Wednesday, August 2, 2023
They’re Bluffing
This Trump Indictment Shouldn’t Stand
Tuesday, August 1, 2023
The Doom Poll
By Nick
Catoggio
Monday,
July 31, 2023
Do you
guys ever think about dying?
As
in Barbie, so too in life: Read through
today’s New York Times survey of the Republican primary and
you might find yourself suddenly thinking about dying.
Or
feeling like you’re dying, even.
The pros
will remind us that it’s just one poll but in this case the pollster enjoys
an A+ rating from FiveThirtyEight.
And the topline number happens to reflect the national polling average almost
exactly. The Times has the race 54-17 for Trump over DeSantis;
the RealClearPolitics average has it 54-18.3. The
frontrunner has tripled the vote share of the only opponent who seemed to have
a chance of defeating him. No candidate in the history of modern presidential
polling has lost a lead of as much as 20 points at this stage of a campaign,
let alone 37.
What
makes this a “doom poll” and effectively a premortem of the DeSantis campaign
isn’t the topline, though, as grim as that is. It’s the fact that, no matter
how you slice and dice the Republican electorate demographically here, Trump is
ahead—often handily. “He led by wide margins among men and women, younger and
older voters, moderates and conservatives, those who went to college and those
who didn’t, and in cities, suburbs and rural areas,” the Times says
of its data. There are effectively zero “DeSantis constituencies” left within
the party, only constituencies that prefer Trump to the governor a bit less
emphatically than others.
The impression
I’m left with after digesting it is that there was nothing DeSantis could have
done realistically to defeat Trump, especially once the drumbeat of indictments
began. The primary isn’t over. It never began.
***
This
disaster has many fathers.
Almost
obligatorily, there’s the boy-who-cried-wolf impact on Republican voters from
institutions being caught with their pants down during the Trump era. It’s a
familiar excuse for the right’s descent into madness, but there’s something to
it. Hillary Clinton should have been prosecuted; Trump didn’t collude with
Russia to get elected; the dismissed and derided pre-election story of Hunter
Biden’s laptop was true; the Alvin Bragg indictment in Manhattan is politicized
nonsense. Each of these episodes reinforced populist beliefs that Trump and his
supporters are victims of a long-running scam by the liberal establishment to
maintain their grip on power by hook or by crook. The backlash has nurtured a
defensive instinct on his behalf so intense that it can no longer be reasoned
with.
And
insofar as it might be reasoned with, right-wing institutional actors have been
too cowardly or selfish to try. Republican politicians who refused to say that
Trump lost the 2020 election for fear of how their voters might react have
now neutered the argument that he’s
unelectable in 2024.
Pro-DeSantis media outlets that spent six years accusing the “deep state” of
being out to get Trump persuaded primary voters not to care about him leaving
top-secret material lying around at his home. A movement that spends every
waking hour brainwashing its members to dismiss any criticism of its leader as
illegitimate and improperly motivated will struggle to criticize him
persuasively when the time comes for new leadership. Go figure.
Republican
voters have been poorly served by institutions during the Trump years, which
helps explain why the Times poll says what it says. But for
those who still believe in personal responsibility, explanations aren’t
excuses. For instance, there’s no excuse for this:
Even
Trump doesn’t claim that there were no classified documents at Mar-a-Lago. But
the right’s justifiable skepticism of certain institutional actors combined
with the hyper-contrarian “question
everything” sensibility of populist media has inculcated in many a willingness to
assume that any—any—politically inconvenient fact must be a lie. Reality
itself is now suspect insofar as it conflicts with political ends. The word
“Orwellian” is overused, but it fits here.
Which
brings us back to the doom poll. Insofar as there’s good news in it, it’s that
not all Republican voters have fallen into Orwell’s trap. The bad news is that
enough have done so as to make it all but impossible for anyone else to win
this primary.
There
are four takeaways from the data.
Trump’s
diehard base really does function more like a cult than a political bloc.
Nate Cohn of the Times sifted
through the numbers and identified 37 percent of the party as constituting the
“MAGA base,” as he describes it. How loyal is the MAGA base?
So loyal
that not a single person in a group of 319 would concede that
their hero had committed serious federal crimes. “The MAGA base doesn’t support
Mr. Trump in spite of his flaws,” Cohn wrote. “It supports him because it
doesn’t seem to believe he has flaws.”
How much
of that loyalty is owed to ideology and how much to persona is hard to say.
When the Times asked Republicans which candidate is more
“fun,” Trump led DeSantis 54-16—almost precisely reflecting his overall lead in
the primary. (In fairness, Trump clearly is the more fun of
the two.) If you’re of the opinion that populist Republicans view politics as
more like pro wrestling than a vehicle for policymaking and government, that
result won’t dissuade you.
