Trump in the World

By John R. Bolton

Thursday, February 20, 2024

 

Analyzing the foreign policy of a conventional incoming president requires assessing the strategic threats and challenges facing America, the crises already boiling on January 20, and his priorities for its first hundred days. But because Donald Trump is far from conventional, any effort to predict what lies ahead in international affairs must include first an assessment of the man himself. February’s catastrophic developments in America’s Ukraine policy alone prove this point.

 

Hard as it is for reporters, commentators, politicians, and academics to grasp, Trump has no overarching national security philosophy. He doesn’t do grand strategy. He doesn’t make “policy” as Washington understands that term. His decisions are transactional, ad hoc, anecdotal, and episodic. Analysts try to draw lines among them, but even Trump can’t, sometimes not even adhering in the afternoon to positions he took that morning. He is not playing three-dimensional chess; he is playing regular chess, one move at a time.

 

Trump and his supporters have enveloped him in a web of mythology about how different his decision-making is from that of other presidents and lesser lights. There are certainly specks of truth in that mythology. Nonetheless, the sheer volume of his tergiversations ultimately proves that many explanations of his behavior merely camouflage his real priority: the unending search for public attention to Donald Trump. Once observers grasp this reality, the efficacy of Trump’s braggadocio drops sharply. Worse, it convinces allies that Trump, and quite possibly America itself, is just as feckless as, for example, Joe Biden.

 

Consider the accuracy and implications of various Trump legends, reflected in both his rhetoric and his actions.

 

First, supporters cite various long-held opinions as evidence of a Trump philosophy — such as favoring low interest rates, permanently — perhaps from his real estate dealings. But this is no more a philosophy than Yoko Ono’s famous repetitive, one-note piano piece is a concerto. Trump has said that “tariff” is the dictionary’s most beautiful word. That may be, but it conjures a person whose only tool is a hammer and who therefore sees every problem as a nail. Indeed, much of this post facto rationalization comes from sycophants still seeking second-term jobs.

 

Second, the most pervasive trope among Trump’s supporters is that his bluster and brash proposals are just bargaining tactics. He is unnerving his adversaries, say supporters, resetting expectations, and rousing his base, thereby paving the way to his actual goals, not the chimerical objectives of his initial rhetoric: “We should take Trump seriously but not literally.” Even those conceding he has no philosophy are optimistic, believing he craves “success,” which predictably coincides with what these supporters, reasonable people themselves, see as “success.”

 

This Trump-friendly analysis contains several errors. His definition of success is what benefits Trump, which he alone deems coextensive with America’s national interests. He may not believe that what he says is only for bargaining purposes. His incoming chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers holds that 20 percent across-the-board tariffs, which Trump has advocated, are, under certain circumstances, economically optimal. On tariffs, therefore, Trump’s business supporters may simply have outwitted themselves.

 

Trump hardly invented taking maximalist initial bargaining positions, but his menacing fusillades obstruct his own objectives, especially when dealing with democratic allies that must consider their own citizens’ reactions, not just Trump’s U.S. base. When Trump refuses to exclude the use of force to gain sovereignty over Greenland, he drives Danish and Greenlandic leaders into a corner, making them less likely to be interested in a mutually acceptable outcome.

 

Moreover, there are longer-term negative effects from Trump’s style that, while hard to calibrate, are nonetheless significant. Pounding rhetorically on Greenland and Denmark, Canada, and Panama, whatever the immediate impact, also persuades them and other allies over time that America is unreliable, untrustworthy, and, frankly, not all there. That is true in spades when he says the United States will “own” the Gaza Strip. Democratic allies are less flexible because their citizens react negatively to being bullied, something Trump fails to understand. Worse, adversaries with expansionist aspirations, including China and Russia, can use Trump’s rhetoric against us, justifying and legitimizing their threatening behavior against, respectively, Taiwan and the South China Sea and states now independent from the former Soviet Union.

