By Dan McLaughlin
Monday, March 28, 2022
Freedom of speech is a natural human right and an
important social value. It is not the only social value; like any other right
or value, it must sometimes be balanced against others, such as democracy,
equality, public safety, and the freedoms of conscience and association. But it
is a bedrock value of tremendous importance. Whether or how it is protected in
law varies by who is threatening it: the federal or state government, schools,
businesses, etc. Even where speech is threatened only by private actors and is not
protected by law, however, the culture of free
speech is worth defending. If free speech dies as a cultural value, it
will not long be respected in law.
And if the culture of free speech dies within the legal
profession, the laws on the books will become unenforceable. A nation of laws
is only as strong as its nation of lawyers. That is why we should be
particularly alarmed when young lawyers seek to stifle free expression.
Free Speakers and Free Listeners
The core of freedom of speech is allowing encounters
between willing speakers and willing listeners, with the goal of advancing the
truth through an adversarial process of dispute and reflection rather than by
restricting ideas deemed too dangerous to discuss. Whether we are discussing
the legal right to speech or the broader cultural value, much of the confusion
(often deliberate) over free speech revolves around the failure to acknowledge
the dual roles of the willing speaker and the willing listener. Your right to
speak does not include a right to compel others to listen to you, a right to
compel others to affirm or repeat your message, or a right to prevent other people
from listening to speakers you reject.
As a private citizen or a private organization, you have
a right not to be forced to offer a private platform to speech you would not
endorse. We all benefit from liberal norms of free speech that promote a large,
public marketplace of ideas. A liberal society, however, must make space for
individuals and organizations to act illiberally in order to control their own
message. A church can expel unbelievers; a political party or an ideological
publication or group can demand adherence to its principles. Those
organizations acting in an illiberal manner internally can
help them promote an external message that competes in the
marketplace of ideas. It helps them become willing speakers available to
willing listeners.
In judging a private organization’s interactions with
individuals, we should ask whether its protection of its own rights of speech
and association are proportionate rather than aimed at suppressing external
speech. For example, as I argued in the case of NFL players protesting the
National Anthem, the league has every right to tell the players that they
cannot use the league’s time and property as a platform by staging political
protests on the field during a league-sponsored, televised event. On the other
hand, the league should also recognize the players’ right to opt out of that
event as well as their right to engage in political protests off the field on
their own time and their own dime without punishment.
A private organization’s entirely legal behavior can,
however, be harmful to the culture of free speech if it lessens the space that
exists for exchanges of ideas to take place. Some private actors play a
particularly large and powerful mediating role in the marketplace of ideas: A
major university, a book publisher, or a social-media platform plays a role in
the culture that is supposed to promote encounters between
willing speakers and willing listeners.
There has been a vigorous debate around whether Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 should be read, or changed, to
recognize a distinction between “platforms” and “publishers” so that the
government can punish social-media platforms and search engines for restricting
access in a way that constricts the willing exchange of ideas. The
platform–publisher distinction is not, in fact, incorporated in the current
text of the law, and there are serious questions about whether the law could
effectively draw such a distinction without causing more trouble than it cures.
But the law aside, the platform–publisher distinction is one grounded in common
sense. People instinctively understand that Google, Twitter, Facebook, or
Spotify are predominantly technological platforms in the liberal business of
providing a marketplace of ideas for willing speakers to meet willing
listeners, while National Review or The Nation or
the Washington Post are in the business of creating speech
for consumption by willing listeners. Even if the platforms and the publishers
are not treated differently in law, their role in the marketplace of ideas is
different, and the cultural judgment of their behavior should be different as
well.
Censors and Censoriousness
Fundamentally, there are three types of threats to
speech. One is the sort of government censorship or government interference
that is against the law. But what constitutes government censorship is
sometimes misunderstood. Much of the recent conservative pushback against, say,
critical race theory in classrooms and workplaces or the instruction of young
children in sexual ideology is not about obstructing messages to willing
listeners, but about resisting the indoctrination of compelled listeners.
There are fair debates around how you draw those lines, because it is
impossible to educate children without conveying values, but when government
employees such as public-school teachers speak in their official capacity to a
captive audience, they are engaging in the use of government power, not their
own, private speech. That exercise of government power should, like any such
exercise, be subject to the ultimate control and supervision of the voters, and
it should reflect their values.
Do you like critical race theory? Take a college
elective. Buy a book. Attend a lecture on your own time. Those are all exercises
of willing listening. Don’t mandate it for schoolkids or employees. Do you want
to promote your sexual ideology? It’s a free country — but not in a public
kindergarten.
The second type of threat is private censorship: behavior
by private actors that obstructs encounters between willing speakers and
willing listeners. Private censorship is mostly legal, although at times it can
run afoul of various specific rules such as contracts or antitrust laws. But
the more pervasive it becomes, the more it can crowd out the access of willing
listeners to willing speakers.