Yet it’s
also true that the more ideological a right-winger is, the more likely he is to
prefer Trump to DeSantis. The former president leads DeSantis 65-15 among “very
conservative” Republicans versus 35-17 among self-described “moderate” and “liberal” ones.
Which is absurd on its face: DeSantis was vastly more conservative than Trump
in his pre-2015 incarnation as a congressman and has been a “high energy”
populist conservative legislator as governor, much more so than Trump was as
president.
However
you define “conservative,” pre-Trump or post-Trump, DeSantis should hold the
advantage. Unless, that is, you define “conservative” as synonymous with Trump
himself, in which case all imitators will pale by comparison to the genuine
article. Judging by the doom poll, that appears to be what most Republicans
imagine “conservatism” to be nowadays. Actual conservatives should take note in
considering whether this party still represents their interests.
And
DeSantis fans should consider the possibility that the “MAGA base” really might
not turn out for their guy in the general election if he wins the nomination.
I’ve been skeptical of that in the past, but a bloc conditioned to view all of
its leader’s failures as illegitimate might well hold a grudge against an
opponent who causes such a failure in the primary.
DeSantis’
best pitches to Republican voters have fallen flat.
The
governor began his campaign touting three supposed advantages over Trump. He
was more electable against Joe Biden, as he proved with his landslide victory
in Florida last fall. He was more aggressive in using executive authority to
advance the populist agenda, walking the walk whereas you-know-who had mostly
just talked the talk. And he would wage culture war against “wokeness” with
special fervor relative to Trump, who cares far less about that issue than he
does conspiracy theories about the 2020 election and the criminal charges
against him.
The doom
poll tested each of those subjects. DeSantis trails in each, badly in some
cases.
Electability?
Fifty-eight percent of Republicans say “able to beat Biden” describes Trump
more accurately than DeSantis. Just 28 percent say the opposite. It’s hard to
believe that a man who’s likely to be under four separate criminal indictments
by the time of the first Republican debate might be a more formidable nominee
for the GOP, but the RCP averages suggest that it’s true. Quite a testament to DeSantis’ own
political liabilities.
An
aggressive, proactive executive? Trump leads on that too. Asked whether the
phrase “get things done” better describes the frontrunner or the governor, 67
percent say Trump versus 22 percent who say DeSantis. It’s hard for a
never-been-president to beat a former president on this metric, it seems.
The war
on “woke”? The Times didn’t test Trump and DeSantis
head-to-head on that but it did ask Republicans whom they’d prefer in a contest
between a candidate who promises to fight corporations that promote “woke”
ideology and another who wants the government to stay out of deciding what
corporations should support. Result: The hands-off candidate leads 52-38. Among
voters who prefer DeSantis in the primary, it’s 55-38. Punishing “woke”
businesses failed to draw majority support even among the most ardent
populist voters, the so-called MAGA base.
Because
the governor’s feud with Disney has linked him so closely in the right-wing
imagination to battling those “woke” businesses, it’s possible that some
Republicans surveyed by the Times recognized this question as
a proxy for their feelings about DeSantis and answered accordingly. In that
case, Trump supporters who back DeSantis’ crusade against Disney on the merits
might have responded disapprovingly here to signal disapproval of the governor.
But
either way, an issue that was supposed to give the challenger a leg up on the
frontrunner has failed to do so. And it’s not the only one that has.
Young
Republicans are Trumpier than their elders in important ways.
If you
thought Friday’s newsletter about the next generation of
Republicans was grim, buckle up.
It might
not surprise you that, according to the doom poll, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is now
more popular among Republicans than Mike Pence is. The former VP enjoys a 44-45
favorability rating; for RFK it’s 53-23. That’s majority support on the
American right for the nuttiest Democrat in the race and plurality disdain for
a staunchly conservative Republican congressman turned governor turned vice
president.
What
might surprise you is that Kennedy’s strongest support comes from Republicans
aged 18-29. It’s not baby boomers watching Fox News glassy-eyed at all hours
who have taken the shiniest shine to frequent Fox guest RFK. It’s the kids.
Among
that group his favorability stands at 67-1. (No typo.) In every other age
group, he’s no higher than 56 percent favorable and no lower than 18 percent
unfavorable.
There’s
a similar age gap on the question of sending military and economic support to
Ukraine. A majority of Republican senior citizens, veterans of the Cold War,
support sending that aid; middle-aged Republicans are less enthusiastic but
even 40 percent of them are in favor. Only in the 18-29 group does support drop
below 30 percent, clocking in at 28-64.
Go
figure, then, that Trump’s lead over DeSantis among young Republicans is even
more lopsided than it is among the primary electorate overall, a 59-15 advantage.
Twentysomething
right-wingers aren’t more populist than older ones across the board. They’re
more willing to legalize gay marriage than their Republican grandparents are
and, remarkably, more willing to support a comprehensive immigration deal that
would grant illegal immigrants a path to citizenship. They’re also more open to
reforming entitlements in the name of reducing the deficit than retirement-age
Republicans are, not very surprisingly.
