National Review Online
Friday, June 27, 2025
The essence of deterrence is credibility. The best way to
stop Russia from attacking even a small NATO country — one of the Baltic
states, say — is for Vladimir Putin to be convinced that the risk of major
retaliation is too great to take. This is why President Trump’s reaction to the
commitment by NATO members at their recent summit to more than double their
defense-spending target is welcome, even if a partial opt-out for Spain is not.
NATO, said Trump, was not a “rip-off,” high praise from this
president. NATO’s European members “really love their countries . . . and we’re
here to help them.” Critically, Trump emphasized that the U.S. still
regarded itself as bound by Article 5 of the NATO treaty, the mutual-defense
provision: “I stand with it, that’s why I’m here. If I didn’t stand with it, I
wouldn’t be here.”
Those were welcome words. While no small part of the
decision by NATO’s other members to boost their spending can be put down to
relentless pressure from Trump, some of the warnings he used to get his way
risked creating grave doubts about the extent to which the U.S. stood behind
NATO’s mutual-defense guarantees. Such doubts could only embolden Putin and,
moreover, encourage NATO members to hedge their bets with Russia, as one or two
have already been doing.
Only a few years ago, with many NATO members struggling,
or not even bothering to struggle, to reach an earlier target of 2 percent,
such a commitment would have been unthinkable. In 2021, just six
NATO members out of 32 had hit that target; by 2024, that total had risen to
23. Fierce pressure from Trump 45 had persuaded them that America’s willingness
to commit to the defense of an alliance in which most members were not pulling their
weight could no longer be taken for granted, whoever was president. And
Russia’s war on Ukraine and increasingly menacing behavior toward the broader
West had made it obvious this was not the time to chance losing that American
support. Last week’s U.S. bombing of three Iranian facilities only underlined
that fact.
The new spending target of 5 percent (of which 1.5
percent can comprise defense-related infrastructure spending, a conveniently
elastic concept in this case) does not have to be hit until 2035. However, some
countries, painfully conscious of geography and history, are racing ahead.
Poland is set to spend 4.7 percent of its GDP
this year, while Estonia has locked in a program that will mean it should spend 5.4 percent in 2029. No less
significant is that Germany — for years one of the worst of the deadbeats,
given its economic strength — appears, at last, to give the long-term threat
posed by Russia the seriousness it deserves. Berlin will take its spending to 3.5 percent by the end of the
decade. Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has declared that the
Bundeswehr must “become the strongest conventional army in Europe.”
Merz has also stressed that this spending is not to “do
the United States a favor — but because Russia actively threatens the freedom
of the entire Euro-Atlantic area,” language designed to rebut any suggestion
that the Bundeskanzler is being bullied by Trump. And it makes a more
substantive point: A strong NATO is in the interests of the U.S. as well as of
Europe, even more so now that the U.S. has to contend with a rising would-be
hegemon in the Pacific.
That said, NATO would not have come to this point without
U.S. pressure. While, as alluded to above, we have been nervous about some of
the tactics Trump has used to this end, there can be no doubt that he (with a
major assist from the Kremlin) has done more than any president in decades to
persuade the Europeans to accept a much fairer share of responsibility for
their own defense. That is a considerable achievement. If the Europeans can
deliver on their commitments, the result will be a much safer world. Even if
embattled Ukraine saw little direct benefit from the summit, the rebuilding of
a stronger NATO will benefit Kyiv as well as the alliance’s members.
Now it is up to Europe to keep those promises. Doubtless,
there will be some backsliding — Spain has already been permitted as much, for
now. It will be up to this administration and its successors to keep up the
pressure on the Europeans to stick to what they have agreed. But they should
endeavor to do so in a way that does not undermine the perception — when it
comes to deterrence, perception is crucial — of the reliability of the American
guarantee, lest they let Putin believe that he has an opportunity to divide and
conquer. These are already dangerous times. There is no sense in making them
more dangerous still.
No comments:
Post a Comment