By David
Satter
Thursday,
July 13, 2023
The dramatic
but short-lived mutiny by the Wagner mercenary group, on June 23–24, has left
Russia in disarray. In recent months, Russian leaders have been preparing for a
long war, confident that they can “outsuffer” Ukraine and exhaust the
commitment of the West. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy head of Russia’s security
council and the country’s former president, during a visit to Vietnam in May
said: “This conflict will last a very long time, decades for sure. This is a
new reality.”
The
Wagner revolt, however, suggests that Russia’s internal situation is not as
stable as it seemed and that the time at its disposal is not unlimited. This
actually heightens the dangers of a wider conflict. If a war of attrition
against the Ukrainians threatens to spark an internal revolt capable of
threatening the regime and dooming the war effort, Russia may decide that the
only alternative to defeat is to use its nuclear arms.
On June
23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, announced on the group’s
Telegram channel that his men had been shelled and he was going to “settle”
with the Ministry of Defense. His forces entered Rostov-on-Don, Russia’s
ninth-largest city, and captured the Russian Southern Military Headquarters
without firing a single shot. He then dispatched thousands of Wagner fighters
north to Moscow to seize Sergei Shoigu, the minister of defense, and Valery
Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, whom he blamed for actions costing
“tens of thousands of lives.”
After
the convoy had covered 470 miles in one day, Prigozhin suddenly agreed to halt
his forces and return them to their bases. They were 120 miles from Moscow. The
Kremlin announced that Prigozhin would not be prosecuted and that he could
leave for Belarus. Prigozhin later said he had given a “master class” in how to
conduct an invasion.
The
unexpected end to the mutiny avoided bloodshed and restored the Russian
political status quo ante at least temporarily. But in several important
respects, Russia has been seriously weakened.
In the
first place, the Kremlin can no longer sustain the impression of massive
support for the government. The mutiny created an opening for the venting of
long-suppressed anti-government feelings. In areas the Wagner forces passed,
the population appeared to support the insurgents. In Rostov-on-Don, the
majority of the people who gathered in the city center cheered the mutineers
and took selfies with them and their equipment even though Putin, in a
televised address, had called them traitors. According to Prigozhin, in cities
along the M4 highway to Moscow, people welcomed his forces with Russian and
Wagner Group flags. Military units offered no resistance and expressed their
support.
The only
direct conflict took place when the Wagner columns were attacked from the air
by the Russian air force near Voronezh. Wagner shot down six helicopters and
one Ilyushin Il-18 airborne command center, killing as many as 30 Russian
airmen. The Il-18 is used to transmit commands to airplanes and helicopters operating
at ultra-low altitudes. Russia has only twelve of these planes, and the loss of
even one could undermine its ability to coordinate its forces during high-tempo
operations.
Even in
this operation, however, the only reason the pilots fired (again, according to
Prigozhin) was that they were told that the Wagner column was a Ukrainian army
unit that had broken through and was on its way to attack the Kremlin. A
military observer in Moscow said he believes that the Wagner forces would not
have met resistance if they had tried to enter Moscow.
***
The Wagner
Group has since shown the ability to set its own rules. According to the
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Prigozhin met with Putin in the Kremlin on
June 29, five days after the mutiny collapsed, and assured him of Wagner’s
unconditional support. Prigozhin has had belongings that were seized in a
search of his residence, including $150 million in cash, gold bars, and an
arsenal of rifles and pistols, returned to him. A week after the rebellion,
Wagner was continuing to recruit fighters to join the war against Ukraine, and,
according to journalists who called its recruitment hotlines, new members sign
contracts with the Wagner Group itself and not with the Russian Defense
Ministry.
In
Moscow, there are many, including “patriotic” war bloggers, who find Putin’s
treatment of Prigozhin almost fantastical. They point out that making anti-war
remarks in a social-media post can result in a prison sentence for
“discreditation of the armed forces,” yet Prigozhin is not being punished for
armed mutiny and the destruction of vital military aircraft.