 

Third, Trump advocates proudly depict him as a “disrupter,” a word some prize even more than “tariff.” But while some disruption is useful, other disruption is not. Ukraine’s “disruption” of Russia’s military over the past three years is clearly positive, although not an example Trumpers cherish. By contrast, disrupting critical alliances, whether NATO or bilateral ties built up over decades, costs us more reputationally and strategically than whatever tactical advantages may accrue. As with Trump’s bargaining, disrupting alliances can make achieving our goals harder while dismaying our allies and leading adversaries to think we have lost our way, which is hardly beneficial.

 

Disrupting adversaries, by contrast, impeding the achievement of their objectives, is entirely sensible. But first you must know your adversaries. Trump’s top three Western Hemisphere problems are clearly not those of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who would almost certainly have listed Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, the “troika of tyranny.” Rather than address the troika in his inaugural address, Trump said, “We’re taking [the Panama Canal] back.” Even his path forward on Venezuela is uncertain. When his supporters can coherently explain why disrupting your friends and ignoring your enemies is beneficial for America, they might have a point. But not yet.

 

Fourth, the extreme form of the “disrupter” defense is the “madman” argument. Often citing Richard Nixon, supporters say Trump is so unpredictable that enemies are intimidated into inaction, fearing his unpredictability. Nixon’s ploy to intimidate China as a “madman,” however, rested on his long-standing anti-communism, deployed to convince Beijing he might use nuclear weapons against it. In short, it was not Nixon’s unpredictability he hoped would worry China but his predictable anti-communism. Of course, Trump has no such philosophical foundations.

 

Moreover, while tactical unpredictability against adversaries can be successful (like America’s Korean War landing at Inchon), strategic unpredictability can frighten and dismay allies or lead adversaries into disastrous miscalculations. Our extended nuclear deterrent is the best example. If adversaries doubt our willingness to retaliate, they may take actions that trigger precisely that response. Allies may conclude that they need their own nuclear deterrent. Such discussions are now under way in South Korea and Japan, increasing the risk of wider nuclear proliferation. Uncertainty, even radical uncertainty, has utility in specific circumstances. In general, however, madness is still madness.

 

Trump often says that neither the Middle East war nor Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would have occurred had he been president, statements inherently impossible to prove or disprove. Typical of Trump, however, though supporters rarely mention this, is that he avoids responsibility for decisions gone awry. But blaming Biden or Obama for his troubles works for only so long. Fortuitously for Trump, he has a readily available alternative to owning his bad decisions: blaming incompetent and/or disloyal advisers, the deep state, or malevolent foreigners. Never Trump himself.

 

Finally, Trump argues that relations between America and foreign states depend almost entirely on his personal relationships with his foreign counterparts. So, as he frequently says, if he has good relationships with Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, then the U.S. has good relationships with their countries. This is manifestly incorrect, but it underlines the real future of Trump’s second term: unending performance art and unknown policy. Putin has already shown he knows how to manipulate Trump’s fascination with himself, agreeing publicly with Trump that there would have been no Ukraine war had Trump been president.

 

None of the foregoing behaviors, however true they are, taken singly or together, amount to a foreign policy. Their frequent appearance only underscores Trump’s lack of policy direction. Ironically, these behaviors are akin to the State Department bureaucracy’s top priority; they are merely points of process, not substantive policy or strategy.

 

***

 

Notwithstanding Trump’s emphasis on Trump, the world awaits his substantive policies, critical to American national security. What happens in his second term’s opening weeks and months will shape international perceptions and reactions in ways impossible to calculate fully. The most important threats facing the United States are China and the emerging Beijing–Moscow axis, with China the dominant partner. Will Trump be primarily a hawk or an appeaser regarding this global challenge, and when and in what order? Who knows?

