By Stephen Webber
Thursday, April 24, 2025
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues into its third
brutal year, and the U.S. government presses for a resolution
to the conflict, it is worth taking a step back and considering the lens
through which we view the war itself.
“Proxy war” is a term invoked by government officials,
analysts, pundits, and scholars to describe the conflict in Ukraine. The label
was notably used by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his criticism
of U.S. policy as early as December 2022. While Putin was trying to influence American
and global audiences by conveying a specific message, the term has long been
used in serious analysis
and policy discussion, perhaps most often by well-intentioned thinkers seeking
to understand and describe the nature of war.
This creates the question—does this accurately describe
the war in Ukraine, and is the term “proxy war” at all useful in the first
place?
The answer is no. The term proxy war is unhelpful in
regards to the Ukraine war specifically, and can lead us astray when thinking
about other conflicts as well. It misses the mark in two ways: It deprives the
parties involved of their agency, and it oversimplifies the often-complex
relationships among all sides. From a practical perspective, these mistakes can
translate into ineffective policies with bad outcomes.
What does ‘proxy war’ even mean?
“Proxy war” means different things to different people.
In the lexicon of international
relations, it can refer to a country taking an action—such as going to
war—at the behest of another country. It can also refer to a group that acts on
behalf of
another country. The term is generally used to
describe situations where one country is providing military support to a
country or group engaged in a military conflict. While this is exactly what the United States
and its allies are doing with regard to Ukraine, labeling the conflict as a
“proxy war,” however, mischaracterizes both the nature of that support and the
larger dynamics of the conflict.
The term “proxy war” carries a principal-agent
connotation. Principal-agent
theory describes how one actor (in this case, a country) delegates a task to
another actor (a country or a group). Each has its own interests that are to
some extent aligned with the other’s. The agent, however, may choose to diverge
from the principal’s wishes. The principal can invest only so much in
controlling the choices of the agent to keep the relationship cost-effective.
Both, therefore, will stay within certain bounds while the agent gets away with
as much as they can while still reaping benefits.
When we apply this lens to an international conflict, we
can come away with the mistaken impression that one actor is the client of
another. In some cases, there is a real power dynamic between the two. The
country providing military support is doing so for a certain set of interests.
The country receiving the support may share only some of those interests. Each
country may try to leverage its role in the relationship to achieve some of its
goals. In this respect, the term proxy war has some utility in the case of
Ukraine and in other instances. Iran, for example, provides support to Yemen’s Houthis,
as well as a broad range of other actors. In some cases, the relationship
between Iran and terrorist groups that it sponsors is close (such as Hezbollah) or less
so (such as Hamas).
Russia, for its part, supported the insurgency
in Ukraine’s east. To be sure the “separatists”
in Donetsk and Luhansk are responsive to Russia.
Despite the fact that there may be a principal-agent
dynamic in play in any such relationship, it is rarely the only or even the
most important aspect of the conflict. The term “proxy” implies a strict
sponsor-client relationship, or that one group is acting as an extension of
another. This is not the case in most wars, as scholars such as Vladimir Rauta,
Reinoud
Leenders, and Antonio Giustozzi have argued.
First of all, all actors in a conflict have agency. Just
because a country or group is receiving military support from another actor
does not mean that it automatically adopts all of their interests and
preferences, a case that Barbara Elias has expertly argued with regard to the
U.S. military’s many partnerships
around the world. Secondly, when we use the term “proxy,” we forget that
external actors can intervene in conflicts for a variety
of reasons and in a variety of ways. Rather than oversimplifying the conflict
as a “proxy war,” we should look carefully at these particular relationships.
A historical example: The Spanish Civil War
The Spanish
Civil War offers an example of a conflict that is often mischaracterized as
a proxy war. The war started in 1936 when the Spanish military launched a coup
against the democratically elected government. The Spanish Army provided the
mainstay of a Nationalist force, which consisted of a broad “right-wing”
coalition of fascists and monarchists, each with their own ideological and
political goals.
These groups coalesced into a relatively cohesive force and maintained support
from Italy and Germany throughout the war. On the other side was the Spanish
Republic. The “left-wing” government consisted of everything from moderate
liberals to radical socialists. The war also saw a broad left-wing uprising of
anarchists, communists, and even federalists seeking regional autonomy within a
democratic nation. This side received support
from Stalin’s Soviet Union, which persisted until 1939 when the Nationalists
eventually won and dictator Francisco Franco began his 36-year rule.
The war is often described as a binary ideological
struggle of fascism against communism, or as a power struggle between Germany
and the Soviet Union. What this misses is that the Nationalist force was never
a proxy of Hitler, nor was the Republic a proxy of Stalin. Using “proxy war” as
shorthand prevents serious thinking about the roots of the conflict, as is
reflected in Antony Beevor’s excellent history.
For example, if one does not understand how the military
class (with its own institutions and interests) came to launch a coup against
the government and why monarchists joined their coalition, they lose a sense of
how the balance of military power may have influenced these groups to align as
they did. They might also overlook the right-wing populist narrative that led
many working-class Spaniards to fight in the Nationalist army, and how they
coalesced around an ethno-religious narrative. One might fail to understand how
communists influenced Republican forces, who at the beginning of the war
included moderate liberals steadfastly opposed to communism.
