole climate-change issue after all. He recognizes that it’s not at the top of most Americans’ list of concerns and that working-class voters, in particular, really don’t care about it. In other words, climate panic has turned out to be a poor catalyst for socialist mobilization. 

 

And socialism is clearly more important to Huber than is the prospect of a warming planet. “Democrats will surely continue to propose policies calling for jobs and public investment,” he writes, “but it’s not clear why climate should be at the center.” 

 

That’s interesting, isn’t it? After 20 years of telling us that climate change is the most important crisis facing all of humanity, the doom-mongers now say they just don’t get what the big deal is.

 

This is all amusing as a tale of raw political opportunism. But there’s more to the story. 

 

On April 29, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) came out with its latest round of projected climate scenarios. The leading global authority on climate change now says that, owing to changes in climate policy, lower emissions, and the availability of renewable energy sources, the most extreme global-warming scenarios “have become implausible.”  

 

Which is to say that the actual “inconvenient truth” has been revealed at last. The dominant climate models were garbage, and the horror story that we’ve been fed for decades is kaput. So if the conventional wisdom on the left suddenly dictates a pivot away from climate change, the pivoters might know more than they’re letting on. 

 

Not that you’d know this from outlets like the New York Times. The paper hasn’t said a word about our having avoided the climate apocalypse. In fact, today, two days after Huber’s piece on the political liability of climate change, the Times published an opinion article stating: “Ecologists warn that in just 25 years, more than 70 percent of the Southwestern needle leaf evergreen forests, which include ponderosa pines, may be replaced by grass in what might qualify as the first significant post-climate change landscape in America.” Without the shade provided by all these doomed trees, snow will supposedly evaporate instead of feeding rivers and streams. The author calls this “a sign of a catastrophic feedback loop beginning to form.” 

 

So left-liberal candidates should avoid discussing climate change while left-liberal news consumers should continue to be fed climate catastrophe? This makes more sense than one might realize. Democratic candidates are freed up to focus on issues that Americans care about, while the media supply their constituents with the left-wing doom-porn they desperately crave. That’s what you call a good model.

Journalism Succumbs To Its Wounds

By Seth Mandel

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

The famous saying attributed to Jean-Paul Sartre holds that “the anti-Semite doesn’t accuse the Jew of stealing because he actually believes he stole. He accuses the Jew of stealing because he enjoys watching the Jew empty his pockets to prove his innocence.”

 

That is no doubt as true today as ever, regardless of the quote’s origins. And it immediately comes to mind when watching, in real time, the evolution in the latest in a long line of accusations about the nefarious trained militarism of Zionist animals. Whereas many of these rumors—my favorite being the griffin vulture that Arab governments claimed had been trained as a Mossad spy—had an air of levity about them, the new one most certainly does not. And that is the idea that Zionist dogs are trained to rape Arabs.

 

The anti-Zionist activists who started or popularized the rumors have made clear that there is no evidence in their favor. That didn’t stop the sick-minded anti-Israel protesters from adopting the talking point, as demonstrators did in London. From there, however, it has moved to the pages of the New York Times, where Nicholas Kristof repeats it.

 

I watched other sensational “reports” of Israeli perfidy circulate among people who treated them as fact recently and thought about how the question of whether Western journalism will ever recover from its alliance with the machinery of Hamas propaganda appears to have been answered. No.

                                                                        

I saw a video of a woman wearing a “PRESS” vest in Southern Lebanon, (though her bio lists no affiliation) and proceed to read a list of talking points off of a card and then say “I just received a heartbreaking report”—please note the wording—of an Israeli drone following a girl riding a scooter and shooting at her until she was mortally wounded.

 

Usually the reporter reports. But when it comes to Israel, activists costumed as journalists “receive” reports and then continue the game of telephone. “Somebody told me” is not reporting, but you can report out what somebody told you. Reporters know the difference, or should.

 

Anyway I only saw this because Leighton Woodhouse, the conservative activist and filmmaker, repeated it, ironically calling it “real life” despite there being no claims of corroboration even by the activists pushing the story.

 

Perhaps because I spent formative years of my career as a real reporter I’m just over-sensitive about this stuff. Perhaps if you “identify” as a reporter then that’s what you are.

 

But then we get to another aspect of the same set-piece scandal. In March, Salo Aizenberg, a board member at HonestReporting and among the most meticulous researchers on the conflict, wrote an article about 10 Gaza “journalists” who turned out to be combatants from Hamas and other local terrorist groups. Aizenberg noted that there were 35 such cases so far, and that independent analysis has found that “60% of those described as ‘journalists’ or ‘media personnel’ had documented ties to militant organizations.” In other words, the majority.

 

Aizenberg began his list with Yacoup Al-Borsh, a Hamas figure that the Committee to Protect Journalists listed as a journalist slain by Israel during the conflict. After publication of Aizenberg’s article, CPJ removed Borsh from its list, apparently with no explanation.

 

This well-documented phenomenon of supposed “civilians” actually being part of Gaza’s various armed forces—in other words, the invading army—goes well beyond journalists. For example, the New York Post just revealed that USAID has found four more employees of the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency who were involved in the grisly crimes of October 7. “The recent investigation by the USAID IG confirms that the UN is deficient in vetting its own staff for ties to terrorist organizations,” an official told the Post.

 

I wrote about this in 2024 in a post titled “Gaza, Land of Make-Believe,” describing the enclave as a place where doctors who aren’t actually doctors work in hospitals that aren’t really hospitals, where journalists aren’t journalists and aid workers aren’t aid workers and teachers aren’t teachers. The problem is that it’s easy for an organization like CPJ to quietly delete someone’s page from a false list well after the fighting stops and the hoax has outlived its usefulness. So that’s what they do.

 

And “reporters” do the same, and continue to do so, as recent events show. I used to ask if there were any journalists at all in Gaza, but Gazans might ask the same about the rest of the world.

The Road to Perdition

By Nick Catoggio

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

Liberalism cares about process, postliberalism cares only about results. That creates an asymmetry.

 

In a liberal system, postliberal factions can get their way by following the prescribed rules for changing policy. Win elections, pass laws, stay within the bounds of the Constitution, and they’re free to implement the mass-deportation program of their dreams.

 

In a postliberal system, the ruling regime writes the rules so that liberal factions can’t get their way. In some cases, like China, that means Tiananmen Square and gulags for dissenters. In less extreme examples, like Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, it meant stacking the electoral deck against opponents—converting the media into house organs for the government, for instance, and turning economic and bureaucratic institutions into arms of the ruling party.

 

The dilemma for liberals in a country that’s slouching toward postliberalism is deciding how long they should tolerate that asymmetry before it places them at an irreversible disadvantage. If postliberals are rewriting the rules to give themselves a permanent structural hold on power, when should liberals abandon their commitment to procedural norms and switch to a more ruthless results-oriented politics of their own to thwart their enemy?

 

I ask because I suspect last week’s court ruling in Virginia has finally pushed the left past that point with respect to the judiciary.

 

On Friday, the Virginia Supreme Court invalidated the state’s ballot referendum authorizing the Democratic-controlled General Assembly to redraw House maps. The old map gave the ruling party a 6-5 advantage; the new one would have expanded it to 10-1. Mid-decade redistricting is very much a violation of traditional norms, but Virginia’s left-leaning electorate was merely fighting fire with fire. After all, Republicans in Texas had already crossed the Rubicon last year when they gerrymandered their own state to try to maximize the number of GOP-held House seats.

 

Insofar as it rewrote procedural rules to favor the ruling party, the Virginia referendum was an exercise in postliberalism. But it had a vaguely liberal justification: As long as both parties are free to favor themselves in states they dominate, neither is creating a permanent structural disadvantage for the other at the national level. The rules apply equally, and each side is capitalizing. There’s no unfairness.

 

The Virginia ruling will detonate that belief. Which is ironic.

 

It’s ironic because the decision itself is a textbook example of liberal reasoning, prioritizing process over results, yet the outrage it’s caused on the left will create a biblical disaster for liberalism in the United States in the long run. Court packing is the single stupidest idea that Democrats have, but if there was anything still holding them back from it before Friday, I doubt there is now.

 

Context is everything.

 

Outcomes are fair if and only if they’re reached via the process codified in law: That’s liberalism, and that’s why the Virginia Supreme Court invalidated the referendum.

 

Virginia law specifies that if the General Assembly wants to amend the state constitution, it must approve the amendment at two separate legislative sessions with an election in between. The first approval for the new redistricting initiative passed last fall, shortly before Election Day—but after early voting had begun. That was too late, the state Supreme Court held. Early voting counts as part of an election, so there was no election “in between” the first and second approvals.

 

Virginia Democrats failed to follow proper process, so the outcome they wanted doesn’t count.