The
danger inherent in mercenaries’ being able to dictate terms to the government
is aggravated by the fact that the Wagner Group is not Russia’s only autonomous
militia. The Kadyrovtsy, the praetorian guard of the Chechen leader, Ramzan
Kadyrov, are a militia of 12,000 members, and they were supposedly on their way
from their base in Donetsk to engage the Wagner Group on behalf of the regime
when the mutiny was called off. In any serious crisis, however, their loyalty
is to Kadyrov, not the Kremlin authorities.
Additionally,
Gazprom, the giant Russian gas-and-energy conglomerate, has five private
armies. They function, for the most part, to guard oil installations, but they
can serve other functions. Potok, the Gazprom military company, was seen in
April fighting alongside the Wagner Group in Bakhmut. Several oligarchs have
their own well-paid and well-armed security forces, and even Shoigu, the
defense minister, has a mercenary group, Patriot, fighting in Ukraine. All of
these groups, under the right circumstances, are capable of becoming a law unto
themselves.
Finally,
as a result of the mutiny, the ban on official discussion of the reasons for
Russia’s war against Ukraine was violated. The Kremlin over many years had
directed an enormous media effort toward convincing Russians that Ukrainians
were a threat to Russia and had to be “denazified.” But Prigozhin, who is a
celebrity in Russia, said publicly that the official justification for the
Russian invasion was nothing but a lie. In a June 23 video released by his
press service, Prigozhin said that the Defense Ministry deceived both Putin and
Russian society when it claimed, in February 2022, that the country faced an
imminent threat from Ukraine. Ukraine was in fact not a threat, he said, and
had no plans to join NATO in an attack on Russia.
“The war
was only necessary,” he said, “so that a bunch of lowlifes could rebel and
promote themselves.” He said the war was important for oligarchs “who are
actually controlling Russia right now.” These remarks will inevitably be passed
on by civilian relatives to soldiers at the front.
***
For Russia,
the military situation was unfavorable even before the mutiny. But the Kremlin
leaders must now weigh actions in the field against the possibility of further
destabilization of the regime.
The U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in April that Russia had suffered 200,000
casualties, including 40,000 dead, in Ukraine. This toll is partly a
consequence of human-wave attacks intended to overwhelm a defending force. In
an interview with Current Time, the U.S.-supported Russian-language television network,
a Ukrainian soldier on the front lines in Bakhmut described the horror of
Russia’s frontal assaults. “The Russian soldiers face certain death in these
attacks,” he said, “but they are not retreating. You can shoot a soldier’s head
off but his comrade will keep coming. Their own commanders will kill them if
they don’t attack.”
The use
of human waves allows the Russian military to hold its more experienced
soldiers in reserve, sending them into battle to exploit weak spots in the
Ukrainian defenses as they emerge. The soldiers used in human waves are usually
convicts or recently mobilized troops and have little leverage with their
commanders. Signs of resistance, however, are beginning to appear. Starting in
late January, a steady stream of videos on social media showed groups of
recently mobilized soldiers protesting against suicidal tactics and heavy
casualties and asking to be redeployed to rear areas. Russian troops have also
produced videos saying that, after their units suffered huge losses, they were
prevented from withdrawing by blocking units tasked with shooting anyone who
tried to retreat.
The
Russian media outlet Verstka reported that, since early February, Russian
soldiers from at least 16 regions of the country have recorded video messages
in which they criticize their commanders for using them as cannon fodder. There
are videos of soldiers — for the most part, newly mobilized and sent into
battle with minimal training — refusing to follow orders. According to NATO
estimates, in the battle of Bakhmut, in which Russia gained territory with
frontal assaults, Russia lost five men for every Ukrainian killed.
There is
now concern over how the Prigozhin mutiny will affect the Russian ability to
stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive. On Russian Telegram channels, military
bloggers have urged Russian soldiers to stay focused on the war. “Brothers!
