By Nick Catoggio
Friday, July 10, 2025
I thought I was prepared for anything after January 20,
but I wasn’t prepared for Donald Trump, NATO enthusiast.
“I came here because it was something I’m supposed to be
doing, but I left here a little bit differently,” the president said
at last month’s NATO summit. “I left here saying that these people really love
their countries. It’s not a rip-off. And we’re here to help them protect their
country.”
He made those remarks a few days after ordering
airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. If you thought his second term would
be more hawkish than his first, you’re smarter than I am.
He wasn’t done. At the White House on Tuesday, he told the press
bluntly that “we get a lot of bullsh-t thrown at us by Putin, if you want to
know the truth. He’s very nice all the time, but it turns out to be
meaningless.”
That’s still not all. A few days earlier, Trump and
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had a phone call that both sides
described afterward in glowing terms. “This was probably the best conversation
in all this time, it was maximally productive,” Zelensky told
his constituents. Trump framed it as “a
very good call, I think a very strategic call. We’ve been helping them and we
will continue to help them.”
He meant it, too. On Monday he ended the mysterious
recent “pause” in U.S. aid shipments to Ukraine and ordered more
defensive weapons for Kyiv. He assured Zelensky, in fact, that he hadn’t
ordered the pause in the first place. That appears to have been Defense
Secretary Pete Hegseth’s doing, a move that apparently caught
the White House off-guard.
What a month for postliberals. Between this, the bombing
of Iran, and the
Great Epstein Disappointment, “America Firsters” are suddenly facing their
roughest sledding of the Trump era. They went to bed on November 5 thinking
they’d elected a geriatric Tucker Carlson and woke up this week to find they’d
elected a tangerine-hued John Bolton.
Why has Donald Trump turned hawkish towards Russia?
Love is in the air.
Part of the answer has to do with the political fallout
from the Iran operation.
I never
believed that the president’s base would turn on him for joining a new war
in the Middle East, but there are enough doves packed inside the Republican
clown car in 2025 to have made the question mildly suspenseful. Trump may have
regarded Operation
Midnight Hammer as a test of whether populists would swallow traditional
right-wing hawkery if it came coated in a MAGA candy shell.
Answer: Boy howdy, would they. A CBS
News survey found 85 percent of Republicans approved of the strikes on
Iran. Among self-identified MAGA Republicans, 94 percent did. If Trump had any
doubts about whether his supporters would stick with him if he turned away from
Russia and toward Ukraine, numbers like that must have eased them.
Another part of the answer has to do with U.S. allies
practicing good policy and good politics.
The big news from last month’s NATO summit was members
committing to boost defense spending from 2 percent of GDP to
5 percent by 2035. European security is now threatened from both the east
and the west, by crazed Russian expansionism on the one hand and postliberal
American indifference to it on the other. NATO members would have had to ramp
up their defense capabilities even if Trump hadn’t spent years hectoring them
about it.
But he has spent years hectoring them, and now
that they’ve done it, he can count it as a major win. NATO did his bidding and,
as with anyone who does so, he’s newly well-disposed to it.
Allied leaders have also been shrewd in how they’ve
handled him. Zelensky has been a model of restraint since his global
humiliation in the Oval Office, never letting his exasperation with Trump
lead him to say something “ungrateful” that might create a pretext for the U.S.
cutting off military aid. And NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has laid it on thick,
praising the president’s Iran operation in terms so fulsome that Trump felt
obliged to share
his message with the world.
If preserving the Western liberal order requires Rutte to
immolate his dignity by referring to Trump as, ahem, “daddy,” that’s a
sacrifice he’s
apparently willing to make. With an extreme narcissist, flattery
will get you everywhere.
All told, the president has been incentivized to behave
more hawkishly. Doing so has earned him new friends abroad and cost him nothing
with his voters. Even for a nationalist, it must be gratifying to play “leader
of the free world” now and then.
But what we’re also seeing in his irritation at Russia, I
think, is a situationship gone bad.
If he wanted to, he would.
“Situationship” is Zoomer lingo for a romantic
relationship in which both parties are interested but with incongruous degrees
of intensity. One wants commitment, the other prefers a “friends with benefits”
arrangement. Yet rather than break things off definitively and seek more
compatible partners, the situation just sort of … lingers.
That’s because each party is getting enough from it to
keep them invested. The “friends with benefits” side continues to receive
occasional, er, benefits while the committed side receives sporadic bursts of
hope that those benefits might blossom into something more meaningful. It
neither grows nor ends. It just is.
