By Bret Stephens
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
Sadr City in Baghdad, the northeastern districts of Sri Lanka and the Guaviare province of Colombia have little in common culturally, historically or politically. But they are crucial reference points on a global map in which long-running insurgencies suddenly find themselves on the verge of defeat.
For the week of May 16-23, there were 300 "violent incidents" in Iraq. That's down from 1,600 last June and the lowest recorded since March 2004. Al Qaeda has been crushed by a combination of U.S. arms and Sunni tribal resistance. On the Shiite side, Moqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army was routed by Iraqi troops in Basra and later crumbled in its Sadr City stronghold.
In Colombia, the 44-year-old FARC guerrilla movement is now at its lowest ebb. Three of its top commanders died in March, and the number of FARC attacks is down by more than two-thirds since 2002. In the face of a stepped-up campaign by the Colombian military (funded, equipped and trained by the U.S.), the group is now experiencing mass desertions. Former FARC leaders describe a movement that is losing any semblance of ideological coherence and operational effectiveness.
In Sri Lanka, a military offensive by the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has wrested control of seven of the nine districts previously held by the rebel group LTTE, better known as the Tamil Tigers. Mr. Rajapaksa now promises victory by the end of the year, even as the Tigers continue to launch high-profile terrorist attacks.
All this is good news in its own right. Better yet, it explodes the mindless shibboleth that there is "no military solution" when it comes to dealing with insurgencies. On the contrary, it turns out that the best way to end an insurgency is, quite simply, to beat it.
Why was this not obvious before? When military strategies fail – as they did in Vietnam while the U.S. pursued the tactics of attrition, or in Iraq prior to the surge – the idea that there can be no military solution has a way of taking hold with civilians and generals eager to deflect blame. This is how we arrived at the notion that "political reconciliation" is a precondition of military success, not a result of it.
There's also a tendency to misjudge the aims and ambitions of the insurgents: To think they can be mollified via one political concession or another. Former Colombian president Andres Pastrana sought to appease the FARC by ceding to them a territory the size of Switzerland. The predictable result was to embolden the guerrillas, who were adept at sensing and exploiting weakness.
The deeper problem here is the belief that the best way to deal with insurgents is to address the "root causes" of the grievance that purportedly prompted them to take up arms. But what most of these insurgencies seek isn't social or moral redress: It's absolute power. Like other "liberation movements" (the PLO comes to mind), the Tigers are notorious for killing other Tamils seen as less than hard line in their views of the conflict. The failure to defeat these insurgencies thus becomes the primary obstacle to achieving a reasonable political settlement acceptable to both sides.
This isn't to say that political strategies shouldn't be pursued in tandem with military ones. Gen. David Petraeus was shrewd to exploit the growing enmity between al Qaeda and their Sunni hosts by offering former insurgents a place in the country's security forces as "Sons of Iraq." (The liberal use of "emergency funds," aka political bribes, also helped.) Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has more than just extended amnesty for "demobilized" guerrillas; he's also given them jobs in the army.
But these political approaches only work when the intended beneficiaries can be reasonably confident that they are joining the winning side. Nobody was abandoning the FARC when Mr. Pastrana lay prostrate before it. It was only after Mr. Uribe turned the guerrilla lifestyle into a day-and-night nightmare that the movement's luster finally started to fade.
Defeating an insurgency is never easy even with the best strategies and circumstances. Insurgents rarely declare surrender, and breakaway factions can create a perception of menace even when their actual strength is minuscule. It helps when the top insurgent leaders are killed or captured: Peru's Shining Path, for instance, mostly collapsed with the capture of Abimael Guzmán. Yet the Kurdish PKK is now resurgent nine years after the imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, thanks to the sanctuary it enjoys in Northern Iraq.
Still, it's no small thing that neither the PKK nor the Shining Path are capable of killing tens of thousands of people and terrorizing whole societies, as they were in the 1980s. Among other things, beating an insurgency allows a genuine process of reconciliation and redress to take place, and in a spirit of malice toward none. But those are words best spoken after the terrible swift sword has done its work.
