Putin Didn’t Know How Good He Had It

By Thomas Graham & Alan Cullison

Friday, February 13, 2026

 

For decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin railed against the world that the United States built after the Cold War. In his account, an international order run by a single power would hinder Russia and produce needless conflict, especially when that power was as self-serving and duplicitous as America.

 

Now Donald Trump is dismantling the order that Putin had so long abhorred, and a new multipolar world is emerging in its place. Putin had thought he could rise to the top of such a system, in which raw economic and military might outweigh diplomacy and alliances. But he was mistaken: The norms and institutions of the postwar order actually masked Russia’s vulnerabilities. Putin has gotten the world he wished for—and it’s threatening to crush him.

 

Moscow had assumed that its immense nuclear arsenal, unparalleled natural resources, and extensive territory in the heart of Eurasia would keep Russia competitive with China and the United States. But these assets have been unable to slow its rapid decline. Russia’s economy is at best one-quarter the size of China’s and America’s, and the gap is growing. Meanwhile, it risks becoming an afterthought in the race for technological supremacy in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing. The country’s economy and technology base are even slowly losing ground to India’s.

 

To make the case that his power is still secure, Putin has touted a wide-ranging strategic partnership with China, which Russia has tried to strengthen particularly since 2022. But the relationship has fallen short of his expectations. Bilateral trade increased at first, but it now appears to have plateaued. China has invested little in Russia’s economy, and nowhere near the amount that the West withdrew after Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Because Russia has few other major trading partners, China seems empowered to drive hard bargains: Negotiations on energy deals—one, called Power of Siberia 2, would bring Russian natural gas to China—have stalled because Moscow hasn’t been able to get Beijing to cover enough of the costs.

 

The war in Ukraine has only deepened Russia’s disadvantages. Before February 2022, some observers thought Russia was one of the world’s premier military powers—an assessment that Ukraine quickly upended. The conflict has now dragged on longer than the Soviet Union’s campaign against Nazi Germany, and it has resulted in more than 1 million Russian casualties, exacerbating the country’s chronic demographic crisis. Even if Putin is able to seize additional territory, most of it will be shelled-out cities and deserted land. Reconstructing it would require billions of dollars that Russia does not have and is unlikely to receive from others.

 

As Putin continues to pour resources into the war, he is hemorrhaging international support and influence. Russia’s long-standing partners in Syria and Venezuela have been swept out of power. Meanwhile, former Soviet states have reoriented away from Moscow and toward Western countries. Armenia and Azerbaijan turned to Trump to resolve a simmering dispute over a transportation corridor. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are strengthening their ties with Washington. Moldova has accelerated its political shift toward Europe. Putin believed that the end of the U.S.-led order would help him consolidate power in the former Soviet space. But Russia has been too weak and ineffective to take advantage.

 

Putin also assumed that a multipolar world would free him from American interference. And indeed, Trump has accommodated Moscow in some ways. His conciliation does not, however, extend to Russia’s energy sector, the foundation of its economy: Last fall, Trump levied wide-ranging sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, the country’s two largest oil producers. The U.S. has also ramped up enforcement against shadow tankers, threatening a primary channel that Russia has used to sidestep sanctions on its oil sales. Trump’s plans to revive Venezuela’s petroleum sector might likewise hurt Russia. Executing those plans may prove more complicated than Trump anticipates, but they could drive Russia’s oil prices below what its federal budget can sustain.

 

Moscow is at the mercy of an American president who circumvents traditional channels of power and obliterates the constraints that once regulated their use. For example, Trump could attempt to use his recently constituted Board of Peace to bypass the United Nations Security Council—and Russia’s veto—and muscle through his preferred policy in the Middle East, eroding Moscow’s influence in the region. Thanks to decisions by both Trump and Putin, moreover, the two powers no longer have any functional arms-control agreements. Without these, Trump could choose to accelerate his “Golden Dome” missile-defense program, which Russia fears could undermine its own nuclear deterrence.

 

Trump’s disdain for international alliances and norms has also begun to reshape Europe in a way that may exacerbate Russia’s weakness. As U.S. security assurances wane, European countries are developing their hard-power capabilities. Germany has committed 100 billion euros to modernize its military, and Poland is building up its armed forces with a goal of amassing 300,000 troops. Putin has long wanted to split the U.S. and Europe. But he might soon find that the continent—which collectively dwarfs Russia in population and wealth—poses a significant challenge even if it doesn’t belong to a U.S.-dominated alliance.

 

Shortly before becoming president in 2000, Putin issued a manifesto explaining how Russia could keep from falling into the second or third rank of world powers. He insisted that America’s global leadership was holding Moscow back. In reality, he didn’t know how good he had it.