The Unsettled ‘End’ of the Iran War

By Judson Berger

Friday, June 26, 2026

 

To adapt Reagan, are you better off today than you were one  war ago? Unless the “you” in that sentence is the Iranian government, the answer increasingly looks to be no.

 

The longer the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding is exposed to the harsh desert light, however, the brittler it starts to look. Seth Cropsey, putting the lamentable developments of the past couple weeks in context, emphasizes that despite the fanfare surrounding the pact, it is not a final status agreement — and that a return to conflict is all but inevitable. (As of Friday, this is already happening.)

 

“It is, rather, an extension of the April cease-fire,” he writes, “and includes no changes to the underlying realities that catalyzed the U.S.-Israel-Iran war in the first place.” The clock merely resets to 60 days.

 

For now, the terms are . . . disadvantageous. A “prompt and utter humiliation” for President Trump is how Philip Klein describes them. As Jim Geraghty puts it: “I suppose you can’t call it a wholesale surrender, in part because the U.S. government is paying retail prices in its concessions.”

 

Jim laments that Iran, at least on paper, is slated to receive $300 billion (from where is not entirely clear) for “reconstruction” and “development” while three key points of America’s economic leverage go away: a naval blockade, sanctions, and restrictions on the export of Iranian oil products. The regime might be better off financially than before the war, while having extracted U.S. commitments not to deploy additional forces in the region for now or interfere in the country’s internal affairs. Trump has pivoted from urging the Iranian people to “take over your government” to saying he never cared about regime change.

 

In exchange, the Strait of Hormuz is ostensibly reopening, but it remains hazardous, as an attack on a cargo ship Thursday plainly demonstrated, while Iran cooks up new ways to reap billions from control over the passageway.

 

It’s not all dismal on America’s side of the ledger. Dozens of Iranian aircraft, naval ships, and missile launchers were taken out over the course of the war. As Noah Rothman writes, America’s enemies witnessed the “rapid dismantling of the Iranian navy” and the establishment of air superiority over the country, among several aspects of the war that “must be taken into account by any great power that would directly challenge the U.S. military.” He adds, “That’s what makes Trump’s MOU so maddening. The weakness it projects will tempt America’s enemies, and the precedents it sets are likely to outlast the memory of America’s victories on the battlefield.” The Obama administration’s mistakes are being repeated, Noah writes.

 

And yet, this may not be the end. As violations of the MOU terms already begin, Jim notes that it’s only a matter of time before Iran further reneges, making space for the U.S. to do the same. Seth Cropsey questions how the purported reconstruction fund could be mustered and how concrete or achievable the sanctions-lifting provisions are. He advises that, as things progress, Lebanon will be key:

 

As more Lebanon crises occur, Iran’s roll of the dice will eventually force an Israeli response — even without U.S. consent — that will raise the odds of a return to war.

 

Trump wanted a deal principally because he hates being cornered. Thus, he refused to authorize an operation against southern Iran or a resumption of strikes after early April. However, there is no reason to expect he will allow a vague, unenforceable piece of paper to constrain his decision-making. The question for U.S. policy is how to generate the flexibility Trump will require when Iran inevitably pushes the region to the brink once again.