By Shane Harris
Thursday, March 06, 2025
Watching President Donald Trump berate the leader of
Ukraine in the Oval Office last Friday, many Western officials were appalled.
But they weren’t surprised. They have long understood what is now obvious to
anyone who watched the ostensible photo op that careened into a diplomatic fiasco:
Trump’s visceral disdain for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is
inversely proportional to his abiding admiration for Russia’s dictator,
Vladimir Putin.
Most U.S. allies I spoke with after the White House
confrontation thought that Trump and Vice President J. D. Vance had planned to
attack Zelensky, like bullies cornering the new kid on the school playground.
One former U.S. official called it a “setup” (the White House denies this),
intended to give Trump a pretext to withdraw American military support from an
ungrateful ally, which, three days later, he did.
The United States also curtailed the intelligence it
provides Ukraine, including technical assistance essential for firing
long-range weapons at military positions miles inside Russia. Those strikes
have allowed Ukraine to slow Russia’s advance, so cutting off the intelligence
is in effect an act of assistance to Moscow. A Ukrainian official I was in
touch with yesterday morning was despondent and confused. He wasn’t sure when
the vital flow of intelligence would be turned back on. CIA Director John Ratcliffe
told Fox Business that it depends on Zelensky’s willingness to work with the
Trump administration on a “peace” plan. But U.S. and Western intelligence
officials have said for months now that Putin is unwilling to negotiate,
because he believes he is winning the war he started against Ukraine and is not
prepared to make concessions. Trump has placed no new pressure on Russia even
as he ties Ukraine’s hands. It’s hard to see how the United States could still
be called Ukraine’s ally.
Watching Trump browbeat a country the United States had
steadfastly backed until just six weeks ago, one bewildered Western diplomat
who served in Russia asked me, “What the hell is happening to your country?”
Now some of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters in the West wonder where their
countries stand with the new leadership in Washington. The question has been on
their mind for months.
Back in the summer of 2024, before Joe Biden dropped out
of the presidential race, I started talking with senior allied officials about
how they were preparing for Trump’s possible return to power. Could they depend
on him to support Ukraine in a war that poses a significant, even existential
threat to Europe? Would Trump preserve decades-old alliances or attempt to
extract concessions in exchange for security support, as he did to Zelensky in
2019 during their infamous “perfect” phone call, and as he is doing now with a
claim on Ukraine’s natural resources? On a tactical level, could longtime U.S.
allies trust the president not to leak or mishandle the intelligence secrets
they routinely share?
My conversations with more than a dozen career diplomats
and intelligence officers throughout the Western alliance, several of whom have
served long tours in Washington, continued through the 2024 campaign, after the
election, and into this week. Eventually the discussion came around to one
basic question: Is Trump a reliable ally?
The answer, unsurprisingly, was no. But it came with an
essential caveat.
The president was not someone they could easily trust.
But the career officials who work for the U.S. government have long been
reliable partners. These are the senior-level employees who actually run the
FBI, the intelligence agencies, and the Pentagon day-to-day, regardless of who
sits in the Oval Office or in the executive suites of headquarters buildings.
When foreign leaders extol the mutual benefit of military
partnerships and intelligence sharing, they’re talking about this layer of
permanent government and the people who work in it. These are the unknown
officials who jointly collect and analyze electronic communications with the
British; make strategic naval plans with the Australians to counter a rising
China; collaborate on North American security and air defense with the
Canadians; partner with the Germans to break up terrorist cells; collaborate
with the Dutch on cyberoperations directed at Russia; and work hand in glove
against Russia with the Ukrainians, whose contemporary intelligence service was
practically built by the CIA.
These relationships are the soft tissue of global
security. They are based on mutual trust that is earned, not assumed. And the
officials who make up this part of the U.S. government are the ones Trump has relentlessly
attacked
since he took office, because they don’t swear allegiance to him. These
working-level relationships took shape in the aftermath of World War II, and
for eight decades they have withstood political stress and the whims of elected
leaders. Now they are being tested in ways that only Trump has dared.
