By Kevin D. Williamson
Monday, August 04, 2025
The annual inflation rate is creeping up, from 2.4
percent in May to 2.6 percent in June, holding well above the Federal Reserve’s
2 percent target. In normal times, that would worry Republicans facing midterm
elections as the incumbent party with control of the White House, the House of
Representatives, and the Senate.
But Republicans, being Republicans, are working hard to
make things worse.
What is causing inflation to remain high and rise higher
still? There are many factors at play. One of them is that Donald Trump and his
Republican allies in Congress are pursuing pro-inflation policies, with the
push-pull of tax cuts and tariffs putting more dollars into the marketplace to
chase fewer goods, which is pretty much the classic formula for inflation.
Trump has inflated many things over the years—his assets
on bank statements, his romantic résumé, his book sales—and inflation is the
sort of thing that must come naturally to such a gasbag. Prices are already
creeping up, with firms such as Adidas,
Procter & Gamble, and Stanley Black & Decker announcing
tariff-driven price increases. Groceries aren’t getting any
cheaper, and neither is housing, the main driver of the late-summer uptick.
But prices are getting higher across the marketplace, as the Bureau of Labor
Statistics runs the
numbers, finding higher prices for “household furnishings and operations,
medical care, recreation, apparel, and personal care.” The few bright spots
include used cars and airfares, which may indicate that people are simply
putting off car purchases and skipping summer vacations under economic
pressure.
Tariffs are a tax—let me emphasize here that Republicans’
key achievement in the Trump years has been the unconstitutional enactment of a
national sales tax by the unilateral directive of president, without
congressional authorization—and, as a tax, a big tariff should be
anti-inflationary: The more money you pay in taxes, the less money you have to
spend on cars and vacations and such.
But tariffs are an especially dumb and destructive kind
of tax in that they do not produce a great deal of revenue in proportion to the
economic distortion they introduce. Given that the tariffs are being
implemented in parallel with what Republicans
insist is “the largest tax cut in American
history”—the cut-by-not-raising measure in their poorly conceived and
idiotically named tax-and-spending bill—whatever counter-inflationary effect
the tariffs might have had is likely to be overwhelmed by the inflationary
effects of large cuts to other taxes, even if the extension of the 2017 cuts
was far from unexpected. And here it is probably worth pointing out that
Republicans are cutting taxes while running a deficit that is projected
to be the third largest in American history.
So we end up with the inflationary effects from the tax
cut with the supply-chain disruptions of the tariffs: more money chasing fewer
goods.
Oof.
When we are trying to get a read on the health of the
economy and on where it is going, one of the things we talk about is the real
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, meaning the GDP growth rate minus the
inflation rate. If you have 3 percent nominal growth but 2.6 percent inflation,
then you don’t have much growth at all; if you have 3 percent nominal growth
and 3.5 percent inflation, then the economy is contracting in real terms. So
inflation matters a great deal for how consumers feel in the here and now, but
it also matters a great deal for how Americans are going to feel 30 years down
the road. Today’s inflation is theft from tomorrow’s prosperity.
Let’s do some English-major math—as always, I encourage
you to double-check my arithmetic and my sources, especially if you are
skeptical of my conclusions.
From the turn of the century until the extraordinary
COVID-19 period, inflation averaged
1.8 percent, just a smidge below the Fed’s 2 percent target. (The Fed likes
2 percent inflation on the theory that a tiny bit of inflation greases the
economic wheels by giving consumers and businesses an economic disincentive to
sit on their money forever and keeps us on the safe side of deflation, a
hard-to-fix condition that can create powerful disincentives to consume or
invest. I am enough of a cranky libertarian that I do not especially like the
Fed’s theory of the case—I do not think that a policy of doubling prices
every 36 years is harmless, and that is what 2 percent inflation does—but that
is an argument for another time.) Our current inflation is not what it was in
the immediate post-COVID period, but it is still high by historical standards:
From January to June, it averaged 2.5 percent and was at 2.6 percent in June,
the most recent month for which figures are available. Maybe 2.6 percent
doesn’t look like a big increase relative to 2 percent, but it is 30 percent
more.
