By Sarah Isgur
Monday, February 23, 2026
By striking down President Trump’s tariffs, the Supreme
Court has once again shown that it is no partisan instrument of Republican
power. Chief Justice John Roberts, who wrote the decision, has a much more
ambitious goal in mind.
A common myth holds that the current court is a 6–3
conservative institution that protects Trump and the GOP—that it is “enabling”
him and giving him a “free
pass” or a “blank
check.” But basic accounting shows that this isn’t true. Last term, for
instance, only 10
decisions, or 15 percent of decided cases, were 6–3. The Court’s liberal
justices—Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson—were the sole
dissenting votes in six of those cases. The Court’s most conservative
justices—Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch—were the sole
dissenting votes in the other four.
Among both 5–4 and 6–3 cases, the Court’s liberal
justices dissented together 15 percent of the time. Conservatives likewise
dissented together in 5–4 and 6–3 cases 15 percent of the time. Most of those
closely divided cases—70 percent—were a mixed bag of conservatives and liberals
on both sides. And almost
half of the Court’s cases were unanimous.
Of course, this Court has decided plenty of cases,
including high-profile ones such as those overturning Roe v. Wade and
affirmative action in higher education, with the six conservatives siding
against the three liberals. But consider that last June, each liberal justice
wrote a unanimous opinion in an ideologically charged dispute—including cases
involving religious
liberty, gun-manufacturer
liability, and reverse
discrimination. The decisions had all been closely watched during the term
as “big cases.” But once they were decided unanimously, with the decisions
written by the Court’s liberals, they weren’t discussed as so “big” anymore.
The Court’s six justices appointed by Republican
presidents don’t vote in lockstep. Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh—both Trump
appointees—voted together in closely divided cases only half the time last
term. In the term before that, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson were all more
likely than Alito and Thomas to be in the majority. It’s hard to argue that
Republicans control the Court when Jackson is winning more than Thomas.
Plenty of people nevertheless argue that this Court is in
the bag for Trump. But in his first term, Trump had the lowest success rate at
the Supreme Court of any president in at least a century. In fact, the first
Trump administration was the first modern presidential administration more
likely to lose than win before the Supreme Court, including in cases
involving immigration and the census. Not to mention that the Court unanimously
rejected Trump’s attempt to change the outcome of the 2020 election. Perhaps
the Court’s pushback against Trump simply reflects that he acts unlawfully more
than past presidents did, but the narrative that he always wins doesn’t hold
up. Although he fared well on the Court’s interim docket over the summer, in
his second term, he has not only lost on the tariffs case; the Court also blocked
him from federalizing the National Guard in Chicago and using the Alien Enemies
Act to deport people without due process.
Why does Trump keep losing at the Court? Because the
larger project the Roberts Court seems to have undertaken is reining in the
power of the presidency and making the president more politically accountable.
Trump’s tariffs and Joe Biden’s student-loan-debt-forgiveness cases were both
about whether a president could act without clear congressional authorization.
The 2024 Loper Bright decision, which held that executive-branch
agencies no longer get to define the scope of their own authority, also
stripped power from the executive branch. So did the vaccine-mandate case
(Biden) in 2022 and the tax-records case (Trump) in 2020. This is a through
line across administrations.
At the same time, the Court is putting the president more
fully in charge of his branch of government. In that sense, Trump is winning.
In Trump v. Slaughter, which involves the question of whether presidents
can fire members of so-called independent agencies, the Court appears poised to
let him have more direct control over those agencies and their personnel to
execute his preferred policies. But that’s only after the justices, in Loper
Bright, took power away from those agencies and handed it back to Congress,
where it belonged. Trump will be a more powerful president over a weaker
presidency.
The Court’s 2024 criminal-immunity decision might seem to
run counter to Roberts’s project—all the more so because of how brazenly Trump
is currently abusing the power of his office. But it does fit. The Court held
that a president exercising the powers of his office is presumptively immune
from criminal prosecution unless the prosecution wouldn’t hurt a future
president’s ability to do his job. In the meantime, it’s up to Congress to
impeach a scofflaw president. Criminal prosecution, no matter how deserved it
might seem, can’t be a substitute for political action by Congress—just as
executive orders, no matter how desirable, can’t be a substitute for
legislative action by Congress.
Too often, casual Court watchers think that the Supreme
Court is deciding whether policy X is good policy. But in reality, the Court is
often tasked only with deciding who gets to decide. The Supreme Court didn’t
decide in West Virginia v. EPA and Garland v. Cargill whether
banning carbon emissions (under Biden) or banning bump stocks (under Trump),
respectively, was constitutional. It decided who has the power to ban carbon
emissions or bump stocks. The answer in both cases was Congress, not the
executive branch.
In preventing presidents from both parties from digging
up decades-old statutes with vague language as the basis to expand their own
power, as Trump tried to do in the tariffs case, the Court is forcing Congress
to assert itself. Democrats in the past have criticized these kinds of
decisions, arguing that the experts in executive-branch agencies are better
positioned to address emerging crises than Congress is. But in Trump’s second
term, they might now be realizing the value in limiting the power of presidents.
After all, this is the logic by which the Court has stopped Trump from
implementing worldwide tariffs at a whim and deploying the National Guard into
cities. I predict that the justices will rule against Trump for the same reason
in the upcoming birthright-citizenship case.
As Gorsuch wrote in his concurrence on the tariffs case:
Yes, legislating can be hard and
take time. And, yes, it can be tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing
problem arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the
whole point of its design. Through that process, the Nation can tap the
combined wisdom of the people’s elected representatives, not just that of one
faction or man. There, deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers
disagreements into workable solutions. And because laws must earn such broad
support to survive the legislative process, they tend to endure, allowing
ordinary people to plan their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift
from day to day.
This is the project the Court has been undertaking. It is
not to help one political party. It is to shrink the presidency back to size
and force 535 people to figure out a lasting solution to our problems, one that
everyone can live with. This is no small thing: If the power of the legislative
and executive branches were more equal—if Americans knew that every
presidential election wasn’t “the most important election in our
lifetime”—perhaps our politics wouldn’t be so broken.
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