National Review Online
Tuesday, September 22, 2026
If the U.S. is indeed on its way to securing a deal with
Denmark and Greenland akin to the one that the president is now describing,
that is good news, even if getting to this point has been far more painful than
it needed to be. Donald Trump maintains that the deal will give the United States
“permanent control over security, and all other needs, in Greenland,” and that
no U.S. adversary could have a base or military presence there without
Washington’s written approval. If so, great.
To be clear, Trump was right about one big thing: that
Greenland merited much more attention than it had been getting. The Arctic may
not have warmed up by as much and as quickly as Al Gore and others claimed it
would, but it has done so by enough to render it much more accessible than
before. As a result, it is becoming a zone of geopolitical competition for its
resources and, more simply, because of location, location, location.
For obvious geographical reasons, that increases the
already-considerable importance of Greenland to this country. The island is a
potential back door through U.S. defenses and a key North Atlantic vantage
point. Moreover, in an era of supply-chain anxiety, it has potentially valuable
mineral resources, including rare earths.
During the Second World War, the U.S. assumed de facto
control of Greenland, which was a colony of Denmark, a country then occupied by
Germany. After the German defeat, the Truman administration floated the idea of
a $100 million purchase. Denmark was not interested but, recognizing
Washington’s legitimate interest in Greenland and all too aware of the broader
Soviet threat, entered into a comprehensive defense agreement with the U.S. in
1951.
Legally, Greenland is no longer a colony. It is a part of
Denmark, but with a high degree of autonomy. In response to the changing
relationship between the two, the defense agreement was amended in 2004 in ways that provided for a greater degree
of consultation with Greenland’s government and effectively restricted the U.S.
“zone” to the one remaining American base (down from a peak of perhaps 17)
at Thule, now known as Pituffik. The U.S. has a relatively small number of
personnel at the facility but maintains critical early-warning installations
designed to detect a missile attack, along with satellite guidance and control
systems (for which locations in the far north are indispensable) and a large
airfield. Given the limited resources Denmark has at its disposal to defend
Greenland, an agreement to upgrade the U.S. presence needed doing.
Asking politely to upgrade the existing agreement might
well have delivered just that — and done so without creating all the
geopolitical self-harm. Unfortunately, Trump went about defending the U.S.
strategic interest in a different way, and that was the wrong way. The core of
the problem has been that, despite his own nationalist instincts, the president
is oblivious when it comes to the national sensitivities of others. Originally,
he had imagined that Greenland could simply be bought:
essentially, it would be “a large real estate deal.” This was not,
unsurprisingly, how the Danes and Greenlanders saw it. The president’s adding
the threat of stick (tariffs and hints of worse) to the promise of carrot
caused a major rift within NATO and did damage to our reputation as a reliable
ally.
Full details of the revised arrangement have yet to be
disclosed. Denmark is talking about a greater role for NATO as a whole,
something that is already underway and was overdue. From the American point of
view, this ought to be in line with our insistence on greater burden-sharing
within the alliance. To be sure, Greenland was already under NATO’s shield, but
emphasizing the involvement of the broader alliance may help seal the deal in
the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments, where the agreement will have to be
ratified and where suspicion of American intentions has soared. Stressing the
fact that Danish and Greenlandic sovereignty will be left intact will help.
There will be no grant of exclusive mining concessions to the U.S., but, if
some reports are accurate, there will be a provision that only NATO and EU
members will be allowed to make “sensitive investments” in
Greenland. If so, that’s also to the good.
One key question that appears to be unresolved is the
durability of any deal. The president is saying that it will be permanent,
which would be best for U.S. interests. But would the agreement really be
“forever” if Greenland became fully independent, something that, judging by the
polls, most Greenlanders would like to see, if only at the right time?
For now, however, it seems that the U.S. is on track to
better secure its position in Greenland, although there’s no deal until there’s
a ratified deal. If and when an agreement is concluded, the best way to
maximize its benefits to the U.S. will be to repair the diplomatic damage that
this episode has caused by rebuilding a deeper relationship with Denmark and
Greenland.
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