By Jim Geraghty
Monday, March
07, 2022
The Russian invasion of Ukraine will end
when one or more of four things breaks:
·
the Russian supply lines;
·
the Ukrainian ability to effectively
resist;
·
the Russian economy;
·
the patience of some armed individuals around
Putin.
The Russian supply lines: On Friday, there was a rumor that “Russia has resources left for
the war until Sunday, after which they will collapse.” There are numerous reports of Russian
attacks as of this morning, so that rumor sounds like an exaggeration of a real phenomenon
— that Russia invaded with far too few resources, that frontline Russian units
are stretching their supply lines thinner and thinner, and that many Russian
units are getting literally and metaphorically stuck in a quagmire.
Trent Telenko, a
retired technical analyst at the U.S. Defense Contracts Management Agency,
offered another fascinating assessment of the logistics and terrain challenges Russian
forces are facing over at the ChicagoBoyz blog:
The head
and first dozen or so kilometers of the southernmost column north of Kiev have
been stuck there for EIGHT DAYS. The Russians have since rammed more and more
vehicles into this monster traffic jam (idiotically “following the plan”
Soviet-style) so the whole thing is now 65-70 kilometers long (almost 40
miles).
And,
because the trucks can’t go off-road due to the Rasputitsa mud and tire
problems, they’re stuck on the roads and the roads’ shoulders three vehicles
wide for the whole @40 miles. That means fuel and resupply trucks can’t move on
or off road to deliver anything to anybody.
So all the
columns’ heads are now out of fuel and battery power. They can’t move north,
south or sideways, and everything behind them is stuck because of the mud, and
rapidly running out of fuel and vehicle battery charge too (assuming they
haven’t already). Nor can any of those columns defend themselves because
they’re too densely packed. They’re just targets waiting for the Ukrainians to
destroy them.
Only the
Ukrainians had something better to do. They opened the floodgates of reservoirs
around those columns to flood them and turn the surrounding areas into
impassable quagmires for months – probably until July or August. Probably
several thousand Russian vehicles in those columns will be irrecoverable
losses. Hundreds of Russian soldiers might have drowned.
This was
not just a debacle, but an EPIC one. About one-fifth of the Russian force in
Ukraine is now flooded or trapped and are definitely out of the war for good.
In a November 2021 essay, Alex Vershinin of War on
the Rocks explained why the Russian army would face intensely
challenging logistical problems if it invaded, and why each Ukrainian attack on
Russian supply-chain trucks would exacerbate those problems:
As a
result of extra artillery and air defense battalions, the Russian logistics
requirements are much larger than their U.S. counterparts. If an army has just
enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the
throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66
percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can
replace in a single day. . . . The Russian army does not have enough trucks to
meet its logistic requirement more than 90 miles beyond supply dumps. To reach
a 180-mile range, the Russian army would have to double truck allocation to 400
trucks for each of the material-technical support brigades.
We’ve already seen videos of Russian soldiers looting shops and
grocery stores for provisions. This is day twelve of the war; numerous
reports indicate Moscow expected Ukraine to capitulate within a couple of days.
The Ukrainian ability to effectively
resist: Notice I write “effectively resist,”
and not resist. The Ukrainian people have demonstrated they will never accept
subjugation or a Russian puppet government, and any Russian satellite state
carved out of its previous territory would likely have bloody borders for a
long time.
But Ukrainians who don’t have ammunition
and weapons — or who cannot get food and water — cannot fight effectively.
Cities
such as Mariupol are being surrounded and sieged, and likely the Russians
aim to starve those cities’ citizens until they surrender. Clearly, one part of
Russia’s “Plan B” is to increase the brutality and attacks upon civilian
targets. The other is revealed in the takeover of the Ukrainian nuclear-power
plants — by controlling critical infrastructure such as power plants,
natural-gas plants, water systems, etc., the Russians can attempt to make
civilians’ remaining in Ukraine’s cities untenable.
Ukraine
has reported that the Russian forces at the site have switched off some mobile
networks and the internet so that reliable information from the site cannot be
obtained through the normal channels of communication.
