By Kevin D. Williamson
Friday, February
14, 2025
The Trump administration has a plan for inflation: Make
it at least a little worse.
I didn’t say it was a good plan.
It is not the case, as one so often hears, that higher
prices inflicted on producers or retailers—in the form of higher taxes,
regulatory burdens, or, today’s topic, tariffs—are necessarily “passed on to
consumers.” That is a myth based on the fiction that sellers in the marketplace
have the power to set prices unilaterally, which they do not—buyers have the
power to say “no,” which is why sellers in very price-sensitive markets (fast
food, many big-box stores) do not just jack up their prices every time there’s
an increase in their expenses. A big seller such as Walmart is much more likely
to try to pass along expenses to its vendors, its business partners, and
(unhappily for them!) its employees than to try to pass them on to customers
who have a dozen different places to buy oatmeal or socks. A business that
relies on Walmart for 70 percent of its sales, on the other hand, has fewer
options.
When there was a big drive to raise the minimum wage a
few years back, we were subsequently treated
to studies that asked—and answered—the wrong question:
whether unemployment had increased in the sectors affected by the local
minimum-wage hikes around the country. There are many things that affect the
employment rate, and the minimum wage is only one of them. Unfortunately, the
relevant question—what the actual employment situation looks like compared to
what it would have looked like without the higher minimum wages—is impossible
to answer with any high level of precision or confidence, it being a
counterfactual and all.
We see the same dynamic at work with changes to corporate
taxes, investment taxes, regulatory-compliance expenses, etc. Tariffs are a
tax, one that is—contrary to what you will hear from the former game-show host
currently serving (incredible fact!) his second stint as president of these
United States—paid by the “importer of record,” which is in most cases a
U.S.-based company. Some of those companies will try to pass on the cost of
tariffs to their customers (who may be individual consumers but who often will
be other U.S.-based companies), some will try to recoup costs by reducing their
employees’ compensation (either in absolute terms or relative to the
no-new-tariffs scenario) or by leaning on vendors and service providers.
Tracking down “tax incidence”—who actually ends up paying the real economic
costs of a tax—is a complicated business, and economists will disagree about
estimates and models.
What they do not disagree about is that taxes on
businesses put upward pressure on prices and downward pressure on wages and
other business expenses. How that all gets sorted out in the marketplace is
head-clutchingly complex, but a good rule of thumb (one that is almost a
tautology) is that the more power a player has in the marketplace, the more
that player is able to pass on expenses to other, less-powerful parties. That’s
one of the reasons increases in minimum wages have so little observable effect
on the actual living standards of minimum-wage workers, who are, pretty much by
definition, the workers whose labor is least in demand.
U.S. housing prices have been on a steep upward
trajectory for years now, and some people—namely homeowners with paid-for
properties or locked-in low mortgage rates—like it that way. And those people
tend to be politically powerful—they vote. The people who are most hurt by
rising housing prices are those just trying to get into their first house, who
tend to be younger and less affluent, and, hence, less politically influential
than the golden oldsters who are benefiting from all that asset appreciation.
Unfortunately for those with modest incomes and those
just trying to buy their first home, the Trump
tariffs are going to put upward pressure on a lot of
things you need to build houses: lumber, steel, aluminum, copper, etc. And
while we should be skeptical of simplistic claims about passing on costs to
buyers, we’ve seen a lot of that in the housing market. People really want
houses, and they’ll stretch to buy one in a way they won’t when it comes to
cheeseburgers or flip-flops.
We produce a lot of those housing inputs in the United
States, but we import a lot of them, too. I get a press release about three
times a week from the lumber lobby’s PR shop, the upshot of each missive being
that U.S. lumber producers are desperate to raise their prices (they don’t put
it quite so bluntly) but cannot because of competition from relatively
cheap Canadian imports. It is cheaper to produce lumber in Canada than in the
United States, not because the Canadian firms are “subsidized,” as their U.S.
competitors claim, but because of more fundamental differences in the way the
two countries’ lumber markets are organized. (The short version is that most
U.S. lumber is produced from private land, while Canadian lumber is produced
from public land, and U.S. companies think the Canadian government doesn’t
charge Canadian producers enough for the privilege of harvesting that timber.)
Lumber is expensive and awkward to ship, but it has a
long shelf life, and there are lots of people all around the world who would
like to buy that Canadian lumber. Tariffs on it are probably not going to
transfer many economic burdens from U.S. lumber producers to Canadian lumber
producers—they are more likely to transfer an economic burden from U.S. lumber
producers to relatively low-income young people who want to buy a house but
cannot afford one, or cannot afford the sort of house they want.
The lumber lobby argues that allowing them to make more
money by taxing Americans who want to buy less expensive Canadian lumber won’t
add very much to the price of a house. And they are probably right about that,
it will likely add only a little. Ditto for the steel tariffs. And the aluminum
tariffs. And the copper tariffs. And higher energy prices from tariffs
on oil. Also the tariffs on a thousand other things that go into making
houses. Housing inflation is already expected to remain
relatively high in 2025—a little higher than the overall rate of
inflation—in spite of high interest rates that have shut many potential buyers
(again, the young and the relatively low-income/low-wealth) out of the
marketplace.
Our housing problem is a little bit like our water
problem—we have a lot of the stuff, but it isn’t where we need it to be. Many
struggling U.S. cities have thousands upon thousands of unoccupied housing
units—15,000
in Baltimore, 24,000
in St. Louis, 55,000 in
Detroit, etc.—but where people want houses is in the
Bay Area, the capital city and its suburbs, Austin, metro Boston, etc. Making
housing inputs more expensive is going to discourage building in those places
and will put unwanted (by would-be buyers, anyway) pressure on prices in those
areas.
Tariffs aren’t the only factor here, or even the most
important one—local housing and land-use regulations and NIMBYism are big
factors, and so is the labor market. (Immigrants make up about
30 percent of construction workers. It is estimated
that one in four New York City construction workers are illegal
immigrants: ¡Vaya con Dios, work force!) Tariffs will be an issue at
the margins—but at the margins is where the real economics happens and where
prices get set. And Americans who are disappointed by their inability to afford
a house ought to understand that the Trump administration is making prices
higher in order to support higher incomes for politically connected business
interests led by well-compensated executives who most definitely can afford the
two or three houses they own, even if Aspen
is getting awfully unreasonable.
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