 

In fact, the majority noted in its opinion, Democrats argued repeatedly during litigation that the court should wait to rule on whether the referendum was legal until after the vote was held. Their bet, obviously, was that the judiciary wouldn’t dare overturn the will of the people once Virginians had voted to approve the new House map. Forced to choose between rubber-stamping a questionable legislative process and nullifying an outcome with unimpeachable democratic legitimacy, surely the court would contrive a way to uphold the outcome by interpreting the law that governed the process flexibly.

 

Except it didn’t. Invalidating a successful ballot initiative with national political implications because the state’s ruling party cut a procedural corner in advancing it is one of the nerviest examples of classically liberal jurisprudence that I can imagine.

 

But that’s not the way anyone to the left of, say, Susan Collins will see it.

 

All they’ll see is that, in a national environment that was already ghastly for Republicans and is getting worse by the day, the GOP’s chances of holding onto the House somehow improved over the past month. That context is everything in understanding the Democratic backlash to the Virginia ruling.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the Voting Rights Act greenlighting redistricting of majority-minority districts could flip more than a dozen Southern congressional districts from blue to red, depending upon how redistricting in those states proceeds. That includes Florida, where there’s a chance that the state Supreme Court will okay a new, redder map despite the fact that the state constitution clearly forbids partisan gerrymandering. Combine that with the Virginia Supreme Court nuking four red-to-blue seats due to the vagaries of when an “election” officially begins, and the left finds its electoral prospects declining at a moment when its lead in the generic ballot is … growing.

 

Democrats will look at all of that and conclude that America is transitioning from a liberal system to a postliberal one, in which right-wing judges rewrite (or reinterpret) the rules to place the ruling party at a permanent structural advantage. “Republicans Don’t Need to Win Elections Anymore. They Just Need Their Judges,” Mother Jones’ Ari Berman declared after Friday’s Virginia ruling, and while that’s not technically true, it’s truer than it was a month ago. According to multiple election analysts, the events set in motion by SCOTUS’s ruling could see the GOP hold its House majority this fall even if it loses the overall popular vote—provided that it does so by less than 4 points.

 

A certain kind of conservative will roll their eyes and intone pedantically that there’s no such thing as a national popular vote in congressional races, which is true but entirely too glib about the consequences of all of this for public faith in liberalism. The less capable our system is of producing outcomes that the losing side will see as “fair,” the greater that side’s appetite for postliberalism will be. If a process-oriented politics can’t deliver fair results, its frustrated subjects will conclude that a results-oriented system is the only alternative.

 

To many, a court overturning a vote of millions of Virginians that went in Democrats’ favor on a debatable procedural technicality will seem unfair. A second court dominated by Republican appointees choosing to end majority-minority redistricting coincidentally at the moment the GOP faces an electoral debacle will seem very unfair. The fact that Donald Trump and his party have broken norm after norm over the last 10 years, yet have plainly strengthened their hold on power over the same period, seems especially unfair, making traditional civic norms feel like a sucker’s game and a path to perpetual minority status.

 

To paraphrase Anton Chigurh: If the rules liberals followed brought them to this, of what use were the rules?

 

On Friday, after the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion was published, even center-left normies were baying for judicial reform. The Democratic court-packing push is coming, beginning—but perhaps not ending—with SCOTUS.

 

The stupidity of court packing.

 

It’s already here, you might respond. It’s been here for a while.

 

True, and that’s a big hole in their commitment to liberalism. Some lefties were kicking around the idea after Ruth Bader Ginsburg died in 2020, and there was enough Democratic support for the concept in 2024 that Joe Biden proposed reforms to the Supreme Court as a campaign gimmick. (Although he preferred 18-year term limits for the justices to expanding the court.) Unquestionably, modern Democrats have been more gung-ho for court packing than Republicans have been.

 

But why would it be otherwise? Republicans don’t need to pack: They’ve dominated the Supreme Court for decades. Adding justices would cost the right more by delegitimizing the court’s rulings than it would benefit them by padding their majority. Democrats are in a different position, and so their calculus is different as well.

 

That calculus has gotten more radical in the weeks since SCOTUS’s decision on the Voting Rights Act. “Some folks are thinking [court] expansion, some folks are thinking [court] term limits or a rotation. I’m open to whatever—but I do know that there’s some real reform that needs to take place,” former Democratic Party leader Jaime Harrison told The Bulwark recently. He predicted that court packing will become a litmus test in party primaries, particularly in states like South Carolina with large black minorities who will resent being redrawn into red districts.

 

I understand the impulse, but I’m still flabbergasted that anyone would entertain it. Court packing is so foolish, and so pernicious, that I’m inclined to say it would be worse for America than anything Donald Trump has done in politics. The president has tried, and will continue to try, to destroy the constitutional order. Court packing would actually do it.

 

Even as a demonstration of partisan ruthlessness, I don’t see the point. What’s to be gained?

 

Any sentient human who lived through the tit-for-tat over filibustering judicial nominees during the last decade and the current tit-for-tat over redistricting will grasp that court packing would lead to the ne plus ultra of partisan reprisal cycles. Each time a party gained a trifecta in Washington, job one would be adding a few more justices to the court to offset the advantage gained by the other party after it added a few more justices the last time it had a trifecta.

 

Election cycles would revolve around court packing. If Democrats took power and added two liberals to the court in 2029, Republicans would campaign aggressively in 2032 on “rebalancing” SCOTUS by adding two picks of their own. If they won and followed through, the newly rebalanced Republican court would presumably overturn any liberal-ish rulings rendered prior to rebalancing. Democrats would have set off a judicial arms race for nothing more valuable than a few years of decisions that favored their side temporarily.

 

Meanwhile, the quality of Supreme Court nominees would collapse. Democrats would argue that it already has, but Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett delivered a big loss to the president on tariffs this year and are likely to deliver another on birthright citizenship, as Trump well understands. There are such things as principled conservative judges, although I grant that they’re rarer than they used to be.

 

Once the seal is broken on court packing, converting the judiciary into a mini-legislature, principle will become a liability. No longer will Republican presidents be able to take a chance on a first-rate but unpredictable jurist like Gorsuch, impressive as he may be; dependable outcomes will completely replace judicial philosophy as a measure of qualification, leading to Supreme Court shortlists populated by nothing but Aileen Cannons and Emil Boves.

 

The United States will have a significantly worse federal judiciary for it, and the public will notice. As much faith as Americans have already lost in the court, wait until the parties are locked in a race to the bottom to find the biggest hacks possible on their side to fill vacancies. Any sense that the Constitution means something apart from what the court’s partisan majority at a given moment wants it to mean will evaporate. Cynicism about liberalism as a system that follows the rule of law will explode.

 

The hackification of SCOTUS will also affect how the president behaves, and not for the better. Once the high court is dominated by toadies who’ll rule however their party likes, the White House will be emboldened to press its luck on executive power grabs that even Trump (so far) hasn’t pursued. If you want a more authoritarian America, normalizing court expansion whenever a party has a trifecta in government is the surest way.

 

Even the virtue of a comparatively modest reform like term limits for justices largely eludes me. Assuming that it’s constitutional, how do Democrats expect to benefit from it? Sure, they wouldn’t have Clarence Thomases on the court for 35 years in the future, but they wouldn’t have Elena Kagans potentially on the court for 35 years, either. And once Supreme Court vacancies become predictable, we’ll run into the same problem I described earlier about elections revolving around them. Presidential candidates will feel pressure to announce their nominee before the election, which will incentivize them to choose hacks.

 

We actually had a presidential election not long ago during which a vacancy on the court hung in the balance. A lot of conservative voters who didn’t care for Donald Trump decided that having him fill Antonin Scalia’s seat was nonetheless preferable to letting Hillary Clinton do it. How’d that work out for Democrats? In a world in which there was no vacancy in 2016, does Trump still win?

 

Think hard on that question. Because it’s distressingly easy to imagine Republican voters weighing a similar conundrum in 2032, with a figure even more loathsome than Trump atop the party, and letting a new Supreme Court court-packing arms race erode whatever few remaining qualms they have about being led by abject cretins.

 

The burning village.

 

All of this is to say that, if you wish for a more classically liberal America, trying to beat the postliberals at their own game is a funny way to go about it. It might solve the asymmetry that I described at the start of this piece, but only by conceding the debate with Trumpists over which system of government the United States should follow.

 

I understand why Democrats feel obliged to do that with redistricting, having had a prisoner’s dilemma foisted on them by Republicans in Texas and left with no choice but to keep pace in the race to maximize House seats. But redistricting proves my point: At the end of this, even if Democrats “win” by gerrymandering a few more seats than the GOP does, we’ll have a country in which all but a handful of congressional races each cycle are uncompetitive.