That is the case with secondary boycotts. If you hate Joe Rogan, don’t listen to
his show. That is the free market for speech at work. But attempting to use
commercial pressure on Spotify in order to prevent Rogan’s willing listeners
from finding him? That is anti-speech. It is the prevention of willing
exchanges of ideas on the theory that your rights to impose economic
consequences on Rogan’s message are greater than the rights of Rogan’s
listeners to hear that message. “This person says wrong things believed by a
large audience” is never a valid basis for seeking the suppression of speech.
Private censorship is also at work when mobs try to use
noise and the force of their collective presence to prevent speakers from being
heard. Want to protest a speaker? Grab a sign and stand peaceably outside. Ask
pointed questions. Don’t shout the speaker down to prevent willing listeners
from hearing them.
The third and least dangerous threat, but a threat
nonetheless, is censoriousness. Free speech does not mean
freedom from any and all consequences for speech. Saying some things should get
you fired from your job or ostracized by your friends. But to establish the
practice of shaming the worst kinds of speech does not mean that every
disagreement should be met that way. A culture of censoriousness means one that
respects the forms of free speech but strangles it in practice
by a continuous posture of outrage and overreaction. A culture that values
speech, civility, a diversity of viewpoints, and a spirit of tolerance and
humanity will not overdose itself on censoriousness.
Lawyers and Mobs
The culture of free speech has been under siege in
America in recent years, and one of the most alarming battlegrounds has been
our law schools. Some of that intolerant mood comes from left-wing faculty, but
much of it bubbles up from progressive law students. Ilya Shapiro, for example,
was met with performatively “traumatized” protesters demanding his
firing at Georgetown Law School, and by an angry mob that shouted him down at UC Hastings College of the Law.
Another common target for the intolerant Left has been the Alliance Defending
Freedom and its general counsel, Kristen Waggoner. Waggoner’s appearance at
Yale Law School — to speak, ironically, on a cross-ideological panel on free
speech — triggered another effort to shout her down. You can read Waggoner’s
account here.
Defenders of bullying mobs, such as Mark Joseph Stern of Slate, have tried their best to whitewash and downplay the events
at Yale Law because the protest was eventually defused to allow the event to go
on (unlike at Hastings Law), but Stern has been rebutted at length with video
and reportage by David Lat (here, here, and in this Twitter
thread), Aaron Sibarium (here, here, and in this Twitter thread), John Sexton, and Dave Urbanksi. To her credit, Yale professor Kate Stith,
who was moderating the event, warned the mob, told them to “grow up,” and
eventually got them to leave the room. But the noise and disruption prevented
many attendees from hearing the panel, and disrupted nearby classes, forcing
some of them to move to Zoom.
Yale has — on paper — a strong policy protecting campus speakers from this sort of
thing. The policy declares that “access to a university event or facility may
not be blocked” and “a university event, activity, or its regular or essential
operations may not be disrupted. . . . Dissenting members of the community may
protest and express disagreement, but they may not interfere with a speaker’s
ability to speak or attendees’ ability to attend, listen and hear.” The policy
makes this specific, including among the banned activities “holding up signs in
a manner that obstructs the view of those attempting to watch an event or
speaker, regardless of the message expressed,” “speaking from a bullhorn,
shouting, or playing amplified music or noise from audio sources in a manner
that interferes with speakers’ ability to be heard and of community members to
listen, or disrupts or interferes with classes or other university activities,”
and “standing up in an assembly in a way that obstructs the view of those
attempting to watch an event or speaker and/or blocking the aisles or routes of
egress.”
Further, the policy has some teeth: A Riot Act–style
“three strikes” rule requires disruptive students to stop after two warnings or
be subject to punishment. The protesters left the room after Stith’s first
warning but continued their activities outside.
Rules, however, have meaning only if they are enforced.
At Hastings, the administration more or less sided with the mob. At Yale, the
response has not been much stronger. What should follow to deter this sort of
thing in the future?
Two proposals are on the table. Stanley Kurtz argues that the university can still discipline anyone
involved, and he points to a policy that (like NLRB rules, the Texas abortion law, the Alaska ethics rules that were
weaponized against Sarah Palin, or other “private attorney general” statutes)
allows anyone to file a complaint:
Yale has perhaps the clearest,
firmest, and most venerable requirements in the nation for sanctioning those
who shout down speakers. . . . Yale Law School’s “Rules
of Discipline” allow any “member of the Law School” (which includes all
Yale Law School faculty members and all Yale Law School
students) to trigger an investigation and hearing regarding any alleged
violation of Yale’s Law School Code. . . .There is substantial evidence that
all of these rules of discipline were violated at the March 10 Federalist
Society event. . . .
