Iran Is Rewiring Its Proxy Network

By Ahmad Sharawi & Bridget Toomey

Sunday, August 09, 2026

 

Among the millions traveling to Iraq for Arbaeen — the annual Shiite pilgrimage to Karbala and Najaf — at least six Iranian men entered the country, presenting themselves as escorts assigned to accompany Iranian pilgrims. In reality, they were officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), sent to help Iraqi militias operate drones.

 

The world got a glimpse of this truth on July 29, when American and Saudi aircraft struck Iran-backed militia positions in northern Iraq, killing the officers. Tehran acknowledged their deaths but described the men as “advisers,” labels that obscured their apparent mission. At least four of the officers were connected to the IRGC Aerospace Force, which oversees the military force’s drone operations.

 

These six men’s deaths exposed how Tehran is rebuilding its battered network of proxies for the next phase of regional conflict. Specifically, the Islamic Republic is deploying mid-level commanders and moving Lebanese, Iraqi, and Yemeni fighters and specialists among proxy-controlled territories to prepare for renewed regional escalation. At the same time, it is organizing smaller, decentralized cells outside traditional militia hierarchies to make the network more resilient and less vulnerable to decapitation strikes.

 

Mehdi Mohammadi, a senior adviser to the speaker of Iran’s parliament, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, described the emerging trend in the Axis of Resistance as “strategic integration.” According to Arab media reports, Iraqi militia units that launched missiles and drones toward the Gulf states and Jordan operated under the direct supervision of IRGC officers. These officers masquerade as diplomats and operate from the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad.

 

Tehran moved its own officers closer to the battlefield to retain the final say over escalation. Senior Quds Force officials sat at the center of this ecosystem. The Quds Force is the IRGC’s expeditionary arm; it includes Iranian commanders who have supervised drone teams from Iran-backed groups such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — groups that have attacked American positions and U.S. and Iraqi energy infrastructure.

 

Iran flew between 10 and 21 IRGC personnel, along with drone and missile equipment, to Yemen in July, according to Reuters. This trip reopened direct flights between Iran and the Houthis after roughly a decade without direct air access. Such flights are intended to give the IRGC easier access to its Yemeni partner. The deployment’s significance was further underscored in that it came mere days before the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia. That move followed the Kingdom’s July 13 bombing of Sanaa airport, as part of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to prevent the plane from landing.

 

In Iraq and Yemen, Tehran was positioning its proxies for escalation. In Lebanon, it had gone further by embedding IRGC personnel inside Hezbollah’s command structure and rebuilding effort after Israeli strikes eliminated the group’s senior leaders.

 

The extent of the IRGC’s presence in Lebanon came into view inside a Beirut hotel room. In March, Israel struck the Ramada Plaza hotel, killing at least four men who had checked in under Lebanese aliases using authentic Lebanese passports. Like the IRGC officers who entered Iraq as pilgrimage escorts, these men appeared on paper to be something they were not. Israel and Iran later identified them as Quds Force personnel responsible for finance and missile development.

 

Additional reservations for suspected IRGC officers, also traveling under falsified Lebanese identities, were later discovered at another Beirut hotel. Tehran had reportedly deployed as many as 150 IRGC personnel to Lebanon, where they were helping reorganize Hezbollah into smaller, compartmentalized cells designed to survive further Israeli attacks.

 

This model was also increasingly present in Iraq. The Islamic Republic created smaller cells to attack Arab countries hosting U.S. forces. Reuters reported that three or four teams, each composed of roughly ten fighters drawn from Iran-backed Iraqi militias, launched at least seven drone attacks toward Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in April and May.

 

The cells offered Tehran several advantages. To begin, they were harder to detect and thus less vulnerable to decapitation strikes. But more importantly, they were not subordinate to a single militia. Iran assembled fighters from different groups — both from within the Iraqi network and other countries — for specific missions. This strategy created a proxy structure that was more integrated across militias, which IRGC–Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani described as the “the unification of the operations room.” At the same time, the move allowed the IRGC to retain more control over fighters, instead of operating through a standard militia chain of command.

 

Houthi fighters in Iraq reportedly launched attacks on Saudi Arabia — a shared target of Tehran and the Yemen-based rebel group. Regional officials described the attack as a joint Houthi–Iraqi operation under IRGC supervision, despite Riyadh’s initial attribution mentioning only Iraq. The Houthis quickly claimed attacks on the Kingdom’s energy infrastructure. When Saudi Arabia and the United States launched an airstrike on Iraq in response, they killed a Houthi commander alongside the IRGC advisors.

 

Cooperation between Iran’s proxies is not new. Hezbollah has trained and supported Iran’s other proxies, alongside the IRGC, since its inception. Iran also mobilized its Axis of Resistance to support the only other state partner in the group, the Assad regime in Syria, during the country’s civil war.

 

The groups also coordinate political and financial activity among themselves. The Houthis opened an official office in Baghdad in June 2024, after years of visits and engagement; twelve years earlier, the group’s primary television network was inaugurated in Beirut under Hezbollah’s guidance. Similarly, Iraqi militias maintain representatives in Lebanon, who coordinate closely with Hezbollah.

 

To be clear, the novelty does not lie in the close contact between elements of Iran’s Axis of Resistance — it lies in the axis’s shifting form. Previously, the Iran-aligned militant groups focused on training and supporting each other in the face of immediate threats. Now, under more direct leadership of the IRGC, they are using each other’s territory as launching pads for regional aggression — all in the interest of the Islamic Republic.

 

Washington is seeking cooperation from officials in Beirut and Baghdad in countering Iranian influence in their countries. President Donald Trump hosted Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in separate July visits, extending good will to two governments that have promised to bring armed groups under state control. But dealing with the governments of Iraq and Lebanon requires both carrot and stick. In that vein, the United States should condition further diplomatic and economic support to Iraq and Lebanon on action: The two countries must expel IRGC and foreign proxy personnel, investigate Iranian operatives and local facilitators, and close offices that other Iranian proxies have opened in their territory.

 

It’s past time for Washington to confront Tehran’s efforts to transform its proxy network. If we don’t act now, the United States and our regional partners face a growing, multifront terror threat that will destabilize the region and challenge our interests for years to come.