Their
preferences may be less a product of considered populist ideology than having
been drawn to Trump’s anti-establishment persona as they came of age
politically and adopting his passions—Kennedy-style paranoia and
anti-anti-Putinism—as their own. And how else could it be, realistically? Any
young voter who dislikes Trump, and there are many, decamped for the Democratic Party long ago. All that’s left of
twentysomethings on the right at this point are MAGA true believers, the sort
of people whose BS detector is sufficiently haywire that they don’t bat an eye
at stuff like this:
If
you’re worried about what the party will look like in 10 years, you should be.
A
more centrist DeSantis campaign probably wouldn’t have fared much better.
As more
bad news piles up for the governor, the second-guessing grows more
intense. Why did he run to Trump’s right? Why didn’t he pitch himself
to more mainstream Republican voters?
I’ve
already answered that at length but the doom poll provides
extra reason to doubt that a more mainstream DeSantis would have won this race.
Here’s how Cohn divides the primary electorate from the Times data
he’s seeing:
You can
see the governor’s strategic dilemma at a glance. If Trump begins with an
absolute floor of 37 percent, there’s hardly any margin for error for DeSantis
in consolidating the remaining 63 percent. To do so he’d need to craft a
message that appeals simultaneously to Republicans who are populist enough to
consider supporting Trump again and to Never Trumpers who have ruled out
supporting him. Is there any such message? Cohn elaborates on
how tricky it would be to try to reconcile these two factions:
These two groups of voters don’t just differ on Mr. Trump; they disagree
on the issues as well. Mr. Trump’s skeptics support additional military and economic
aid to Ukraine, and comprehensive immigration reform, while they oppose a
six-week abortion ban. The persuadable voters, on the other hand, take the
opposite view on all of those issues.
Remember
in March how DeSantis tried to have it both ways on Ukraine? There’s a reason:
To satisfy Never Trumpers and Quite Possibly Trumpers, he
needed to take two different positions, essentially. So he did. It didn’t work great.
I think
the governor and his team calculated correctly that they couldn’t win by
conceding the MAGA base to Trump and trying to thread a needle that somehow
consolidated the remaining 63 percent. It’s impossible. There are too many
candidates competing for that second group and too many factions with
conflicting visions for the party to coalesce behind a single message. So
DeSantis tried something bold—he attempted to win over part of the MAGA base
itself with a “more Trump than Trump” message. He thought that if Trump fans
began defecting from the cult leader to him, overjoyed Never Trumpers and
Trump-skeptic persuadables would toss aside their misgivings about the
governor’s hyper-populist pandering and rally behind him to slay the dragon.
It was a
bold strategy, high risk and high reward. And he put in the work: The last two
years of DeSantis’ tenure as governor were dedicated singlemindedly to trying
to convince the MAGA base that he’s more Trump than Trump. From COVID to
critical race theory, from trans rights to woke corporations, there’s no
populist hobby horse DeSantis hasn’t saddled up and eagerly ridden to show the
right that he meant business. No Republican since 2015 has made as compelling a
case legislatively that he, not the leader of the party, is the most formidable
populist in the party.
If he
had suddenly backburnered all of that in order to run a more mainstream
campaign, blathering about the economy or what have you, he’d still
be far behind Trump but with a different coalition. There’d be more Never
Trumpers behind him—and fewer populists. The second-guessing would be as loud
as it is now, but instead of wondering why he wasn’t running further to the
center, armchair quarterbacks would be wondering why he wasn’t running further
to the right. What was the point of spending so much time on CRT, etc.,
in Florida if he was only going to end up positioning himself as a slightly
more populist Nikki Haley? Trump voters hate him now!
So he
ran to the right. He made a play for the MAGA base. It hasn’t worked: DeSantis
trails Trump 62-31 in the doom pool head-to-head, the sort of binary choice
where we would expect every Trump-skeptic in the party to hold their nose and
support the governor. If that’s the best DeSantis can do while pandering his
heart out to woo stubborn populists, what reason is there to think he might
have done better by pandering to them less?
Are
there some moderate Republicans who prefer Trump to a more-Trump-than-Trump Ron
DeSantis, and who might have switched to the governor had he run a more
centrist campaign? Sure, maybe. But how persuadable are those “moderates,”
really, if they’re sticking with Trump in the present circumstances? Chris
Christie put it starkly:
Consider
the possibility that this party, including its so-called moderates, is entirely
too far gone for any strategy to have successfully pried away a majority of
Republicans from Trump. In fact, in the head-to-head question with DeSantis,
the doom poll finds that 22 percent who believe Trump committed serious federal
crimes still prefer him to the governor. Even college-educated
Republicans, whom DeSantis was winning not long ago, now favor Trump by 17 points
despite the fact that we’re at two indictments and counting.