This has
been confirmed by Ukraine’s nuclear regulator which informed the IAEA today
that it had started having major problems in communicating with staff operating
the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Less than 24 hours after Ukraine’s regulatory authority
said it had been able to maintain communications with Ukraine’s largest nuclear
power plant, it today said the phone lines, as well as e-mails and fax, were
not functioning anymore. Mobile phone communication was still possible, but
with poor quality.
The Russian economy: As of this hour, a Russian ruble will get you seven-tenths of one cent. Moody’s has downgraded Russia’s bonds to junk status and “Moody’s
view is that the risk of a default occurring has significantly increased.” No
matter how this crisis shakes out, international investors will be
exceptionally wary of Russia for a long, long time, making it much harder for
the Russian government to borrow money.
Intriguingly, some U.S. economists think China might conclude that Russia is
just a bad investment, both financially and geopolitically.
The patience of some armed individuals
around Putin: Igor Shushko, a former Russian
race-car driver, wrote on Twitter a translation of a long assessment
from a source he characterized as an active analyst for the FSB, the Federal
Security Service of the Russian Federation and the successor organization to
the KGB.
Some parts of the message ring
particularly true, such as the Russian intelligence agencies being furious and
fearing they’re going to be scapegoated for bad decisions made by Putin and military
leaders, and the sense among Russian intelligence that even if their forces
ever manage to occupy Ukraine, they will never pacify Ukraine.
But that FSB source also fears that Putin
will attempt nuclear blackmail to force the West to lift the sanctions, or even
detonate a nuclear weapon on Ukrainian soil. “Is there a possibility of a
localized nuclear strike? Yes. Not for any military objectives. Such a weapon
won’t help with the breach of the defenses. But with a goal of scaring everyone
else (The West).”
If this Russian analyst can see how
disastrous the war is turning out for Russia, there is a chance that someone
else closer to Putin can see it, too.
It is extremely likely that the only armed
individuals who get anywhere near Putin belong to his own security detail.
Putin isn’t interacting with many people these days, and he’s probably not
going to be outdoors or in any public spaces anytime soon.
If you buy the stories of Russian state media, Putin’s
security detail is thorough and professional, befitting a man with many enemies
and a paranoia cultivated by an earlier career in the KGB:
The
security team’s IT engineers and technicians install jammers to block any radio
detonation signals to the president’s location. The equipment maintained by the
president’s surveillance team pings all smartphones and other devices in
immediate proximity to the president’s location to control any suspicious
activity. . . .
Former
police operatives aren’t fit for this work — they are trained to apprehend and
for the president’s bodyguards, his security is the first priority, not the
necessity to apprehend the attacker. The guard must have “operational
psychology”, which means being able to anticipate and prevent threats and to do
this unnoticed by others, which is also important. Other requirements for the
position: applicants must be younger than 35, have a height between 175 and 190
cm and weight between 75-90 kg.
The president’s
personal guards must also understand foreign languages and be basically
proficient in politics — just to understand who approaches the president and
how these people should be treated. . . .
The
suitcases these guys are carrying are protective shields that can be deployed
to protect the president from bullets. The guards are armed with a 9-mm ‘Gurza’
pistol that can shoot up to 40 bullets per minute, penetrating bulletproof
vests from a 50-meter distance. However, if a shootout occurs, that means the
security team has failed — any attacks should be above all prevented
beforehand. Another piece of equipment meant to protect the ward are kevlar
umbrellas carried around by the guards — they are super sturdy and can protect
from projectiles.
Finally, there have been rumors of Putin’s
having health issues for many years, and some have observed that Putin seems particularly puffy-faced in his recent appearances.
(If Putin really does have some serious ailment, that might explain his keeping
his distance from others in public appearances, and his seemingly extreme fear
of catching Covid-19.)
Would a man fighting a terminal disease be
in a hurry to achieve his lifelong goal of reacquiring Ukraine under Russian
authority? Would his usual caution and risk calculations be cast aside, as he
felt he was up against the ticking clock of his own mortality?
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