By Arash Azizi
Sunday, March 01, 2026
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is dead, and the regime he ran
will very likely transform. But no one should imagine that its nature or future
will come down to a single person.
The country’s 13-man National Security Council
essentially sidelined Khamenei after the 12-day war in June. It has effectively
run the country since the summer and will likely continue to do so, even after
a new supreme leader is appointed.
At the moment, a temporary three-person leadership
committee has officially taken charge, but real power continues to rest with
the security council, which is dominated by military and political insiders.
Among them are the council’s powerful convener, Ali Larijani, and the current
speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a wily former air-force general
popular with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The first task of the country’s rulers, whether through
the three-man leadership committee or the security council, will be to manage
the current war with the United States and Israel. They will face relentless
pressure to abandon Iran’s decades-long hostility and find a different path
forward. Iran’s two major adversaries have thoroughly humiliated it; the regime
was not able to hide its reclusive leader for even a few hours.
Mostly to save face, Iran’s new leaders will likely
continue to hit at American and Israeli targets in the region for a little
while. But in time, those in charge will probably be willing to strike a new
bargain if it extends the regime’s lease on life. Donald Trump and Benjamin
Netanyahu might be receptive to such a deal as an alternative to open-ended
conflict.
“This atmosphere, and loud speeches by Iran’s leaders
against America, will change in a matter of months,” a source close to Qalibaf
told me by phone. He asked that we withhold his name because of the sensitivity
of wartime conditions. “The Islamic Republic has no way but to end the conflict
with the U.S. and focus on economic development. Our resources are done. That’s
the only way forward.”
The source envisaged that Iran would establish diplomatic
ties with the United States and take a position on Israel similar to that of
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. This would mean giving up Khamenei’s
quixotic quest to destroy Israel and instead conditioning recognition on a
diplomatic solution to the conflict with the Palestinians. The source also
pictured the relaxation of socially repressive domestic laws, such as the
mandatory hijab, and perhaps even a slight political opening.
If the future of the country depends on a new clerical
leader, however, the composition of the three-man interim leadership committee
doesn’t inspire much hope. It includes President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is a
reformist, but also Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, an ultra-hard-line former
minister of intelligence and the current head of the country’s brutal
judiciary. The third member is Alireza Arafi, a hard-line cleric who serves on
the Guardian Council and has long been seen as a continuity candidate to succeed
Khamenei. The Assembly of Experts, the body tasked with the job of selecting
the new supreme leader, could anoint one of the two clerics on the three-man
committee. Or it could pick somebody else.
There are many reasons to believe, however, that the
successor to Khamenei will not be the decisive factor in determining Iran’s
course, and that the country will take the path described by my source,
regardless of the clerical leadership. Arafi has spent most of his life in the
seminary and will be no match for the military power players in the regime.
Ejei is a murderous extremist, but he has also historically been open to
wheeling and dealing with the likes of Qalibaf. The Guards, and other parastatal
institutions, control not just the guns but most of the Iranian economy.
Larijani and Qalibaf have made plenty of harsh statements
of their own about Israel and America, but they both incline toward pragmatism.
They know full well how little ammunition (real and metaphorical) Iran has for
fighting a prolonged war. Larijani is also close with former President Hassan
Rouhani, who can be brought in from the cold as the doyen of the regime’s
West-facing faction. If men like these call the shots, the regime’s policies
will be transformed, however cynically. The 1979 revolution will have finally
reached its thermidor and abandoned its founding zealotry.
Such an outcome would fall far short of what so many
Iranians, myself included, have fought for—what thousands have only recently
died for. It would not bring Iran democracy. It would not vindicate the brave
civil-society leaders who fill Iran’s prisons on spurious convictions because
they demanded an end to the Islamic Republic’s authoritarian rule. These
figures and many others call for elections for a fresh constituent assembly
that could draw up a new social contract for Iran.
Yesterday, in an effort to galvanize democratic forces,
oppositionists announced the foundation of the Strategic Council of Republicans
Inside Iran. The group’s name emphasizes what it is, but also what it is not:
That it is “republican” means it is not monarchist, and is therefore distinct
from the movement behind former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. That it is “inside
Iran” sets it apart from the activist diaspora. The council is formed of 70
political figures inside the country whose names have not been declared
publicly but have been sent to the U.S. and European governments.
The success of this group is to be fervently desired, but
for now it remains unlikely. Even if American and Israeli air strikes eliminate
yet more of Iran’s top leaders, the country’s democrats will have a hard time
taking power, because they lack organized networks. This doesn’t mean that
they—we—should give up. Only that we should get organized. Iranians have
striven for democracy at least since 1906, when the Constitutional Revolution
led to the establishment of our Parliament. That fight shouldn’t stop now, just
as one of its greatest adversaries has been removed from the scene.
Even in the not-quite-best-case scenario, Khamenei’s
demise will likely allow Iran to abandon some of his most destructive core
policies in the short-to-medium term—not least, his insistence on sacrificing
Iran on the altar of a failed ideology. To that extent, even if the Islamic
Republic lives on a little longer, Khameneism will be buried alongside
Khamenei. That’s almost enough to make me hopeful for the future of Iran.
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