 

That means more partisan performance artists in Washington, more perverse incentives against legislative compromise, and more public nihilism about American democracy. Postliberalism is a civic cancer regardless of which party benefits in a particular theater of political combat. It always amounts to burning the village to save it.

 

It would be nice if Democrats realized that well enough to avoid crossing lines that the GOP hasn’t yet crossed, like court packing. They don’t need to cross it: With three Republican appointees on the current Supreme Court over 70, it’s possible that the next Democratic president will get to fill a seat held by a conservative. Maybe Clarence Thomas will hang on too long, as Ginsburg did, or maybe John Roberts will decide that he’s not so eager to have a Republican president name his successor given the state of right-wing politics nowadays. All the left needs to regain power on the high court is a few election victories and a little luck.

 

But you know what they’ll say to that: We’ve been patient. We’re in a crisis. There’s no more time. The political energy in the party is where it is. They’re probably going to try to expand the court in 2029 if they gain a trifecta, and if they succeed there’ll be nothing left standing between America and banana republicanism. If you’ve had your eye on any foreign real estate, I suggest buying soon.

This Is What It Looks Like When a Great Power Is Losing a War

By Noah Rothman

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

In the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States is “losing.” In fact, the president may have already “lost” his “disastrous and irrational war” with the theocrats in Tehran. Trump is reportedly chastened by his failures, and the far-reaching consequences that America will suffer as a result of this epochal setback are only beginning to come into view.

 

At least, that’s what we’re hearing from the highest echelons of American public life. Yet, as military historian John Spencer recently observed, these are subjective appraisals. Wars are not won or lost in the comments section, and victors are not determined by vibes alone. Rather, they should be “judged through military capability, economic endurance, political cohesion, freedom of action, strategic leverage, and the ability to sustain power while degrading an opponent’s.”

 

Those who want to know what it looks like when a great power is losing a war should look to Russia.

 

The “symbolism” of this year’s “diminished” Victory Day parade in Moscow is “hard to overstate,” read The Economist’s coverage of Vladimir Putin’s comprehensive embarrassment this week. Indeed, the downscale event, which featured none of the heavy equipment that typically lumber through Red Square, occurred without incident because Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (or, as Putin now refers to the head of the supposedly Nazi menace in Kyiv, “Mr. Zelensky”) pledged not to rain Ukraine’s long-range drones down on it.

 

Moscow’s downcast parade, The Economist added, was a metaphor for Russia’s increasingly frustrating battlefield setbacks. The Kremlin’s spring offensive inside Ukraine has already failed, the report contended. Last month, Russian forces experienced a net loss of territory they controlled inside Ukraine for the first time in nearly two years. Kyiv’s drone armada is striking ever deeper inside Russia. Moscow is now losing a staggering 35,000 soldiers per month to combat with Ukraine’s forces, contributing to the roughly 1.4 million total number of Russians killed or wounded by Ukrainian forces. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are putting pressure on its exports, which fell by 7 percent in April even as revenues generated from oil and gas sales climbed due to Iran war-related supply constraints.

 

“The stoicism and fatalism of Russian soldiers must be wearing thin,” King’s College professor Sir Lawrence Freedman told The Economist. “If the Russians have nothing to show for their efforts, I would not be surprised if in some places things start crumbling.” Yet, if Russia’s soldiers remain stolid, the Russian people are beginning to buckle.

 

“Something in the air has changed in Russia,” the Carnegie Endowment’s Alexander Baunov ascertained last week. “Now even loyalists complain about the mounting restrictions and repression, and once-upbeat businesspeople are now despondent.”

 

The Russian people, Baunov contends, increasingly chafe at the restrictions on their liberties imposed on them in pursuit of a battlefield victory that now appears to be unattainable. “Military growth no longer means increased income and opportunities,” he noted, “negative growth in the first months of 2026, judging by the commander-in-chief’s somber tone, amounts to a retreat.”

 

The outbreak of war proper in 2022 forced the various elite groups to unite in order to survive. Now the uncertainty over the war’s outcome is causing cracks in the regime’s foundation and ceiling, and the entire edifice is subsiding. Even if it survives, it will no longer look like it used to.

 

Looking back at Spencer’s criteria, they appear far more applicable to Putin’s Russia than Trump’s USA. Moscow does not have “freedom of action” on the battlefield. It has lost the ability to dictate the tempo of events. Its economy is shrinking now following several years of war-driven growth. If Baunov is right, the regime’s “political cohesion” is visibly eroding. Russia does not have the requisite “strategic leverage” over Ukraine’s foreign partners necessary to force them to sacrifice Kyiv. And Moscow’s ability to “sustain power” while degrading Ukraine’s is in doubt. Given Kyiv’s growing global prestige as the world leader in indigenous defensive drone technology, Ukraine has arguably eclipsed the Kremlin’s geopolitical influence.

 

Even those who are certain that Donald Trump has lost the Iran war would struggle to convince dispassionate observers that Iran is in anything resembling the position Ukraine presently occupies. Until they can, all the talk of how the president has led America into defeat should be taken with a grain of salt.

The Empire of Baloney

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

An item from NBC News: “U.S. and Iran exchange fire near the Strait of Hormuz; Trump says ceasefire still holds.” Wha? “The attacks highlighted the fragility of the ceasefire in the area around the Strait of Hormuz ....”

 

An item from the Wall Street Journal: “Muted U.S. Response to Iranian Attacks Deepens Gulf Fears About Cease-Fire.” Fears about what? More WSJ:The efforts to play down the attacks came as the Trump administration tried to protect a fragile cease-fire and keep peace talks moving forward.”

 

In the words of that great philosopher Jules Winnfield: “English, m----------r! Do you speak it?”

 

A ceasefire is what you have when the firing has ceased. There is no fragile ceasefire that “still holds” between the United States and Iran—we are in a shooting war. There’s no ceasefire—there is firing. A good deal of it. Donald Trump may no longer be threatening (let’s not forget!) war crimes and genocide, but it’s only Monday, and no one knows what the week will bring. I don’t think there probably is much of a market for media apologia from your favorite correspondent, so I’ll try to keep this part brief: There is a real challenge for reporters and editors, opinion columnists, and the poorly trained monkeys who evidently write the headlines over at nbcnews.com when it comes to covering Donald Trump and his grim, grubby little band of slavering sycophants, which is that it is difficult to write about people who simply lie about everything all the time, from the minor to the major, changing their story from moment to moment, saying the first thing that comes into their minds or whatever it is they think will get them through the next two minutes. The difficulty is in striking a balance between implicitly adopting the assumptions of the people who are lying to you (who you know are lying to you, and who know that you know are lying to you, and you know that they know that you know, etc. ad literal nauseam) and writing as though you were always performing a real-time fact-check in the background of whatever reporting it is you are trying to do or whatever argument it is you are trying to make.

 

And so we end up with reporters writing about the possibility that a ceasefire that does not exist will cease to exist, with legal reporters and analysts tugging at the nuances of the administration’s superficial and entirely thoughtless legal pretexts without acknowledging that they are pretextual, carefully considering the “qualifications” of nominees to high office who are reality-television grotesques and dancing bears from cable “news” programs, economic writers who studiously ignore the fact that National Economic Council director and ghoul-Muppet Kevin Hassett has been transmogrified into the intellectual version of whatever kind of lobotomized “—doodle” it is you get when the non-poodle part is Walther Funk.

 

It ain’t easy, I know.

 

Every now and then, I have a podcast conversation or a panel talk with a straight-news reporter who isn’t supposed to share his opinions about the stuff he covers, exemplifying a long and proud tradition of journalistic hypocrisy, and I’ll say something that is obviously true, e.g., “J.D. Vance is a throne-sniffing Luciferian gargoyle who would sell his beloved Mawmaw into white slavery if he thought it would move him a quarter-inch closer to the presidency,” and the reporter will do that thing where someone nods and says “No” at the same time and can’t help but laughing a little bit and says, “Well, I don’t know that I would put it exactly like that. ....” Or, less colorfully (if I must), when I characterize something the president or one of his toadies has said as a “lie,” and the reporter puts on his best Very Serious Man of Washington face and goes off slightly diagonally, insisting that the statement was offered “without evidence” or that it was “bluster” or “hyperbole” or whatnot.

 

But a lie is a lie is a lie is a lie is a lie.

 

That’s important for people in the journalism business, of course—if you can’t write or say that a lie is a lie, or if you feel compelled to treat an obvious lie as though it were something other than an obvious lie, then you really can’t do the work of journalism, whether you are an opinion-and-commentary guy or a straight-news reporter—but, more than that, it is important for us as free men and women in our roles as citizens in a self-governing republic. You can run a fiefdom on deceit, a kingdom on lies, and an empire on baloney, but you cannot long maintain a free society under the rule of law without a reasonably high baseline of honesty in the public conversation. Right now, we have a situation in which federal judges have decided that they can no longer assume that the lawyers serving the executive branch are not simply lying to the courts in their filings and statements. (The legal mumbo-jumbo for this is the “presumption of regularity.”) Once you lose that, you don’t get it back. Trump right now is trying to transfer $10 billion from the federal government to his personal bank account, and much of the commentary treats with strange respect the fiction that this is a lawsuit in which the president is, in effect, suing himself, if you take that “unitary executive” stuff seriously.