It’s not
primarily the MAGA base that has delivered us to this point in the right’s
civic deterioration. It’s those not-very-persuadable “persuadables” who keep
finding ways not to let themselves be persuaded who are to blame.
One
voter, asked by the Times why he was sticking with Trump over
the governor of Florida, answered memorably: “He might say mean things and make
all the men cry because all the men are wearing your wife’s underpants and you
can’t be a man anymore. You got to be a little sissy and cry about everything.
But at the end of the day, you want results. Donald Trump’s my guy. He’s proved
it on a national level.” There’s nothing Ron DeSantis can do about “logic” like
that. He spent the last year in Florida exploring creative ways legislatively
to target men who enjoy wearing women’s underpants and he got “results,”
believing that doing so would flip precisely this type of voter into his column
and away from Trump.
He miscalculated. Only one candidate can own the libs to the satisfaction of most of the Republican Party, it seems. The governor is doomed. Do you ever think about dying?
The Incoherence of the Rally around Criminal Defendant Trump
By Dan
McLaughlin
Monday,
July 31, 2023
It often
feels pointless even to argue with defenses of Donald Trump at this point,
given the generally poor quality of the pro-Trump commentariat, most of which
boils down to “Trump has a following so we should cater to it.” The rest is
typically just reasoning backwards, rather than attempting to follow some line
of thinking that the commentator actually believed before 2015. That said,
Trump continues to have a following, so it is occasionally worth reviewing the
arguments made in favor of following Trump. These aren’t straw men; they’re the
actual arguments. Yossi Gestetner is a vocal Trump supporter on Twitter who has
penned some of them in a Substack
newsletter. Let us
consider Gestetner’s case for why, in his view, the various criminal
indictments of Trump are neither (1) a negative reflection on Trump, (2) a
reason to be concerned about Trump’s capacity to win an election, nor (3) a
sign that Joe Biden and the Democrats would very much prefer to run against
Trump.
The most popular line these days by anti-Trump conservatives and
Republicans is that the DOJ is indicting former President Donald Trump to help
him win the 2024 GOP nomination to make it easier for Democrats to beat
Republicans in the fall. Those conservatives also claim that Trump brought his
legal troubles on himself. . . . If Trump is indicted for politics, how can one
also claim he brought it upon himself? It’s either or. It makes no sense to be
both.
It is
not remotely inconsistent to believe both that Trump’s political enemies have
political reasons to pursue him, and that Trump has actually made their job a
lot easier by committing crimes and by doing unethical and/or stupid things. No
less an authority on presidential self-destruction than Richard Nixon
famously said as much in 1977 about his own
downfall: “I brought myself down. I gave ’em a sword. And they stuck it in, and
they twisted it with relish. And I guess if I’d been in their position, I’d a
done the same thing.” In other words, Nixon had enemies and he
made it easier for them.
Think of
the old detective question: Does a suspect have motive, opportunity, and means?
Democrats have a motive to destroy Trump in the 2024 general election. They
have the means, via the Justice Department and the Manhattan County and Fulton
County (Georgia) district attorneys’ offices and the New York attorney general
and E. Jean Carroll’s lawsuit, to do so. But they have had these things before,
with regard to Trump and prior Republican leaders. They still have it with other
Republican contenders they hate, such as Ron DeSantis. Why have the rest not
been indicted, or (in the Carroll case) found liable for sexual battery? Why
was Trump himself not indicted in 2016? Lack of opportunity.
You can
make the case, quite properly (as I and others have) that the Manhattan DA’s
indictment is legally bogus in half a dozen ways, that the Mar-a-Lago boxes
indictment applies a different standard of justice than what was used to
justify not indicting Hillary Clinton, and that the Fulton County DA appears to
be contemplating what may be a radical expansion of Georgia racketeering law.
But none of that means that these prosecutors were inventing cases out of whole
cloth, or (at least in the boxes case) that Trump is not actually guilty of
serious federal crimes. The Manhattan DA’s case would not exist if Trump had
not paid off a porn actress to cover up an affair, which he did.
The Georgia investigation would not exist if Trump had not led a monthslong
effort to overturn an election he lost and put improper pressure on the Georgia
secretary of state, which he did. The boxes case would not
exist if Trump had not deliberately chosen to take with him out of office
documents with sensitive national-defense information that had not been
declassified, which he did. Over and over again, like Nixon,
he has given his enemies a sword.
The DOJ inserted itself in the politics of . . .
2012 by arresting the anti-Muslim filmmaker to fuel the Benghazi video
talking point and by giving the IRS a pass on its anti-Tea Party abuses.
2016 by weaponizing what they knew all along was a Dem-funded Russia
Hoax.
2020 by giving the Bidens a pass and discrediting the laptop.
