By James C. Capretta
Monday,
April 03, 2023
For
months, the British press has been filled with alarming accounts of long waits
for medical attention among National Health Service (NHS) patients facing
life-threatening conditions and emergencies. While wintertime hospital crowding
is not unusual, the steep deterioration in the
system’s overall performance over recent months is unprecedented and points to something more
serious and fundamental than a bad flu season. So too, do surveys that show the British public is more
dissatisfied than it has been in decades with the quality and accessibility of
the NHS.
Charting
a way out of the current crisis is something only the elected leaders of the
U.K. can do, but identifying what has gone wrong is a matter of interest
outside of the country too, as the NHS has been held up for years as a model to
study and possibly emulate. In the U.S., where there is still an active debate
over the relative merits of the government and the market in health care,
growing unease with the fully public system of a close Western ally is
noteworthy.
Making
sense of the NHS’s challenges requires some understanding of its origins and
evolution. The current crisis, as well as the many less intense episodes of
impaired access to services that have occurred in previous years, are not
unrelated to how it all began.
Labour’s
NHS.
The U.K.
moved decisively toward adopting a national health system in the years
preceding and during World War II, a time of growing public support for
expansion of the welfare states of Western governments. The historic Atlantic Charter, which cemented the planned postwar
alliance between the U.S. and U.K., mentions adoption of “social
security”—social support broadly understood—as a shared global objective.
Two
seminal government reports during World War II provided crucial momentum for a
British national health system. In 1942, Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s
coalition government published an expansive review of social insurance options, written by Britain’s leading
expert on the subject, William Beveridge. The Beveridge report, as it came to
be known, provided the template for the postwar British welfare state.
In 1944,
Conservative MP and Minister of Health Henry Willink authored a second study examining in more detail what
would be required to provide access to medical services for the entire British
population. It quickly became an unlikely bestseller in a population hungry to
think ahead to life after the war.
While
the national debate over a possible NHS had been largely nonpartisan to this
point, the Labour Party’s landslide election in July 1945 brought an end to
that.
A
pivotal figure in those years was Aneurin Bevan, who served as postwar Prime
Minister Clement Attlee’s minister of health. Bevan was a former coal miner
from Wales with socialist instincts. He wanted an NHS run as a free public
service for all citizens, in much the same way that public education comes with
no direct charges to its users.
Bevan’s
vision for the original NHS carried the day and led to three pivotal decisions.
First,
free care at the point of service was a foundational principle (with the minor
exception of some prescription drug cost-sharing in NHS England). The absence
of patient cost-sharing, and the attendant hassle collecting such payments
entails, are important reasons the NHS is so beloved by British voters. They
have the right to cradle-to-grave medical care without ever receiving a bill
for the services they use.
However,
with no cost-sharing by patients, demand is regulated partly through
restrictions (directly and indirectly) on the supply of services, which means
patients often must wait weeks and sometimes months before receiving
non-emergency care.
Second,
Bevan did not want the NHS funded by premiums or anything resembling mandatory
contributions, a common feature of the nationalized systems in Europe. Instead,
the NHS receives its budget directly from Parliament, in competition with other
public services.
Third,
Labour’s decision to nationalize the hospital industry placed the government
squarely in the position of not only paying for medical services but managing
their delivery. This, too, sets the NHS apart from many other Western
governments that have national health insurance programs that pay for services
from networks managed in the private sector (albeit often with a non-profit
requirement).
The
strong Labour Party imprint on the initial NHS design, especially the decision
to take over running the hospital system, had the predictable effect of pushing
the Conservatives into opposing the original NHS law, which Parliament approved
in 1946. This partisan split has had lasting effects on British politics.
Labour sees the NHS as its most important achievement, while Conservatives must
regularly demonstrate their loyalty to the health system to fend off attacks.
The result has been general acceptance of the NHS as originally conceived and
relatively modest differences in emphasis on how to improve it.
Eroding
access to care.
What is
most troubling about the NHS today is that the government has been providing it
with substantial added resources in recent years—planned funding for 2023-24
will be at least 35 percent above what it was a decade earlier after accounting
for inflation—and yet plunging productivity is leading to longer waits for
care.
A
closely watched metric is the size of the waiting list for hospital-based
procedures, which are services that patients need but which are not emergencies
and therefore can be scheduled. As of September 2015, there were 3.3 million
people on the NHS England’s hospital waiting list, which was considered far too
high at the time. The list now stands at 7.2 million—about 12 percent of the
population. Many patients with painful conditions are now forced to wait many
months and sometimes more than a year to receive care.
Hospital
emergency rooms are also hopelessly overcrowded, which is forcing many patients
to stay in ambulances until spaces open up or to wait at home longer before
going to the hospital. In mid-2012, 5 percent of emergency room patients had to
wait more than four hours before receiving attention. In mid-2022, 42.7 percent
of all patients were forced to wait for at least that long before they received
any care, and some patients now wait many hours longer than that.