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
Cash for Kim, Revisited
Wall Street Journal
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
You have to read to page 347 of yesterday's report on the United Nations Development Program's antics in North Korea before reaching the recommendation that is likely to cause a panic in Turtle Bay: Give member states access to the internal audits, now secret, of UNDP programs.
That simple principle – let the funders see how their money is spent – is anathema in the international aid community and was at the heart of the U.S. exposé last year of the UNDP's slipshod operations in North Korea. If the U.S. hadn't blown the whistle, it would be business as usual. This latest report – by three experts appointed by the UNDP – is a wake-up call for more accountability throughout the U.N.
The UNDP's transgressions in North Korea include personnel practices that gave Pyongyang officials access to sensitive information; limited oversight; poor tracking of funds, including money that was diverted to the North's purposes; and transfer of dual-use technology. It adds up to a picture of how Pyongyang manipulated the UNDP for its own financial ends – while the U.N. agency let it happen. In March 2007 the executive board took the unprecedented step of suspending operations in North Korea, and two investigations – by the U.N.'s own Board of Auditors and the U.S. Congress – have confirmed the U.S. allegations.
In yesterday's report, the auditors write that they "are unable to confirm the total size" of the UNDP program in North Korea between 1997 and 2007 – an amazing indictment of UNDP financial practices. They calculate total expenditures between $57.1 million and $72.3 million, which roughly accords with what the U.S. had estimated and far exceeds the UNDP's guess.
Where did all this money go? The auditors conclude that 38% of disbursements were to "government agencies." Its review of "selected" projects finds that the documentation for 77 projects – or 74% – was so poor that they could not determine "whether the ultimate beneficiary is consistent with the payee name indicated in the financial system." That is, nobody knows where the money went – except perhaps Kim Jong Il.
Also notable is the report's findings on dual-use technology. Of the 151 pieces of equipment reviewed by the auditors, 95 were on the U.S. Commerce Department's control list and required an export license. Many were "controlled by the U.S. for national security and anti-terrorism reasons . . . and were of heightened concern." The UNDP hadn't obtained the required licenses. The auditors add that when the UNDP pulled out of North Korea in March 2007, it left this equipment behind. The UNDP failed to obtain the required "retransfer authorization," the report dryly notes. Translation: Retrieval was impossible because the North already had the stuff.
Each time we use "fraud" or "corruption" to describe what happened in North Korea, the UNDP objects. So let us be precise. The corruption is on the part of North Korea, which abused U.N. rules and siphoned off U.N. money for its own nefarious purposes while UNDP looked the other way. There is no evidence of personal corruption on the part of UNDP officials.
Rather, as this and other investigations prove, UNDP head Kemal Dervis, Associate Administrator Ad Melkert and their colleagues are guilty of gross negligence, if not willful indifference. At best it is an extreme case of clientitis, with a nasty side-effect that causes the patient to spin and weasel his way out of every legitimate accusation.
The bomb that went off yesterday at the Danish Embassy in Islamabad killed a UNDP employee, whose office was located next door. It's a sad reminder that U.N. workers often take risks to do their jobs world-wide. The best way to honor their work is through better governance that leads to more effective help for the people the U.N. purports to serve.
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
You have to read to page 347 of yesterday's report on the United Nations Development Program's antics in North Korea before reaching the recommendation that is likely to cause a panic in Turtle Bay: Give member states access to the internal audits, now secret, of UNDP programs.
That simple principle – let the funders see how their money is spent – is anathema in the international aid community and was at the heart of the U.S. exposé last year of the UNDP's slipshod operations in North Korea. If the U.S. hadn't blown the whistle, it would be business as usual. This latest report – by three experts appointed by the UNDP – is a wake-up call for more accountability throughout the U.N.
The UNDP's transgressions in North Korea include personnel practices that gave Pyongyang officials access to sensitive information; limited oversight; poor tracking of funds, including money that was diverted to the North's purposes; and transfer of dual-use technology. It adds up to a picture of how Pyongyang manipulated the UNDP for its own financial ends – while the U.N. agency let it happen. In March 2007 the executive board took the unprecedented step of suspending operations in North Korea, and two investigations – by the U.N.'s own Board of Auditors and the U.S. Congress – have confirmed the U.S. allegations.