In practical terms: If you invested $1 million today at a
7 percent nominal rate of return and 2 percent inflation, then you’d have a
real return of 5 percent per year, giving you about $4.3 million at the end of
30 years. (I assumed annual compounding to keep it simple.) Raise the inflation
rate to 2.6 percent and you lose about $700,000 in real returns over that same
period, ending up with $3.6 million. (Moral of the story: Inflation stinks, but
it is still pretty nice to have $1 million that you don’t need to touch for the
next 30 years.) Inflation is a thief, but it is more like an embezzler than an
armed robber: It steals more than many headline-generating economic crises do,
but it steals quietly, without drama.
The math that holds true for personal investments also
holds true for GDP growth. With 2.5 percent real GDP growth year-over-year, our
$29 trillion economy becomes a $61 trillion economy in 30 years; at 2 percent,
it is only a $53 trillion economy, meaning that we gave up $8 trillion in real
GDP growth. Do you know what you could do with an extra $8 trillion a year in
GDP? You could fund the entire federal government at 2024 levels with more than
$1 trillion left over.
If you are a regular reader of this column, then you know
I think the notion that presidents are somehow directly responsible for
near-term economic performance is the real voodoo economics, but for
illustration purposes, and since the politicians like to talk about it that
way: If we started with today’s economy and had two choices—the real growth
rate of the Clinton years (4 percent) or the real growth rate of the first
Trump administration (2.6 percent)—the difference would be stark. At the
Clinton rate, we’d have a $94 trillion economy in 30 years, but at the Trump
rate, we’d have only a $57 trillion economy. The difference between the Clinton
rate and the Trump rate would be $37 trillion in favor of Clinton.
Trump doesn’t like math like that: He just fired the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics because he didn’t
like the jobs report, which is what you’d expect from the Walter Mitty of
Joseph Stalins.
Caveats, caveats, caveats: Yes, the 1990s were awesome,
and the unusually robust growth rate of the Clinton years was less the work of
Bill Clinton than it was of Bill Gates, Marc Andreessen (he didn’t invent the
internet, but his
web browser made it usable), and a raft of
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists who launched new firms and products that
created immense wealth in that period. You’d think that some smart politician
would be thinking to himself: “Hey, is there anything that we can do now to
recapture some of that Clinton-era secret sauce?”
The 1990s were characterized by tons of investment,
reasonably stable prices, expanding global trade and the integration of
worldwide supply chains, relatively easy access to higher education and the
consequent emergence of an educated work force with a reasonably high tolerance
for risk, and, in politics, a mutual death grip that saw Bill Clinton and Newt
Gingrich cage-fighting their way to a small budget surplus produced by modest
spending reforms and a significant but by no means radical tax increase. We
cannot simply recreate the economic and political conditions of the 1990s
afresh in 2025, but what Trump et al. are doing is trying to resurrect some of
the worst economic ideas of the 19th century. I love John Quincy
Adams, but if you’re producing a trade agenda in 2025 that he
would more or less recognize, then you’re probably not thinking hard
enough.
Words About Words
William F. Buckley Jr. once asked me for a vocabulary
word, and I felt pretty good about that. The word in question was lapidary,
which means “related to stonecutting” but is often used to describe a style of
writing that is so lucid and precise that it seems like the sort of thing that
ought to be engraved in stone.
I don’t suppose this hilariously
illiterate marker put up by Eric Trump in tribute to
his hilariously illiterate father qualifies as literally lapidary—I
assume that is embossed metal, not engraved stone—but it is close enough. We
could fairly call it monumentally stupid.
It is good to get a decent copy editor to look over your
work before making it public, and that is especially important to do if you
happen to be in the unfortunate situation of being stupid. The Trump boy packs
a remarkable number of illiteracies into only a few words, among other things
reporting that “it was his abiding love for Scotland – the ancestral home of
his beloved mother, Mary Anne MacLeod – and the great game of golf, that
inspired the team and I to build the New Course and complete what many believe
to be The Greatest 36 Holes in the world,” moronic random capitalization
and italics in the original.
