By John R. Bolton
Thursday, February 19, 2026
Regime change is somewhat back in favor in Washington,
albeit in decidedly Trumpian ways. But what exactly should the phrase mean?
When and under what circumstances is it advisable, and how is it best
accomplished? Are free elections the only measure of success?
Let’s first clear the air of yesterday’s conventional
wisdom, before Trump became America’s premier regime-change advocate. Opponents
said it never works, citing failed efforts like the ones in Cuba (1961) and
Venezuela (2019); or they came at some later (often quite distant) point to
find the policy distasteful, as in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Afghanistan
(2001), and Iraq (2003). They didn’t mention successes in Germany (1945), Japan
(1945), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), or even, depending on your perspective,
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Warsaw Pact’s collapse and the Soviet Union’s
disintegration are also part of regime-change history, with mixed results.
It’s complicated. Regime change is not a philosophy; it’s
a means available to achieve American national security objectives and, like
any means, subject to cost-benefit analysis about both feasibility and chances
of success. It doesn’t always succeed and doesn’t always fail.
When a country behaves in ways harmful to American
interests, it is essentially axiomatic that we can either seek to change its
behavior or, failing that, change its regime. In an overwhelming number of
cases, especially with allies, we choose to induce behavioral change.
Ironically, with allies, Trump has an urge for regime change, as with Canada
and Greenland. He failed in the first case (if he was ever serious about the
attempt). His callous ploy to annex Canada mortally wounded Pierre Poilievre’s
candidacy for prime minister, dismaying Canadian and U.S. conservatives alike,
and allowing Mark Carney, who’d been sworn in after Justin Trudeau resigned, to
succeed Trudeau as the country’s elected leader. Trump is also failing in his
threat to wrest Greenland from Denmark; Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, whose
polling had been heading downward, has gotten a boost. Trump’s error in these
instances was to even contemplate regime change when diplomacy would have
sufficed (and still can).
Normal presidents focus on adversaries whose behavior is
anathema to us and whose leaders are ideologically, religiously, or
temperamentally impervious to diplomacy, untrustworthy, or just plain stupid.
In some cases, as with the Soviet empire, regime change is a decidedly
long-term project, while in others (Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran today)
contemporary action is eminently possible. These are always issues of
feasibility, advisability, and methods (invasion, economic coercion,
subversion, etc.) on which reasonable people can disagree.
But if prudent political judgment counsels regime change,
and the mechanics to achieve it seem realistic, decision-makers still must
determine what exactly is the “regime” to be changed. Indeed, although
conceptually separate, the extent of the change required is almost always
inextricably linked operationally to the antecedent issue of feasibility. In
well-planned regime-change efforts, all these questions have been thought
through in advance. A good plan does not guarantee success, but it beats winging
it.
There is no magic formula to decide how to change a
regime, or what levels of government need to be changed. As Edmund Burke wrote,
“Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to
every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect.
The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial
or noxious to mankind.” Unfortunately, regarding today’s unfolding
regime-change scenarios, we have a White House in which winging it is a way of
life. Whether in Venezuela, Iran, or Cuba, strategic planning is noticeable by
its absence.
***
In Venezuela, regime leader Nicolás Maduro was removed in
a brilliantly conceived and executed military operation. But not only does the
apparatus founded by his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, remain in power, its new top
dog seems to have Trump’s affection. “She’s a terrific person,” said Trump of
acting President Delcy Rodríguez, as much a Chavista as anyone in Venezuela.
Trump’s rush to make money from Venezuela’s oil and the unfounded hope that
future production there will depress near-term U.S. gasoline prices have
produced optimism that we can do business with Caracas’s remaining
drug-smuggling authoritarians.
So delighted with Rodríguez’s “cooperation” was the White
House that Venezuela’s Central Bank recently received $300 million in proceeds
from sales of Venezuelan oil previously held up by America’s blockade. These
funds may not have gone into foreign bank accounts as in days of yore, but the
reality is nearly as bad. Rodríguez, her brother Jorge (president of
Venezuela’s National Assembly), and the thugs Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino
and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, whose power is backed by arms, can now
pay salaries to the military, the colectivos (motorcycle gangs used to
intimidate civilians), and the civilian bureaucracy of the Chavista state. So
doing allows them to bolster their political positions, buy more time for
maneuvering to avoid Washington’s “oversight,” and wait for Trump’s short attention
span to turn elsewhere.
Meanwhile, Trump is disparaging the opposition, which won
the 2024 presidential election and which the United States recognizes as the
legitimate government. In almost all the skills necessary to run a government,
the opposition is fully capable. Starting at least from the failed coup in
2019, both the opposition and Washington did extensive planning for the day
after. Venezuela has educated, experienced businesspeople who can run the
civilian agencies and negotiate seriously for a brighter oil-sector future.
There is no immediate need for presidential elections.
Edmundo González, the legitimate president, could be sworn in immediately. This
is precisely what happened in 1989 in Panama after the United States overthrew
Manuel Noriega. The 1988 presidential election winner, Guillermo Endara, was
sworn in almost immediately and commenced governing, including establishing
control over Panama’s military and police. While Venezuela’s National Assembly
is almost completely illegitimate and corrupted (as is the judiciary) because
of Maduro’s repeated efforts to frustrate the popular will, it does not require
fixing immediately. When the new government gains its footing, new elections
for the assembly would be ensured.