In this case we needn’t depend on
sniveling administrators to act. Any Yale Law School student or faculty member
has the power to file a complaint, or rather a series of complaints, against
those who participated in the shout-down. And according to Yale Law School’s
Rules of Discipline, those complaints must be investigated and acted upon. So,
for example, the members of Yale Law School’s Federalist Society who were
present at the event, and whose freedom to learn was interfered with, can file
complaints and initiate hearings.
As in other contexts, I’m wary of designing a grievance
procedure this way. Similar grievance processes that trigger an automatic
initiation of the disciplinary machinery can, as we have seen in an example from Stanford Law School, be abused as a weapon
against speech even by people on the right. But the friends of free expression
have few enough weapons with which to defend speech; one may as well use the
tools that are given, so long as they remain on the books.
The other proposal, from Judge Laurence Silberman of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals: Blacklist the law students from clerkships. “Students
who are identified as those willing to disrupt any such panel discussion should
be noted,” Silberman wrote in an email to other Article III judges. “All
federal judges — and all federal judges are presumably committed to free speech
— should carefully consider whether any student so identified should be
disqualified from potential clerkships.”
Mark Joseph Stern, who is plainly still seething over
being called out for his dishonest effort to get Shapiro
fired by Georgetown Law, argued on
Twitter that Silberman was doing the same thing: “I know we had a big
conversation on here about the propriety of complaining to someone’s
prospective employer about their free expression of unpopular views, so I’m
sure Silberman’s email will be condemned across the aisle.”
Stern is missing the point. Nobody is trying to get the
Yale protesters (or those at Hastings or Georgetown) punished or blacklisted
for having bad opinions. The point of what Silberman is proposing is to cancel
only the cancelers — to impose consequences for the abuse of the power
to suppress speech. These people want the privilege of a law license, which
allows private professionals to wield governmental power. They intend to do so
as antagonists of the right of willing listeners to find willing speakers. That
is dangerous to the culture and to the law of one of our most cherished
freedoms.
Very few values are more essential to the law than both
sides getting heard in order that disputes be adjudicated by a reasoned
decision-maker. Systems of law are designed to resolve disputes by speech and
evidence precisely so that disputes will not instead be resolved by resort to
violence. Mobs are the antithesis of that: They bring the force
of the crowd to bear to drown out reason. Left to run wild, they will destroy
not just speech but law itself.
The question Silberman raises is what to do with people
who graduate from law school having been taught that there is only upside to
illiberal attacks on speech. That is, in fact, a question that should worry
potential employers, not only because it is a sign of a temperament unsuited to
the practice of law but also because it is a pattern of behavior likely to be
repeated in the workplace, with ruinous effects on any organization. The sorts
of people who think that speakers ought to be shouted down on campus are
unlikely to be tolerant of co-workers or subordinates. It is a symptom of an
abusive personality unfit by character to a collegial workplace or a powerful
profession.
Mobs will continue to suppress speech unless and until
they face consequences. The cancelers and the mobs should be
the ones on the receiving end of their own medicine — they ought to be the only
ones. A recent New Yorker article about the birth of
Method acting tells the story of how the great director Elia Kazan made up his
mind in 1952 to “name names” of fellow members of his onetime theater company
Communist cell to the House Un-American Activities Committee. Kazan knew that
the people he was naming would be canceled in the McCarthy-era sense,
blacklisted from working in Hollywood or many other corners of show business.
But then, Kazan recalled, these same people had been all too eager cancelers
themselves, to the point of firing Kazan himself for departing from the Party
line. “In 1936, the Party had ordered the Group’s cell to seize control of the
company. When Kazan refused, he was publicly shamed and kicked out”:
I couldn’t clean out of my mind the
voice of V. J. Jerome and its tone of absolute authority as he passed on the
Party’s instructions for our Group Theatre cell and his expectation of
unquestioning docility from me and the others. I heard again in my memory the
voice, arrogant and absolute, of the Man from Detroit as he humiliated me
before my “comrades” in Lee Strasberg’s apartment over Sutter’s Bakery. I
recalled the smell of the sweet chocolate topping and the cinnamon from below
and how silent my fellow members had been, unresponsive until they’d voted
against me.
Ideally, open enemies of speech should face proportionate consequences.
That is why the longer-term answer is something more like what Kurtz proposes:
Universities should reclaim the power to discipline students until they learn
that this is America and act like it. To that end, the disciplinary tools
available should be put to use. But if students manage to graduate high
school and college and law school without
developing the capacity to tolerate disagreeable speech, the legal system
itself will have no choice but to take a stand to prevent them from using the
tools of the law to close down the marketplace of ideas.
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