By Jonathan Ruhe
Friday, November 13, 2026
As President Donald Trump and his administration weigh a
renewed military campaign against Iran, it’s worth taking time to
consider how the conflict—regardless of its ultimate outcome—affects us beyond
the near term in the Middle East. The war has expanded cracks in the foundation
of America’s superpower status and brought our adversaries closer together.
Fortunately, it also highlights how we can address such fundamental problems.
In his final speech, days before dying in the opening
strikes of the war, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the United
States as “an empire heading toward collapse.” After suppressing mass protests
and surviving foreign attacks, Khamenei’s successors and Iranian state media
declared that America was “no longer the superpower it
claimed to be” and had “entered the beginning of its imperial decline.” Accordingly, “The world is moving [on] from the period of U.S. hegemony.”
Their obvious political motives aside, these claims
overlook what makes American power exceptional. Rather than being just one
among several great powers, the U.S. is
the only country in modern history with an uncontestable
preponderance of military and economic power over all of its neighbors
combined. This absence of nearby rivals leaves us “free to roam,” projecting power overseas to prevent anyone
replicating such predominance that would, in turn, enable them to intrude in
our neighborhood. Tellingly, while there have been a dozen great-power wars in
Europe and three in Asia, there have been zero in the Western Hemisphere since
U.S. independence. Trump’s national security strategy emphasizes that remaining
the sole regional hegemon is vital to homeland and hemispheric
defense.
Damaging as it would be, losing a war to Iran would not
single-handedly undo this singular accomplishment. The Western Hemisphere would
still be unipolar. The United States would remain the only great power,
anywhere, with a nuclear monopoly and collective
security pact governing its entire region. Nor would victory against the
United States, by itself, make Iran a Middle Eastern hegemon. Iran’s economy,
war industries, and internal cohesion are far too fractured and fragile for it
to dominate the region.
The Iran war matters for American superpower status
because of the broader global competition in which it is taking place. Even
before the war, China and Russia sought predominance in East Asia and Europe,
respectively, through tighter cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and each other.
Helping Tehran prolong a costly and desultory conflict—one that dissipates and
distracts U.S. power—now leaves Beijing and Moscow freer to pursue their goals.
This “simultaneity problem” also serves Iran’s interests by
forcing America to spread resources and attention across a wider and tougher
playing field.
Many experts
note how this axis of “aggressors” and “upheaval” is producing a “new normal of rising conflict” without parallel since World War II. Indeed, “axis” aptly recalls one of America’s
prior contests of collective deterrence and industrial attrition against
aspiring peer rivals. But today’s adversaries are better at coordinating,
sustaining, and exploiting one another’s belligerence than we are at countering
them. This certainly was not the case in either of the World Wars or the Cold
War.
Today’s axis collaborates in halls of power, on factory
floors, and on battlefronts. At the highest levels, China’s decades-old
insistence on territorial integrity and nonintervention has been replaced with
support for Russia’s maximalist aims in Ukraine. China also stopped insisting on
freedom of navigation once Iran started attacking commercial vessels in the
Strait of Hormuz. Following U.S. attacks last year on Iran’s nuclear
facilities, China and Russia ended their longstanding support for U.N.
Security Council efforts to compel Tehran’s compliance with the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. The more that U.N. and U.S. sanctions have been
imposed on Russia, Iran, and China, the more closely the three work together to
reduce shared economic vulnerabilities and undermine America’s global financial
clout. Pointedly, President Xi Jinping equates his “No Limits” partnership with
Russia to Sino-Soviet cooperation against fascism in World War II.
These three countries also enable each other’s military
resilience and readiness. Russia’s munitions output and pummeling of Ukraine are reliant on Chinese and Iranian raw
materials, dual-use technologies, and weapons components. China helped Iran’s ballistic missile
program recover surprisingly quickly from Israeli airstrikes in
2024 and 2025. Since Operation Epic Fury began, Beijing and Moscow have sent billions’ worth of military hardware, explosives, and dual-use items to
relieve Iran’s hard-hit defense industries.
Mutual assistance flows directly to and from
battlefields, too. In exchange for high-end weapons, North Korea reinforces Russia’s front lines in Ukraine with thousands of combat
troops and millions of artillery rounds. Combined exercises and military exchanges grow as China and Iran absorb Russia’s
experiences fighting Ukraine’s Western-armed and -trained forces. Data and U.S. weapons captured in that war improve Iran’s projectile attacks. With an eye to future
high-intensity conflict, China is studying Iran’s air and naval war against the United States and Israel. In
that war and elsewhere, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian intelligence sharing enhances tactical proficiency,
interoperability, and preparedness for all three. In all these ways, they make
life more costly and complex for the United States and its partners everywhere.
Prior hegemonic challengers never worked this concertedly
and cohesively to overpressure and outlast the United States and its allies.
