From Ally to Aggressor

By Mike Nelson

Wednesday, December 31, 2025

 

To paraphrase a quote widely attributed to Trotsky, Greenland may not be interested in President Trump, but President Trump is still interested in Greenland. For the past year, Trump and those close to him have continued their rhetorical campaign signaling interest in annexing the island—currently a possession of treaty ally Denmark. Whether one is meant to take him literally or figuratively, this sustained chorus, growing louder and more committed, is taking a toll—alienating allies and complicating necessary security cooperation—and will have lasting effects into the future, potentially changing America’s role in the international order and paving the way for future aggression by adversaries.

 

President Trump announced last week that he had appointed Louisiana Gov. Jeff Landry to serve simultaneously as the presidential envoy to Greenland. Trump, speaking at an event the next day about a new class of Navy warships, said, “We need Greenland for national protection.” And Landry’s post after the president’s announcement suggests that he sees this role as part of the continuing effort to bring Greenland under American control. In response to Landry’s appointment, the Danes summoned the newly installed American ambassador in Copenhagen to express their concern and condemnation of the United States’ continued hostile messaging and threats to Danish territorial integrity.

 

This wasn’t the first time the Danes have summoned the senior American in their country in a diplomatic act of disapproval—in August they summoned Charge d’Affaires Mark Stroh after reports that three unnamed Americans close to the administration were actively sowing political upheaval among the native Greenlandic population.

 

Despite not being an issue upon which he ran, nor one for which he has made a compelling argument, the president is pressing his interest in seizing control of Greenland from the Danes—either by taking direct possession or through a hegemonic relationship with a newly independent Greenlandic client state. Unlike various other hyperbolic or inflammatory statements the president has made since taking office (such as making Canada the 51^st state), which are often dismissed by his defenders as harmless trolling, Trump and his proxies have not shifted away from their designs on Greenland. The appointment of Landry is the latest move suggesting that the administration is not just trolling, but actually sees control of Greenland as a preferred outcome.

 

Trump had first signaled an interest in acquiring the island during the tail end of his first term, but the concerted messaging and pressure have increased since the transition months ahead of his current administration earlier this year. The month after the election, Trump said American possession of Greenland is “an absolute necessity.” In January, prior to the inauguration, Trump proxies including his son Donald Trump Jr., Sergio Gor, and the late Charlie Kirk traveled to Greenland to deliver the message that Americans would “treat you well” in a hypothetical future of U.S. control. In March, Vice President Vance made a hasty visit to the U.S. base at Pituffik, Greenland, to proclaim that Trump’s “desire” to control Greenland should not be denied, as though the desire in and of itself was justification for alienating a NATO ally and committing the U.S. to territorial conquest. And, as previously mentioned, in August the Danish government said it had evidence of three individuals with close ties to the White House conducting influence operations to subvert Denmark’s legitimate rule.

 

Generally, the president and his associates have provided varied reasons for this “desire,” including national security and strategic positioning for military access in the North Atlantic, extraction of rare minerals found in Greenland, and vague gestures toward the autonomy of ethnic Greenlanders (85 percent of whom oppose U.S. control). Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick even seemed to decry the injustice of Viking conquests centuries ago, which makes one wonder whether he is going to start any future public statements with land acknowledgements.

 

If another country were making such claims and justifications to seize sovereign territory, the United States, at least in previous administrations, would likely have objected—and historically we have. Arguments about access to strategic naval ports and sea lanes, as well as protection of an “oppressed” native population, don’t sound very dissimilar from the Russian pretense for the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Desire to control natural resources is the same rationale used for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It stands to reason we could see China making these same kinds of claims and pointing to American interests in Greenland as they seek to absorb Taiwan.

 

Our adoption, instead of rejection, of these kinds of illegitimate justifications represents a shift for the United States, from protector of the international order and the sovereignty of nations to aggressor, conqueror, and bully. It is a perverse inversion of the post-Cold War order established by George H.W. Bush when he said that this kind of aggression “will not stand” as long as America has something to say about it.

 

While our interest in Greenland is just one of many concerning approaches to American foreign policy, it serves as a microcosm for what is to come—in how America views our role in the world, how we view the use of coercion or force, and how the rest of the world views us. Previously, the world could count on America to take up the cause of smaller countries being threatened by larger nations, whether that support was direct (Kuwait in 1990), indirect (Ukraine in 2022), or even just rhetorical (Georgia in 2008). Now, not only is that support no longer a given, the United States may be one of the predatory aggressors threatening those smaller countries. Trump has stated on multiple occasions that he will not rule out military force to gain control of Greenland.

 

This coercive approach reshapes our generally virtuous role in the world, but it also threatens our ability to address the very security goals the administration cites when expressing an interest in Greenland. The president is correct that we should be concerned with our access in the North Atlantic and the increasingly important and competitive Arctic, but it’s not clear what benefit would come from taking possession of Greenland that could not be achieved via increasing our military presence there—the same way we extend our global strategic reach through a cooperative network of bases on the soil of allies and partners, from Ramstein Air Base to Robertson Barracks in Australia, from Doha to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. But what the administration’s  approach will do is alienate—if not make outright adversaries of—the same countries with whom we need to partner to better deter enemies like Russia.

 

Seven of the countries with established access to the Arctic (United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) have enjoyed general consensus in preventing nefarious activities in the frozen north by the eighth country (Russia). But that cooperation is unlikely to endure as these current partners and allies recalculate the nature of American power, loyalty, and judgment. American aggression or coercion against a NATO ally will only further weaken the alliance that has protected the West’s interests—an obvious desire for bad actors like Putin and seemingly a favored outcome of many within the president’s orbit.

 

America is not beholden to the opinion of foreign powers as we determine our interests, but it should give us pause when our allies are condemning our approach and our adversaries are cheering it. Whatever gains the administration believes can be made via the annexation of Greenland—likely the financial interests of presidential allies seeking mineral rights—are small compared with the damage done by this new and shortsighted approach to the use of America’s power. If we seek greater military access to the North Atlantic, we could do so through agreement and cooperation with our Danish allies. If American companies seek investment in Greenland’s mineral resources, they can do so through the traditional business arrangements that exist throughout the world. And if America truly wished to take possession of Greenland, the administration could offer to purchase it the same way we gained Louisiana or Alaska—an offer Denmark is not obligated to accept. But our current approach of pressure, coercion, and potentially force is illegitimate in terms of the use of American power and influence, ill-advised in terms of priority among other global issues, and ineffective in terms of meeting our security concerns. In fact, it will make us, and the world, less secure.