That “inspired the team and I” boner is an example of
overgeneralizing a common correction. When you are 3 years old, you might say,
“Johnny and me went to the park,” and hear from your father, who cannot stop
himself when it comes to that sort of thing, that what you meant to say is
“Johnny and I went to the park.” And from that, many young people learn the
wrong lesson, i.e., that the proper form is always “[name of other
person] and I.” But it isn’t. “Me” is an objective pronoun, meaning a pronoun
used to refer to someone to whom something is being done, whereas “I” is a
subject pronoun, meaning the pronoun used to refer to someone who is doing
something. You wouldn’t say, “Golf inspired I to take an interest in Scottish
culture,” and, so, you also wouldn’t say “God inspired Johnny and I to take an
interest in Scottish culture.” You’d say, “Golf inspired me [or inspired Johnny
and me] to take an interest.”
I am always grateful to the editors who keep me from
making dumb mistakes, which I do fairly often. Mistakes aren’t a big deal—if
you write as much as I do, then you’re probably going to make some mistakes.
(In years of editing Jay Nordlinger, I did not find a mistake in his grammar or
usage, although I do remember having seen one ordinary typo. But Jay ain’t
normal.) Making a mistake isn’t something to be embarrassed about: Making a
plaque with your mistakes on it to display in a public area when you could have
saved yourself some trouble by simply asking somebody with a better command of
the language to look over your work before elevating your stupidity to
monumental status—that’s something to be embarrassed by.
In Other Wordiness …
An eponym is someone or something after which
something else is named. But sometimes an eponym has more than one association,
which can lead to misunderstanding. For example, it is perfectly natural to
read the words “German chocolate cake” and think that this is a formation like
“Swiss cheese” or “Chinese checkers,” at which point you may start to wonder
where exactly in Germany they are growing the coconuts that are the frosting’s
defining ingredient. The dessert isn’t German at all—it is named for Samuel
German, an English-American baker and the creator of German’s Sweet Chocolate,
a baking chocolate. You may have heard someone correct you about “Canadian
goose,” which is properly “Canada goose,” though it was not (as I had once
assumed) named for a discoverer with the name “Canada,” like “Bell’s palsy”
(for Charles Bell) or (Coenraad Jacob) Temminck’s tragopan, a kind of pheasant.
The Canada goose is indeed named in honor of Canada, but the common name of Branta
canadensis is Canada goose, not Canadian goose.
The Canada goose was catalogued by Carl Linnaeus, the
Swedish naturalist who codified biology’s binomial nomenclature, the system by
which species are designated by genus and species: Homo sapiens, Canis
lupus, etc.
(If you have ever asked for a recommendation letter or
book blurb, then you know how weird it can feel to ask people to write nice
things about you. But people wrote some glowing things about Linnaeus:
Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote of him, “I know no greater man on Earth”; Goethe
judged, “With the exception of William Shakespeare and Baruch Spinoza, I know
no one among the no longer living who has influenced me more strongly.” Pretty
good stuff as epitaphs go.)
It goes without saying that the false prince of all
eponyms is English plumber Thomas Crapper, who did patent the floating ballcock
associated with the modern flush toilet but whose name did not inspire
the excretory word associated with it, a word that goes well back into Middle
English.
In Closing
Today is the Feast of St. John Mary Vianney, who was
known as the Curé d’Ars. He was a parish priest in Ars, France, and is
the patron saint of parish priests. Parish priests are what Catholics call
“secular” clergy, which may sound funny to the uninitiated ear—how could a priest
be secular?—but the original meaning of secular is “in the
world,” not, as we now sometimes use it, “irreligious.” A secular priest is a
priest who belongs to a diocese, as opposed to a priest who belongs to a
religious order such as the Society of Jesus or the Dominican Order.
One of the things for which the Curé d’Ars was
known was his emphasis on confession and reconciliation, and I very much admire
the fact that he (some of my Reformed friends may find the theology here a
little hairy) constantly performed acts of penance on behalf of his
parishioners, which is, from a certain point of view, probably the most
literally Christian thing a man could do. We live in a time of relentless
self-aggrandizement, from the president on down to every obscure social media
poseur, and such a figure as St. John Vianney must seem increasingly strange to
us. You will know that things are getting a little better when the Curé
d’Ars seems a little less weird—and a lot better when he seems more like an
example toward which to aspire.
I myself am not there yet—I do not exempt myself from any
of the general criticism you’ll read in this column—and the most I could really
say is not that I aspire to better things but that I aspire to aspire to better
things.
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