Trump has spent almost a decade seeking commitment from
Vladimir Putin to a U.S.-Russia rapprochement, and Putin is receptive—to
a degree. He speaks with Trump regularly, politely listens to his peace
proposals, teases him with sweet nothings about how
good their relationship could be, and even suggests
plans to meet. He’s very friendly, “very nice all the time,” as the
president put it.
But he won’t commit. The New
York Times reduced the problem to one sentence: “As Mr. Trump makes his
frustration with Mr. Putin known, it has become clearer that Mr. Putin is
prepared to risk his relationship with the U.S. president in service of what
has emerged as his overarching goal after 40 months of full-scale war—achieving
Ukraine’s capitulation to his demands.”
They’re in a situationship and the party that’s seeking
commitment is exasperated, as inevitably happens in such things. Essentially,
Trump has at last issued an ultimatum to his beau to choose between him and the
wanton murder of Ukrainians, and Putin is choosing wanton murder.
Not only is he choosing it, he’s rubbing Trump’s face in
it. Russian drone attacks on Ukraine have risen
substantially since Inauguration Day, with the biggest assaults of the war
coming shortly after
Putin’s most recent phone call with the president. That’s how contemptuous
he is of his would-be partner’s needs.
You can even hear a bit of the jilted lover in Trump’s
grumbling about the “bullsh-t” Putin keeps throwing at him, stringing him along
with no intention of getting serious.
I wonder if it’s occurred to the president yet that his
foolish willingness to maintain this situationship has encouraged his beloved
to take advantage of him.
“The Russian leader is convinced that Russia’s
battlefield superiority is growing, and that Ukraine’s defenses may collapse in
the coming months, according to two people close to the Kremlin,” the
Times reported. Had Trump begun the peace process by pushing a new
military aid package for Ukraine, brandishing a stick while offering a carrot
to Moscow, the prospect of a long war might have forced Putin to negotiate.
Instead the White House advertised its reluctance to prolong the conflict,
encouraging the Kremlin to fight on in hopes that the U.S. might eventually cut
Kyiv off altogether.
The basic problem in any situationship is that the party
seeking commitment fails to set boundaries. Trump refused to set boundaries by
arming the Ukrainians robustly and now Putin is walking all over him, breaking
his heart.
We’ve probably also reached the stage common to all
failing relationships in which one partner wonders whether he or she ever
really knew the other. I wrote about that in
May: Trump seems to have believed, not entirely without reason, that Putin
is more mafioso than nationalist fanatic and would drop this silly Ukraine
business if America dangled enough economic and diplomatic goodies at him.
(That’s what Trump himself would do.) If his friend in Russia was unwilling to
commit to him, getting him to do so might be a simple matter of offering more
benefits.
But that rarely works in situationships. The president
now seems to be facing the bitter reality that Putin really does care
more about genociding Ukrainians than he does about Donald Trump’s affection.
He’s never going to commit. As the saying goes: If
he wanted to, he would.
So the situationship is over, then?
A rekindled romance?
Of course not. Situationships seldom formally end because
they never formally begin. It’s never fully off or on so it might be rekindled
at any time. The hallmark of a situationship is uncertainty.
Which is also the hallmark of Trump’s Ukraine policy,
coincidentally.
It’s the hallmark
of all of his policies, from tariffs to mass deportation to foreign wars.
He’s erratic by temperament and a showman by nature, has a low
tolerance for political pain, and seems to regard unpredictability as an
unvarnished strategic asset, all of which conspires to create profound
uncertainty around his next move. You never know what he might do, which is how
he likes it.
His administration is also staffed by incompetents,
adding an additional layer of uncertainty. Has Pam Bondi seen
Jeffrey Epstein’s client list or hasn’t she? Is Marco Rubio negotiating
with Venezuela on behalf of the White House or is Ric Grenell? Does Kristi
Noem really want FEMA to wait days
for her sign-off before rushing to the aid of flood victims? Did Pete
Hegseth halt weapons shipments to Ukraine because he’s a
villain or because he’s an idiot? Even when a policy is coherent, there’s a
good chance that it will be carried out ineptly and confusingly.
Throw one more layer of uncertainty on top for the
president’s corruption. On Wednesday he launched a trade-war blitzkrieg on
Brazil by slapping a 50
percent tariff on its imports—even though the U.S. runs a trade surplus
with that country. Trump is aggrieved that his friend and fellow right-wing
authoritarian, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, has been criminally
charged, so he’s using his “national emergency” tariff powers to try to
influence the justice system there.
