By Noah Rothman
Monday, February
28, 2022
Earlier this month, as the Russian
military bore down on Ukraine, Foreign Affairs published an
influential article asking what was at the time an imponderably terrible
question: “What if Russia
Wins?”
An invasion, argued Liana Fix and Michael
Kimmage, would herald a “permanent state of escalation between Russia and
Europe” characterized by direct economic warfare and the ever-present threat of
open hostilities. Moscow would hold a gun to Europe’s collective head,
destabilizing the continent’s political institutions and threatening the
integrity of the NATO alliance. That outcome would have been horrifying enough,
but it was the most thinkable of the possible outcomes that would result from a
full-scale Russian campaign of regime change in Ukraine. In the interim,
Ukrainian resistance and the West’s response to Russian aggression have taken
the prospect of a swift victory off the table. We’re now forced to confront
what is in some ways an even more unnerving crisis than the one that would have
followed the outright conquest of Ukraine: What if Russia loses?
As dawn broke on the fifth day of Russia’s
campaign in Ukraine, Moscow had
still not secured any of its primary strategic
objectives. Ukraine’s major population centers remained in Kyiv’s control, the
skies over the country were still contested, and Ukraine’s elected government
remained intact. Western intelligence clearly underestimated the capacity of
Ukrainian forces to resist the Russian onslaught, and the Kremlin seems to have
neglected the tactical and
logistical preparations needed
to quickly occupy and pacify the country.
Moscow also underestimated how the West
would respond to a naked landgrab on the European continent. In response to
Russia’s aggression, the geopolitical status quo that prevailed for decades
melted away over the course of a single weekend. A new order is rapidly
supplanting the old one, and it is entirely disadvantageous for Russia. All of
Europe and partner states in the Pacific region, including Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Singapore, and others, have locked arms in a campaign of
crippling economic warfare against Moscow. Moreover, from Russia’s strategic perspective, its actions have
compelled Europe’s more accommodationist powers to engage in the conflict.
Germany has abandoned pacifism. The German chancellor announced this weekend that his country would
raise defense spending to two percent of GDP, scuttle the Nord Stream II
pipeline, invest in liquid natural-gas terminals, and export lethal armaments
to Ukraine. Sweden and Switzerland have abandoned neutrality. Bern will join
the West’s sanctions regime, denying Russia a financial haven and an avenue to
launder money, and Sweden is sending thousands of anti-tank
weapons to the Ukrainian front. Passive
actors like Denmark and Belgium are dispatching weapons and even irregular
fighters to the frontlines. Putin-friendly figures like Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Turkey’s Recep Erdoğan have fallen in line with the West. The European Union is finally
acting on its ambitions to serve as a defense force by shipping fighter aircraft across the Ukrainian border. And non-aligned states including
Sweden, Finland, and Kosovo are making noises about seeking NATO membership.
In one breathtakingly foolish maneuver,
Putin has demonstrated the limits of Russian military capabilities and birthed
into existence a new European political covenant of the sort that Western hawks
have spent decades unsuccessfully advocating. The Kremlin’s actions have left
Russia politically isolated, economically devastated, and militarily boxed in.
As much as these conditions are of material benefit to the West, they are also
extremely dangerous.
How does Putin deescalate the crisis he
inaugurated? Such an outcome is hard to envision now. The tactical setbacks
Moscow is experiencing in Ukraine and the collapse of Russia’s strategic
fortunes in its regional environment will tempt Russian policymakers to
escalate the conflict in order to deescalate it. Vladimir Putin’s decision to
announce the activation of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal is a clear signal
to the West that it must pare back its support for Ukraine. It’s quite possible
that Moscow could label Western nations providing material support to Kyiv
co-belligerents in an active war against Russia. It could violently interdict
weapons shipments into Ukraine, or conduct cyberattacks on vital elements of
Western civilian infrastructure. Already, NATO-aligned naval vessels have found
themselves in Russia’s crosshairs. Whether by accident or as a shot across NATO’s bow, it’s not hard to
imagine a Russian strike on a Western asset that cannot be ignored.
At the moment, there is precisely no
appetite in the West for allowing Russia a face-saving way out of this crisis.
Moscow misjudged its adversaries. The West misjudged Russia. And Ukraine
couldn’t possibly have imagined the outpouring of support for its efforts to
sustain the fight. Everyone’s assumptions about how this conflict would play
out proved inaccurate. Those assumptions will need to be replaced with new
assumptions. There will, therefore, be a lot more fighting to come until all
parties have discovered and reestablished a durable equilibrium in the region.
At the moment, Putin has a lot to prove, and the stakes as he views them are
quite possibly existential—both for his regime and the greater Russia he has
set out to reconstitute. As unappetizing as the prospect is, Western
policymakers must consider the circumstances that Russia needs in order to
confidently deescalate this situation.
This is an exquisitely delicate moment.
Among Ukraine’s Western supporters, the temptation toward triumphalism will be
difficult to reject, but cooler heads must prevail. Ukrainian’s national
ambitions cannot be sacrificed, or the West will be menaced further by
revisionist actors all over the globe. But the Russian regime also needs a soft
place to land if it is expected to accept a meaningful peace that doesn’t leave
Ukraine a broken nation in a perpetual state of semi-frozen conflict on the
borders of NATO. Today, with bullets flying, bombs bursting, and a burgeoning humanitarian
catastrophe unfolding in real-time, that’s a hard pill to swallow. But a
failure to make those preparations today could produce an infinitely more
terrible set of circumstances tomorrow.
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