It is essentially the opinion of anti-Trump Cons that this
increasingly-political DOJ would suddenly be out of ideas if only Trump behaved
differently or if someone else was the GOP nominee. Weird. Third, how do
those Cons plan on defeating a DOJ that they claim is so corrupt? By insulting
GOP voters that they are “too stupid” to “get” what’s going on here?
Again:
Democrats and their allies in the press will try whatever they
think they can get away with. But the simple reality is, sometimes it
works and sometimes it doesn’t. It didn’t work against Reagan. It didn’t
work against George W. Bush until after he’d won two national elections. More
recently, there are scores of examples of hotly contested statewide campaigns
for the Senate and governorships over the past decade in which it hasn’t worked
(such as against Ron DeSantis in Florida and Glenn Youngkin in Virginia). The
plan to win in spite of this is to pick candidates who don’t hand their
enemies the sword.
Elections
are decided at the margins. Voters who are on the fence are accustomed to
hearing what both sides say, and they discount a certain amount of it. If you
want to persuade those voters not to reelect a guy who is old, chronically
dishonest, and surrounded by a stinking pile of corruption, you will have a
better chance if you don’t pick a nominee who is all of those things himself —
a nominee many of those people already voted out of office four years ago.
In
analyzing whether the indictments are political in terms of helping Trump within
the primary, by causing Republicans angry at the politicization of justice
and the targeting of Trump to rally around Trump, Gestetner —
characteristically of Trump supporters — ignores the evidence entirely.
Democrats spent tens of
millions of dollars in 2022 boosting Trump-endorsed and/or “stop the steal” candidates in
Republican primaries. Those candidates mostly won their primary races, and
every single one of them who did lost in the general election. It has been too
extensively reported and openly stated from too many places to deny that
Democrats not only believe that
they overperformed in 2022 by running against Trump but prefer to do so again in 2024.
And thus
far, it has worked like a charm. Look at the RealClearPolitics national poll
average:
Trump’s
commanding lead over DeSantis in October 2022 was cut significantly after the
election, as people evaluated the great success of DeSantis and the
across-the-board failure of so many Trump-backed candidates. DeSantis remained
around 30 percent in the polls, and Trump below 50 percent — until Alvin Bragg
indicted Trump near the end of March, which was swiftly followed by Trump
pulling away and continuing to do so through this writing, four months and two
indictments later. Occam’s razor suggests that Democrats getting exactly what
they want, following actions by Democratic prosecutors, is a sign that Trump’s
voters are the ones being played for the marks here.
Gestetner’s
only response, after assiduously avoiding the specifics of
2022:
The loss by Trump in a few states and the loss by some of “his”
candidates in 2022 was narrower than the impact that anti-Trump Cons have on
politics. If not for GOP saboteurs and self-righteous cons criticizing Trump .
. . and then sitting out elections in the name of country over party, many
states would have gone differently. In other words, Dems “want” Trump to be the
face of the GOP because of the expectation that GOP Saboteurs and Self
Righteous Cons (the ones who claim that Dems want Trump . . .) will again lead
to more GOP losses. Those Cons don’t notice that they are the mark!
There
are so many things wrong with this. First, notice the double standard: “Some
voters won’t vote for Trump or his candidates” is the voters’ fault, but the
behavior of Trump’s voters is never their fault, and the actual reality
of Trump’s political problems is a thing to be solved just by yelling at people
to get in line. Second, it ignores reality. Consider Georgia. Donald
Trump’s acid
criticisms of Brian Kemp were far more public and went far beyond what any leading
Republican said during the election about Herschel Walker. Kemp rolled to
victory, while Walker lost — yet we’re supposed to believe that Walker’s problem
was being sabotaged? Kari Lake told McCain voters not to support her —
in the face of the simple math that a large majority of Arizona Republican
voters had backed McCain in past elections — and somehow it’s other
people who drove those voters away?
It’s
always somebody else’s fault that, since 2017, Republicans have lost the White
House, the House, the Senate, and crucial elections in state government in
Arizona, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, Maryland, Massachusetts,
and Kansas. They got back only the House, only narrowly, and no thanks to Trump
ousting Republican incumbents in favor of primary challengers who lost their
general elections. All of this operates on the assumption that the reader has
somehow failed to notice anything Donald Trump says or does, or anything his
allies say or do.
I’m sorry, I live in a world where reality actually matters, and if you are losing, you don’t just keep doing the same thing and expecting a different result. In 2016, Trump was something different. But it’s not 2016 anymore. Trotting out the same guy at age 78 and expecting him to win back people he’s alienated is not realism, it’s just a refusal to accept that the world has moved on.
