By Judson Berger
Friday, June 20, 2025
Lenin may not have ever said that “there are weeks where
decades happen,” but we’re passing through another one all the same.
As Israel conducts its devastating campaign against
Iran’s nuclear and military sites and leadership, the very survival of the
country’s theocratic regime is in question.
Whether “regime change” is an explicit goal of Israel or,
as Benjamin Netanyahu described it to Fox News, a potential outcome of its military operation (or both),
the scenario is now openly contemplated. Most recently, Israel’s defense minister said in response to Iran’s strike on a
hospital that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei should not “continue to exist.” Reza
Pahlavi, Iran’s exiled crown prince and son of the toppled shah, this week declared from afar that the Islamic Republic is
“in the process of collapsing” and called for a “nationwide uprising to put an
end to this nightmare once and for all.” He claimed that “Iran will not descend
into civil war or instability,” citing preparations for “the establishment of a
national and democratic government.”
Those are ambitious statements. Ayatollah Khamenei, for his part, issued a defiant message on
Wednesday, rejecting President Trump’s all-caps demand for “unconditional
surrender” and warning that “any U.S. military intervention will undoubtedly be
accompanied by irreparable damage.”
Trump, who taunted that the supreme leader is an “easy
target” but said he’s safe “for now,” is currently prodding Tehran to negotiate, as he weighs a strike. On that debate, National Review’s editorial makes the qualified case
for U.S. intervention to take out Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility — but cautions
about the many unknowns associated with regime change or regime collapse:
It is true that the regime,
weakened by Israeli hammer blows, eventually could fall. This would presumably
be a strategic boon for the West in taking off the map an inveterate, dangerous
enemy that has destabilized the region for decades. But no one could know with
certainty what would come next, and chaos and civil war might ensue.
“We know through our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq
that ‘regime change’ always looks easier before you get started,” Jim Geraghty
writes. (As one administration official told Axios, “It’s the Ayatollah you know versus the
Ayatollah you don’t know.”)
Of course, the ayatollah we know is . . . really, quite
awful (though his health and level of control during the war are a subject of debate).
Jim notes, too, the risk of the alternative:
There’s a cost to regime
preservation, as well.
Since the first days of the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, the men who rule the Islamic Republic of Iran have been a
cancer upon the world. The regime is the globe’s foremost sponsor of terrorism,
beginning its reign of terror with the hostage crisis and continuing it in the
Beirut barracks of American servicemen, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the
hijacking of TWA flight 847, Khobar Towers, and in the cities of Iraq. They
hate Americans and Israelis but don’t care whom they hurt in their global
campaign of chaos. The Iranians have bombed a Jewish community center in Argentina, Israeli diplomats driving through the streets of New Delhi, a tourist bus in a coastal town in Bulgaria, a taxi
in Bangkok, Thailand. Their “diplomats” have been found supplying explosives to terrorists. It goes well beyond
Israel; Iran stands accused of supporting terrorism, bombings, cyberterrorism,
planned assassinations, attempted assassinations, successful assassinations,
and other mayhem in Albania, Bahrain, Denmark, France, Kenya, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Thailand.
NRO has hosted a vigorous debate all week about the
merits and demerits of U.S. involvement in Iran, and the proper conditions for it, not to bring about the collapse
of the government but to help Israel take out Fordow. (You can read the takes
from Phil, Charlie, Michael, Noah, Mark, Andy, Jim, and others.) Andy McCarthy argues that “there is no reason to believe
President Trump contemplates more than a lightning strike that destroys Iran’s
potential to besiege our nation and our allies with nuclear weapons,” and he
notes: “We who favor regime change in Iran as an American foreign policy goal
have never favored achieving it by an American military presence.”
Michael Brendan Dougherty is dubious that U.S. intervention and all that follows
would play out neatly: “I hope that magic button exists, that Donald Trump
presses ‘bombs away’ and we get everything we want and nothing we don’t. . . .
But I’m not counting on it.”
The hopes, as expressed by Pahlavi, for a tipping-point
wave of anti-regime protests may also be misplaced. For all we know, Israel’s
strikes could serve to inspire at least the short-term appearance of national
solidarity inside Iran, giving the mullahs the most gossamer thread of popular
will with which to hold together their oppressive syndicate. Trump could swoop
in to make a deal, or not.
But the question of what comes “After the Ayatollahs,” as Shay Khatiri explored in a 2024
magazine piece that is well worth revisiting in this moment, is one that may
have to be answered much sooner than we thought.
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