 

(Where is William Gaddis when we need him?)

 

The governments of free societies are based on consent, and there is no consent without trust. Trump is, of course, a pathological liar in his own right, but what is arguably worse is that he makes telling the most risible, shameful, and obvious lies a condition of serving in his administration, which is easy enough for a soulless wretch such as J.D. Vance, who already has lowered himself below the possibility of degradation, but consider how thoroughly association with Trump has corrupted—or revealed the corruption in—figures such as Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, John Thune, and Tom Cotton. 

 

Words matter. Some words take the form of arguments. Some take the form of promises. Some take the form of lies. And some take the form of equivocation. It is better to be direct.

 

English: Do you speak it?

 

Words About Words

 

Note to the former Department of Defense: I will cut you.

 

The U.S. Department of War (Except When It’s in Iran or When We Need Some Legal Ass-Coverage In Which Case It Certainly Is NOT a War) is winning one arms race, i.e., the weaponization of irritatingly stupid acronyms. Behold the “Presidential Unseal and Reporting System for UAP Encounters,” or PURSUE.

 

Seriously: I will cut you.

 

In Other Wordiness ...

 

Slate: “Does John Roberts’ Whites-Only Childhood Home Explain the Supreme Court’s Callais Ruling?”

 

Clowns. Shameful stuff.

 

And Furthermore ...

 

Mrs. W. is a highly educated and literate woman but not one typically given to literary flourishes of the sort for which her husband has a weakness. So when I texted to ask for an update on the children the other day and her answer contained both the words “shenanigans” and “antics,” I knew it was time for an in-person appearance.

 

Economics for English Majors

 

When we talk about competition in economics, we tend to talk mainly about competition among producers and among sellers: We talk about how firms such as Amazon and Walmart work to maintain competitive prices, we wonder how American companies are supposed to compete with subsidized or protected competitors in China or the European Union, and we celebrate the role of competition in achieving economic efficiency and providing consumers with lower prices and more choices.

 

And that’s all true. But we also compete—often in a much more significant way—as consumers.

 

One of the stress-inducing aspects of what we call, for lack of a better word, globalization is that Americans (and local consumers everywhere) compete more directly with buyers from around the world than they did a generation ago. You can see this most dramatically illustrated in the case of limited-edition products or goods that are by nature produced in relatively small numbers.

 

Thirty years ago, a guy looking to buy a Rolex in Dallas was mostly competing with consumers who lived within easy driving distance of the local Rolex dealer, which typically would have a selection of most models in stock and for sale at the authorized-dealer price. But the rise of Internet-enabled global commerce means that the same guy in Dallas is now competing with every potential buyer everywhere in the world who wants that same watch, which produces some perverse results: absence of stock at authorized dealers and prices on the secondary market that far exceed authorized-dealer prices, meaning that buyers are left to pay two or three times the notional dealer price for secondhand goods. (There is an Audemars Piguet watch boutique that I have popped my head into a few times over the years that is fully staffed up and that has never, as far as I have seen, had any inventory in stock for sale.) It’s the same with limited-edition sneakers or Ferraris and things like that—but it also is the case with non-exotic goods such as jet fuel and houses and workers.

 

The increase in home prices, owing in no small part to barriers to construction in the markets where the jobs and opportunities are most abundant, has led to a growth in investor-owned rental properties, with private-equity funds and financial firms buying up single-family homes and operating lucrative rental businesses. This has produced a great deal of angst and rage among would-be homebuyers and the politicians who are sensitive to them, but, so far, no one seems to be listening very carefully to the market, which is saying: We need to build more houses in Austin, Boston, Silicon Valley, and other places where people want to live. The same firms that are investing in rental businesses presumably would invest in building new houses and selling them if it were as lucrative, but it isn’t—at least in many markets at this time. If you want to make housing more abundant, then the thing to do is to make housing more abundant. More is more.

 

The same holds true with firms that complain about a lack of workers in fields such as construction trades and other skilled blue-collar work. There isn’t a shortage of would-be workers in these fields, any more than there is a shortage of would-be agricultural workers or would-be hotel-room cleaners: The problem is that would-be employers are not offering sufficiently high wages for these jobs. “Americans just won’t do these jobs!” comes the cry from the farm lobby or the hotel industry, but that is not quite right—Americans won’t do those jobs at the wages the farmers and hoteliers wish to pay. The economic arguments for turning a blind eye to illegal immigration are particularly vexing: If you cannot run a profitable business without systematically breaking the law, then you don’t have a business at all, properly speaking—you have a criminal enterprise. If a hotel cannot operate profitably while paying market wages, then the problem isn’t maids and porters who do not wish to work for sub-market pay—the problem is to be found in economic conditions peculiar to that industry.

 

The same politicians who tax and regulate the crap out of every business from cosmetologists (2,100 hours of education required in Iowa) to plumbers (in many states, becoming a master plumber involves more years of education than going law school) rarely if ever stop to think about how these costs could put downward pressure on wages, to such an extent that otherwise law-abiding businessmen become habitual criminals when it comes to labor and immigration law. But we pile up costs on businesses and then talk as though the problem with the hotel industry is that people who clean rooms are getting paid too much.

 

On both sides of the transaction, we tend to talk as though the other party had all the power: The argument for minimum-wage laws and mandatory employer-provided benefits is based on the assumption that workers don’t really have much choice and have to take whatever the bosses are offering them, which not only isn’t true for highly skilled and in-demand workers but also is true for less-skilled workers, as anybody who has ever tried to hire a babysitter (ahem) can tell you: The minimum wage where I live is $12.77, but good luck finding childcare at that rate unless you want to leave your children in the care of hobos. Similarly, we often talk about producers and retailers as though they had unilateral price-setting power, e.g., the old saw about companies “simply passing on costs” to consumers, which is far from a simple thing when consumers have choices, especially in highly price-sensitive markets such as fast food or inexpensive clothing.

 

Global shipping has become much more efficient over the course of several decades. That means that consumers have a lot more choices and, in many cases, enjoy lower prices for manufactured goods. It also means that it is a lot easier to redirect a gallon of jet fuel or gasoline from North American consumers to Asian or African consumers if that’s what the market wants. That’s why even with our splendidly productive domestic energy industry, Americans are not sheltered from shocks to the petroleum markets—which is only fair, since the current big ugly shock was caused by Americans, who are really smart and creative as entrepreneurs and absolute blockheads as voters.

 

In 2024, a rare Star Wars doll sold for more than $1.3 million. It wasn’t a one-of-a-kind, but pretty rare: About 25 are thought to exist. But scarcity is a real thing, and, from that point of view, everything from a gallon of gasoline to a pair of socks is a limited edition—and, at some margin, the economics are going to reflect that. If you want more, then think twice before you vote for politicians who get in the way of more.

 

In Closing

 

I don’t think I would have liked the late Ted Turner, though I did once spend a few happy hours wandering around one of his vast properties in Montana. Turner may have had some silly political views but, God bless him, he put his money where his big ol’ mouth was when it came to land conservation. And I suppose somebody was going to create the 24-hour news cycle if he hadn’t got to it first. Turner was the best friend the American bison has had since Charlie Goodnight, with 51,000 shaggies roaming more than 2 million acres. As legacies go, that is magnificent.

The Left Suddenly Cares Very Little About Misinformation

By Noah Rothman

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

‘There’s no guarantee to free speech on misinformation or hate speech, and especially around our democracy,” Minnesota Governor Tim Walz once insisted. That was hardly a marginal outlook within the Democratic Party. “Misinformation can erode people’s confidence in elections,” Connecticut’s deputy secretary of state, Scott Bates, agreed, “and we view that as a critical threat to the democratic process.” He and his fellow Democratic officials warned that false political narratives are often promoted by hostile foreign powers, and they can lead the unstable to violently lash out at their surroundings. In their report on the “crisis of disinformation and misinformation” in America, Joe Biden’s advisers pledged to “counter the influence and impact of dangerous conspiracy theories that can provide a gateway to terrorist violence.”

 

These and other Democrats were wrong to contend that Americans’ civil rights were contingent, but they had reason to worry that those who are susceptible to suggestion are liable to act on their delusions. Today, however, that urgent mission has fallen out of fashion on the left. The self-appointed disinformation police have disbanded, and the mechanisms that were once devoted to countering false but popular narratives have sputtered to a halt. It’s no coincidence that this sudden outbreak of lethargy coincides with the growing appeal of misinformation among Americans on the left.