In yesterday's report, the auditors write that they "are unable to confirm the total size" of the UNDP program in North Korea between 1997 and 2007 – an amazing indictment of UNDP financial practices. They calculate total expenditures between $57.1 million and $72.3 million, which roughly accords with what the U.S. had estimated and far exceeds the UNDP's guess.
Where did all this money go? The auditors conclude that 38% of disbursements were to "government agencies." Its review of "selected" projects finds that the documentation for 77 projects – or 74% – was so poor that they could not determine "whether the ultimate beneficiary is consistent with the payee name indicated in the financial system." That is, nobody knows where the money went – except perhaps Kim Jong Il.
Also notable is the report's findings on dual-use technology. Of the 151 pieces of equipment reviewed by the auditors, 95 were on the U.S. Commerce Department's control list and required an export license. Many were "controlled by the U.S. for national security and anti-terrorism reasons . . . and were of heightened concern." The UNDP hadn't obtained the required licenses. The auditors add that when the UNDP pulled out of North Korea in March 2007, it left this equipment behind. The UNDP failed to obtain the required "retransfer authorization," the report dryly notes. Translation: Retrieval was impossible because the North already had the stuff.
Each time we use "fraud" or "corruption" to describe what happened in North Korea, the UNDP objects. So let us be precise. The corruption is on the part of North Korea, which abused U.N. rules and siphoned off U.N. money for its own nefarious purposes while UNDP looked the other way. There is no evidence of personal corruption on the part of UNDP officials.
Rather, as this and other investigations prove, UNDP head Kemal Dervis, Associate Administrator Ad Melkert and their colleagues are guilty of gross negligence, if not willful indifference. At best it is an extreme case of clientitis, with a nasty side-effect that causes the patient to spin and weasel his way out of every legitimate accusation.
The bomb that went off yesterday at the Danish Embassy in Islamabad killed a UNDP employee, whose office was located next door. It's a sad reminder that U.N. workers often take risks to do their jobs world-wide. The best way to honor their work is through better governance that leads to more effective help for the people the U.N. purports to serve.
Monday, June 2, 2008
America's generosity is unmatched
Star Parker
Monday, June 02, 2008
Americans are hearing so much these days about how bad we are that we're starting to believe it.
In a recent Gallup poll, 68 percent said they are "dissatisfied with the position of the United States in the world today," and 55 percent said they think that the rest of the world views us unfavorably.
However, as I page through a publication called the Index of Global Philanthropy, which is produced annually by the Center for Global Prosperity at the Hudson Institute in Washington, it becomes obvious that these American feelings of self-deprecation are misguided.
This is the just released third annual edition of this index. It produces a unique snapshot portraying the full extent of American generosity to developing countries, by amount and by source.
Usually when the question of aid to the developing world arises, we think of government funds. But this index shows that, whereas it may be the rule in the rest of the industrialized world that most aid is government aid, in our country this isn't the case. Most of the contributions that Americans make abroad are private and voluntary. And they are large.
In 2006, the latest year for which data is available, the index reports that Americans contributed privately and voluntarily $34.8 billion to individuals and organizations in developing countries.
Philanthropy is distinct from government aid in that it originates with private citizens and is voluntary, but also the recipients are private individuals and organizations, as opposed to governments. Private to private versus government to government.
The $34.8 billion in philanthropy from private Americans exceeded the $23.5 billion in official U.S. government aid abroad by $11.3 billion, or 48 percent.
This private philanthropy is flowing from foundations, corporations, private and voluntary organizations, universities and colleges, and religious organizations.
Of particular interest in this year's index is the $8.8 billion reported from religious organizations. According to Carol Adelman, who directs this work, the data was produced by commissioning "the first national survey of congregational giving to the developing world" ever done.
The average contribution of congregations was $10,700.
To put this in some kind of perspective, the $8.8 billion in giving from American religious institutions to developing countries was $1.5 billion more than the total giving from all private sources in 30 of the world's major industrialized democratic countries combined.