 

The predominant threat of such a geostrategic imperative involves assessing China’s rapidly expanding nuclear-weapons and delivery-system capabilities. How should Washington respond to an emerging tripolar nuclear world, with two peer competitors, not just one as in the Cold War? Then as now, smaller nuclear-weapons states like Britain and France were not strategically significant. We do, however, face terrorist-level threats from rogue states like North Korea and Iran. Against the USSR, enormous effort went into quantifying U.S. nuclear-warhead and delivery-system requirements, deterrence calculations, retaliatory strategies, and arms control efforts. But all these issues turned on a bipolar, not a tripolar, calculus. They are almost irrelevant to a tripolar nuclear world, where the linkages of nuclear programs and strategies between our two adversaries are unknown. That this is a daunting challenge, and requires enormous presidential effort and leadership, is indisputable. From what I witnessed and experienced, I can attest that Trump has neither the inclination nor the ability to do the demanding work that presidents alone must do.

 

Instead, albeit not irrationally, Trump focuses on China’s presence near the Panama Canal, and its (and Russia’s) interests in Greenland. But by refusing publicly to rule out using force to control both the canal and Greenland, he has made safeguarding our legitimate interests more difficult.

 

Trump should concentrate on Beijing’s decades-long efforts, unfortunately highly successful, to steal our intellectual property; massive subsidies and other anti-market policies benefiting its export-oriented manufacturers; and the strategic threats, posed by ZTE, Huawei, and others, to gain global control of fifth-generation telecommunications, vacuuming up whatever information passes through those channels. These and extensive Chinese assertions of politico-military power across the Indo-Pacific show that Beijing is mounting a whole-of-society drive to achieve hegemony, first regionally and then worldwide. If any international issue requires forging an American grand strategy, it is the China threat. On that score from Trump: nothing.

 

Instead, Trump, having previously opposed TikTok, a dangerous cyber-espionage arm of Chinese intelligence, now seems intent on “saving” it, because of TikTok investments by major Trump contributors and Trump’s impression that his campaign benefited by using the social media platform. This is classic Trump: American national security falls before the imperative of benefiting Trump personally. Reports that he wants an early visit to China amplify the impression that “saving” TikTok strikes him as a wonderful present for Xi Jinping. Importantly, Trump’s stance has not gone unchallenged, with potentially significant domestic political import. Key Republicans including Senators Tom Cotton and Pete Ricketts oppose his efforts to thwart the statute requiring that TikTok be severed from Chinese ownership, control, or operational influence before being allowed to function in the United States

 

On Ukraine, Trump’s February 11 phone call with Vladimir Putin produced a bonanza for Moscow. Trump clearly wants the war in Ukraine (and the Middle East war) behind him as soon as possible, although he now concedes that may take up to six months rather than 24 hours. (Neither Russia nor Ukraine ever believed that the 24-hour ploy was feasible.) Trump’s impatience shows he cares less about how these Biden wars end than simply getting them over with. He is now well on his way, to the detriment of both Ukraine and America’s national interest.

 

The future augurs only worse. U.S. efforts to reach a Russia–Ukraine agreement will be directed by Trump personally, if I know anything about the man. During the campaign, JD Vance said that an acceptable settlement would include a cease-fire freezing the existing battle lines, creation of a demilitarized zone, and Ukraine’s commitment not to join NATO. Despite Russia’s enormous casualties over the past three years, the Kremlin would be delighted with such a deal.

 

That, or possibly even worse, is what Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced in the wake of the February 11 Trump–Putin conversation. America reversed its long-standing positions that Ukraine should regain full sovereignty and territorial integrity, and also vetoed any possibility of NATO membership. Christmas in February for Putin. The terms for Ukraine may only worsen during the coming negotiations. Similarly, Trump’s obsession with personal relations between heads of state bodes poorly for Volodymyr Zelensky, whose rocky relationship with Trump, starting with the “perfect phone call” in July 2019, never improved.