Everyone who holds a weapon at the line of contact, remember that your enemy is
across from you,” read one message.
The
disarray in Russia has boosted the morale of the Ukrainians. A video of a
well-known Ukrainian drone commander, known as “Magyar,” watching the revolt
while eating large amounts of popcorn went viral. At the same time, however, a
weakened Russia is dangerous because it could easily be pushed closer to the
use of weapons of mass destruction.
According
to a report in the Financial Times, Chinese president Xi Jinping
warned Putin during their March summit meeting in Moscow against using nuclear
weapons in Ukraine, a sign that he takes the possibility seriously. At the same
time, Russia’s nuclear threats have increased. In his statement predicting a
long war, Medvedev also threatened Ukraine with a preemptive nuclear strike. On
June 13, Sergey Karaganov, a Putin security adviser, called for using nuclear
weapons against Ukraine’s Western supporters.
The
Russians also have other means short of using nuclear weapons to inflict
catastrophic damage on Ukraine. On June 6, an explosion tore a hole in the
Kakhovka hydroelectric dam, which spans the Dnipro River in Russian-held
territory, leading to a massive water surge that forced the evacuation of
thousands of people on both sides of the river. The flooding destroyed an
irrigation system vital for maintaining much of Ukraine’s fertile land along
the Dnipro that now might be transformed into a desert.
The
Kakhovka dam was built to withstand almost any type of attack from the outside,
leading independent experts to conclude that the explosion was carried out by
the Russians, likely by mining the dam’s generating room. The Russians had
access to records of the dam’s engineering characteristics, kept in Moscow from
Soviet days. As a result of the explosion, the Ukrainian army lost positions on
the Dnipro’s many islands, which would have served as a base for a future
landing operation, thus all but eliminating the possibility of an offensive in
the Kherson region.
The
mining of the Kakhovka dam may, in turn, be followed by other war crimes.
Russia has controlled the Zaporizhzhia nuclear-power plant, the largest in
Europe, since March 4, 2022. In June, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky
announced that the Russian military had placed “objects resembling explosives”
at the plant with the possible intention of blowing it up and blaming the
disaster on Ukraine. Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Russia’s state nuclear-power
company, said in a statement to the Russian news agency TASS that Ukraine’s
armed forces were preparing to attack the plant.
***
In the
wake of the Prigozhin mutiny, Putin thanked Russia’s forces of law and order
for having “stopped a civil war” that was about to plunge the country into
“chaos,” saying, “You have defended the motherland and the lives, liberty, and
security of our citizens.” The Kremlin also issued a set of guidelines for how
the mutiny was to be described in the state media. A copy was obtained by the
Russian news site Meduza.
According
to the guidelines, mercenaries who took part in the insurrection were to be
called “false patriots,” “rebels,” and “traitors.” Although Russia’s security
forces and law enforcement took no action during the insurrection, they were to
be described as “Russia’s real defenders.” It was recommended to emphasize that
the “warriors” of Russia’s armed forces consider Putin to be their “true
leader,” while he, in turn, sees them as a “reliable backbone of the state.”
It
remains to be seen how effective this propaganda treatment will be in light of
the fact that millions learned of the mutiny and witnessed its astonishing
progress firsthand. A Moscow journalist said that people were in a state of
total shock when they realized that the Wagner columns were advancing on Moscow
and no one was trying to stop them. “Half of Moscow was in horror, but others
waited with joy in the hope that something would finally change.”
The
Putin regime is good at propaganda and manipulation, but Russians were never
before confronted with such a graphic demonstration of the regime’s impotence.
There are serious dangers ahead, but there are also some grounds for hope that
the Putin machine, created in 1999 with the bombings of Russian apartment
buildings and exemplified in the forcible human-wave attacks in Ukraine, may
finally be nearing its end.
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