The ‘No Deal’ Summit and the Path to Peace in Ukraine

National Review Online

Saturday, August 16, 2025

 

The optics of diplomacy are often not for the squeamish. The enthusiasm, whether real, feigned, or a bit of both, with which Donald Trump greeted Vladimir Putin in Alaska made a nauseating contrast with the horrors of daily life in Ukraine.

 

In a just world, Ukraine would regain the territory stolen from it since 2014, receive massive reparations from Russia, and be admitted to NATO. But Russia will not give up its ill-gotten gains any time soon, whether by force or voluntarily, and it is likely to be years, if ever, before Ukraine will be able to join NATO. Faced with that reality, Western policymakers should concentrate on doing what they can to secure the independence of the 80 percent of Ukraine that remains under Kyiv’s control. If some New York City realtor–style schmooze brings Ukraine closer to that goal, so be it.

 

The talks themselves yielded little of substance, which was probably why, once Putin and Trump had addressed the media after their meeting, they didn’t take any questions. Despite that, the meeting, described by Trump as “very productive,” was in a sense substantive. There were signs that each man believes that he can do business with the other. The language that Trump used to describe the absence of progress contained no hint of a slammed door: “There were many, many points that we agreed on, most of them, I would say a couple of big ones that we haven’t quite gotten there, but we’ve made some headway.”

 

The identity of those “big” points remains unknown, however. Putin’s insistence that, while he was “sincerely interested” (how kind) in ending the war, all its “primary causes” had to be eliminated, is a requirement hard to reconcile with genuine Ukrainian independence, and thus peace.

 

At the same time, despite apparent schmoozing on Putin’s part too (for example, he evidently agreed with Trump that the 2020 election had been stolen), the U.S. president demonstrated that he was, contrary to some fears, prepared to end the talks without an agreement. “There is no deal, he said, “until there is a deal.”

 

Nevertheless, Putin can claim wins of more consequence than a photo-op. Above all he dodged any requirement to pay a fresh price for his failure to agree to a cease-fire. This is a significant climbdown by Trump. Earlier he had talked of “very severe consequences” if Putin had failed to agree to a cease-fire at the summit, which followed his demands in late July that Putin should do so within “ten to twelve days” (previously the president had referred to 50 days) or face “very severe” tariffs and other sanctions. These had been expected to include “secondary” sanctions on countries such as China that bought Russian oil (some have already been imposed on India), but further extending such sanctions is off the agenda for “two or three weeks.”

 

This matters. Without a preliminary cease-fire it will be hard to proceed to the more formal armistice that remains the most likely form of eventual peace deal. Trump’s later comments that it was now up to Ukraine’s President Zelensky (with some help from the Europeans) to secure that cease-fire should not be read too literally.  The president will clearly remain involved in the peace process. But for any American intervention to be successful, before long it will (however chummy the talks in Alaska) have to involve more stick as well as carrot.

 

Putin almost certainly believes that he can win a war of attrition against Ukraine. Even agreeing to hold these talks was, if only partially, an element in a broader effort to string the U.S. along as Russia’s forces gnaw away at Ukraine. Trump should remember that while patience is a virtue, being a patsy is not. In the aftermath of the meetings, he wants to hold off on further sanctions for now. That’s fine, but in the absence of progress toward a cease-fire in fairly short order he should resume turning the sanctions ratchet.

 

Overall, we can only repeat the views that we set out ahead of the talks. In exchange for a durable armistice, Russia can be handed concessions, however undeserved, above all in the form of the de facto acceptance of its control of the territory that Moscow has seized since 2014 (de jure recognition should remain off the menu unless granted by Ukraine), but also the gradual relaxation of sanctions.

 

We add that proviso because we remain convinced that Putin’s longer-term ambitions will not be satisfied by merely hanging onto the territory Russia has grabbed since 2014. Accordingly, if any armistice between Moscow and Kyiv is to amount to more than an interlude before Russia returns to the fray, it must be backed up by continued Western support for Ukraine. And the West itself — in the form of a reinvigorated NATO under U.S. leadership — must remain united.