By Shane Harris
Sunday, June 22, 2025
Whenever Donald Trump has contemplated confrontation with
Iran, his decisions have been guided less by the consensus of the U.S.
intelligence community than by his own calculation of risk and reward. At times
he has pulled the trigger. At times he has backed down. All the while, the U.S.
assessment of Iranian nuclear intentions has stayed remarkably consistent.
Now, Trump has gone
all in. His decision this week to drop more than a dozen of the largest
conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal on key Iranian nuclear facilities was
based, he has said, on his belief that Iran is close to being able to make the
ultimate weapon.
That’s not exactly what his intelligence agencies have
concluded. Their official, publicly stated assessment of Iran’s nuclear-weapons
ambitions is that Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei suspended the country’s
nuclear-weapons program in 2003, the year that the U.S. invaded Iraq and
toppled Saddam Hussein in order to seize his supposed weapons of mass
destruction. Those turned out to not exist. But Iran’s leaders reasonably
feared that the U.S. might next turn its sights on their country and its very
real weapons program.
Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence and
(on paper at least) Trump’s senior intelligence adviser, reiterated the
consensus view in congressional testimony this March. But she also noted that
Iran had built up its largest-ever stockpile of enriched uranium, the core
ingredient of a weapon, in a manner that was “unprecedented for a state without
nuclear weapons.”
Her brief remark escaped much scrutiny but turns out to
have been telling.
In recent briefings with Trump, CIA
Director John Ratcliffe has laid out what the
intelligence agencies know, particularly about Iran’s uranium stockpiles, and
said Iran was clearly trying to build a nuclear weapon, according to officials
familiar with his presentation who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss
a sensitive matter. On its face, that appears to contradict the long-standing
intelligence-community position. But Ratcliffe’s analysis is actually a more
nuanced reading of the available information.
In a separate briefing for lawmakers last week, Ratcliffe
used a football analogy to describe Iran’s ambitions: If a team had gone 99
yards down the field, its intention was obviously to score a touchdown, not
stop at the one-yard line, he said.
International experts agree that Iran has enriched
uranium to a point that is close to weapons grade, a fact that Vice President
J. D. Vance has emphasized in his own public remarks. Senior administration
officials take little comfort in Khamenei’s decades-old halt to the
nuclear-weapons program. Trump believes that Iran is actively pursuing
everything it would need to build a weapon, and in relatively short order, if
the supreme leader gave the go-ahead. That’s the real threat, and the reason
Trump gave the order to strike now, officials told me.
It also helps that Israel has assisted in paving the way.
Trump’s thinking is in line with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s; the prime
minister has said that Iran may have been months or mere weeks away from
building a weapon, and has generally taken the view that the country’s leaders
are stockpiling uranium precisely for that purpose. In the week leading up to
the U.S. strike-–which Israeli leaders appear not to have known about in
advance-–the Israeli
air force pummeled nuclear facilities, killed nuclear
scientists and experts, and degraded Iranian air defenses.
The Israeli attacks, like the American ones, appear to
have been largely driven by a sense of opportunity, after Israel previously
weakened the regime and neutralized its longtime proxy forces in the region.
There is no reason to think that the Trump administration, or Israel, suddenly
had some new window into Khamenei’s brain. But the president took an intuitive
view of the intelligence the U.S. has long possessed, and a fateful set of
actions based on it.
It’s too pat to say that Trump has ignored his
intelligence advisers, although he certainly created that impression. “Well
then my intelligence community is wrong,” he said earlier in the week when a
reporter noted that the agencies had found no evidence that Iran was trying to
build a weapon. Trump had previously said that Gabbard was also wrong when she
testified earlier this year.
Officials have told me that they’re not just concerned
about Iran’s ability to build a warhead that could be placed atop a ballistic
missile—a complex process that would require Iran to build a device that could
survive reentry into Earth’s atmosphere and land precisely on its target. The
regime could construct a simpler device and hand it over to a third party.
In an interview last month with a state-linked news
outlet, Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist and the
former head of the country’s Atomic Energy Organization, warned that Iran could
use nuclear weapons against the U.S., Great Britain, and Israel without
deploying them on missiles or an aircraft. “What if they are attacked from
within?” he asked, an unsubtle suggestion that Iran could give a nuclear weapon
to one of its proxies.
Israel was apparently listening and thought that
Abbassi-Davani might possess the know-how to make such a device. He was killed
earlier this month in an Israeli air strike.
Democratic lawmakers and Trump’s critics are sure to
press for more information on when and how the president came to his decision.
Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut told my colleague Isaac Stanley-Becker that
he was briefed last week on the intelligence. It “was clear to me that Iran did
not pose an imminent threat, that they are not on the verge of being able to
obtain a nuclear weapon that could pose a real threat to neighbors, and that
negotiations were ongoing and certainly not at their endpoints,” Murphy said.
On Sunday morning, Defense
Secretary Pete Hegseth briefed reporters about the
U.S. operation and was asked whether new information had persuaded Trump to
act. Hegseth declined to share many details about Trump’s decision making, but
he allowed that “the president has made it very clear [that] he’s looked at all
of this, all of the intelligence, all the information, and come to the
conclusion that the Iranian nuclear program is a threat, and was willing to
take this precision operation to neutralize that threat.”
Ultimately, Trump’s decision to bomb Iran had little to
do with any sudden change in intelligence assessments. The choice to use
military force was a judgment call, and now, it’s his to own.
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