 

Putin deployed his KGB best effort to play Trump for the easy mark that Putin thinks he is, preparing the ground for Trump’s February 11 concessions. Putin said he agreed with Trump that there would have been no Ukraine war had Trump been president, a pure flattery play. Then Russia released longtime hostage Marc Fogel, a classic winning move with Trump, and Belarus released another U.S. citizen. Ukraine’s best hope is that Putin’s charm offensive fails — recognizing, as always, that hope is not a strategy.

 

Ukraine’s legitimate search for security guarantees is another stumbling block if precluding NATO membership remains the administration’s line. Indeed, the Ukraine–Russia negotiations may reinvigorate Trump’s anti-NATO feelings and the risk that he will withdraw from the alliance. Hegseth stressed to Europeans that Washington was no longer primarily interested in Europe. While true for decades, given America’s worldwide interests, it was another unnecessary slap at NATO allies. Many Republicans, including some now serving in Trump’s administration, believe his NATO rhetoric is merely for bargaining purposes. His comment that NATO members should spend 5 percent of their GDPs on defense, rather than the 2 percent 2014 target, omits that actually that should be America’s goal as well, but Trump likely picked 5 percent precisely because he doubted many NATO members could achieve it.

 

Moreover, supporters will have difficulty explaining Trump’s stunningly ignorant repetition of Russian propaganda, as recently as just before the inauguration, that it was “written in stone” that Ukraine would not join NATO, until Biden changed it. If Ukraine did join, said Trump, “then Russia has somebody right on their doorstep, and I could understand their feelings about that.” He repeated this pro-Russian line after speaking with Putin, suggesting it might have provoked Russia’s invasion. Just to remind: It was George W. Bush, not Biden, who pushed for expedited membership for Ukraine (and Georgia) at NATO’s 2008 Romania summit, and Russia invaded Ukraine first in 2014, before Biden’s presidency.

 

In the Middle East, Trump personally and forcefully confronted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the imperative that he accept what is unarguably the cease-fire/hostage-exchange deal that Biden had pushed for seven months. Trump wanted to proclaim the release of hostages as his first achievement, even before assuming office. But what comes next is utterly unclear, with the deal seemingly near collapse. Netanyahu may have assurances not only that Trump will not block an Israeli effort to destroy Iran’s nuclear-weapons program but that the U.S. may well assist it. That would be the right policy.

 

But remarks by Trump and various advisers seem to confuse the present cease-fire with permanent peace, including the Biden deal’s commitment that Israel negotiate with Hamas about Gaza’s future. It may also mean extending the Biden-brokered cease-fire with Hezbollah in Lebanon and taking no effective action against the terrorist state that could emerge in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. That such widely divergent possibilities are in play reflects Trump’s lack of coherent strategic thinking, his day-by-day approach to an enormously complex problem. While he may be likely to follow a more strongly pro-Israel policy than Biden’s, the mere existence of uncertainty on such basic issues shows how fickle a second Trump term could be.

 

So much more remains obscure, such as trade and tariff policy, especially because Trump simply doesn’t understand how tariffs work. In his inaugural address, he repeated his erroneous view that tariffs extract revenues from foreigners, not from Americans. No wonder he likes tariffs, but the specifics of his “plan,” and therefore their impact on the U.S. economy and our foreign relations worldwide, are still question marks. The opening weeks of the new administration showed no coherent tariff policy, nor does one seem likely to emerge soon. So too the potential foreign policy implications of Trump’s unfolding effort to expel illegal immigrants. While considerable ink has been spilled on how this program will work domestically, its external effects are little studied or understood.

 

Undoubtedly, the world facing Trump is more dangerous and uncertain than when he left the White House in 2021. His basic propensities and biases have not changed. What will happen in the wider world, what roles his senior advisers will play in actual practice, who will emerge as most important in various national security matters, and many more questions are unanswerable, and will likely remain so for some time. We can only be certain that Donald Trump aberrationalism will, for well or ill, once again be on display.