The Anti-Trump Field’s Big Psychological Roadblock
By Noah
Rothman
Monday,
July 31, 2023
The latest New York
Times/Sienna survey of the Republican political
landscape tells a familiar tale: Donald Trump remains the dominant figure in
the GOP with the support of roughly half (54 percent) of the primary vote, and
roughly half of (52 percent) of that half comes from Republican primary voters
who will consider voting for no other candidate. We’re left with a race in
which about a quarter of the GOP won’t vote for anyone other than Trump,
another quarter won’t vote for him under any circumstances, and a vast middle
of the Republican primary electorate is persuadable but leans toward Trump.
That is the state of play that has pertained for months, and the persuadable
vote remains unpersuaded by the non-Trump options.
Even
beyond the headline horse-race numbers, the Times/Sienna poll makes
especially clear the problem faced by those who hope to move the party past
Trump. Fifty-six percent of Republican voters said that they believe that Trump
“did not do anything wrong” in relation to the allegations of criminal
misconduct brought against him by the Justice Department. And 71 percent said
Trump had “not committed serious federal crimes.” Another 71 percent said it
was imperative that the GOP “stand behind Trump.” Among those who think the
Republican Party is obliged to support Trump’s criminal defense are 83 percent
of voters who are “open to Trump” in the primaries, 63 percent of GOP voters
who are backing DeSantis in the primaries, and nearly one-third of Republicans
who describe themselves as not being open to pro-Trump arguments. In other words,
believing that Trump is being persecuted isn’t exclusive to Trump supporters;
it’s a GOP-wide phenomenon.
There is
a nascent effort among Trump’s Republican opponents to accuse the former
president of wasting his donors’ contributions by dedicating a wildly disproportionate
amount of campaign cash to his
legal-defense fund.
The assumption in that line of attack is that Trump’s supporters will regard
that as a misallocation of resources, but we have no indication that Republican
voters will see it that way. In fact, it seems most Republican voters view
Trump’s legal woes as contributing to his overall appeal as a candidate, which
renders the distinctions between his campaign’s coffers and his legal-defense
fund negligible.
The Times write-up of the poll featured
a colorful argument in Trump’s favor made by a 69-year-old retail manager who
mocked the “little sissy” milksops who “cry about everything.” There is,
however, a lot to be gleaned from this categorization of Trump support in the
rawest, most emotional terms. In poll after poll, Republicans have expressed in
no uncertain terms that they are not evaluating Donald Trump’s performance
analytically as they would (and do) for other Republican politicians. They will
not stomach even
rhetorical criticisms of
the former president, and they are inclined to dismiss as illegitimate the
consequences Trump’s conduct invites.
The Times/Sienna
poll doesn’t just paint a portrait of a primary race that has been static over
the course of this year. It illustrates a dynamic around Trump’s political
persona that has been static for the better part of a decade.
Trump’s
legal woes are interchangeable with any number of persecutions to which the
former president has been supposedly subjected. Their specifics never matter
much because, by the time his supporters are finished transforming them into
allegories for the conditions they resent in their own lives, the issue is no
longer Trump.
When
Trump is accused of paying off a pornographic actress to keep silent about
their extramarital tryst, the Family Research Council’s Tony Perkins insists that the real issue is
that America treats Christianity like a “welcome mat” on which “people can just
stomp their feet,” and he says he’s just “glad that there’s somebody on the
playground that is willing to punch the bully.” When Trump’s property is
searched by the FBI because he allegedly mishandled classified documents and
misled investigators, former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee says the real story is that
“it can and it will ultimately happen” to average voters, too.
Trump
himself has entertained the validity of
the claim that
he is “the most persecuted person in the history of our country,” but that
might not go far enough for some. He may be “the most persecuted man since
Christ,” depending on
whom you ask.
Trump’s latest legal troubles have been subsumed into this psychologically
unhealthy rubric. “Any Republican that doesn’t act on Democratic fraud should
be immediately primaried,” Trump said at a weekend rally, transforming
his prosecution into a political litmus test. And this strategy is likely to
work, as it has in the past, to make the president’s biggest liabilities in a
general election into core strengths in the primary.
The task
before a Republican who hopes to defeat the former president in the primary
will be to disabuse the party’s voters of the vague impression that his
problems are a validation of their own circumstances. It’s understandable why
Republican candidates would shrink from such a monumental undertaking: These
are not rational conclusions, so they are impervious to rationality. Moreover,
it’s hard to imagine how a Republican candidate could engage in that effort in
a way that didn’t appear to indict voters for having bad judgment or being susceptible
to motivated reasoning. But if the GOP’s other aspirants cannot convince
Republican voters that Trump has personal agency, is as flawed and fallible as
any man, and does not exist as an abstract proxy for a variety of unrelated
circumstances, there is no point to their presence in this primary campaign.
