By Noah Rothman
Tuesday, June 17, 2025
This
post is in response to Honor and Ukraine
Michael writes: “The problem was not the fact that we
could not deliver on the implicit promises we made to Ukraine. The problem was
that we made these implicit promises without ever thinking seriously about
whether we could live up to them.”
I think that is a fair criticism of the Biden administration, which routinely talked itself out of its own commitments. That is a
reversible condition that the Trump administration should get to work
reversing.
If, however, Michael means to suggest that the United
States does not possess the wherewithal to live up to its commitments — that it
is limited by material resource deficiencies, which prevent it from effectively
opposing the Russian military’s irredentist project — I disagree. I rejected
the argument when JD Vance made it in the pages of the New York Times last
spring, and I still reject it.
Indeed, the campaign’s secondary effects undermine the
argument that America lacks the defense-industrial base to meet its objectives
in Ukraine. Among these effects is the revitalization of the U.S.
defense-industrial base, as defense firms ramp up production — sometimes on
spec — basing their investments on the sound assumption that the deteriorating threat environment
abroad will yield returns.
What I don’t understand is why Michael’s criticism of the
West for not contributing to the cause in Ukraine commensurate with our
rhetorical commitments to Kyiv’s sovereignty — an argument that I can get
behind — somehow requires us to continue to underinvest in our commitments.
That is less a critique than a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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