By Jim Geraghty
Tuesday, August 19, 2025
Three good things came out of yesterday’s high-profile
summit with President Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, European
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer,
Finland’s President Alexander Stubb, France’s President Emmanuel Macron,
Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. (You almost never see that many major
Western leaders in one room outside of G-7 summits.)
First, it’s much better to see Zelensky and Trump shaking
hands, smiling, and joking around in the Oval Office, compared to the shouting
match from earlier this year.
Second, and much more consequentially in the long term,
Trump expressed a willingness to participate in security guarantees for Ukraine:
Q: Your team has talked about
security guarantees. Could that involve U.S. troops? Would you rule that out in
the future?
Trump: Uh, we’ll let you know
that maybe later today. We’re meeting with seven great leaders of great
countries also and we’ll be talking about that. They’ll all be involved, but
there’ll be a lot of uh there’ll be a lot of help when it comes to security.
There’s going to be a lot of help. It’s going to be good. They are first line
of defense because they’re there. They’re Europe, but we’re going to help them
out also. We’ll be involved.
At a broadcast press briefing after his meetings,
Zelenskiy said, “Security guarantees will probably be ‘unpacked’ by our
partners, and more and more details will emerge. All of this will somehow be
formalized on paper within the next week to ten days.”
If this comes to pass, it will be one of the biggest
game-changers to the region imaginable, an outcome that is not just good enough
for the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine that is independent, but one that would
effectively shut off the possibility of further Russian aggression in the long
term. In fact, because this is such a huge win for Ukraine, it’s fair to wonder
if it will come to pass, or what the catch is.
President Zelensky is right that
such an offer by President Trump would be a “significant change.” Such talk has
been a non-starter among the so-called restrainer wing of the Trump coalition
for years. But iron-clad security guarantees from the West (preferably inside
the NATO alliance) are, of course, one of Ukraine’s biggest goals. The delta
between the two positions has repeatedly put Ukraine, its supporters in the
West, and the restrainers at loggerheads.
On Sunday, U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff appeared on CNN and described
the guarantees as such:
We agreed to robust security
guarantees that I would describe as game- changing. We didn’t think that we
were anywhere close to agreeing to Article 5 protection from the United States,
legislative enshrinement within the Russian Federation not to go after any
other territory when the peace deal is codified, legislative enshrinement in
the Russian Federation, not to go after any other European countries and
violate their sovereignty.
So we agreed to — and there was
plenty more.
Later in the interview, Witkoff elaborated:
JAKE TAPPER: In terms of
Ukrainian security guarantees, you mentioned the Article 5 guarantee of NATO,
an attack on one is an attack on all. Russia would allow that to happen, that
any more — any further incursions into Ukraine, Russia would understand would
be seen as an attack on all NATO members?
WITKOFF: No, Jake, that’s not
what I said. What I said is that we got to an agreement that the United States
and other European nations could effectively offer Article 5-like language to
cover a security guarantee. So, Putin has said that a red flag is NATO
admission.
TAPPER: Right.
WITKOFF: And so what we were
discussing was, assuming that that held, assuming that the Ukrainians could
agree to that and could live with that — and everything is going to be — is
going to about what the Ukrainians can live with.
But, assuming they could, we were
able to win the following concession, that the United States could offer
Article 5-like protection, which is one of the real reasons why Ukraine wants
to be in NATO. We sort of were able to bypass that and get an agreement that
the United States could offer Article 5 protection, which was the first time we
had ever heard the Russians agree to that.
In case you’ve forgotten, Article
Five of the NATO treaty states:
The Parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.
“Article 5-like protection,” as Witkoff describes it, is
the “I
Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter” of military alliances.
In a matter of months, we’ve gone from some of the worst
possible outcomes for Ukraine — Trump furiously confronting Zelensky with the
world watching, and a short-lived, non-presidentially informed halt to military aid
to Ukraine — to the potential of one of the best possible outcomes for
Ukraine. Would Ukrainians prefer to have all their conquered territory back?
Sure. But when it comes to consolation prizes, a serious military alliance with
the United States and knowing the 82nd Airborne would parachute in if Russian forces ever
tried to invade again is pretty sweet.
Did Putin really agree to this? Or is this some sort of
ruse?
If Putin really is willing to acquiesce to a U.S.
security guarantee for Ukraine, allow me to float another explanation. If you’ve been getting your news from the likes of Douglas
Macgregor, you’ve been hearing that the Ukrainian military forces are on
the verge of collapse, and Russian forces will be breaking through the lines
and rolling into Kyiv, for more than three years now.
I’ve tried to not be excessively optimistic in my
assessments of how the military campaign is going for Ukraine; war is hell, and
the Ukrainian military has paid a terrible price in its defense of its
homeland. In June, the U.S. Center for Strategic and International
Studies estimated that Ukrainian fatality rates are also high at between
60,000 and 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed, with a total of 400,000
casualties, which include both killed and wounded. (You can read about my talks with some of those wounded soldiers here.)
For perspective, the Pentagon’s official count of in-theater deaths for the
Vietnam War was 58,220.
But all of us can notice that the battle lines have
barely moved in several years. The Ukrainians may not be winning the war, but
they’re not losing it, either.