 

It was not surprising that Donald Trump’s third attempted assassin was, by his own admission, inspired by some of the many spurious but trendy allegations of misconduct that orbit around him. What was surprising was that CBS News anchor Norah O’Donnell thought the president had to respond to his would-be killer’s deranged ramblings.

 

“What’s your reaction to that?” O’Donnell asked Trump after she read from a portion of the accused’s manifesto alleging that Trump is a “pedophile, rapist, and traitor.” In an earlier age, the alleged gunman’s actions would have sufficiently discredited him. Perhaps O’Donnell wanted Trump to address the charges against him because they are common currency in the forums in which the activist left cocoon themselves. Popular or not, though, the conclusions to which Trump’s latest attacker was wedded are unsubstantiated.

 

The notion that that the president is a “pedophile” is a faith-based assertion predicated on the presumption that Trump just had to have a more sordid relationship with Jeffrey Epstein than all publicly available evidence indicates. ABC News agreed to pay Trump $16 million to settle a defamation claim after anchor George Stephanopoulos falsely claimed that a civil court had found the president liable for rape when the jury in that case concluded the opposite. The accusations of treason, we must assume, stem from the left’s attachment to the assertion that Trump colluded with Moscow to get himself installed in the presidency, the extensive and unproductive investigations into those allegations apparently notwithstanding.

 

It would be inaccurate to say that these uncharitable assumptions about the president are exclusive to the left’s unrepresentative fringes. They are not. Indeed, rank-and-file Democrats are increasingly receptive toward paranoid conspiracism. That phenomenon was illustrated by a recent poll in which one in three self-identified Democrats said that they don’t even believe that the president was singled out once again for assassination at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner at all. What’s more, that same survey found that a staggering 42 percent of Democratic respondents believed the bullet that grazed Trump’s ear in Butler, Pa., was a carefully orchestrated act of political theater.

 

Perhaps Democratic institutionalists gave up on the fight against false narratives because that campaign had become inconvenient. After all, misinformation is what the base craved. There may be no better example of that tendency than the degree to which the left has become susceptible to any claim that implicates Israel in a misdeed.

 

In a New York Times op-ed over the weekend, Democratic Representative Josh Gottheimer accused his fellow Democrats of knowingly subordinating their scruples to their need to curry favor with a “small but vocal and growing segment of the political left making opposition to support for Israel a new litmus test.” Conveniently for Gottheimer, the Times proved the truth of his accusation the following day when it published an op-ed accusing Israel of training dogs to rape Palestinian detainees.

 

That’s an extraordinary claim that needed more evidentiary support in the paper of record than a handful of links to outside publications and social media posts. But for a certain cohort, perhaps the very activist class of which Gottheimer warned, no evidence is needed to publicize the notion that Israel is engaged in genocide, either by slaughtering the Palestinian population wholesale or by starving it into submission. The lack of evidence in support of these claims or the marshaling of obvious fabrications designed to advance the left’s preferred fictions about Israel never seem to generate much pushback from those who once policed the malicious untruths that came from the right. Why?

 

We all know why. The initiatives designed to anathematize right-wing myths had nothing to do with civic hygiene. They were political operations aimed not at contributing to the sum of human knowledge but, rather, advancing the interests of one political party. Now that it is that very political party that is beholden to its own preferred falsehoods, the threat posed by misinformation has suddenly become far less acute.

 

The Democrats may have forgotten just how committed they were as a party to policing the dangerous spread of misinformation. If they were ever honest about the motives fueling that crusade, if it wasn’t merely a cudgel they used to bludgeon the American right, then Democrats have an obligation to crack down on their own purveyors of disinformation. Until then, average Democrats will have to navigate a blinding fog of misinformation on their own.

Ignoring the Debt Won’t Make It Go Away

National Review Online

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

 

Fifteen years ago this week, John Boehner, the new Republican House speaker at the time, laid down a gauntlet in the pitched battle over raising the debt ceiling.

 

“To increase the debt limit without simultaneously addressing the drivers of our debt — in defiance of the will of our people — would be monumentally arrogant and massively irresponsible,” he told the Economic Club of New York on May 9, 2011. “It would send a signal to investors and entrepreneurs everywhere that America still is not serious about dealing with our spending addiction.”

 

Boehner’s demand in the same speech that any spending cuts be in the “trillions, not just billions” set the stage for a standoff that consumed Washington for months and rattled financial markets around the world.

 

Today, by any objective measure, the nation’s debt challenges are far more daunting than they were back in 2011, when the Tea Party generation of Republicans swept into power. In that year, in the wake of a major recession and President Obama’s costly response to it, the value of the debt held by the public had grown beyond $10 trillion for the first time ever. As of the end of this March, it has more than tripled to over $31 trillion. In 2011, debt reached 66 percent of economic output (significantly higher than the 39 percent in 2008). It has now exceeded 100 percent of gross domestic product for the first time since World War II. But there is really no parallel between the fiscal situation then and now.

 

In the 1940s, the U.S. was facing the temporary costs of responding to a short-term world-historical event. Once the war was over, the economy boomed and military spending retreated to peacetime levels. As a result, the debt was cut in half within a decade and continued to decline into the 1970s. In contrast, the U.S. now has a growing retirement-age population that is living longer and absorbing more benefits than ever before. On top of this, instead of returning to pre-Covid levels once the pandemic subsided, bloated spending has simply become baked into the budget. Thus, unlike the post-war period, the U.S. is on track to maintain massive and growing deficits for as far as the eye can see. For all the publicity surrounding them, Elon Musk’s DOGE efforts did nothing to change this trajectory.

 

What is particularly worrisome is that even though the debt crisis is much worse than it was in 2011 by any objective measure, the issue of containing the federal debt is barely detectable on the nation’s political radar. News of the latest dismal milestone of debt reaching World War II levels barely garnered attention. A combination of the progressive pull in Democratic politics and the populist transformation of Republican politics has put us in a situation in which neither major party is interested in even discussing containing the debt — let alone doing the heavy policy lifting required to address it. These days, talk about reforming entitlements — by far the biggest driver of our national debt — is likely to be greeted with as little enthusiasm on the right as it is on the left. Radical proposals from Democrats like the “wealth tax” would come nowhere near closing the fiscal gap if directed solely toward that purpose, but are being pitched as a way to fund vast expansions of the welfare state anyway.

 

For this reason, the problem is only going to grow worse. At some point in the next several years, debt will exceed the World War II record. By the time today’s newborns graduate college, it will reach 150 percent of GDP. The current elevated levels of inflation and interest rates will pale in comparison to what Americans of that generation are likely to experience.

 

Unfortunately, ignoring the problem won’t make it go away.

The Vietnam Problem

By Rich Lowry

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

 

Since Vietnam, there’s been a persistent impulse in our political debate to declare almost any military conflict another Vietnam.

 

So, let’s be clear — the Iran war is not another Vietnam. Not even close.

 

The Iran war isn’t a yearslong war of counterinsurgency involving hundreds of thousands of American troops on the ground engaged in bootless search-and-destroy missions.

 

That long-ago defeat, nonetheless, sheds light on our difficulty getting Iran to capitulate or to sign on to an acceptable deal, despite the massive punishment it is sustaining.

 

Vietnam demonstrated that military superiority doesn’t equal success, and neither does sheer ordnance or technical proficiency, especially in a limited war against a foe with a fanatical political will alien to American sensibilities.

 

Now, it’s always possible that the Iranians, ground down by the air campaign and ongoing blockade, cry “uncle” at some point. Certainly, the blockade allows us to impose more comprehensive economic pain on Iran, with limited military cost, than we did on the enemy in Vietnam with the exception, perhaps, of the 1972 mining of Haiphong Harbor. (The converse is that the North Vietnamese had no power to disrupt the global economy.)

 

There’s no doubt that we’ve demonstrated a military preeminence over Iran, just as we did over North Vietnam. We have long been good at blowing stuff up and are better at it now than ever.

 

The problem comes when we run into an enemy that has a high threshold for pain and is determined to outlast us, while we make what we hope will be a time-limited commitment, seek to avoid escalations that carry unpredictable risks, and operate from a tenuous base of domestic political support in the United States.

 

This is why we can utterly dominate our adversaries and still succumb to asymmetric campaigns of attrition; it explains, in short, why in the post–World War II era, we haven’t lost battles, only wars.

 

It’s likely that President Trump launched the Iran war believing he could force a quick understanding with the Iranians based on the belief that they are, ultimately, rational interlocutors — the Persian equivalent of a construction contractor with whom he’d dealt hundreds of times in the course of building a tower or golf course.

