By Kevin D. Williamson
Friday, September 25, 2026
American farmers rely on imports for many of their most
critical inputs—fertilizer, chemicals, machinery—and rely on exports to large
overseas markets such as China for a big part of their profits, and, as such,
conducting a series of trade wars fought with tariffs is just about the worst
possible economic policy for them as a group. Naturally, American farmers and farming communities keep voting roughly
two-to-one for trade wars—a vote for Donald Trump, the guy who insists that
“trade wars are good and easy to win,” is a vote for trade wars.
Farmers voted for trade wars, and trade wars they got.
And—surprise!—agriculture is in something like a
full-blown recession, with farm incomes projected to decline by a whopping 5.5 percent in real
terms this year. Farm bankruptcies are up 46 percent since 2024, and some 15,000 farming operations went dark last year. This is an
entirely predictable outcome of the 2024 presidential election.
In much the same way that Americans lately have been
promised that gasoline and diesel prices are just on the verge of going back
down—and in much the same way that the Republican standard-bearer has been
three weeks away from a healthcare plan for 12 years now and running—Trump
keeps saying that the Chinese have committed to buying $x billion worth
of this or that commodity from U.S. farmers, and—surprise!—those commitments continue to go unrealized, with China being at
the moment many, many billions of dollars behind on promised orders from U.S.
farmers. “We like to hear commitments from Chinese buyers, but we also need to
see beans on boats headed west,” says a board member of the American Soybean Association. It is almost as though one
cannot quite trust in the good intentions of an authoritarian police state run
by Communist Party oligarchs or in the sound judgment of a serially bankrupt
former game show host who once tried to overthrow the U.S. government. Which
raises the question:
Why are American farmers such a bunch of chumps?
Thomas Frank’s famous thesis, spelled out in What’s
the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, is that
shady right-wing corporate interests have successfully used culture-war
rhetoric and Jesus talk to snooker Middle America’s farmers, blue-collar
workers, and small-business owners into—all together now!—“voting against their
own interests.” It isn’t a very good thesis, inasmuch as the evidence very
strongly suggests that voting in a way that would appear to be at least
superficially at odds with one’s self-interest is so common as to be nearly
universal in American politics. Americans are not especially self-interested
voters.
For example, college-educated white voters and
college-educated African American voters are, on average, more progressive than
the non-college-educated of their respective racial groups, and
college-educated white voters in particular are more likely than their non-college counterparts to
support redistributive tax and welfare policies that are likely to increase
their own tax burden while providing no benefit to them, their families, or, in
general, to people who are economically similar to them. The Democrats are the
party friendlier toward redistributive tax and welfare policies, and it is the
Democrats—not the Republicans—who in recent years have seen the most growth in
their support among the educated and affluent most likely to be disadvantaged
by those policies. As Sam Zacher, a researcher with the progressive Analyst
Institute, observes in a very interesting 2024 paper titled “The Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of
Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution”:
Strikingly, in multiple elections
since the 2010s, the data actually show a form of “backwards” polarization:
majorities of affluent voters voted for Democratic candidates. Specifically,
some evidence shows that Democratic candidates actually beat Republicans in
attaining support from the top 5% (by income), the highest income stock- owning
voters, and even the top 1% of voters (by income) over the past decade.
That being well-disposed toward welfare programs (to
linger on an illuminating example) does not neatly follow income should not
surprise you very much if you have thought through the issues a little bit.
There are many possible factors at work. High-income African American voters,
having the shared experience of racial discrimination, may be more oriented
toward racial solidarity than class interest and may see their socioeconomic
status as necessarily tied up with the shared interests of black Americans, who
are more likely to rely on welfare programs than whites. (African Americans
make up about 13 percent of the overall population but more
than twice that share of SNAP beneficiaries, for example.) Similarly: For
years, I have been chronicling the leftward political drift of Wall Street, and
people who are surprised by the political loyalties of the men and women at the
commanding heights of finance should consider that these voters are
disproportionately products of the Ivy League and other elite universities,
that they largely live and work in and around New York City and other major
metros, and that they have a great deal politically in common with similarly
situated voters who do not work in finance but who share experiences and
interests with the Wall Street gang even if they occupy lower tax brackets. A
related, albeit cynical, possibility is that affluent Americans of all
backgrounds have an unarticulated but understood interest in giving the poor
just enough to depress any more radical efforts at economic reorganization, in
much the same way that many historians see the emergence of the Bismarckian
welfare state as an essentially conservative program meant to take the steam out
of the socialists with more far-reaching ambitions.
Whatever the reason, it is reasonably well-established
that economic self-interest has very little reliable effect on voting or policy
preferences. As the economist Bryan Caplan observes, “self-interest has little effect on public opinion.” Caplan
is among those who believe that we would have better politics if voters were more
self-interested because altruistic attitudes so often lead voters to support “foolish policies,” and he laments that the stereotypical,
conspiracy-theory-adjacent view that our policymaking agenda is dominated by
billionaires is—alas!—not quite true. Rather, there is broad agreement across
income groups on many big policy questions, including the big economic ones,
though the very wealthy do tend to prevail in those cases where they sharply
disagree with the non-wealthy. In those cases, Caplan writes, “democracies
listen to the relatively libertarian rich far more than they listen to the
absolutely statist non-rich. And since I think that statist policy preferences
rest on a long list of empirical and normative mistakes, my sincere reaction is
to say, ‘Thank goodness.’”
In much the same way that Harvard-educated,
Manhattan-dwelling Wall Street traders vote a lot like Harvard-educated,
Manhattan-dwelling nonprofit executives, rural America has a fair number of
export-dependent farmers who vote a lot like the clerk down at the
feed-and-seed. Many of those farmers are multimillionaires with graduate
degrees from Texas A&M who run sophisticated high-tech businesses and know
a hell of a lot more about crop genomics than Bobby Kennedy Jr. does and a good
deal more about practical Chinese politics than Marco Rubio does: They aren’t rubes—but
they vote like rubes.
Well, I didn’t vote for an assault on American
farmers! I didn’t vote for $6.59 diesel because I wanted to spend $320 to fill
up my F-250. I didn’t vote for chaos! I didn’t vote for this! I hear that
all the time. But the truth is, some 77 million Americans did vote precisely
for this. Trump ran as a trade-war and tariffs guy. This is what a trade war
looks like: It makes you poor and vulnerable. Trump’s low character was a
matter of public record way back in the ancient days when the great big wall in
our political discourse was the one running through Berlin. His profound
ignorance, biliousness, and moral grotesquery long have been observable in
American public life for anybody with enough money to buy a copy of the New
York Post. Americans should have known better in 2016, but there’s no
excuse for not having known better in 2024. Farmers voted for this just as much
as Philadelphians have spent two generations or more voting for high crime and
crappy schools and Angelenos have voted for ... well, go there and have a look
around.
There are better ways to govern. We could begin with
Caplan’s observation—which is unimpeachable—that Americans’ “policy preferences
rest on a long list of empirical and normative mistakes,” e.g., that a country
can get rich by blockading its own ports, literally bombing its own supply chains, having the state seize the means of production, and deporting a chunk of its workforce—and doing so because a
pampered and half-literate New York City real estate heir thinks socks and building
supplies aren’t expensive enough.
Yes, Americans voted for this: Farmers and car dealers
and a whole lot of people who should have known better. The
question is how much pain it is going to take for Americans to choose something
better.
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