By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, July 26, 2023
The Russian military has some peculiar priorities when it
comes to choosing targets in Ukraine: pregnant women and newborns, the
hospitals that serve them, churches, and, this week, grain
terminals, the last being part of a strategy to use the threat of food
shortages to blackmail countries dependent on imported grains into pressuring
Ukraine to accept a Moscow-designed settlement while raising the value of
Russia’s own grain exports.
Which is to say, the Russian commitment to behaving like
Roger Moore-era Bond villains—minus the groovy style and badinage—remains
undiminished.
Of course, we can count on Vladimir Putin’s chirping
secretaries on the American right to continue finding excuses to give Moscow
whatever Moscow demands—but the world’s foodstuffs markets run on supply and
demand, not cheap propaganda.
The Monday attack on the grain facility at Reni, on the
Danube River near the Romanian border, was carried out with Iranian drones.
That is an interesting wrinkle. Iran is one of the countries in this world that
should be least eager to see further disruptions to the grain markets: A
combination of drought, sanctions, and perpetual economic mismanagement at the
hands of its fanatical ayatollahs have left the so-called Islamic Republic on
the verge of a food disaster: Domestic
grain production is in decline, inability to make good on payments has
interrupted supplies from trading partners including Russia
and India,
institutions
such as hospitals and childcare facilities face food shortages, etc.
And now India
has prohibited the export of non-basmati rice after a delayed monsoon
raised fears of production shortfalls.
Iran’s recent internal instability began with the killing
of Mahsa Amini by Iran’s immoral morality police, and rising food prices
quickly turbocharged the nationwide protests.
Tehran is making itself a very uncomfortable-looking bed.
Washington should see to it that the ayatollahs recline there for a good long
while.
The current sanctions regime has done real damage to
Iran’s economy, but not enough to dispositively release the grip of the
wretched regime that holds that unhappy country hostage. These sanctions in
theory exclude food and medicine, but, in reality, food and medicine are more
than trivially affected, too, simply because the Iranian government and
domestic buyers often cannot muster the resources to pay for such supplies as
are available. Indian basmati exporters already have declared that they will
service the Iranian market only for cash payments or letters
of credit (bank-guaranteed payment instruments) because of the accrual
of unpaid bills for Indian produce.
Iran is, in effect and to a considerable degree, an
active participant in the Russian war on Ukraine, providing not only drones but
also promising other munitions such as surface-to-surface missiles. Western
governments have complained bitterly about this, but they have not availed
themselves of the most obvious weapon at hand: formally extending the sanctions
to food.
If Iran is going to help Russia destroy the world’s food
supplies, then let Iran be the first to pay the price for it. This isn’t to say
that we should let the Iranian people starve—it is to say that we should do
what we can to inflict enough economic pain to force Tehran change its ways or
to destabilize the country enough to give the Iranians a chance to create a
better government for themselves. Iran was a reasonably normal country within
living memory—there is no iron law of the universe that says Iran has to be a
miserable backwater under the heels of corrupt misfits and vicious
degenerates. The Iranians would be doing themselves a favor to get rid of
these oligarchs—and, more to the point, they would be doing the rest of the
world a favor, too.
Yes, that would be a harsh measure. Sometimes, harsh
measures are necessary.
Because of the attention given to Oppenheimer,
Christopher Nolan’s new film, Americans are going through one of their periodic
revivals of the debate over whether dropping two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945
was the right thing to do. The usual questions have been raised: How
many American lives would have been lost in an invasion of the Japanese
mainland? How many Japanese lives? Was unconditional surrender a necessary
condition for peace? Etc. But one consideration that rarely is
discussed—because it involves the instrumentation of horror—is the fact that it
was useful, and possibly necessary, to make an example of Japan. German
fanaticism and Japanese fanaticism were different in important ways, and
Germany’s fanaticism was not enough to sustain its war effort after it was clear
that the Allies would prevail—but Japan’s was. Germany ended up being divided
between a Soviet-dominated East and a free West, while Japan was nuked into
submission and then subjected to an occupation that, in some practical senses,
remains in place. (The formal occupation ended in 1952.) In
different ways and along different lines, the U.S.-led postwar coalition tore
Japan and Germany down to their foundations and built something better than
what either had been before—if there is a good case for imperialism, that is
it. The civilized world was able to do that not only because it had the
material resources but because it had the necessary moral context, founded in
the understanding that there must be a high price to pay for starting a war of
the sort Germany and Japan were guilty of initiating if we are to discourage
similar aggression in the future.
There will be a time to consider the necessity of setting
such an example in the case of Russia and its allies, Iran among them, in the
not very distant future. U.S. foreign-policy thinkers, whose defining defect
traditionally has not been timidity or excessive humility,
have overcorrected in the wake of the failures and disappointments in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and much of the discussion assumes that the choice before
Washington is to advocate one model of perilous stalemate or a different model
of perilous stalemate. We should be thinking bigger—and bolder. These are very
long-term projects, of course, and long term projects are how big things get
done: There’s a reason we still have 25,000 troops in Japan.
In the short term, Iranian drones are destroying grain
that could be used to feed hungry Iranian people. This is an invitation to
highlight the internal contradictions of the Iranian position, and to teach a
lesson that will—if taught thoroughly—be remembered.
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