By Pieter
Cleppe
Tuesday,
April 25, 2023
Over the
years, the European Union (EU) has been rolling out all kinds of measures meant
to deal with climate change. This push has been accelerating lately, and it is
becoming ever more evident how often it just amounts to raising more barriers
to trade in a bid to keep foreign competition out of the EU.
The
starting point for this is the EU’s de facto “climate tax.” Since 2005, the
European Union’s “cap and trade” scheme has involved imposing a
levy on CO2 emissions with its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), whereby
entities could then trade away their right to emit CO2. The idea is that by
enabling companies to buy and sell such a right, emissions are saved where it
is most efficient to do so.
One
small objection here is that — as the prominent Danish economist Bjørn Lomborg
has pointed out — complying with
stringent CO2-reduction targets laid out in the international Paris Climate
Agreement would
necessitate a financial cost of $1–2 trillion every year from 2030 onwards, but
only reduce temperature increases by a mere 0.027 °C. Lomborg believes a better
use of financial resources would be to help victims of natural disasters. He
also believes that the EU and its member states would see more return on
investment by no longer constraining nuclear power, an energy source that
notably combines reliability — something which “renewable” energy sources like
wind and solar power lack — with minimal CO2 emissions. The EU is divided on
this approach, however, even if, in the case of nuclear power, all of its
members are legally bound to promote this energy source as a result of the
Euratom treaty.
Instead,
European governments are now broadening the range of industries that will be
charged for their CO2 emissions. The European Parliament just voted to extend the “cap and trade”
scheme to the building and transport sectors, which were previously exempt.
Importantly, this will apply to gasoline, diesel, and heating fuels such as
natural gas, which means it will directly affect everyday households.
True to
form, the new policy also includes measures to compensate consumers for this
cost created by the EU itself. An 87 billion euro “Social Climate Fund (SCF)”
will be set up, which the same EU consumers will need to finance as taxpayers.
It
remains to be seen whether inflation and continuously elevated European energy
prices will lead to opposition from voters. One French left-wing
politician dubbed the newly agreed measure to
extend the EU carbon market as another attack “on the most precarious . . .
households.” However, in Western Europe the political power of the green
movement is still very strong. In Belgium and Germany, for instance, governing greens are
fighting to delay the extension of perfectly functioning nuclear-power plants,
with varying degrees of success.
If all
of that isn’t bad enough, the whole thing is now degrading into protectionism.
With its new climate tariff on imports — dubbed the EU “Carbon Border
Adjustment Mechanism”
or CBAM — coming into effect in 2026, the EU aims to compensate European
industry for the competitiveness it has lost thanks to the climate levy.
Despite protests by the EU’s trading partners that this violates World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules, the EU is simply going ahead with it.
Such
policies stem from the same economic-policy illiteracy which lies at the root
of Europe’s experimental energy policies. These involve phasing out domestic
fossil-fuel production without establishing a reliable and cost-effective
substitute. Together, the results are currently contributing to what has been
described as an ongoing process of “deindustrialization” in Europe that is hurting
importers and end-consumers.
And
these are not the only policies doing damage. Indeed, there are plenty of
examples of EU climate policies being used for protectionist purposes. The EU’s
newly proposed Net Zero Industry Act, for instance, aims to ensure a 40 percent local share for
key green technologies by 2030. The policy is in part a response to the Biden
administration’s Inflation Reduction Act — which, with certain exceptions,
reserves fiscal support for “green” investment to North American miners and
manufacturers — but that doesn’t make it any less unreasonable.
According to Francisco Beirão, head of EU
government affairs at a company that develops and manages solar projects, this
proposal is “very protectionist” and is driven by fear of competition from the
U.S. and China. Former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt has also warned that the EU’s response risks
ending up as “crude protectionism and dirigisme.” And even Bruegel, an EU
policy think tank with close ties to the European Commission, has condemned the EU’s proposal as
“unabashedly protectionist” given that “the aim is import substitution of
specific manufacturing products, on a rather massive scale.”
Bloomberg
columnist David Fickling has offered a
particularly clear-sighted perspective, arguing that the EU’s green protectionism
will actually “slow the pace of renewable transition, by forcing up costs for
renewable developers and electric-vehicle buyers,” all “in an attempt to
protect sub-scale European green-energy manufacturing industries.”
Taking a
step back, it is clear that Europe is headed in the wrong direction. Indeed, Brussels’s
outward support for ineffective climate-change policies reflects its inward
protectionist mood. If things continue on this course, it won’t be good for
Europeans or for the planet.
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