When consolidating all assistance funds flowing from the United States to developing countries, the total is $129.8 billion. This is the total of government aid, philanthropy, and remittances -- funds sent directly by private individuals to other private parties in developing countries, often family members. A far second in total giving behind the United States is the United Kingdom at $20.7 billion.
There are a couple of important messages here.
First, of course, is the incredible compassion and generosity of Americans. American largesse does not need to be pried or forced by the government. It flows organically from free, civic minded and often religiously motivated citizens. And it comes from citizens of every income strata. The religious giving data shows that whereas the average congregation gives $10,700, the median number is $2,500, indicating that there are many smaller, less wealthy congregations engaged.
The other headline is the central importance of the private sector in both generating prosperity, but also in sharing it.
Bookshelves now strain with studies showing the failures of government-to-government aid.
It is individuals who create wealth. Compassion and personal responsibility reside in the breasts of those same individuals. Neither can be said of government bureaucracies.
Barack Obama spoke at the commencement ceremony at Wesleyan University the other day. He talked about national service and, recalling John F. Kennedy, committed to doubling the size of the Peace Corps if elected president.
From what I see and what the data shows, Americans don't need government to make them care, contribute, and volunteer. If anything, they need less government so they'll retain and keep control of more of what they produce and subsequently share with those in need.
Other countries may have their own motivations for what causes them to view Americans the way they do. But the data is clear. Americans are unmatched in creating prosperity and sharing it.
It's time to pay closer attention to what Americans do rather than what others say.
Monday, June 02, 2008
Americans are hearing so much these days about how bad we are that we're starting to believe it.
In a recent Gallup poll, 68 percent said they are "dissatisfied with the position of the United States in the world today," and 55 percent said they think that the rest of the world views us unfavorably.
However, as I page through a publication called the Index of Global Philanthropy, which is produced annually by the Center for Global Prosperity at the Hudson Institute in Washington, it becomes obvious that these American feelings of self-deprecation are misguided.
This is the just released third annual edition of this index. It produces a unique snapshot portraying the full extent of American generosity to developing countries, by amount and by source.
Usually when the question of aid to the developing world arises, we think of government funds. But this index shows that, whereas it may be the rule in the rest of the industrialized world that most aid is government aid, in our country this isn't the case. Most of the contributions that Americans make abroad are private and voluntary. And they are large.
In 2006, the latest year for which data is available, the index reports that Americans contributed privately and voluntarily $34.8 billion to individuals and organizations in developing countries.
Philanthropy is distinct from government aid in that it originates with private citizens and is voluntary, but also the recipients are private individuals and organizations, as opposed to governments. Private to private versus government to government.
The $34.8 billion in philanthropy from private Americans exceeded the $23.5 billion in official U.S. government aid abroad by $11.3 billion, or 48 percent.
This private philanthropy is flowing from foundations, corporations, private and voluntary organizations, universities and colleges, and religious organizations.
Of particular interest in this year's index is the $8.8 billion reported from religious organizations. According to Carol Adelman, who directs this work, the data was produced by commissioning "the first national survey of congregational giving to the developing world" ever done.
The average contribution of congregations was $10,700.
To put this in some kind of perspective, the $8.8 billion in giving from American religious institutions to developing countries was $1.5 billion more than the total giving from all private sources in 30 of the world's major industrialized democratic countries combined.
When consolidating all assistance funds flowing from the United States to developing countries, the total is $129.8 billion. This is the total of government aid, philanthropy, and remittances -- funds sent directly by private individuals to other private parties in developing countries, often family members. A far second in total giving behind the United States is the United Kingdom at $20.7 billion.
There are a couple of important messages here.
First, of course, is the incredible compassion and generosity of Americans. American largesse does not need to be pried or forced by the government. It flows organically from free, civic minded and often religiously motivated citizens. And it comes from citizens of every income strata. The religious giving data shows that whereas the average congregation gives $10,700, the median number is $2,500, indicating that there are many smaller, less wealthy congregations engaged.
The other headline is the central importance of the private sector in both generating prosperity, but also in sharing it.
Bookshelves now strain with studies showing the failures of government-to-government aid.