The
impaired access to emergency services has real consequences: Official measures
of mortality indicate that the NHS’s shortcomings are contributing to higher
than normal death rates, with perhaps as many as 500 “excess”
deaths occurring every week.
The
cause is not insufficient staffing. As of November 2022, there were nearly
128,000 physicians working in NHS England’s hospitals, which is 35 percent above
the number employed in 2010. The increase in nurses has been similarly
dramatic.
The hard
reality is that the NHS is now delivering far fewer services for every pound it
receives than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared to 2019, outpatient appointments are down
13.8 percent. More
resources can help, but the NHS will continue to struggle if the dramatic decline
in productivity is not halted and reversed.
The
reform pendulum.
The
major parties have offered competing plans for improving the system’s
performance. In general terms, the Conservatives have stressed using
competition within the NHS to improve productivity, while Labour favors more
funding, better planning, and exacting management. Neither approach has led to
fully satisfactory results.
The
modern era of NHS reform began, as with so much else in recent British
political history, with the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. It is a testament
to the political potency of the NHS that Thatcher never pushed for full
privatization or denationalization of NHS hospitals even as she denationalized
several other industries. Instead, she searched for a way to bring more
discipline to the NHS so that its performance would improve as a matter of
institutional design and not only in response to episodic political pressures.
Her
thinking on the NHS was influenced by Alain Enthoven, a U.S. economist who
championed “managed competition” for American health care. For the U.K., he recommended introducing an internal market
within the NHS, by splitting the procurement and the delivery of services into
separate subunits. The hope was that competition for resources within the NHS
would allow patients to gravitate to the higher performers.
The
internal market concept never sat well with NHS advocates or the Labour Party,
and was set aside when Tony Blair was swept into power in the 1997 general
election. His government favored cooperation among providers when planning
budgets, although the internal split between the NHS’s two main functions was
retained. Blair also pushed to increase the NHS budget so that it was more
closely aligned with spending in Europe.
When
Labour lost the 2010 general election in 2010, the coalition government that
took over was led by Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, and it favored
moving back toward the internal market focus of the Thatcher era. Funding
continued to rise but at rates below that which had occurred during the
Blair-Gordon Brown era.
After
the Brexit vote, the Conservative governments of Prime Ministers Teresa May,
Boris Johnson, and Rishi Sunak have steered toward a non-ideological posture on
improving the NHS. They each have pushed for more funding and management
adjustments intended to encourage greater productivity mainly through more
autonomy and decentralization.
Their
strategies have not worked, as the NHS has fallen into the worst crisis since
before the Thatcher premiership. With a general election coming sometime before
early 2025, the Conservatives have the most to fear from an electorate that is
justifiably frustrated with the inability of the government to make urgent
medical attention something that can be taken for granted in an emergency.
Public
control in context.
NHS
advocates contend that there is nothing inherently wrong with the U.K.’s health
service that would not be fixed with appropriate levels of funding and
political support, which are conditions they believe are met when Labour is in
power.
One
reason that Labour sometimes loses elections is that, while voters want
inexpensive and accessible medical care, they also want low taxes. A
well-designed health system should be resilient enough to function well even as
control of the government occasionally shifts between and among competing
parties.
Running
the NHS is also a particularly difficult assignment for the U.K. government no
matter which party is in charge because of the complexity of providing high-quality,
and ever-changing, medical services to a diverse population of more than 60
million.
The
scale of the enterprise is itself an indicator of the challenge. In 2019, there were 1.5 million NHS employees, which placed it fifth on the list
of the world’s largest employers (one and two were the US Department of Defense
and China’s People’s Liberation Army, respectively). U.K. political leaders are
ultimately responsible for setting the salaries and pay levels of this immense
workforce. A major contributing factor to the current turmoil has been a series
of strikes by doctors, nurses, and ambulance drivers, with the government
sitting on the opposite side of the negotiation table. These are matters that
are handled mostly by private institutions in other countries.
Further,
government control can hinder the steady flow of needed capital investments, as
the returns from such spending often occur on timeframes that do not match with
the electoral cycles of the officials who are held accountable by voters for
the NHS’s performance.
No
easy answers.
The
NHS’s unusually high level of public control compared with other nationalized
health systems means that very little can happen within the NHS that is not the
direct result of a decision taken by the bureaucracy overseeing it or the
elected officials who approve its budget. And this is how it has been for
three-quarters of a century.
Put more
pointedly, if the NHS is not meeting the expectations of its users (and it
clearly is not at the moment), the blame lies squarely with the government that
has had full control over it for decades.
Even so,
British voters are not likely to respond to the current crisis with a new openness
to far-reaching reform. They remain committed to the NHS as it was originally
constituted, and especially to the ideal of free care at the point of service.
The
pressure then is on the Conservatives who now hold power. It is up to them to
find a formula that retains the NHS’s founding principles and yet also embeds
within it incentives for continuous productivity and quality improvement. Their
fortunes in the next election may hinge on what they come up with.
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