World War I’s Central Powers came closest, albeit on a smaller scale. As that
war dragged on, Germany took control of military planning and operations,
supplying munitions and raw materials, and setting terms for peace on all
fronts. This enabled the Central Powers to win more battles than they otherwise
would have, but it also exposed the coalition’s fundamental frailty and abject
reliance on Berlin’s operational expertise and industrial output. Additionally,
the United States faced only one aspiring regional hegemon, and we geared up
for all-out war only after Germany, its satellites, and their economies were
bled white by three other great powers for four years.
America faced simultaneous bids for regional hegemony in
World War II, and it joined the war as its enemies’ combined might was trending
upward. Yet on the whole, the Tripartite Pact—the Axis—always amounted
to less than the sum of its formidable parts. Its members never meaningfully
coordinated their parallel assaults on Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and
the United States. Axis forces surprised one another as much as their enemies with
bold gambits that directly influenced the war’s course and outcome for all of
them. Mussolini’s Mediterranean push and Hitler’s Russian invasion each dragged
in the other, diverting precious troops and supplies from higher priorities.
Berlin and Tokyo failed to synchronize their total wars against America and the
Soviet Union—the two primary threats to their ambitions and, ultimately, their
survival. And like the Central Powers, Axis members were resource-poor and
geographically susceptible to blockade by the Allies.
In the Cold War, the Soviet-led bloc dominated Eastern
Europe and, for a time, threatened to overrun East Asia. At drastic economic
cost, this bloc competed in conventional and nuclear arms races with the West.
But Moscow’s Eurasian imperium was encircled closely by U.S. military
alliances, and its partnership with Beijing lasted barely a decade before
devolving into outright hostility, which invited Washington to play them off
one another.
In each historical example, moreover, the United States
provided the hard power to prevail. Long before the country entered World War
I, American munitions, metals, food, energy supplies, and loans enabled Britain
and France to mobilize their societies and empires for industrial war.
These supply lines were so important that Germany gambled on unrestricted
submarine warfare to sever them, even at the risk of U.S. military
intervention. While doughboys fought on the Western Front in 1918 largely with
French and British weapons, our World War II “arsenal of democracy” supplied
allies with prodigious numbers of ships, planes, tanks, air defenses, bombs,
machine guns, and even entire factories. We carried this defense industrial
base into the Cold War, with major downsizing coming only in the 1990s.
Particularly in World War II and the Cold War, the United
States also coordinated armaments production and distribution effectively with
allies. Restoring this leadership is even more critical for meeting the
challenge posed by today’s axis, since America cannot be the arsenal of
democracy—or “freedom”—that it was in the 1940s, even with reforms
underway. Our industrial base requires too much overhaul, our adversaries work
together too efficiently, and they control too many critical resources to be sustainably deterred or reliably
defeated by America’s industrial might alone.
The Iran war is a microcosm of this situation. Munitions
shortages created by Operation Epic Fury have constrained further U.S. military options against Tehran while also limiting the availability of those munitions for use by
American and allied forces in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. These
shortfalls then feed our adversaries’ opportunism by undermining our collective
deterrence and preparedness. Regardless of its direct merits and immediate
effects, resuming major military operations against Iran will aggravate this
larger concern.
The specific bureaucratic, legal, and financial fixes to
our defense-industrial crisis are well known. Successive U.S.
administrations, Congress, and allies have started working toward these ends.
Trump also is right that everyone must do more for shared defense. Yet, the
problem’s global scale and interconnectedness mean that solutions must be
bigger than just reviving “a golden age of American manufacturing, where supply chains
are coming home [and] production’s coming home,” in the words of Defense
Secretary Pete Hegseth. They also require direction and leadership that reflect
our enemies’ unprecedented cohesion. This element is sorely absent from
American statecraft, particularly with Trump’s open courting of Vladimir Putin
and deep public undermining of the transatlantic alliance.
In this new great power competition, the United States
cannot meaningfully defeat Iran if Russia retains a path to victory over
Ukraine and China feels emboldened to support both. By the same token, any
inability of our partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to arm and
defend themselves threatens us equally in all three regions and, thus, our
hemispheric security as well. Part of the solution is expanding America’s
defense industrial base and making it more resilient through greater and more
urgent coproduction with Australia, South Korea, Japan, Europe, and overlooked places like Israel. This is necessarily a
broader-based arsenal of freedom than that which helped win World War II.
Protecting America’s superpower status also requires us
to look even more broadly and leverage a key benefit of that status—one that
our adversaries cannot yet match. Our unique capacity for diplomatic and
economic leadership, if properly applied, can help allies and partners work
together more effectively to meet shared global needs and reduce burdens on our
own defense industry. Some of this occurs ad hoc, as our partners scramble for
alternatives in the absence of clear direction or incentives from Washington.
But as our adversaries close ranks and wars in Europe and the Middle East
overlap, we cede a key advantage by failing to coordinate defense-industrial
buildups among Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, our formal allies in NATO and Asia, and
our Abraham Accords partners.
Unparalleled global challenges call for unparalleled
global measures. Winning the latest contest for hegemony requires America to
harness its superpower like never before.
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