By John Gustavsson
Monday, June 01, 2026
Even as Democratic activists in the U.S. cool to the cause of climate alarmism, environmentalism
maintains its political and economic grip on policymakers on the other side of
the Atlantic Ocean. Years into a cost-of-living crisis, why is the European
Union still so green?
It may be easy to dismiss this as a case of fanaticism:
Sure, American progressives may perhaps not have been truly sincere when they
proclaimed their faith in the upcoming apocalypse and the gospel of Greta
Thunberg, but maybe her fellow Swedes — and other Europeans — are true
believers?
While “sincere” environment activists may be a more
common breed in Europe, that does not explain the actions of policymakers and
civil servants — technocrats who know for a fact that the “climate transition”
was sold to voters by giving disproportionate publicity to worst-case
scenarios, rather than the more likely, less catastrophic, and less
headline-grabbing scenarios outlined by the likes of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change.
Instead, one must first understand that the EU is a
slow-moving beast. The legislative process is complicated and sluggish, with 27
countries and an often-equal number of different viewpoints all struggling to
be heard. The rules of the union mean that a third of the countries are able to
veto most legislation, and in some cases, unanimity is required. Passing the European Green Deal in the first place required truly
draconian efforts of political willpower and coordination, and reversing or
altering the deal would hardly be any easier.
Making matters worse, the EU has driven past every
conceivable off-ramp, events that would have allowed it to change course while
saving face. Mere months after the European Green Deal was unveiled, the Covid-19 pandemic
went on to turn the world upside down. Mass unemployment and government
borrowing followed. At this point, the EU could have cited the pandemic as an
excuse as to why climate goals had to be postponed, and some money earmarked
for green projects instead used towards health-care or furlough programs.
The next “off-ramp” was the Russian invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022. With Europe suddenly needing to provide aid to Ukraine and
rearm itself, policymakers could have made the case that the original timeline
of the Green Deal was no longer feasible. Shortly thereafter, inflation would
hit double digits in many EU member states, once again providing an excellent
“excuse” to cancel a Green Deal that was negotiated in the bygone Zero
Interest-Rate Policy (ZIRP) era, and whose ambitious goals assumed that this
era would never end.
Now, policymakers are truly stuck with a project that
virtually ensures the EU won’t see much of the global, energy-intensive AI
boom, as prohibitive electricity prices cause data centers and tech
firms to choose other locations. As slow and complicated as the legislative
process in the EU is, that alone cannot explain why none of the off-ramps were
taken.
It is also, as it so often is in politics, about power.
Environmentalism is a convenient ideology for those who wish to transfer power
to the state, as it provides justification for the state’s expansion. In
Europe, however, environmentalism is chiefly not used to transfer power from
the voters to the state, but from the states to the European Union. For a
supranational organization whose founding treaty infamously states that it is
to strive to be an “ever-closer union,” hardly any excuse for centralization is
ever passed by.
And such an excuse was exactly what environmentalism
provided: No single EU member can deal with climate change on their own, since
none of them contributes to more than 0.7 percent of global greenhouse gas
emissions. The only way to fight this new threat, Brussels explained, was to do
it together, under the benevolent direction of your friendly neighborhood
eurocrat. Anyone who did not want to see the Swiss Alps underwater had no
choice but to go along with the program.
That the EU as a whole only ever contributed 10 to 15 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions even
before the first moves to transition were taken in the 1990s is the type of
“inconvenient truth” voters rarely heard when the Deal was passed. It is now
down to less
than 6 percent, yet Europe’s green frenzy continues virtually unabated.
For the EU, the sunk cost has also been far greater than
for America. Long before the European Green Deal, the EU made serious — and
costly — efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Whereas American emissions
wouldn’t peak until 2007, in the EU, they peaked in 1990, after which
they have been on a steady decline. Total U.S. emissions were still more than
20 percent higher in 2024 at the end of Biden’s presidency than they had been
in Europe in 1990.
Europeans have felt the pain of climate policies in the
form of gas prices that (prior to the Iran war) averaged 2 to 3 times what American car owners paid. Higher
electricity prices, tied to the shuttering of oil and coal but also nuclear
power plants, have prevented air conditioning from taking off in Europe —
ironically, this increases the number of Europeans who will suffer and even die
as a result of rising global temperatures. Already, more than 60,000 Europeans die of heat every summer. More Europeans
die from lack of AC than Americans do from gun violence.
Europeans have gritted their teeth and accepted that
sacrifice, along with a large chunk of its traditional manufacturing sector —
jobs that they were promised would be replaced by roles in “green”
manufacturing and other “climate-friendly” industries the EU anticipated
dominating on the world stage. That is not how things have turned out.
Instead, China has ascended as a dominating force in green industries like solar panels and — worse for the EU —
batteries and electric vehicles. Automobile exports are now dropping fast. From 2008 to 2023, over 2.3 million European manufacturing jobs were lost,
compared to “only” around 800,000 in the United States during that time
period.
There is also no guarantee that lost manufacturing jobs
would return and shuttered factories reopen any time soon even if Brussels were
to pump the brakes now, much like how the coal mining jobs have so far failed
to return despite Donald Trump’s reversal of Biden’s policies (they also
declined under his first term).
For EU policymakers, climate transition initially looked
like an easy win: First, you implement some harmless green policies. Then, when
the prophesied climate apocalypse fails to take place, you can claim credit. It
was not just great virtue-signaling, but also the perfect set-up for a “win”
for those who wished to demonstrate the greatness of centralized EU efforts.
However, the “harmless” transition policies proved
costlier, and voters turned out to be less invested in the project than the
policymakers believed. On paper, most voters did support the idea of
climate transition. But supporting an idea is different from actually
paying the price at the pump and in the form of higher utility bills. (And
let’s not forget those abominable paper straws.)
After all these sacrifices, few governments in the EU
could afford to admit that it was all for nothing. Their position is made even
more precarious as this would be the second such embarrassment: After the
2015–16 refugee crisis, most governments across Europe took steps toward
restricting immigration, effectively conceding that the parties they had (and
continue to) labeled “far-right” had been correct about the challenges caused
by rising immigration numbers.
To give the same parties another win and concede that —
much like multiculturalism — climate transition too had turned out to be a
better idea on paper than in practice would simply be too much.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. economy has
outgrown the economies of Western Europe, creating a growing wealth gap. As Europe continues down the path of
chasing green dreams instead of greenbacks, this gap is only likely to continue
to grow until the day its leaders are finally forced to admit that their
policies only ever ensured future generations would inherit not a cooler
planet, but a poorer continent.
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