Forcing Ukraine to Surrender to Russia Is No Path to Sustainable Peace

National Review Online

Thursday, April 24, 2025

 

On the face of it, the members of the Trump administration who set out their ideas for the basis of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine appear to know as little about dealmaking as they do about diplomacy as they do about Russia. The suggestion that Ukraine should legally cede Crimea to Russia, something that had not been on the table before, does nothing other than strengthen Moscow’s negotiating position, while sending a terrible message to both Kyiv and the European members of NATO (a message that will not be overlooked by China or those threatened by it). Kyiv has rejected the idea, and the peace process (such as it is) is in disarray.

 

Tacitly accepting that Ukraine will never win back Crimea (it won’t, at least militarily) is one thing, but for the administration to insist that Ukraine should give up its legal right to the peninsula is quite another. The president later posted on Truth Social that “nobody is asking Zelenskyy to recognize Crimea as Russian Territory.” That still leaves open the possibility that the U.S. would extend de jure recognition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. That would be less humiliating for Ukraine, but it would still risk setting a dangerous precedent with regard to the territorial integrity (and, in the worst case, sovereignty) of parts of the former Soviet Union no longer under Moscow’s control. The administration may think that legally recognizing the loss of land beyond recall is no more than a goodwill gesture, a sweetener to induce Russia to come to terms. Good luck with that: The Kremlin will see it as an admission of weakness and ask for more.

 

In the summer of 1940, the U.S. stated that, legally, it would not recognize the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and it never did, even if, in practice, it largely went along with Soviet rule in the formerly independent Baltic states. This combined defense of an important principle (recognition of the Baltic nations’ right of self-determination) with grubby realpolitik (accepting that there was little the U.S. could do to help the Balts regain their independence, at least directly, any time soon). That, more or less, with the realpolitik again left unspoken, has been the position that Washington has maintained to date over Russia’s occupation of Crimea. If that holds, it is an undeservedly good result for Moscow. The deeper that Kremlin rule becomes entrenched in Crimea, the less chance there is that it will ever be handed back to Ukraine.

 

The second territorial issue concerns the large swath of eastern Ukraine now occupied by Russia. So far as that region is concerned, the American suggestion is that the front line should be “frozen.” Ukraine is, quite rightly, demanding a cease-fire before serious negotiations begin. Kyiv suspects, with good reason, that Russia will grab land while talking peace. The final determination of the fate of occupied eastern Ukraine (Crimea aside) would then (it is proposed) be settled by a more permanent peace deal. In practice, this would probably mean de facto, but not de jure, acceptance of the 2025 status quo and, in all likelihood, an arrangement somewhat similar to the “temporary” armistice at the intra-Korean border, which has endured since the 1950s.

 

That has worked because, until now, the U.S. has stood behind South Korea, which has taken advantage of the peace to build up its economy and, if not always smoothly, its democracy. A similar arrangement (accompanied by prisoner exchanges and the return of Ukrainian children effectively kidnapped by Russia) would likely be a deal that, albeit through gritted teeth, most Ukrainians would accept. They could then focus on rebuilding the roughly 80 percent of their country under Kyiv’s control. The more prosperous and democratic that Ukraine becomes, the more secure it will be. That’s why any deal should include confirmation of Ukraine’s right to join the EU. Joining the EU would take years, but the experience of post-Soviet Eastern Europe shows that the direction of travel — cleaning house ahead of EU membership — is healthy, both legally and democratically, and encourages foreign investment.

 

None of this will work, however, unless Ukraine has some assurance that its independence will be backed by hard power as well as soft (although there are good strategic reasons why it should conclude a metals deal with the U.S.). Unless suitable deterrence is put in place, the Kremlin will treat a peace agreement as an opportunity to restock its arsenal and replenish its forces before attempting another assault on Ukraine. That is why the American proposal that the peace deal should include a formal prohibition on Ukrainian membership in NATO is a serious mistake.

 

Ukraine will not be able to join NATO for a long time, if ever, not least because it would require the unanimous approval of all existing members, and this would be unlikely to be forthcoming. But that’s another unpleasant truth that is best left unspoken. Moscow, Washington, and, however unhappily, Kyiv know that NATO membership is out of Ukraine’s reach. But an absolute prohibition on NATO membership not only is an affront to Ukrainian sovereignty — Ukraine should be able to decide its alliances for itself — but also sends a signal that undermines the credibility of any security guarantees Kyiv receives from the West. The less credibility those have, the more likely that Putin will be tempted to try his luck with round three.

 

Sadly, establishing that credibility has been made much more difficult by the poisoned relationship between the U.S. and much of the rest of European NATO. Detoxing it, even if the desire to do so is there, will take a while (especially given the fight over tariffs). But if the administration intends to continue providing some support for Ukraine (for now, anyway), it must leave no doubt that it will stand behind European NATO (which is not the same as offering any guarantees to Ukraine), especially during the period when NATO’s European members assume — as they should — more responsibility for their defense and, independent of NATO, the security of their wider neighborhood.

 

If the administration, which has foolishly muddied the waters with its belligerent talk about Canada and Greenland (not to speak of slanging matches over X with President Zelensky, a practice both sides should cease), is not serious about continuing to stand up for the very basic principle that countries should not invade their neighbors, then the world, not just Ukraine, will face a very dangerous future.