It is individuals who create wealth. Compassion and personal responsibility reside in the breasts of those same individuals. Neither can be said of government bureaucracies.
Barack Obama spoke at the commencement ceremony at Wesleyan University the other day. He talked about national service and, recalling John F. Kennedy, committed to doubling the size of the Peace Corps if elected president.
From what I see and what the data shows, Americans don't need government to make them care, contribute, and volunteer. If anything, they need less government so they'll retain and keep control of more of what they produce and subsequently share with those in need.
Other countries may have their own motivations for what causes them to view Americans the way they do. But the data is clear. Americans are unmatched in creating prosperity and sharing it.
It's time to pay closer attention to what Americans do rather than what others say.
The Law is an Ass
Burt Prelutsky
Monday, June 02, 2008
I often find myself wondering how seemingly normal people ever wind up being criminal defense attorneys. When even Harvard law professor and one-time member of O.J. Simpson’s so-called dream team Alan Dershowitz claims that over 90% of all criminal defendants are guilty, why would any sane person want to devote his life to trying to spring hundreds, maybe even thousands, of felons?
I realize that our legal system insists that every murderer, rapist, pedophile and kidnapper, is entitled to the very best defense his lawyer can provide, but what sort of human being wakes up in the morning and, even before brushing his fangs, is busy thinking up ways to aid and abet those monsters? And just how is he morally superior to the goon who drives the getaway car?
Some years ago, I recall that a lawyer pleaded the case of a murderer who was on Death Row, awaiting execution. His argument was that because his client had gained so much weight while in prison, it would be cruel and unusual punishment to hang him because the rope might break. Death by hanging, by the way, had been his client’s own choice.
Now, really, how does anyone with even a modicum of self-respect and a sense of humor, make that argument to an appeals court without bursting out laughing? Frankly, if I had been on the bench that day, I would have assured the mouthpiece not to worry about the rope because even if it broke, the fall would no doubt kill his gargantuan client.
But these legal beagles clearly make up in gall for what they obviously lack in other areas. Just the other day, I read about a case that lawyer Cara DeVito was arguing before the California Supreme Court. Her client, Dennis Louis Nelson, was convicted and is now serving a life term for the 1976 rape and murder of a young woman named Ollie George back in 1976.
Mr. Nelson was only charged and the cold case solved after DNA from the crime scene was run through the state’s DNA offender database. It was Ms. DeVito’s contention that the long delay in prosecuting the case had made it impossible to put together an adequate defense because witnesses had died, evidence may have been lost and memories may have faded.
It’s true that I never went to law school, but it appears that, essentially, her argument is that because Mr. Nelson eluded the authorities for all these years, it isn’t cricket to use modern technology to nail him at this late date, when he had every reason to think he’d gotten away with it.
If I were hearing the case, I’d point out to Ms. DeVito that if Nelson had turned himself in back in 1976, a life sentence being what it is, her client probably would have been let out of prison 25 years ago.
What truly astounds me, though, is that I’m quite willing to wager that if Ms. DeVito had decided to become a streetwalker, her family would have disowned her, but because she got a law degree, she’s the apple of their eye.
Monday, June 02, 2008
I often find myself wondering how seemingly normal people ever wind up being criminal defense attorneys. When even Harvard law professor and one-time member of O.J. Simpson’s so-called dream team Alan Dershowitz claims that over 90% of all criminal defendants are guilty, why would any sane person want to devote his life to trying to spring hundreds, maybe even thousands, of felons?
I realize that our legal system insists that every murderer, rapist, pedophile and kidnapper, is entitled to the very best defense his lawyer can provide, but what sort of human being wakes up in the morning and, even before brushing his fangs, is busy thinking up ways to aid and abet those monsters? And just how is he morally superior to the goon who drives the getaway car?
Some years ago, I recall that a lawyer pleaded the case of a murderer who was on Death Row, awaiting execution. His argument was that because his client had gained so much weight while in prison, it would be cruel and unusual punishment to hang him because the rope might break. Death by hanging, by the way, had been his client’s own choice.