Given the successful U.S. capture of Maduro, and the
substantial military force assembled near Venezuela, Washington and the
opposition could have brought down the entire Chávez-Maduro regime. Indeed, the
U.S. military’s stellar tactical performance highlights the utter lack of
strategic thinking so necessary for successful regime change. Most of the force
remains in place and can still act, although time is likely on the side of
Maduro’s remaining subordinates. Administration officials have claimed that the
opposition could not have brought the military (and implicitly the colectivos)
sufficiently under control to keep order. This view is wrong in multiple
respects. It certainly is not the opposition’s view, and was not their view in
2019.
Trump cited Iraq as an example of regime change that went
too far, particularly in disbanding the army, and de-Baathification more
broadly. At least in hindsight, few now dispute that too much of Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi state was dismantled, but it is hardly a sensible reaction to
conclude that only the topmost leader needs removing. One can debate the
correct level at which Maduro’s regime needs to be politically decapitated, but
it is plainly more than just Maduro alone. We can leave the precise judgment largely
in the hands of those most knowledgeable, namely the opposition. Certainly the
cabinet and high-ranking officials must go, including roughly 2,000 flag-rank
military officers who are living off the state oil company and drug money.
The military is the main bone of contention. Trump says
the opposition would lose control of the military and risk civil war, but this
assessment of the military is simply incorrect. The opposition believes that
enlisted personnel and many officers are substantially sympathetic to their
cause. The rank and file know both who is corrupt and that their families and
friends must endure the desperate straits of Venezuela’s economy. The
opposition can exploit weak links in the chain of command and determine who would
come to their side, assuming of course that Washington would bother to
coordinate strategically with them. Certainly, after nearly 30 years of
authoritarian rule, there can be no assurances of avoiding bloodshed and the
settling of scores. But the risk is worth taking. The opposition thought so in
2019 and believes that again today. They may be wrong, and if they are, they
will bear the brunt of the regime’s undoubtedly brutal reprisals. I would bet
on the opposition, not the spotty intelligence and second-guessers in
Washington.
Regime-change failure could also occur in Cuba, with one
major difference. The large (numbering 2.5 million or more) Cuban-American
community has been thinking about a post-Castro regime since the first refugees
began arriving in America after the fall of Fulgencio Batista in 1959. All of
these efforts at advance planning for the day after, considered and debated at
length, enhance the prospects for rapid progress once the current regime
collapses. Moreover, Cuba’s long-emphasized proximity to Florida (“just 90
miles away,” we said worriedly during the Cold War) means an extraordinary
opportunity for interaction with island residents, which would be immediate and
inevitable. Millions of tourists (count me in) would want to visit Havana and
help the domestic economy. Especially with Secretary of State Marco Rubio doing
overwatch, not even the current administration can botch regime change in Cuba.
***
Iran’s ayatollahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), the real center of power, present the big test. When
demonstrations recently erupted, Trump urged the people, “keep protesting — take
over your institutions!!! . . . help is on its way. miga!!!” He added
later, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” I only wish I and others
had brought Trump to this point in his first term, but better late than never —
if he really means it. The regime’s brutality needs no further proof,
especially given its long-standing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and its
role as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. The massacres in
January of tens of thousands of demonstrating civilians underscore the point. A
regime prepared to treat its own countrymen so inhumanely has no inhibitions
about incinerating either the Little Satan (Israel) or the Great Satan
(America) with nuclear weapons, or committing further barbarities against
foreign civilians, directly or through surrogates like Hamas and Hezbollah.
The ayatollahs and the IRGC will not go quietly or
bloodlessly even in the best circumstances. Nonetheless, the regime has not
been this weak since it seized power in 1979. Economic despair, discontent
among the youth, women’s rejection of the ayatollahs’ claims to speak God’s
will, and intensifying ethnic tensions are all at work. This is the moment for
Washington to work with the opposition and for Trump to vindicate the red line
he drew by telling Tehran to stop the killing. Striking key instruments of state
power like air defenses, IRGC headquarters and bases, the Basij militia (Iran’s
version of the colectivos), the nuclear and ballistic missile programs,
and naval assets in the Gulf would reduce both the regime’s capacity for
domestic repression and its threats externally.
Iran presents a case in which it is nearly inconceivable
that a successor regime could be worse than the incumbent. Today, the IRGC
wields power, economically as well as militarily, with the ayatollahs providing
religious and ideological camouflage. Whether now, or when the ailing
86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dies, the opposition must try
to split off defectors within the IRGC leadership and that of the conventional
military, and even some of the ayatollahs, to join their side. Amnesty should
be given to those who do. As in Venezuela, rank-and-file personnel see clearly
the economic devastation the regime has wrought, including desperately low
water supplies countrywide.
Iran’s near-term successor regime would likely be some
form of military government, hopefully one that recognizes its main job as
preparing for Iran’s people to choose how to be governed, and for the regular
military then to return to its barracks. The IRGC and Basij must be disbanded
and the ayatollahs confined to their religious duties. Diaspora Iranians have
many competing day-after plans, but diverting their attention now to
considering the future leadership is a mistake: it’s the surest way to splinter
even further an opposition already sharply divided, as with many exile
populations, into factions competing to govern Iran once the ayatollahs fall.
American help can provide the opposition with resources like communications
capabilities, dollars, and, if they want them, weapons. There need be no U.S.
boots on the ground. This is the time for Washington to act, although whether
the White House has thought through assistance packages is anyone’s guess.
Regime change is not necessarily quick and easy, but
neither is it impossible nor always doomed to failure. I do not know whether
Trump has seriously considered any of this. Presumably someone in his
administration is doing so, untouched, we can hope, by the misconception that
there is no American interest in seeing friendly regimes around the world.
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