 

Of course, though, the Islamic Republic is not fundamentally transactional; it is a profoundly serious ideological project grounded in Shia Islam.

 

What is called “mirroring” in international relations — the belief that an adversary shares our essential characteristics — has been a persistent failing of U.S. foreign policy over the last 60 years.

 

If Trumps tends to think any foreign actor is recognizable from the world of New York real estate, LBJ wanted to believe that the Vietnamese might act like FDR Democrats. “My God, I’ve offered Ho Chi Minh $100 million to build a Mekong Valley,” he said at one point, adding, “If that’d been George Meany, he’d have snapped at it.”

 

Foreign policy adviser Robert Komer said that the president “felt no particular need to delve into what made the Vietnamese Vietnamese — as opposed to Americans or Greeks or Chinese.”

 

And why worry about any of that if we had the ultimate solution to the conflict?

 

As Max Boot notes in his book on America’s small wars, The Savage Wars of Peace, when queried by a reporter about how the Americans would defeat the Viet Cong insurgency, General William Westmoreland responded simply: “Firepower.”

 

We possessed it in abundance. Boot writes: “The U.S. side had sensors, ground radar, infrared equipment, defoliants, herbicides, cluster bombs, missiles of various varieties, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery of various calibers, naval vessels ranging from small patrol boats to giant nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and of course all the aircraft – everything from B-52 bombers to UH-1 Huey helicopters to specially fitted C-47 airplanes known as Puff the Magic Dragon equipped with automatic machine guns capable of spitting out 6,000 rounds a minute.”

 

In 1965, LBJ launched an air campaign called Rolling Thunder, which was supposed to last for weeks, but instead went on for years. He stopped repeatedly to demonstrate our goodwill and give the North Vietnamese a chance to come to their senses and negotiate a deal. LBJ paused Rolling Thunder for five days in May 1965 for this purpose, and got nothing. He stopped for 37 days near the end of the year, and got nothing again.

 

All told, Rolling Thunder unloaded a prodigious amount of ordnance, roughly 800 tons a day for three and a half years, according to Boot. Throughout the entire war, the U.S. dropped 8 million tons of bombs, far eclipsing what we used in World War II.

 

Much of this was the equivalent of Joseph Conrad’s gunboat futilely firing into the jungle in The Heart of Darkness (itself, of course, the template for the great Vietnam War movie Apocalypse Now).

 

The target list in Iran has been much more discriminating, and achieved concrete goals of degrading the regime’s military and industrial capacity. But the idea that simply listing the number of targets hit, or saying we were “ahead of schedule,” somehow proved that we were close to achieving strategic goals — toppling the regime, getting it to give up its highly enriched uranium, reopening the Strait of Hormuz — smacked of the empty bean-counting that characterized the U.S. government’s defense of the conduct of the Vietnam War.

 

This method of evaluating the progress of a campaign is known as “the McNamara Fallacy.”

 

Again, it’s possible that the blockade at some point collapses the Iranian economy. Yet it’s quite possible that the IRGC is as fervently determined as the North Vietnamese, who lost 1.1 million, or 5.5 percent of their population of 20 million. The equivalent in the U.S. today would be nearly 19 million combat losses.

 

Trump has been careful to try to avoid U.S. casualties. On the one hand, this limits an Iranian asymmetrical advantage (a willingness to take casualties that we lack), but on the other, it forecloses the possibility of taking swift, decisive military actions that risk U.S. casualties — and thus extends the war.

 

This raises the question of staying power. We all know the supposed Taliban adage, “You have the watches, but we have the time.” George C. Marshall once said the U.S. couldn’t fight a Seven Years’ War; the media impatience over the Iran conflict has sometimes made it seem that, today, we are hard-pressed to wage even a seven-week one.

 

Our blockade is, without doubt, a clever use of U.S. asymmetric power. It is relatively low risk to us, while imposing disproportionate pain on Iran. If we could maintain it for the duration, we probably would grind the Iranian regime to dust. The problem is that Iran has an asymmetric power of its own — the ability, despite its vast military inferiority, to create enough risk in transiting the Strait of Hormuz that civilian shipping doesn’t want to attempt it.

 

Time is on our side in that the Iranians are experiencing more direct and more grievous costs; time is on their side in that the political tolerance in the U.S. for an extended conflict is low, especially given that very little public case was made for the war in advance and it started out unpopular (the Vietnam and the Iraq wars were on much firmer ground at their inceptions).

 

If we end up in an unsatisfactory place, it will be because our many tactical victories didn’t add up to the hoped-for strategic effect and we didn’t have the requisite will — either the willingness to escalate, or to persist — to make the Iranians buckle.

 

It is a story as old as time, and familiar to Americans from the course of a number of our limited wars over the last 70 years.

Why Nigel Farage Will Never Be Prime Minister

By John Gustavsson

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

 

Last Thursday, local elections were held across much of the United Kingdom. Nigel Farage’s Reform UK party emerged as the big winner, gaining more than 1,400 seats and securing control of 14 out of the 136 local councils where elections were held. With a projected national vote share of 26 percent, Reform became the largest party by far.

 

But despite this astonishing success, Nigel Farage will never be Britain’s prime minister.

 

To understand why, one must first understand Farage’s modus operandi. Since his political career began in the 1990s, Farage has operated as a “sniper,” popping up every now and then whenever he has sensed an opportunity, after which he would fade from the limelight for months — or years — at a time, preventing overexposure.

 

This strategy was possible because Farage was, until now, never considered a credible candidate for prime minister. He was rarely asked about his views on issues other than those he was known for, such as immigration and Brexit. Few journalists ever asked Farage about mundane, complicated issues — how he would balance the budget, or how he would cut wait times to the National Health Service.

 

With Reform UK now actually having to govern dozens of councils, Farage won’t be able to choose his moments and issues anymore. Instead, for the first time, he will be forced to defend the tough decisions the Reform-led councils will have to make. It’s all well and good to campaign on opposition to migrant detention centers and wokeism, but that alone won’t balance any budgets or fill any potholes. For the first time in his career, Nigel Farage will be forced to defend a record, instead of merely attacking others’.

 

Reform’s challenge is made even greater by the makeup of the councils it has just won. Most of them are British “rust belt” councils — with high unemployment, social deprivation, and fiscal deficits. These are not easily governed areas, especially not for a party inexperienced at governing.

 

Of course, if Nigel Farage had assembled an Avengers-style team of fiscal superheroes to run on his party’s ticket, this might not have been a problem. It could have even bolstered Reform’s credibility, if it were able to turn around the fortunes of long-struggling councils. But unfortunately, we already have an idea of how things will go down. Last year, Reform won a majority of seats on the Kent County Council, on a promise not to raise taxes and instead use a DOGE-style approach to identify waste and fraud. The latter was shelved, with Reform councilors admitting they couldn’t find any waste to cut. Instead, taxes were raised.

 

Rather than the populist Avengers, Farage’s party resembles an island of lead-painted misfit toys. In their desperation to run a full slate of candidates, Reform took to cold-calling members of the public, asking them to stand for the party. By now, it is clear that corners were cut when vetting these prospective candidates: Among those elected last week on Reform’s ticket are a Holocaust denier, a self-proclaimed believer in white racial supremacy, a man who referred to the Nazis as “real visionaries,” and even someone who suggested melting down Nigerians and using their bodies to fill in the potholes.

 

With candidates like these, it should not surprise anyone that more than one in ten of the Reform councilors who were elected last year have already left or been expelled from the party. Two of the five members of Parliament that Reform UK elected in 2024 have also left — one after being expelled, the other leaving of his own accord.

 

In fairness, it must of course be noted that Reform has padded its bench with several Tory defectors, including former cabinet members. Unfortunately, these defections have highlighted a problem Nigel Farage has struggled with throughout his entire career: his inability to share the spotlight.

 

As leader of the UK Independence Party, Nigel Farage convinced two Tory MPs — Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless — to join his party. He promptly fought publicly with both of them, and the latter would go on to re-defect back to the Tories. In a similar vein, Rupert Lowe, Reform’s most prominent MP second only to Farage, was expelled last year after months of public in-fighting. He has since formed his own party which is beginning to register in the polls.

 

When Robert Jenrick, a Conservative rising star who had lost the leadership race in 2024 to Kemi Badenoch, defected in January this year, Farage publicly humiliated him during the press conference announcing his party change, mocking Jenrick’s record in government and claiming Jenrick was “ashamed” of what he had done as minister of immigration. When Jenrick instead attempted to defend his record, Farage cut him off. At the same press conference, Farage announced May 7 as a deadline for Tories who wanted to defect to his party, clearly expecting that a firm deadline would cause a stampede. Instead, only one additional Tory — the long-ostracized former Home Secretary Suella Braverman — would go on to defect after Jenrick.

