Monday, November 16, 2026

How the Iran War Exposes Cracks in America’s Foundation

By Jonathan Ruhe

Friday, November 13, 2026

 

As President Donald Trump and his administration weigh a renewed military campaign against Iran, it’s worth taking time to consider how the conflict—regardless of its ultimate outcome—affects us beyond the near term in the Middle East. The war has expanded cracks in the foundation of America’s superpower status and brought our adversaries closer together. Fortunately, it also highlights how we can address such fundamental problems.

 

In his final speech, days before dying in the opening strikes of the war, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the United States as “an empire heading toward collapse.” After suppressing mass protests and surviving foreign attacks, Khamenei’s successors and Iranian state media declared that America was “no longer the superpower it claimed to be” and had “entered the beginning of its imperial decline.” Accordingly, “The world is moving [on] from the period of U.S. hegemony.”   

 

Their obvious political motives aside, these claims overlook what makes American power exceptional. Rather than being just one among several great powers, the U.S.  is the only country in modern history with an uncontestable preponderance of military and economic power over all of its neighbors combined. This absence of nearby rivals leaves us “free to roam,” projecting power overseas to prevent anyone replicating such predominance that would, in turn, enable them to intrude in our neighborhood. Tellingly, while there have been a dozen great-power wars in Europe and three in Asia, there have been zero in the Western Hemisphere since U.S. independence. Trump’s national security strategy emphasizes that remaining the sole regional hegemon is vital to homeland and hemispheric defense.

 

Damaging as it would be, losing a war to Iran would not single-handedly undo this singular accomplishment. The Western Hemisphere would still be unipolar. The United States would remain the only great power, anywhere, with a nuclear monopoly and collective security pact governing its entire region. Nor would victory against the United States, by itself, make Iran a Middle Eastern hegemon. Iran’s economy, war industries, and internal cohesion are far too fractured and fragile for it to dominate the region.

 

The Iran war matters for American superpower status because of the broader global competition in which it is taking place. Even before the war, China and Russia sought predominance in East Asia and Europe, respectively, through tighter cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and each other. Helping Tehran prolong a costly and desultory conflict—one that dissipates and distracts U.S. power—now leaves Beijing and Moscow freer to pursue their goals. This “simultaneity problem” also serves Iran’s interests by forcing America to spread resources and attention across a wider and tougher playing field.  

 

Many experts note how this axis of “aggressors” and “upheaval” is producing a “new normal of rising conflict” without parallel since World War II. Indeed, “axis” aptly recalls one of America’s prior contests of collective deterrence and industrial attrition against aspiring peer rivals. But today’s adversaries are better at coordinating, sustaining, and exploiting one another’s belligerence than we are at countering them. This certainly was not the case in either of the World Wars or the Cold War.  

 

Today’s axis collaborates in halls of power, on factory floors, and on battlefronts. At the highest levels, China’s decades-old insistence on territorial integrity and nonintervention has been replaced with support for Russia’s maximalist aims in Ukraine. China also stopped insisting on freedom of navigation once Iran started attacking commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Following U.S. attacks last year on Iran’s nuclear facilities, China and Russia ended their longstanding support for U.N. Security Council efforts to compel Tehran’s compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The more that U.N. and U.S. sanctions have been imposed on Russia, Iran, and China, the more closely the three work together to reduce shared economic vulnerabilities and undermine America’s global financial clout. Pointedly, President Xi Jinping equates his “No Limits” partnership with Russia to Sino-Soviet cooperation against fascism in World War II.  

 

These three countries also enable each other’s military resilience and readiness. Russia’s munitions output and pummeling of Ukraine are reliant on Chinese and Iranian raw materials, dual-use technologies, and weapons components. China helped Iran’s ballistic missile program recover surprisingly quickly from Israeli airstrikes in 2024 and 2025. Since Operation Epic Fury began, Beijing and Moscow have sent billions’ worth of military hardware, explosives, and dual-use items to relieve Iran’s hard-hit defense industries.

 

Mutual assistance flows directly to and from battlefields, too. In exchange for high-end weapons, North Korea reinforces Russia’s front lines in Ukraine with thousands of combat troops and millions of artillery rounds. Combined exercises and military exchanges grow as China and Iran absorb Russia’s experiences fighting Ukraine’s Western-armed and -trained forces. Data and U.S. weapons captured in that war improve Iran’s projectile attacks. With an eye to future high-intensity conflict, China is studying Iran’s air and naval war against the United States and Israel. In that war and elsewhere, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian intelligence sharing enhances tactical proficiency, interoperability, and preparedness for all three. In all these ways, they make life more costly and complex for the United States and its partners everywhere.