***
Trump casually abused U.S. allies’ trust practically from
the moment he first took office.
In May 2017, he revealed
a sensitive source of Israeli intelligence to two senior Russian officials
during a meeting in the Oval Office—while the FBI was investigating Russia’s
interference in the election and potential connections to Trump’s campaign.
That same month, a furious British Prime Minister Theresa
May complained to the American president that his officials had disclosed the
name of a suicide bomber who attacked a concert arena in Manchester, preempting
local law enforcement. Police were also outraged that U.S. officials had leaked
crime-scene photos to American reporters that the British had shared in
confidence.
Not one to spill only other governments’ secrets, by then
Trump had already revealed the presence of two U.S. nuclear submarines off the
coast of North Korea, during a phone call with the president of the
Philippines. In 2019, Trump tweeted a potentially revealing U.S.-spy-satellite
photo of a missile launch site in Iran. In 2022, after the FBI found that
Trump had stored boxes of classified documents at his Florida mansion—an action
for which he was criminally charged—former White House aides said they weren’t
shocked, because the president had routinely mishandled
classified information while in office, taking transcripts of calls with
foreign leaders, as well as intelligence-briefing materials, up to his
residence for no clear reason and without an explanation.
Trump’s loose lips and sticky fingers arguably made U.S.
allies less safe. In light of that history, allied officials told me recently
that they were taking steps to limit the classified information they shared
with the U.S. They would not stop sharing entirely; foreign countries depend
too much on information that the United States provides them to blow up the
entire arrangement. But the officials laid out a number of ways they could
protect what they send over the transom. All the possibilities rely on those
trusted relationships with career officials in U.S. national-security agencies.
In rare cases, allies might hold back a very sensitive
piece of intelligence altogether. But more often, they would ask their
counterparts to keep some information to themselves and not share it higher up
in their organizations, where it might find its way to the president’s
political appointees and potentially to him. The allies would not be hiding
things from Trump, exactly—just avoiding the risk of bringing him in on things
he doesn’t need to know. Another official told me their service might ask the
Americans to read intelligence only in person, perhaps at the country’s embassy
or a headquarters building. The Americans would still know the information, but
they would take no hard copies with them that might find their way into the
hands of Trump’s political advisers.
Some allied officials suggested that they would not start
any new joint operations with the Americans unless necessary. Even before the
election, one official in an allied intelligence service told me they were
waiting to see the outcome before doing any new business with the Americans.
They feared starting work under a president they could trust, only to regret
the arrangement when Trump took over.
The allies aren’t worried only about how the Americans
handle their secrets. Trump’s purge of senior FBI officials has eliminated many
of the very interlocutors foreign law-enforcement and security officials deal
with on any given day. Several officials told me they were anxiously waiting to
see whom they are to call now, and whether their trusted contacts will be
replaced by political loyalists.
What’s more, one official worried, if American
intelligence agencies are distracted by internal battles, what vital
information might their agents miss? Would the quality of information about
terrorist plots or Russian espionage degrade? How helpful a partner can the
United States be when it is consumed by feuds?
Allied officials can protect some information by limiting
what they tell their counterparts. But to restrict the flow of technical
information, particularly “signals intelligence,” the fruits of electronic
eavesdropping or cyberespionage, is difficult.
The U.S. and British signals-intelligence systems are so
intertwined as to be practically one and the same; their technical equipment,
or “kit,” as the Brits like to say, is sometimes physically co-located. The
systems are so compatible that in 2003, when the National Security Agency was
tracking a plot by al-Qaeda to detonate a nuclear weapon inside the United
States, officials made a contingency plan to transfer the control of U.S.
signals intelligence to the British, in the event that NSA headquarters was
taken out by terrorists, Michael Hayden, the agency’s director at the time,
once told me.
That kind of nightmare-scenario planning speaks to the
bedrock level of trust between the U.S. and Great Britain, its closest ally.
The two countries are members of the so-called Five Eyes, an Anglophone
security pact that includes Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The member
states share an enormous amount of classified information. And although the
United States is by far the biggest contributor to that bounty, it materially
benefits from the other countries’ ability to fill in the gaps with their own unique
sources and capabilities. The American intelligence system, massive as it is,
cannot cover everything.