 

Nigel Farage’s inability to play well with others and share the limelight did not prevent him from being a successful single-issue insurgent, but it does limit his ability to lead the kind of broad political movement necessary to put him in Downing Street.

 

Some may push back and argue that Farage’s success in convincing a majority of the British electorate to vote to leave the European Union in 2016 is proof that he does have mass appeal. That, however, ignores that he was not part of the official Vote Leave campaign: Though Farage, in his own words, “begged” the Vote Leave campaign for a role, the official campaign made it clear they wanted nothing to do with him. The reason was cold, political calculus: The campaign knew, from its own internal numbers, that Farage’s polarizing “love-him-or-hate-him” persona was a disadvantage for a referendum campaign that needed to win an outright majority.

 

While he deserves credit for the work he did for Brexit over 20 years, without which the referendum may never have happened, this persona remains very much a disadvantage for Farage now as he takes aim at the highest office in the land, especially since one key assumption Farage made has already failed to materialize: As previously mentioned, mass defections from the Tories never occurred. Instead, while the Tories suffered losses in last week’s elections, they still outperformed expectations. A party that looked set to collapse a year ago has now stabilized, while polling averages indicate Reform peaked in October 2025.

 

Had the Conservative Party collapsed, as Farage believed that it would, Reform may have been able to mop up remaining right-wing voters skeptical of Farage by arguing that he and his party were the only credible option left on the right. That the Tories are once again competitive — less than two years after being ousted in a landslide defeat — will no doubt have alarm bells blaring for Farage and Reform.

 

Polls also indicate that Tory leader Kemi Badenoch is by far the most popular party leader in Britain, currently besting every other leader — including Farage — in head-to-head matchups in the polls. This can prove vital in a general election in Tory/Reform constituencies, where left-wing voters may end up tactically voting for Tory candidates to stop Nigel Farage.

 

Speaking of left-wing voters, Labour — which underperformed the already-low expectations heading into the local elections — now has plenty of time to replace Keir Starmer (who is expected to be ousted) with someone more suitable to win back Reform voters.

 

As memories of both Starmer and the shortcomings of the past Tory government fade, it will only be harder for Farage to retain Reform’s already-shrinking polling lead, especially considering that he will spend much of the next few years having to defend the actions of his party’s councilors elected last Thursday. In the end, Nigel Farage’s local election triumph is more likely to prove to be a pyrrhic victory, rather than a stepping stone to Downing Street. Instead of bringing him closer to power, the elections handed Farage the very thing he had always so skillfully eluded: accountability.

Monday, May 11, 2026

Israel’s Creation: The Ultimate ‘Decolonization’ Project

By Roy Altman

Thursday, May 07, 2026

 

Roman soldiers carry the Temple menorah and sacred objects in a triumphal procession. Relief panel from the Arch of Titus, Rome, c. 81 CE.

Detail from the Arch of Titus in Rome, created to celebrate the Roman suppression of the First Jewish Revolt in 70 AD and the conquest of Jerusalem. The depicted relief shows Roman soldiers returning home with sacred Jewish objects looted from the Second Temple.


The claim that Jews are imperialist “colonizers” isn’t new. It emerged from the Victorian-era antisemitism of an influential English journalist and matured in the early Soviet Union, long before the modern state of Israel was founded. As Paul Johnson (1928–2023), the great historian, observed:

 

The Soviet campaign against the Jews, after 1967 a permanent feature of the system, was itself conducted under the code-name of anti-Zionism, which became a cover for every variety of anti-Semitism. [The] Leninist theory of imperialism, like Marx’s theory of capitalism, had its roots in anti-Semitic conspiracy theory.

 

As Johnson showed, the claim that Jews are “imperialists” predated Vladimir Lenin, leader of Soviet Russia from 1917 until his death in 1924. Johnson traces the source of this claim to the English writer and journalist J.A. Hobson, who travelled to South Africa to cover the Boer War in 1899. Hobson, as Johnson relates, regarded Jews as “almost devoid of social morality,” and possessing “a superior calculating intellect” that allows them “to take advantage of every weakness, folly and vice of the society in which he lives.”

 

In his 1900 work, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects, Hobson blamed the conflict (falsely) on “a small group of international financiers, chiefly German in origin and Jewish by race.” Two years later, in 1902, Hobson expanded on this conspiracy theory in Imperialism: A Study, which argued that international finance—directed by Jews—was “the chief force behind colonies and wars.”

 

In his own book about imperialism—and its supposedly Jewish causes—Lenin wrote that he’d “made use of the principal English work on imperialism, J.A. Hobson’s book, with all the care that, in my opinion, this work deserves.” As Johnson explains, Hobson’s theory that an international oligarchy of Jewish financiers—the “peculiar race,” in Hobson’s words—was behind all European colonialist projects “became the essence of Lenin’s own” view, expressed to great effect in his above-quoted 1916 work, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.

 

Keep in mind: This is 32 years before the modern state of Israel came into being. “Leninist theory,” as Johnson notes, subsequently

 

forms the attitudes of many Third World states toward imperialism and colonialism, as they acquired independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Granted the theory’s antisemitic roots, it was not difficult to fit into it the concept of Zionism as a form of colonialism and the Zionist state as an outpost of imperialism.… That ‘Zionism’ in practice stood for ‘the Jews’ became quickly apparent.

 

In the 1960s, Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization from 1969 until his death in 2004, repurposed Hobson’s theory to suit his own political objectives. While Hobson had claimed that Jewish financiers were bankrolling the expensive colonial ventures of European governments, Arafat pivoted to the more extreme contention we see in academia today: that Jews have no historical connection to the Land of Israel at all—that they’re simply colonists in Israel, in much the same way as the British were colonists in America, India, and South Africa, among many other places.

 

As support for this claim, Arafat often would say that Jews had dug around the Temple Mount in Jerusalem and found “nothing there.” More recently, Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat’s successor and the president of the Palestinian Authority—now in the twentieth year of his four-year term—has been parroting Arafat, claiming that “Israel dug under the al-Aqsa [mosque]… and they could not find anything.”

 

This contention was once (properly) seen as outlandish. At the Camp David Summit in 2000, for example, US envoy Dennis Ross cautioned Arafat not to make this sort of frivolous historical argument to Bill Clinton: “If he hears you denying [the Temple’s] existence [in Jerusalem], he will never again take you seriously.” In more recent years, however, the claim that Jews are colonists in Israel has become mainstream on college campuses, at the United Nations, and in many Western media outlets.

 

But this claim fundamentally inverts the concept of colonization and ignores the historical evidence—casting the Jewish people, who have ancient and continuous ties to the land, as colonists while attributing indigenous status to Muslim Arab populations whose presence stems only from later conquests of the region.

 

Colonialism is a political and economic process by which one nation exerts its dominance over foreign territories and populations. There are two kinds of colonialism: extractive colonialism and settler colonialism. Extractive colonialism occurs when a foreign nation exploits a native population merely for the purpose of enriching or empowering its own empire. Settler colonialism, by contrast, occurs when a foreign population immigrates to a new land and, once there, displaces or dominates the indigenous people of that land.

 

The essential element of both categories of colonialism is the foreignness of the colonizing population. The colonists don’t speak the land’s language, practice its religion, or share any of its cultural heritage. They also carry the names of their own ancestors, and they typically pass those naming conventions down to their descendants.

 

All well-accepted examples of colonization meet this basic definition. For instance, England colonized what is now the United States by sending its citizens to distant shores (including a place now called New England)—lands on which no English person had ever set foot before—with the hope of finding raw materials that could be sent back across the pond to enrich the British Empire. This aspect of America’s colonization meets the definition of what today we would call extractive colonialism. Before long, however, English Puritans were coming by the tens of thousands—fleeing the tyranny of Charles I and looking for a safe place to practice their religion freely. This aspect of American colonization is an example of settler colonialism.

 

In either case, before they came to America, English citizens had never spoken any of America’s languages, practiced its religions, nor shared in any material aspects of its culture. And, when they got here, they carried English (not Native American) names—like John Winthrop, Walter Raleigh, and Francis Drake—and they passed these names on to their descendants such that, even generations later, the English colonists in America still bore English names (like George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson).

 

The First Thanksgiving at Plymouth, a 1914 portrait by American painter Jennie Augusta Brownscombe depicting early 17th-century settlers at England’s first permanent English colony in New England.


Take another example. The Spanish colonization of the Americas—a prototype of the extractive model—colonized Central and South America by sending Spanish conquistadores to (what is now) Mexico, Peru, and Colombia to subdue the indigenous populations there and steal the gold and silver deposits that would finance the Spanish Empire’s global ambitions. To read Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s account of Spain’s conquest of Mexico is to understand what a colonist truly looks like: an outsider with no historical, linguistic, cultural, or religious connection to the land he’s conquering.