 

Prior hegemonic challengers never worked this concertedly and cohesively to overpressure and outlast the United States and its allies. World War I’s Central Powers came closest, albeit on a smaller scale. As that war dragged on, Germany took control of military planning and operations, supplying munitions and raw materials, and setting terms for peace on all fronts. This enabled the Central Powers to win more battles than they otherwise would have, but it also exposed the coalition’s fundamental frailty and abject reliance on Berlin’s operational expertise and industrial output. Additionally, the United States faced only one aspiring regional hegemon, and we geared up for all-out war only after Germany, its satellites, and their economies were bled white by three other great powers for four years.

 

America faced simultaneous bids for regional hegemony in World War II, and it joined the war as its enemies’ combined might was trending upward. Yet on the whole, the Tripartite Pact—the Axis—always amounted to less than the sum of its formidable parts. Its members never meaningfully coordinated their parallel assaults on Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Axis forces surprised one another as much as their enemies with bold gambits that directly influenced the war’s course and outcome for all of them. Mussolini’s Mediterranean push and Hitler’s Russian invasion each dragged in the other, diverting precious troops and supplies from higher priorities. Berlin and Tokyo failed to synchronize their total wars against America and the Soviet Union—the two primary threats to their ambitions and, ultimately, their survival. And like the Central Powers, Axis members were resource-poor and geographically susceptible to blockade by the Allies.   

 

In the Cold War, the Soviet-led bloc dominated Eastern Europe and, for a time, threatened to overrun East Asia. At drastic economic cost, this bloc competed in conventional and nuclear arms races with the West. But Moscow’s Eurasian imperium was encircled closely by U.S. military alliances, and its partnership with Beijing lasted barely a decade before devolving into outright hostility, which invited Washington to play them off one another.

 

In each historical example, moreover, the United States provided the hard power to prevail. Long before the country entered World War I, American munitions, metals, food, energy supplies, and loans enabled Britain and France to mobilize their societies and empires for industrial war. These supply lines were so important that Germany gambled on unrestricted submarine warfare to sever them, even at the risk of U.S. military intervention. While doughboys fought on the Western Front in 1918 largely with French and British weapons, our World War II “arsenal of democracy” supplied allies with prodigious numbers of ships, planes, tanks, air defenses, bombs, machine guns, and even entire factories. We carried this defense industrial base into the Cold War, with major downsizing coming only in the 1990s.

 

Particularly in World War II and the Cold War, the United States also coordinated armaments production and distribution effectively with allies. Restoring this leadership is even more critical for meeting the challenge posed by today’s axis, since America cannot be the arsenal of democracy—or “freedom”—that it was in the 1940s, even with reforms underway. Our industrial base requires too much overhaul, our adversaries work together too efficiently, and they control too many critical resources to be sustainably deterred or reliably defeated by America’s industrial might alone.

 

The Iran war is a microcosm of this situation. Munitions shortages created by Operation Epic Fury have constrained further U.S. military options against Tehran while also limiting the availability of those munitions for use by American and allied forces in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. These shortfalls then feed our adversaries’ opportunism by undermining our collective deterrence and preparedness. Regardless of its direct merits and immediate effects, resuming major military operations against Iran will aggravate this larger concern.

 

The specific bureaucratic, legal, and financial fixes to our defense-industrial crisis are well known. Successive U.S. administrations, Congress, and allies have started working toward these ends. Trump also is right that everyone must do more for shared defense. Yet, the problem’s global scale and interconnectedness mean that solutions must be bigger than just reviving “a golden age of American manufacturing, where supply chains are coming home [and] production’s coming home,” in the words of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. They also require direction and leadership that reflect our enemies’ unprecedented cohesion. This element is sorely absent from American statecraft, particularly with Trump’s open courting of Vladimir Putin and deep public undermining of the transatlantic alliance.

 

In this new great power competition, the United States cannot meaningfully defeat Iran if Russia retains a path to victory over Ukraine and China feels emboldened to support both. By the same token, any inability of our partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to arm and defend themselves threatens us equally in all three regions and, thus, our hemispheric security as well. Part of the solution is expanding America’s defense industrial base and making it more resilient through greater and more urgent coproduction with Australia, South Korea, Japan, Europe, and overlooked places like Israel. This is necessarily a broader-based arsenal of freedom than that which helped win World War II.

 

Protecting America’s superpower status also requires us to look even more broadly and leverage a key benefit of that status—one that our adversaries cannot yet match. Our unique capacity for diplomatic and economic leadership, if properly applied, can help allies and partners work together more effectively to meet shared global needs and reduce burdens on our own defense industry. Some of this occurs ad hoc, as our partners scramble for alternatives in the absence of clear direction or incentives from Washington. But as our adversaries close ranks and wars in Europe and the Middle East overlap, we cede a key advantage by failing to coordinate defense-industrial buildups among Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, our formal allies in NATO and Asia, and our Abraham Accords partners.

 

Unparalleled global challenges call for unparalleled global measures. Winning the latest contest for hegemony requires America to harness its superpower like never before.

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