This is the same guy who went to Saudi Arabia a few
months ago and condemned
neoconservatives for imperiously lecturing foreigners on how to govern their
affairs. Now here he is, not only doing the same thing with Brazilians but
grossly abusing trade policy to add some oomph. Is he for or against meddling
in other nations’ civic cultures? The answer, it seems, depends whether his
cronies are in charge of that culture or momentarily under its thumb.
All of this uncertainty has crashed down on the heads of
Ukrainians, for whom the stakes of American inscrutability are unusually high,
and it’s been further complicated by Trump and Putin suddenly being “on a
break” in their situationship. Nancy
Youssef considered the consequences in a piece published Wednesday in The
Atlantic:
Like their corporate counterparts
trying to prepare for tariffs, Zelensky and the Ukrainian military are
struggling because they don’t know what U.S. policy will look like. Military
planners and former U.S. officials who have worked on weapons deliveries to
Ukraine told me that sudden changes create a series of logistical, political,
and military challenges that could hamper Ukraine’s grip on its territory as it
battles a larger, better-armed foe.
…
Without a clear picture of the
assistance it’s getting from what has been its single most important backer,
Ukraine can’t design its war plans or effectively respond to attacks. That’s a
perilous situation to be in at a time when Russia is dramatically scaling up
the quantity of missiles and drones it’s launching Ukraine’s way.
European sources have described a “feeling of whiplash”
to Politico
after watching Trump go from dove to hawk on Russia. Reportedly the Ukrainians
have sought clarity from Hegseth but can’t get in touch, and aren’t sure that
he could speak authoritatively for the White House even if they succeeded.
Other sources complained that they can’t tell if the institutional balance of
power in the administration now lies with friends or foes of Kyiv. “As a
result, governments are preparing for multiple scenarios,” Politico reported,
“making it difficult to design any Ukraine strategy while Trump’s foreign
policy appears to change at a whim.”
No one is willing to bet on sustained American support
for the Ukrainians because that’s not how the president operates, and it’s really
not how situationships operate. No one believes he’ll relinquish his romantic
dream of putting the Cold War to bed and brokering an alliance with Putin. In
fact, when he un-paused the latest weapons shipment to Ukraine a few days ago,
he authorized only
10 Patriot missile receptors rather than the full allotment that had been
scheduled. “This isn’t my war,” he has reportedly told confidants, refusing to
take ownership of it by arming Zelensky to the teeth.
His hawkish turn of late is probably best understood,
then, less as an enduring strategic shift than the foreign policy equivalent of
trying to make Putin jealous. Forcing the Russian to consider what he’s lost by
squandering his opportunity to commit to Trump and America might, in Trump’s
mind at least, cause him to have a change of heart.
It won’t—if he wanted to, he would—but you can’t reason
with infatuation, which is why situationships happen in the first place. All
it’ll take to get the president back on the hook, I suspect, is Russia agreeing
to a new round of talks, the diplomatic version of flowers and candy. It’s the
bare minimum, but Trump is invested enough that that’ll probably suffice.
A toxic relationship.
One would think hawks in Congress would want to end this
situationship and force him to break up permanently with Putin.
They could do it. Legislation that would impose steep
secondary sanctions on countries that buy Russian oil, most notably China, is
in the works as I write this. Trump would be powerless to undo those sanctions
once they became law—ideally.
But get this: According to the
Times, the legislation was rewritten recently at the White House’s
request to “give Mr. Trump wide discretion in determining how and when to
enforce the financial penalties on Russia.” In other words, knowing that policy
uncertainty is crippling Ukraine, and having just watched the president abuse
his tariff authority in grotesque new ways in Brazil, Congress’ solution to the
situationship is to … cede even more control to Trump over relations
between the U.S. and Russia.
They’re not going to force a break-up. They’re going to
supply the president with more “benefits” to offer his beau, in this case in
the form of sanctions relief, in hopes of getting him to commit.
One would think hawks might at least insist on pairing a
new grant of discretionary authority for the White House with a new military
aid package for Kyiv to enhance the stick-and-carrot dynamic. If the goal of
all this is to get Russia to value a relationship with the U.S. more highly
than killing Ukrainian children, making the latter more costly for Putin would
help.
But no, another “large” weapons package for Ukraine is
unlikely, according to one Republican senator. Sanctions will be the
president’s only stick, and if implementing them poses as much risk to the
global economy as some experts think (one imagined
“a meltdown in global energy markets or a worldwide recession owing to a
tailspin in global trade”) then Trump will assuredly TACO
his way out of doing so lest they do any damage to his economic legacy.
Real leverage for Zelensky would require an America where
Congress isn’t in its own toxic relationship with the president, one that veers
periodically from extreme
sadomasochism to outright
abuse. We chose not to have a country like that last November. If we wanted
to, we would.
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