Yet now, even the Five Eyes is not sacrosanct. Late last
month, the Financial Times reported that Trump-administration officials
were discussing kicking
Canada out of the pact, as a way of extracting more favorable security and
trade arrangements. Two allied officials bluntly described the proposal to me
as “crazy.”
The White House official reportedly pushing the
expulsion, Peter Navarro, later claimed he hadn’t done so. But other officials
told me that Trump indeed has toyed with the idea, which would have been
unthinkable under previous Democratic and Republican presidents. How one member
jettisons another is not clear, because the other countries can work with
whomever they choose. A “Four Eyes” alliance theoretically could exclude the
United States, but it would be a severely diminished partnership.
***
Nothing Trump has said or done since taking office this
year has lessened allies’ concern about his reliability. Recently, the newly
elected chancellor of Germany has suggested that the time has come for the
transatlantic powers to break up.
“My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as
quickly as possible so that, step-by-step, we can really achieve independence
from the U.S.A.,” Friedrich Merz said last month.
Merz may have taken to heart a truculent
speech Vance had given days earlier at the Munich Security Conference. The
address, in which vice presidents customarily acknowledge the alliance’s shared
democratic values and mutual security interests, was read as a giant middle
finger. “He told us off,” one Western official in the audience put it to me
more diplomatically. Vance’s speech was the dominant subject for the remainder
of the conference.
Vance further infuriated European officials in an
interview with Fox News this week, when he dismissed their potential
contribution to a future peacekeeping force in Ukraine as “20,000 troops from
some random country that hasn’t fought a war in 30 or 40 years.” His comments
were widely seen as directed at Great Britain and France, which have pledged to
commit forces to such an effort. But troops from more than two dozen additional
countries have died fighting with U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign
officials were quick to note.
Hanging over the rapid dissolution of these old
relationships is the question of who would lead in the United States’ absence.
Keir Starmer, the British prime minister, held an emergency meeting with
Zelensky and other European leaders in London on Sunday, trying to assemble
what he called a “coalition of the willing” against Russia. Starmer insisted
that the United States remained a reliable partner, while exhorting his
colleagues to seize a “once-in-a-generation moment” to protect Europe from
Putin’s expansionist appetites. The Americans would clearly not lead that
effort. But the British have been working to secure an American “backstop” to a
peace deal in Ukraine, keeping long-range weapons and other heavy equipment on
standby in a nearby country in case Russia attacked Ukraine again.
Vance isn’t alone in undermining allied confidence. Tulsi
Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, took to X on Friday, praising Trump
for his “unwavering leadership in standing up for the interests of the American
people, and peace. What you said is absolutely true: Zelensky has been trying
to drag the United States into a nuclear war with Russia/WW3 for years now, and
no one has called him on it.”
Putting aside that Trump actually told Zelensky he risks
a third world war if he doesn’t strike a peace deal, not that he was “trying to
drag the United States” into one, Gabbard’s statement is completely at odds
with years of intelligence reporting that the office she now leads has provided
to American policy makers and allies. U.S. intelligence has long assessed that
Russia invaded Ukraine in the hopes of decapitating its leadership and
installing a Kremlin-friendly government. When Gabbard portrays Zelensky as the
aggressor, and rhetorically backs up Trump’s pressure campaign on Ukraine, she
politicizes the intelligence community at the very highest level, something
every allied official I talked with has long feared. Gabbard’s office didn’t
respond to my request that she elaborate on her comments.
Seemingly the only country praising Trump’s strong-arming
of Ukraine is Russia. After Zelensky left the White House, the Kremlin
spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told a Russian-state-television reporter, “The new
administration is rapidly changing all foreign-policy configurations. This
largely coincides with our vision.”
This, too, is an outcome the allies have dreaded. The
officials I talked with debate why exactly Trump is so solicitous of Putin;
they have for years. But there was little arguing this week that the United
States seems to be switching sides.
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