Spain and Europe’s Crisis of Meaning

By Joshua S. Treviño

Tuesday, August 04, 2026

 

The immediate Ceuta crisis may have receded, with most of the 60,000 invaders having returned to Morocco, but it leaves in its wake a series of follow-on crises for Spain, Europe, and America alike.

 

The Spanish predicament engages problems both foreign and domestic. The Moroccan state, having demonstrated its ability to overrun Spanish territory at will, has experienced neither counter nor penalty and is unlikely to do so. At the strategic level, Spanish defense confronts a problem long-known and also long-ignored, in the imperative to keep the difficult-to-defend Plazas de Soberanía strewn upon the North African coast secured: a challenge that becomes acute when Morocco leverages hybrid warfare. That level of warfare, exploiting “civilian” means and targeting systemic non-military vulnerabilities, is uniquely effective when its targets will not recognize it as warfare, and therefore do not bring the full array of capabilities to bear against it. Spanish governance is therefore confronted with three interrelated imperatives: to maintain a qualitative superiority versus Moroccan means, to recognize hybrid warfare as such, and to use the full spectrum of state power against it. This is easy to diagnose but exceptionally difficult to undertake, especially for a Western government of the left.

 

That government of the left, in Madrid’s case, is another of Spain’s problems. It is manifestly true that the Moroccan state bears direct responsibility for the immediate crisis, but its actions ought to be seen as opportunistic. That opportunity was presented by the government in Madrid. The Socialist regime of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has signaled throughout its tenure that it is inimical to Spanish identity, heritage, and sovereignty: from waging cultural war upon Spanish and Catholic Church sites and symbols within Spain, to pushing through a hasty and ill-considered program of legalization for extraordinary numbers of illegal immigrants, to forming its own government upon a base of concessions to territorial separatists. Based upon the record of the past three years alone, a Moroccan calculus that now is a good time to test Spanish territorial integrity is not irrational.

 

Sánchez has further achieved something extraordinary, brought to light in the international reactions to the Ceuta crisis, that he did not expect after posturing himself as the anti-Trump leader of the global left: near-total isolation of Spain in its moment of crisis. Having assiduously courted global anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian sentiment, and having sought maximum visibility in his opposition to the American war upon Iran, Sánchez gained no support whatsoever from the Arab and Muslim world when his nation’s territory was invaded by one of their own. Having positioned himself as the stalwart counter to an unpopular-in-Europe American leadership, Sánchez received no meaningful support whatsoever from European nations when Spanish territory, which means European Union territory, was violated. Worse than that, the general discussion within Europe centered upon how to isolate and punish Spain for failing to do its part in securing European borders. Having made Spain the sole NATO power to refuse the 5 percent defense-spending mandate, Sánchez was confronted with well-earned American remonstrances and reminders that American policy increasingly favors Morocco, which is at least a state with fruitful direction and purpose.

 

Spain is a victim in the Ceuta crisis, it is true: but the Spanish political leadership in power is its primary victimizer.

 

The Spanish political leadership not in power, facing a national election in the coming year, is now confronted with its own choices. Spain’s political landscape features two major parties of the right. One, the venerable Partido Popular, may be broadly described as a technocratic right, managerial and experienced. It is the larger of the two. The other, Vox, is smaller but historically more oriented toward issues of Spanish cultural inheritance. Both parties’ leaders, Alberto Núñez Feijóo of Partido Popular and Santiago Abascal of Vox, have seen fit to go to Ceuta in the wake of the crisis — as has, it should be noted, Sánchez himself. (One may ask why King Felipe VI has not gone, as might seem appropriate, and the probable answer is that the Socialist government has blocked the trip.) Whether Spain’s right, across both parties, can leverage this moment into something larger remains to be seen. The movement writ large, across the past 20 years, has not been as aggressive in the defense of Spanish identity and heritage as the left has been aggressive in diminishing both. If 60,000 Moroccans storming a Spanish city of 80,000 citizens does not inspire resolve, it is difficult to imagine what will.

 

Something must, because Spain is on its own. The enervated project of the European Union has shown its quality in this crisis just as much as Spanish Socialism has, and it looks just as weakened in its own way. The European powers have had much time and opportunity to reflect upon their self-defense and its challenges, from the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea, to the 2015 migrant crisis, to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine proper, to the post-2024 American reorientation away from European defense, to the 2026 Iranian attacks upon European territory and energy supplies. Now, a European-power city is briefly overrun, and the general reaction of Europe is directed against that European power, and not against the Moroccan state proximately responsible for the overrunning. At this writing, 22 EU member states have called for an “emergency” meeting on Spanish irresponsibility and remedies for it. On the one hand, Spain’s Socialists deserve it; on the other hand, European preference for focusing upon process changes within Europe to the exclusion of confronting the external threat speaks volumes.

 

An American with ordinary historical consciousness might note that Europe finds itself in the era of America’s own Articles of Confederation, but with no Americans to set it right. What does Europe mean if Europe will not preserve itself?

 

From that American perspective, we learn much, little good, of the state of Spanish and European governance now. Yet there are reasons for optimism, if we discern them. The European response is insufficient, but it is also the opposite of 2015: The general reaction is to solidify borders, not open them, and this is progress. Spain will have elections no later than late-summer 2027, and the Spanish right — which contains within itself many good patriots whom Americans would recognize as such — may rescue both the situation and their country. Finally, the United States since January 2025 has arrived at the right policy formula for dealing with threats like the ones confronting Ceuta and Europe at large. Borders must be sealed, mass migration must be ended, benefits to illegal entry (from state welfare to remittances and beyond) must be stopped, human traffickers must be confronted and pursued, terror designations must be issued, state sponsors must suffer state consequences, and the full array of national power, including the military, must be brought to bear for all of it. All this requires recognizing hybrid warfare for what it is. What the Americans have imposed with much success in the Caribbean basin is equally appropriate for the Mediterranean basin. We have the lessons and the experience — we only await the partners with whom to share both.