 

Dozens of similar examples abound. The case of Algeria is particularly relevant because many Palestinian Arabs (and their supporters) cite the ultimately successful national uprising against French colonial rule in Algeria as a kind of model for the Palestinian cause. That uprising took more than seven years (from late 1954 to early 1962), and resulted in the deaths of more than a million Algerian civilians. The Algerian National Liberation Front never won a battle—but, when it was all said and done, the French army packed up and moved over half a million French nationals back to France.

 

The cover of a January 1959 edition of the Syrian magazine Al-Jundi, commemorating the Algerian uprising against French colonial rule.


Similarly, the fact that Palestinians are weaker than Israel and that thousands of Palestinians have suffered and died (and will continue to suffer and die) in their forever war with the Jewish State—indeed, the fact that the war is protracted and indefinite—is seen as precisely the point: To defeat a militarily superior “colonist,” the argument goes, the indigenous population must only outlast him. Outlasting him isn’t easy, of course. But if a native population struggles long enough, the Palestinians believe, the foreign oppressors will ultimately tire of fighting (and dying) on foreign soil and, cutting their losses, will turn around and go home—as the French did in Algeria.

 

The problem with this Palestinian narrative is that it ignores the available evidence—the basic facts on the ground—which would lead any neutral observer to understand that Israel meets none of the commonly accepted definitions of colonization. Israelis aren’t foreign to the land they now govern

 

Jews, not just in Israel, but all over the world, share a common DNA ancestry—DNA that, as dozens of genetic studies have shown, spread from the Levant (where Israel is today) thousands of years ago. Israeli Jews also speak the same language, practice the same religion, and share a deep cultural and historical connection to the Jews who have lived continuously in Israel for thousands of years.

 

Indeed, even today, the Jews of Israel pass on to their children the very same names that, according to the archaeological record, have been given to Jewish children in the land of Israel for millennia. No less significantly, the state of Israel wasn’t at its founding (and isn’t today) a colony of any foreign government.

 

As Golda Meir once quipped to then-Senator Joe Biden, Israelis have a secret weapon: “We have nowhere else to go.” Israel, in other words, wasn’t created to enrich (or expand the influence of) any European power. It thus cannot be—and has never been—a colonialist state.

 

History itself makes plain that, if anyone has “colonized” the Land of Israel, it has been the succession of Muslim armies from Arabia, Egypt, Damascus, Baghdad, and Turkey (not to mention Christian Crusaders, Roman and Byzantine emperors, and British colonists) that ruled Jerusalem as foreign occupiers for almost two millennia.

 

Throughout all these occupations, thousands of Jews remained in the Land of Israel. We know this because archaeologists in Israel have found Jewish synagogues and cemeteries dating all the way back to the 1st century AD. And new discoveries are often being made. In 2025, for instance, archaeologists excavated a Jewish synagogue in the Yehudiya Nature Reserve, located in Israel’s Golan Heights, dating back to the 6th century AD.

 

 

We know it because, when the Arabs built the Dome of the Rock in 691 AD, it was maintained for years by 300 black slaves, 20 Jewish servants, and 10 Christians.

 

We know it because the Seljuk Turks (whose empire would envelop the entire region during the 11th century) tell us that, in the AD 940s, the Jewish community of Jerusalem had split in two—with the followers of the traditional scholar-judges (called gaons) on one side and the Karaites (a novel sect whose members rejected any law but the Torah and who believed in a return to Jewish sovereignty in Israel) on the other.

 

We know it because, in the years leading up to AD 1011, the Fatimid occupiers of Israel allowed their Jewish subjects to build a synagogue on the Mount of Olives, to maintain a rabbinic academy in Jerusalem, and to pray at the Eastern Wall of the Temple Mount.

 

We know it because occupying Muslim forces passed an ever-evolving series of laws addressing the rights of their Jewish subjects. In AD 1266, for instance, the Arabs forbade the Jews of Israel from entering the Cave of Machpelah, in the foothills of Hebron, where the Patriarchs are buried—and where King David was anointed—to pray.

 

We know it because of a long litany of Muslim massacres against Jews in Israel—the most notorious coming in AD 1518, when occupying Ottomans slaughtered hundreds of Hebron’s Jews.

 

Detail from a woodcut by 19th-century French printmaker Paul Gustave Louis Christophe Doré depicting the burial of the biblical matriarch Sarah in the Cave of Machpelah, also known as the Cave of the Patriarchs.


We know it also because, after Napoleon Bonaparte won Egypt for France at the Battle of the Pyramids in 1798, he marched his army through Gaza and up toward Jerusalem, where he found a mostly desolate country, ignored by Ottoman occupiers and populated mainly by small communities of Jews, Christians, and Bedouins. On March 18, 1799, Napoleon laid siege to Acre—then under the command of an Ottoman dictator who called himself “the Butcher” and whose chief minister was a native-born Jewish man named Haim Farhi. Napoleon took Acre after defeating the Butcher’s army of foreign mercenaries (principally Albanians, Afghans, and Turks) before turning to Jerusalem, on the outskirts of which he issued his now-famous “Proclamation to the Jews” of April 20, 1799:

 

Bonaparte, commander in chief of the French Republic in Africa and Asia, to the rightful heirs of Palestine—the unique nation of Jews who have been deprived of the land of your fathers by thousands of years of lust for conquest and tyranny. Arise then with gladness, ye exiled, and take unto yourselves Israel’s patrimony. The young army has made Jerusalem my headquarters and will within a few days transfer to Damascus so you can remain there [in Jerusalem] as ruler.

 

Since the destruction of the Second Temple in AD 70, the Jews of Israel pined, like their cousins in the diaspora, for the “redemption of Israel.” For centuries before the reconstitution of Jewish sovereignty, in fact, Jews returned each year to the Temple Mount on the anniversary of its destruction (the Ninth of Av in the Jewish calendar) and, praying at the Western (or Wailing) Wall, would rend their clothes. Witnessing this sorry scene in the 4th century, St. Jerome wrote: “On the day of the Destruction of Jerusalem, you see a sad people coming to visit, decrepit little women and old men encumbered with rags and years” who “weep over the ruins of the Temple.”

 

Detail from an 1806 print by French engraver Louis François Couché Graveur depicting Napoleon Bonaparte granting freedom of worship to the Jews.


Judah Halevi, the great Spanish rabbi, wrote in 1141:

 

O [Jerusalem] city of the world, most chastely fair,
In the far West, behold I sigh for thee.
Oh! Had I eagles’ wings, I’d fly to thee.
And with my falling tears make moist thine earth…
When I dream of the return of thy captivity,
I am a harp for thy songs.

 

 And every year at the end of their Passover Seder, Jews the world over would sing—then as now—the ancient refrain: “Next year in Jerusalem!”

 

The earliest textual evidence we have is the Merneptah Stele, a granite slab from 1208 BC inscribed with an account of the pharaoh Merneptah’s military victories—including his campaign against Israel. If you go back to the period of the Stele’s creation 3,200 years ago, and look at all the different peoples who existed at that time, there is only one people who still speaks the same language, who still practices the same religion, who still lives (and governs) in the same land as it then did—and those are the Jews who live and govern in Israel today.

 

So, if we care about the rights of indigenous peoples—if we care at all about decolonization projects that liberate native populations from the imperial forces that have occupied their homelands for centuries—we should recognize that the story of modern-day Israel represents one of the most successful decolonization projects in human history.

 

And that was once the view even of Arab leaders. In March 1918, for instance, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, King Hussein—leader of the Arab armies that fought, together with T.E. Lawrence (of “Lawrence of Arabia” fame), to dismantle Ottoman rule in the Middle East—penned an op-ed in the Al Qibla newspaper. In it, he wrote that “the country [Israel] was for its original sons [the Jews] a sacred and beloved homeland,” and that “the return of these exiles to their homeland” would be beneficial to the Arab inhabitants of the region.

 

Nine months later, in December 1918, Hussein’s son, Faisal I, who would become the first king of Iraq, held a banquet in Jerusalem. At that event, Faisal gave a toast, toward the end of which he said, “No true Arab can be suspicious or afraid of Jewish nationalism.… We are demanding Arab freedom and we would show ourselves unworthy of it, if we did not now, as I do, say to the Jews—welcome back home.”

 

Prince Faisal would later send a letter to US Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter—who, like his friend and fellow justice, Louis Brandeis, was a passionate Zionist—expressing his strong support for the Zionist cause.

 

That’s all unsurprising. The Quran itself makes clear that Allah promised Israel to the Jewish people: “And remember,” the Quran says, “when Moses said to his people, ‘O my people! call to mind the goodness of God towards you when he appointed Prophets among you, and appointed you kings, and gave you what never had been given before to any human beings: Enter, O my people! the holy land which God hath destined for you.’”