Focusing on the tension between the Soviet Union and
Germany also overlooks the differences between these two powers in why and how
they intervened in the war. As historian Robert H. Whealey describes it, Germany may have pursued
economic and diplomatic interests ahead of ideological ones. While the Soviet Union did seek to
check Hitler’s expansion, it had other goals in mind, namely a modus vivendi
with other European powers after its own civil war. Both countries provided arms, advisers, and
even air forces, throughout
the war. After the civil war, Franco’s Spain did not fight alongside the Nazis
in World War II.
At the time, many international audiences
saw the conflict as one of democracy against fascism. This was only partially
true, as both belligerents were ideologically diverse and only partially
influenced by their external backers. During the civil war, for example, the
splintering of Basque communities among multiple factions had a lot to do with
a desire for local autonomy.
Those in the United States that saw the war primarily
through the lens of Germany’s power struggle with the Soviet Union, or who
viewed the Nationalists and Republicans simply as clients of their backers
failed to understand the war. In reality, the Spanish Civil War was fought by
coalitions pursuing their own interests. External backers shaped the conflict,
but were never fully in control.
Why Ukraine is not a proxy war.
This brings us back to the war in Ukraine, a very
different situation from the Spanish Civil War. Most obviously, it is a war
between two states rather than a civil war. Still, some refer to it as a proxy
war as the United States continues to provide support,
along with NATO, the European Union, and other allies. Russia, for its part,
also receives economic support from China,
weapons from Iran,
and soldiers from North
Korea. The broad coalition supporting Ukraine generally shares
a belief in democratic values and norms regarding state sovereignty. To one
degree or another, they also wish to deter future Russian aggression and foster
an international system more conducive to their national and collective
security. Those supporting
Russia share very different goals, that may involve countering U.S. influence.
At first glance, one could conclude that the war is really about a power
struggle between one faction led by the United States and another led by
Russia. As was the case with Spain, this is an incorrect characterization.
First, to call this a proxy war deprives all parties of
agency, most of all the Ukrainians. To refer to Ukraine as a “proxy” would
suggest that they entered into the war at the U.S.’s direction, or that they
are acting as a stand-in for the United States. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Ukraine is fighting because Russia invaded
its territory, seeking to overthrow the elected government and erase its
existence as a nation. In this case, Ukraine’s only real option is to fight for
survival. It also implies that the United States has a high degree of control
over Ukraine’s choices. While U.S. military support undoubtedly creates a power
dynamic between the two nations, they are both very much independent actors.
Secondly, it misses the different dynamics
among all the actors involved. China likely has a different reason for acting
as Russia’s economic lifeline than North Korea does in providing troops. Iran,
for its part, operates in a very different strategic context from the other two
nations. Each is willing and able to provide a different kind and level of
support based on their interests, which are loosely aligned in opposition to
American power. In this way, there is a different set of factors shaping the
actions of each country involved.
If the idea of “proxy war” is discarded, the situation in
Ukraine comes into clearer focus. Such labeling emphasizes an adversarial
dynamic between the United States and Russia, neglecting that the U.S.
objective in Ukraine for the last three years has been not to weaken Russia but
defend Ukraine. Prior to 2014, the
United States had largely sought
to improve relations with Russia. Even after the seizure of Crimea, U.S.
support to Ukraine increased in a way
that suggests a desire to avoid escalation, with lethal arms sales not
beginning until 2017.
Emphasizing Ukraine’s dependency on U.S. support similarly ignores the reality
that Ukraine is fighting of its own accord. While the United States is enabling
Ukraine in important ways, the Ukrainians would have to fight regardless.
American support, although perhaps vital, is not the only support Ukraine is
receiving.
If the war is not primarily about a power struggle with
Russia, nor U.S. leverage over Ukraine, then U.S. policy should focus on the
challenge at hand: supporting Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.
Three years into a terrible war, it may be time for the United States to
develop an approach focused on the Russian invasion itself. The first step
would be to take stock of the operational situation within Ukraine, and then
develop a clear strategy as to how American diplomatic, economic, and military
power can be matched to Ukrainian needs in a way that renders Russia incapable
of achieving its military objectives. Such an approach could be coordinated
with the Ukrainians, and possibly a broader network of allies, who may be
positioned to provide niche capabilities, share the resource burden, and
leverage their unique strengths.
The idea of proxy war usually falls short of
characterizing the complex dynamics of any military conflict. Academics and
analysts should exercise caution when thinking of one country or group as a
“proxy” for another, or of a conflict as a “proxy war” between two powers.
Policy makers, especially, should beware of adopting this lens. Whether
confronting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or Iran’s support of terrorism, the
United States should always be aware that every party in a conflict has their
own interests and the agency to pursue them. With this in mind, U.S. policy
makers can begin to untangle the complex relationships that shape the course of
war. Only then can the United States act in a way that promotes its values and
advances its national security interests.
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