So many
Republican officials have foolishly lent credence to the notion that Trump’s
unique and constant struggles are the most visible signs of a sub-rosa
conspiracy against individual voters that it may be impossible to debunk that
notion now. But the job is still to try. If Trump’s Republican opponents run
against Trump only by criticizing his policy preferences or his flare for the
dramatic, they will lose. Of course, if Republican voters cannot help but see
in Trump and his predilection for self-inflicted wounds a reflection of
themselves, they were destined to lose anyway.
Joe Biden Is Donald Trump’s Best Friend
By Rich
Lowry
Tuesday,
August 01, 2023
Donald Trump doesn’t
look, at the moment, like he needs any help winning the Republican nomination,
but he’s getting an assist from President Joe Biden.
The
incumbent president — rather than being the indispensable political antidote to
Trump that Democrats imagine him as — may well prove the key to his
predecessor’s return to the White House.
Biden is
an asset to Trump’s primary campaign and could, through his weakness and
ineptitude, end up electing him in 2024.
Biden is
indicting Trump; he’s making Republicans pine for the days when Trump was
president; and he’s lackluster in prospective head-to-head polling matchups.
All of
which is boosting his adversary’s prospects. The indictments, of course, create
a rally-around-the flag effect among Republicans. It was the shoddy indictment
from Manhattan district attorney Alvin Bragg that launched Trump onto a new,
higher trajectory in the primary race. But the federal indictments from special
counsel Jack Smith have reinforced the effect.
That the
indictments come with a split screen of the Biden Department of Justice
coddling Hunter Biden only makes Trump’s argument that there’s a two-tier
system of justice that’s been weaponized against him more potent.
Meanwhile,
Biden’s poor record in office drives GOP nostalgia for the Trump presidency, a
significant benefit to the former president looking for a restoration.
Finally,
Governor Ron DeSantis and other Republicans want to argue that Trump isn’t
electable, but Biden’s dismal political standing vitiates this case. Every time
there’s a poll showing Trump competitive with Biden, it’s harder to portray him
as a sure loser. The RealClearPolitics polling average has
Biden leading Trump by less than a point, and a recent Marquette University
poll had the two tied 50–50.
Democrats
may figure that all this is good — Trump is so toxic that he’s the weakest of
the plausible Republican candidates, no matter what polls more than a year
before the election might say. Biden beat him once before, right?
Yes, but
it’s not as though he trounced Trump the first time around. Biden’s Electoral
College victory was built on a series of razor-thin victories in places such as
Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Who’s to say that in the right circumstances
for Trump they couldn’t tip the other way? Trump narrowly won in 2016 and
narrowly lost in 2020, so why is another narrow victory supposed to be out of
the question?
It’s
often said that Trump hasn’t done anything to win one swing voter back to his
side since 2020. True enough, but Biden, who hasn’t been the norm-honoring
moderate as advertised, has certainly done things to shed voters.
Democrats
act as if Biden is a once-in-a-generation political talent when he’s an
80-year-old man whose foremost political achievement is beating an unpopular
incumbent in the midst of a pandemic with a basement campaign. In Biden’s tenth
quarter in office, Gallup has his approval rating at 40 percent, the lowest
rating for post–World War II presidents at that point with the exception of
Jimmy Carter.
As the
2016 election demonstrated, running two candidates who are deeply unpopular is
a recipe for volatility. And Trump–Biden would make Trump–Hillary look like the
halcyon days of widely admired, consensus political leaders. A CNN poll from
June found that 36 percent of respondents didn’t view either Trump or Biden
favorably, and only about a third had a favorable view of each of them.
Indeed,
the 2016 vibe is strong. Back then, Democrats hoped to run against Trump and
put up their own incredibly weak candidate with barely a serious internal fight
(Bernie Sanders was never going to win the nomination) or second thought. One
of Clinton’s serious vulnerabilities, the email scandal, was ruled off-limits,
just as Biden’s age and his family’s influence-peddling scandal are verboten
topics among Democrats now.
How did
that turn out?
If Trump
would have lots of baggage heading into 2024, he’d also presumably have a
beatable incumbent standing between him and a second term.
The Italian Option
By
Dalibor Rohac
Tuesday,
August 01, 2023
Italy’s
prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, recently visited Washington, with the
aim of aligning her country more closely with the United States — and laying
the groundwork for pulling out of the China-led Belt and Road
Initiative. American conservatives should take note.
Many in
the Republican Party, encouraged by the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and by
the success of “populist” and “far-right” parties across Europe, would like to
reshape American conservative politics in the European image. National
conservatives, integralists, and many others are trying to put policy meat on
the bones of Trump’s moment in American politics. All of them would be well
advised to take a closer look at Meloni and right-wing leaders in countries
such as Sweden, Finland, and Poland, instead of remaining fixated on Meloni’s
influential Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orbán.
