Russia’s Threats to Europe Extend Beyond Ukraine

By Elizabeth Kennedy Trudeau & David J. Kramer

Friday, September 11, 2026

 

Russia’s war against Ukraine, initiated in 2014 and then launched on a full-scale basis in 2022, is the gravest security crisis on the European continent since World War II.

 

But it’s not the only Russian threat on the continent. Russia’s gray-zone, or hybrid, war against the rest of Europe beyond Ukraine poses additional, serious challenges to NATO and U.S. interests.

 

Russia has been testing NATO’s resolve and solidarity since 2006, when ex-Russian agent Alexander Litvinenko died after being poisoned with polonium in downtown London. It continued the next year with a massive cyberattack against Estonia that left NATO unsure how to respond. And in the years since, this campaign has only intensified.

 

Russia has carried out or attempted assassinations on NATO territory, and its drones and missiles have violated member nations’ airspace. According to a senior NATO military official, NATO has scrambled fighter jets nearly 700 times in two years to intercept Russian aircraft. Russia has weaponized migration, manipulating migrant flows to destabilize and pressure NATO allies. It has threatened to attack NATO states that aid Ukraine, most recently the United Kingdom and Germany. Germany has blamed attacks aimed at critical infrastructure, including an explosion at a train station and two separate incidents targeting power stations, on Russia, as well as attempts to damage aircraft at Germany’s Leipzig airport with explosive drones. Even U.S. interests in Europe are not safe from Russia. In a September 3 Russian missile attack against Ukraine, Russia badly damaged a Coca-Cola plant.

 

In response to Germany’s claim of Russian responsibility for the drone threats at Leipzig airport, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared “the beginning of a real war with Germany.” This typifies Russia’s approach: Blame the targets and victims of its aggression. It does it with Ukraine by absurdly accusing the government there of being run by Nazis. It’s doing it with Germany and others who provide support to Ukraine to help Kyiv defend against Russia’s brutal war.  

 

Russia’s poke-and-prod approach also seeks to divide NATO and expose as hollow its Article 5 guarantee—the core NATO principle that means an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all. Its increasingly complex alignment with other autocracies like China, Iran, and North Korea adds to the level of danger.

 

And every day, as casualties mount and drones and missiles kill civilians in Ukraine almost four and a half years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no interest in peace. Immediately after a brief ceasefire to enable U.S. envoys to visit both Moscow and Kyiv last weekend, Russian forces resumed their brutal aerial campaign against Ukraine.  

 

The Saturday visit to Moscow by U.S. special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner followed two other known meetings between U.S. and Russian officials. In August, CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Moscow, reportedly to warn his Russian counterparts against an attack on a NATO member state and to argue that Russia’s war against Ukraine was going poorly. Putin refused a meeting with Ratcliffe, perhaps because the CIA director was delivering a message Putin didn’t want to hear. By contrast, Putin warmly welcomed Witkoff and Kushner, whom he’s met on numerous past occasions.

 

In between the Ratcliffe and Witkoff-Kushner visits to Moscow, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent invited—over the objections of European members—Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov to North Carolina for a meeting of G20 finance ministers, the first time Russia was represented at such a gathering since its full-scale invasion.

 

We both served in the State Department with a combined three decades of experience (including stints at NATO and the Pentagon for Elizabeth). Experience has shown us, time and again, that adversaries pay close attention to what we say, as well as what we do. They notice divisions and hesitation; they exploit ambiguity. They play with words. Russia certainly does. We cannot give Russia reason to doubt our commitment to our allies.

 

We are past the warning stage. The lights are blinking on the dashboard. The Trump administration, together with NATO allies, needs to provide Ukraine with the military assistance it needs to win the war, not just defend itself. It’s also imperative that Russia and other adversaries understand that America is committed to freedom and stands in solidarity with all of our allies in Europe and beyond.

 

For nearly eight decades, NATO has symbolized the ideal of deterrence, ensuring that any adversary understands the consequences of aggression. That, for example, a country that attacked Estonia, Poland, or Finland knows it would not be taking on that country alone—it would be starting a conflict with NATO. This idea is the heart of Article 5, but Article 5 only has meaning if our adversaries believe the United States will honor it. One hopes that Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow disabused Russian officials of their wishes that the United States will not follow through on its NATO commitments.

 

Any ambiguity about Article 5 isn’t leverage, but a weak link in that chain of solidarity. If Moscow assesses that readings of NATO obligations rest on political moods, deterrence simply crumbles. The probing and testing will become more frequent and may end in dire choices for the alliance.

 

On the anniversary of September 11, we should also clearly recall the one time in NATO’s history when Article 5 was invoked—in our defense.

 

After the devastating attacks in New York and Washington, and the crash in Pennsylvania, NATO was there. NATO aircraft patrolled American skies, and, in the years to come, our European and Canadian allies deployed thousands of their forces with us in Afghanistan. Men and women from NATO countries, large and small, fought shoulder to shoulder with us, and thousands died there.

 

NATO, of course, is changing: European allies are spending more on defense, building their own military capacity, and assuming greater responsibility for their own security, including assuming a leadership role in supporting Ukraine. These are certainly steps that needed to happen—and more should be done.

 

But Europe’s increasing investment in defense does not relieve the United States of its obligations. A stronger Europe, partnered with the ironclad American commitment to NATO, both makes the alliance stronger and reestablishes deterrence.

 

Russia and its malign partners must understand that starting a war with a NATO ally would be a terrible mistake. After all, Russia is no match for the United States and Europe if the latter two stick together and support each other.

 

A peaceful and secure Europe has been one of the United States’ great strategic advantages since the end of World War II. The greatest threat to such a Europe arose when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In defending its land and freedom from Russian takeover, Ukraine contributes to European security by standing between the rest of Europe and a Russian military on the march. During his visit to Moscow, Ratcliffe reportedly urged his Russian interlocutors to recognize that continuing the war Putin started would end badly for Russia.

 

While not a member of NATO, Ukraine is most deserving of Western support not just to stay in the fight but to help it win the war Russia started against it. Supporting Ukraine helps secure the rest of Europe, plain and simple.

Russia does not have to like NATO, but it must believe NATO and the United States when we say, with no ambiguity, that an attack on one will bring a response from all, and that the United States keeps its word. Russia should clearly understand what will happen if it attacks a NATO ally because, simply, that’s how we make sure it never does.