In this war of attrition, yes, the Russian forces have
crept forward. But at an exceptionally slow pace and paying a jaw-dropping
price in blood and equipment. In June, Riley McCabe of CSIS wrote a spectacular illustrated op-ed in the Washington Post
laying out how between January 2024 and June 2025, Russia advanced an area less
than the size of the state of Delaware. At the same time, more than 950,000
Russian soldiers have been killed and wounded since the war began, with an
estimated 200,000 to 250,000 killed in action.
If you’re wondering how Russia could be suffering
significantly higher casualties than the Ukrainians, I’ll refer you back to my first conversation with national security analyst Kyle Orton:
“It’s a very Russian war,” Orton
summarized succinctly. “It started catastrophically badly. Nothing worked at
the start, but then, over time, the Russians did improve. They found what
didn’t work, and stopped doing so much of that, and more to the point, through
artillery, and a willingness to bear unimaginable human sacrifices, they’ve
turned it around. They can’t win in a sense that they can’t take Kyiv. But they
can grind down Ukraine to accepting something that really is unacceptable.”
(The term “human meat waves” also came up in that
conversation.)
In other words, since the start of the war, Russia has
endured anywhere from 3.4 to 4.3 Vietnams’ worth of killed in action. And
remember, Russia didn’t have the healthiest demographics before the
war started.
There’s been this mentality that Russia can endure
endless casualties, that the Russian economy can endure any number of
sanctions, that the elites of Moscow and Saint Petersburg will endure any
inconvenience, and the poor of Russia will endure any hardship and any number
of buried sons in pursuit of total victory in Ukraine.
But what if those are finite? As Bloomberg recently reported:
Growth in the Russian economy is
stalling. Oil revenues have slumped. The budget deficit has widened to the largest in
more than three decades. Inflation and interest rates remain painfully high. Behind the walls of the country’s banks,
some insiders are sounding alarms about a looming debt crisis.
What if Putin’s bargaining position is much weaker than
the public perception — shaped in large part by propaganda efforts like the bot farms — and
what if Putin is looking for a way to end the war and spin it as a glorious
victory?
Third, Putin and Zelensky will, reportedly, be meeting
face to face in the near future, at least if President Trump has something to say about it.
This represents Putin de facto recognizing Zelensky as
the legitimate head of state of an independent country, no matter how much
Putin calls Zelensky “illegitimate,” “toxic,” and head of a “neo-Nazi regime.”
(Lot of Jewish Nazis out there, Vlad?)
Finally, this morning, Politico writes: “A potential MAGA
split over security guarantees for Ukraine would mark the third such foreign
policy fissure in recent months, following disagreements about the military
strikes aimed at Iran’s nuclear capabilities and U.S. support for Israel’s war
in Gaza. Both of those bent Trump’s coalition, but didn’t break it.”
Did those actions really bend Trump’s coalition
all that much?
Have you seen a lot of MAGA folks up in arms about the
bombing of the Iranian nuclear program lately? Yes, Tucker Carlson and Steve
Bannon were really irate about it, but did you see a lot of rank-and-file Trump
supporters genuinely upset about it? Didn’t the polling indicate that MAGA voters were the
demographic most supportive of Trump’s decision to launch the strike?
Remember how bombing Iran’s nuclear program was supposed to start World War
III, and we were going to lose? Remember how it didn’t?
The military strike on Iran was 60 days ago, but it feels
like 60 years ago.
ADDENDUM: Semafor reports:
Jerusalem Demsas left The
Atlantic in recent weeks to launch The Argument, a new publication that aims to push back
against the populist right by strengthening the ideas and arguments of modern
liberalism and convincing readers of their legitimacy.
You keep hearing that the left is growing more opposed to
Israel and antisemitic these days, so it’s a good sign that they’re going to
get a new magazine featuring a writer whose first name is “Jerusalem.”
It’s good to see a new left-of center magazine, because
the magazine rack at your local Barnes & Noble only features the New
Yorker, The Atlantic, The Nation, Rolling Stone, Harpers,
Mother Jones, the New Republic, Esquire, New York magazine,
the American Prospect, maybe a stray copy of Dissent
and Jacobin, and I’m
sure I’m forgetting at least one or two others. It’s an underserved market!
I kid, I kid. It’s always good to see new magazines
getting started. Semafor also reports:
The publication will also launch
with solid financial backing: Demsas told Semafor The Argument raised around $4
million at a $20 million valuation. The company’s investors include Arnold
Ventures, Open Philanthropy, Susan Mandel, Gaurav Kapadia, Rachel Pritzker,
Simone Coxe, John Wolthuis, and Patrick Collison. The organization also said it
received a grant from Tyler Cowen’s Emergent Ventures.
You know why National Review runs webathons and
ask readers like you for money? Because we don’t have billion-dollar
foundations throwing multi-million-dollar donations at us. The upside is we
never hear, “Hey, you can’t write that. This billionaire donor of ours won’t
like it.”
For example, Rachel Pritzker is Illinois Governor JB
Pritzker’s cousin. Somehow, I think it will be a long time before The
Argument runs a column or essay laying out Governor Pritzker’s flaws and contending he
should not be the 2028 Democratic presidential nominee.
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