Orbán
has received much acclaim from supporters of Trump and Ron DeSantis. He’s been
given a rock star’s welcome at various CPAC conferences, and in fact one of his
government-funded NGOs, the Center for Fundamental Rights, hosted such a
conference in Budapest this year. With his unique ability to “own the libs” and
fund visiting fellowships, university chairs, and swanky conferences, Orbán has
seized the imaginations of the New Right’s opinion leaders — not least Tucker
Carlson and Rod Dreher — like no other European politician.
Arguably,
the combination of Orbán’s outsized influence and his pro-Russian positions —
rejection of lethal aid to Ukraine, opposition to sanctions against Russia, and
deepening of Hungary’s energy ties to Russia — has played some role in the
decline of Western support for helping Ukraine in its war.
That is
just one reason why America’s New Right must move beyond its current Hungarian
fixation. And as Meloni’s example underlines, Orbán is not the only game in
town.
Forget
about policies on Russia and Ukraine for a moment. If America’s conservatives,
old or new, care about our geopolitical competition with China, they cannot
ignore the role that Hungary has played as a vehicle for Chinese interests
in Europe. It has served as a long-standing logistical center for Huawei, and
its government has opposed all European efforts to hold Beijing accountable for
human-rights violations. In fact, it takes pride
in being a
“a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative,” as Orbán put it.
There is
also Hungary’s flourishing relationship with Iran, whose students enjoy
privileged access to Hungarian universities, with around 2,000 of them studying
in Hungary at the moment, and whom Hungary’s foreign minister praised last year for its
“constructive role” in the current war in Ukraine.
Orbán is
skillful at telling different audiences, including American conservatives,
exactly what they want to hear. Yet, in reality, the relatively secular Hungary
is not a particularly exciting model for social conservatives. Like in most
European countries, abortion is legal up to twelve weeks (20 in special
circumstances), and the government has made little effort in its 13 years in
office to tighten the existing restrictions. Although new legislation banning
displays of homosexuality in materials targeted at minors made headlines in the
West in 2021 and was even compared to an earlier “gay propaganda” law in
Russia, Hungarians of all political stripes seem distinctly relaxed about the
subject. With little fuss, the country introduced same-sex partnerships — still
nonexistent to this day in neighboring Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia — in 2009.
It is telling that Orbán has not used his overwhelming political mandate to
roll the institution back.
In the
crisis of 2015, Orbán portrayed himself as an arch-enemy of illegal
immigration, particularly from Muslim-majority countries. Yet, unlike Italy,
Hungary has never been a target destination for asylum seekers and illegal
migrants. Meloni has to do more than just bloviate, and besides draconian
punishments for people-smugglers, she has pushed the EU to negotiate a
hard-nosed deal with Tunisia to stop the flows across the Mediterranean.
To be
sure, Meloni’s Italy recognizes same-sex partnerships, too, but the government
is keen to push back the existing legal protections, and has recently revoked the birth certificates of
children born to lesbian couples. Accused by
activists of
pursuing a “medieval vision” of family life, Meloni delivers at least as much
on the culture-war front as Orbán, if not more. Yet, she manages to do so
without his geopolitical toxicity. In fact, on Ukraine, she has grown into one
of Europe’s most impassioned supporters of arming the country, as “Ukrainians
are defending the values of freedom and democracy on which our civilization is
based, and the very foundations of international law.”
America’s
New Right may also look at Poland, governed by the Law and Justice Party (PiS).
Arguably America’s premier European ally, Poles are poised to spend over 4
percent of their GDP on defense this year. Ninety percent Catholic, it features
a self-styled Catholic integralist as a member of its government’s cabinet
(Zbigniew Ziobro, the justice minister), abortion is effectively banned, and
there is no recognition of same-sex partnerships — not even those concluded
elsewhere in the EU, as the European Court of Justice ordered member states to do. Needless
to say, Poland has provided home to millions of Ukrainian refugees and aid that
far outpaces, in relative terms, U.S. assistance, and its political leadership
and opposition are essentially unanimous about the importance of Ukraine’s
eventual victory.
Alternatively,
New Right conservatives may ask members of the Sweden Democrats or the Finns
Party, both “far-right” parties currently in governing coalitions in their
respective countries, about their plans on immigration or crime. They will hear
a rejection of illegal migratory flows, an intention to restrict asylum (to
essentially zero, in the case of Sweden Democrats), and a commitment to
stronger law enforcement. In both Nordic parties, as in PiS and Meloni’s
Brothers of Italy, there is also good will toward the United States and a
clear-eyed understanding of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the stakes of the war
in Ukraine — all of them absent in Orbán’s FIDESZ.
On
either side of the Atlantic, there is no putting the populist genie back into
the bottle. But populist politics can take on more or less responsible forms,
particularly in areas of foreign affairs and security. The sooner American
acolytes of the New Right break with of their current obsession with Orbán’s
Hungary and find an alternative avatar — at a minimum, one who is friendly to
the United States, like Meloni — the better for them and for the future of our
nation.



