Is Iran’s War Coming to the West?

By Mike Nelson

Monday, September 28, 2026

 

Early Sunday morning, five men were arrested in England as they were preparing to attack RAF Fairford, a British military base that hosts several hundred U.S. military personnel and aircraft—notably some of the B-1 and B-52 bombers that have conducted strikes on Iran. The specifics of the planned attack are not yet known, in large part because the quick reaction of British counterterrorism police—who intercepted and arrested the men before they could carry out the attack—meant that the explosives-laden vans the men were driving never got to their intended destinations.

 

The public does not yet know the identities of the suspects, the content of any statements they’ve made to police, and what materials may have been recovered from the suspects’ vehicles and residences, but British police are said to be investigating Iranian involvement in the foiled attack. And we should not be surprised if the evidence, when it is available, does point toward Iran. As military and economic pressures increase on the Iranian regime, and as fewer options present themselves to attack U.S. forces in the Middle East, Iran is likely to expand the war—in terms of target types, geographic location, and means of attack. These kinds of external operations are also in keeping with Iran’s long history of gray-zone, asymmetric, and terror attacks against Iran’s adversaries all over the globe.

 

Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, Iran conducted assassinations throughout Europe, killing dozens of dissidents and opponents of the revolutionary regime across France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria. In 1980, Iran even successfully assassinated a target within the United States, killing Iranian exile Ali Akbar Tabatabaei outside his home in Bethesda, Maryland. More recently, in 2011, Iran recruited conspirators and agents in the United States to conduct an attack targeting the then-Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Adel al-Jubeir. The plot involved attempts to recruit a member of a Mexican drug gang to place a bomb in a Washington, D.C., restaurant, which would be detonated when al-Jubeir dined there. The plot was ultimately foiled when the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration intercepted Iran’s efforts to recruit a Mexican gang member. Iran has also not given up on its desire to assassinate President Donald Trump and several other members of his first presidential administration for their roles in ordering the killing of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds Force.

 

The specifics of the attack on RAF Fairford are not yet known, meaning its intended purpose is unclear. This could have been a largely symbolic attack intended to further drive down popularity for an already unpopular war in advance of the U.S. midterm elections. It could have also been specifically targeted to destroy or degrade a critical portion of America’s integrated offensive capabilities. The act of dropping bombs on Iranian targets is the end result of an incredibly complex, global chain of military power that integrates not only the aircrews and airframes dropping the bombs, but everything from the intelligence analysts and collection assets that identify and develop the targets to the logisticians who move the fuel and ordnance required for the attacks and the cooks and medics who provide life support. Targeting any part of the vast, interconnected chain of capabilities could disrupt the U.S. military’s ability to meet our planned operational efforts. This attack could have been targeted toward the aircraft, fuel depots, ammunition storage facilities, or even aircrews themselves—all of which are essential to the American military’s capacity to project air power over Iran.

 

This attack also highlights another topic that has been front of mind in the war. If the attack had been successful, not only would it likely have destroyed American assets and taken American lives, but it likely would have killed British military personnel or civilians. Even with the attack intercepted, 85 British homes in the vicinity of the vehicles have been evacuated as a precaution. In other words, even if our allies do not decide to actively join the fight against Iran, Iran has shown that it is willing to target countries that merely host U.S. forces engaged in the conflict. Iran has displayed this inclination consistently throughout the conflict, launching attacks against Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. This attack would seem to be a continuation of that targeting methodology, wherein Iran views the locations from which U.S. forces launch as legitimate targets. In this light, it is understandable that Italy and Spain may have been reluctant to allow access, basing, and overflight authority for U.S. forces conducting offensive operations out of fear that doing so could have opened them to Iranian attacks.

 

The Trump administration has become mired in this conflict in part because of a lack of planning and clarity on both the things that we can control, such as our goals and reasoning for the conflict, and the things we cannot, such as the action of the enemy. But while Iranian responses may be outside American control, they should not be outside of American imagination, anticipation, and preparation. Iran’s disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz was fully predictable prior to a conflict, yet the president claims to have been taken off guard by the Iranian response. We may now be facing another round of Iranian escalation, the targets, means, and locations of which are less easy to anticipate and, therefore, require the vigilance and preparation the administration has been uninterested in providing to date.

 

The president and his administration must begin to communicate more earnestly and effectively about what is going on in the war against Iran, what the U.S. military is doing, and what we are hoping to achieve as the conflict stretches on. If Iran does conduct successful attacks against Americans outside the Middle East—be they kinetic or cyber, aimed at military targets or civilians—the administration will need to answer difficult questions about how such an attack could happen in a conflict in which the president has already declared victory dozens of times.

 

Regardless of the Trump administration’s statements otherwise, we are still very much at war—a war that has not been resolved through overwhelming military force or through diplomatic maneuvering. Until the conflict is resolved, Americans should not be surprised when Iran seeks to harm the U.S. and its interests. The administration was correct in characterizing the Iranian regime as an evil supporter of terrorism across the globe. It would do well to start believing its own perspective and preparing accordingly.