You Can’t Deter China by Ignoring Europe

By Keith Self & Mark Montgomery

Friday, June 19, 2026

 

There is a mistaken belief by some in Washington that deterring Chinese aggression requires the United States to cut back its military commitments in Europe, where American forces help NATO to deter Moscow. But this approach misses the key fact that Putin’s Russia is an active threat, waging a war of imperial aggression against Ukraine right now and testing whether NATO will defend Poland, the Baltics, and the rest of the alliance’s eastern flank.

 

There is ample reason to be concerned about potential Chinese aggression, primarily against Taiwan, but it remains a possibility, not a fact. What the advocates of pulling American troops out of Europe fail to recognize is that China is taking the measure of America’s response to Russian adventurism, gauging whether there is a steadfast resolve to defend the West and preserve national boundaries. The stronger and more united NATO remains, the less incentive Beijing will have to test American resolve elsewhere.

 

Moscow is a formidable opponent. It is willing to absorb staggering casualties, endure crushing sanctions, and restructure its economy around sustained military aggression. From Georgia to Crimea to the current conflict in Ukraine, the pattern of its wars is not defensive, it is expansionist. The security of the Baltic states, Poland, and NATO’s eastern flank are not abstract concerns; they are targets on a list that Putin is working through with grim patience.

 

While Beijing is rapidly militarizing, it is worth noting that China has not fought a major war outside its borders since 1979. Chinese strategic doctrine emphasizes deterrence, information dominance, and economic coercion far more than kinetic conflict. And an amphibious assault on Taiwan would be among the most complex military operations in history.

 

This aspect of Chinese strategy should inform the debate about U.S. forces in Europe. The United States will not be successful if it simply pares back rotational brigade deployments to Poland and the Baltics and removes long-range fires battalions from the European theater. It should first work with NATO to establish conditions and develop transition plans that allow Europe to fill the posture gaps created by the American departures. All an uncoordinated change to U.S. force accomplishes is creating a window of vulnerability that Russia will notice and exploit.

 

For generations, Europe has been the anchor of Western democracy. Twice in the 20th century, American soldiers fought and died there to prevent tyranny from overrunning the continent. The peace and prosperity that followed were forged through American leadership and NATO solidarity. Europe remains a close trading partner and its gross domestic product (GDP) is the second largest in the world behind the United States.

 

But today, that legacy of partnership faces its toughest test since the Cold War. The responsible path toward building up European defense capabilities requires conditions-based changes, not rigid adherence to cut-back calendars. Further reductions in U.S. forward presence in Europe should be tied to demonstrated European capability milestones — verified munitions stockpiles, proven command-and-control integration, combined exercise results that demonstrate genuine interoperability. That approach maintains the pressure for European investment while ensuring that the transition does not produce a deterrence gap that tempts Russian adventurism at exactly the wrong moment.

 

Current conflicts are exposing an allied defense industrial base hollowed out by a post–Cold War holiday from history that has not recovered, especially in Europe. Artillery shells, long-range missiles, and air defense interceptor inventories are all lacking, and production lines are not running at rates that can sustain high-intensity conflict demands. Meanwhile, many of the munitions needed to deter conflicts tomorrow are being expended against Iran today.

 

This is the simultaneity problem in its most concrete form. Addressing it requires rebuilding allied production capacity across long-range precision munitions, air and missile defense interceptors, and undersea warfare systems — not as a China hedge but as the foundation of a credible global deterrence posture. That credibility is being tested in ways that should concentrate minds in Washington.

 

America’s task is not to choose between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It is to manage both, alongside allies — with conditions, and with the industrial capacity to back up the commitment. History does not reward nations that prepare for distant possibilities while ignoring active threats. But it equally does not reward nations that abandon hard-won strategic positions in the name of efficiency and then spend a generation rebuilding what they gave away.

 

There is a crucial distinction between strategic hybrid warfare and kinetic conflict. While Russia’s aggressive posture is designed to fracture NATO, the Chinese Communist Party is nuanced in its approach to global expansion, relying instead on economic coercion, cyberintrusion, and political influence. Comparatively, Russia — not China — is the closest wolf to the sled.

 

Both Putin and Xi Jinping see hesitation and debate in Western capitals as weakness and opportunity. Our task must therefore be to show resolve, speed, and strategic clarity. Reinforcing NATO’s eastern defenses and modernizing European command infrastructure are investments in global deterrence to prevent far costlier wars later.

 

America’s course must be clear: Confront aggression decisively, encourage our allies to take more responsibility, and preserve peace through strength. Only then can the United States continue to be, in Abraham Lincoln’s words, the “last, best hope of Earth.”