Now, really, how does anyone with even a modicum of self-respect and a sense of humor, make that argument to an appeals court without bursting out laughing? Frankly, if I had been on the bench that day, I would have assured the mouthpiece not to worry about the rope because even if it broke, the fall would no doubt kill his gargantuan client.
But these legal beagles clearly make up in gall for what they obviously lack in other areas. Just the other day, I read about a case that lawyer Cara DeVito was arguing before the California Supreme Court. Her client, Dennis Louis Nelson, was convicted and is now serving a life term for the 1976 rape and murder of a young woman named Ollie George back in 1976.
Mr. Nelson was only charged and the cold case solved after DNA from the crime scene was run through the state’s DNA offender database. It was Ms. DeVito’s contention that the long delay in prosecuting the case had made it impossible to put together an adequate defense because witnesses had died, evidence may have been lost and memories may have faded.
It’s true that I never went to law school, but it appears that, essentially, her argument is that because Mr. Nelson eluded the authorities for all these years, it isn’t cricket to use modern technology to nail him at this late date, when he had every reason to think he’d gotten away with it.
If I were hearing the case, I’d point out to Ms. DeVito that if Nelson had turned himself in back in 1976, a life sentence being what it is, her client probably would have been let out of prison 25 years ago.
What truly astounds me, though, is that I’m quite willing to wager that if Ms. DeVito had decided to become a streetwalker, her family would have disowned her, but because she got a law degree, she’s the apple of their eye.
Labels:
Hypocrisy,
Law Enforcement,
Recommended Reading,
Tort Reform
How Sarkozy Lost France
By Guy Sorman
Monday, June 2, 2008
How does one go from a 53% electoral victory to a 20% approval rating in one year? Embattled French President Nicolas Sarkozy is undoubtedly asking himself that very question.
His private life isn't the problem. His much publicized divorce, followed by a third marriage to a former model turned singer, shocked the oldest and the most conservative voters. But the new Madame Sarkozy has become as discreet as she is elegant.
Rather, the problem is the disconnect between Mr. Sarkozy's rhetoric and his actions. What his first year in office teaches us – America's presidential candidates take note – is that the way to become the most unpopular of presidents is to take all sides on every issue. By talking like a reformer, Mr. Sarkozy has displeased the partisans of the status quo, and by failing to undertake the reforms he proclaims, he's also disappointed the partisans of change.
France missed out on the free-market reforms that swept the world in the 1980s, and has not since been able to make up for its relative loss of dynamism. Economic growth has been presentable – thanks to the accumulation of capital and to the excellence of globalized businesses that do not depend on the state – but nothing new is happening. For younger workers and smaller entrepreneurs, the operation of the market is gummed up by state interference. Unemployment remains around 25% for those between the ages of 20 and 28 (higher still among those without a diploma) and as high as 80% among immigrant populations in the ghettos.
No president before Mr. Sarkozy had directly confronted this French stagnation: Francois Mitterrand (1981-1995) could not liberalize France because he was a socialist; Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) did not want to.
Mr. Sarkozy said he wished to end this stagnation. He clearly campaigned on the promise of a freer economy. But once he was president, things changed; every gesture friendly to economic freedom has been followed by a half-measure or a renunciation.
Consider his recruitment of Socialist ministers – most notably Bernard Kouchner to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also Eric Besson at Economic Planning and Fadéla Amara at Urban Policy. This might have seemed wise at the time, but the pursuit of consensus prevents boldness of action.
Or consider his very first reform, that of the universities. The reform provides that university presidents are now to be elected by a council representing faculty, employees and students. Predictably, these councils have been taken over by leftist unions who will eliminate all conservative candidates. Privately, the professors' unions exult because nothing has really changed; publicly, they condemn the universities' supposed enslavement to the requirements of capitalism.
Another reform failure: genetically modified organisms (GMOs). France is one of the few countries in which farmers, in the face of a coalition of ecologists and leftists, find themselves denied the right to raise these plants. So what does Mr. Sarkozy do? In the land of Louis Pasteur, one might expect a speech about the glories of progress, an appeal to the French biotechnology industry. Instead, he supports a law that authorizes GMOs but makes their approval conditional on the permission of judges who will see that the environment is respected. Neither side in this fight was satisfied.
On the immigration front, Mr. Sarkozy has managed to antagonize both the right and the left. He provoked an outcry on the left and among human-rights organizations when he proposed to check the DNA of immigrants asking for family reunification. Meanwhile, he angers the right as his campaign promise to shift from spontaneous (often illegal) immigration to a more selective immigration policy remains merely rhetoric.
But perhaps nothing better illustrates Mr. Sarkozy wanting it both ways as his stance toward France's famed 35-hour work week. As a candidate, Mr. Sarkozy repudiated the extravagant law that limited the work week to 35 hours. As president, Mr. Sarkozy maintains the 35-hour limit: the left celebrates; the right is befuddled. But at the same time, Mr. Sarkozy multiplies exceptions to the 35-hour law, as long as the employer respects Byzantine juridical procedures.
One last example: Mr. Sarkozy and globalization. A steel business purchased by the Indian group Mittal risks going out of business. Will Mr. Sarkozy call upon the French to make the transition to activities that are more creative and worthier of the national genius (and of France's high salaries)? No. He hurries to the Lorraine, and swears to workers that he, as president, will not close a single factory.
How can one explain Mr. Sarkozy's refusal to choose, this great capacity to proclaim contradictory imperatives with such enthusiasm?
First, the noble hypothesis: To become the consensus president of all the people when one was elected by just over half of them is a temptation that spares no chief of state. But the allure of consensus, a nice idea in itself, leads to an incapacity to govern.
Another hypothesis: Mr. Sarkozy's inability to choose reflects a postmodern personality detached from all ideological convictions. Thus, President Sarkozy has conserved the whole monarchical protocol established by General de Gaulle in 1959, but he runs around in shorts through the palace grounds.
Mr. Sarkozy calls this collage of opposites "pragmatism." He denies (somewhat like Barack Obama) that there is still a division between right and left, as if there remained only the proponents of change and those of the status quo. But what change?
Without a clear vision, pragmatism à la Sarkozy, like consensus à la Sarkozy, is a recipe not for change but for ambiguity and unpredictability: France has a skipper without a compass.
The French are not pleased.
Monday, June 2, 2008
How does one go from a 53% electoral victory to a 20% approval rating in one year? Embattled French President Nicolas Sarkozy is undoubtedly asking himself that very question.
His private life isn't the problem. His much publicized divorce, followed by a third marriage to a former model turned singer, shocked the oldest and the most conservative voters. But the new Madame Sarkozy has become as discreet as she is elegant.
Rather, the problem is the disconnect between Mr. Sarkozy's rhetoric and his actions. What his first year in office teaches us – America's presidential candidates take note – is that the way to become the most unpopular of presidents is to take all sides on every issue. By talking like a reformer, Mr. Sarkozy has displeased the partisans of the status quo, and by failing to undertake the reforms he proclaims, he's also disappointed the partisans of change.
France missed out on the free-market reforms that swept the world in the 1980s, and has not since been able to make up for its relative loss of dynamism. Economic growth has been presentable – thanks to the accumulation of capital and to the excellence of globalized businesses that do not depend on the state – but nothing new is happening. For younger workers and smaller entrepreneurs, the operation of the market is gummed up by state interference. Unemployment remains around 25% for those between the ages of 20 and 28 (higher still among those without a diploma) and as high as 80% among immigrant populations in the ghettos.
No president before Mr. Sarkozy had directly confronted this French stagnation: Francois Mitterrand (1981-1995) could not liberalize France because he was a socialist; Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) did not want to.
Mr. Sarkozy said he wished to end this stagnation. He clearly campaigned on the promise of a freer economy. But once he was president, things changed; every gesture friendly to economic freedom has been followed by a half-measure or a renunciation.
Consider his recruitment of Socialist ministers – most notably Bernard Kouchner to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also Eric Besson at Economic Planning and Fadéla Amara at Urban Policy. This might have seemed wise at the time, but the pursuit of consensus prevents boldness of action.
Or consider his very first reform, that of the universities. The reform provides that university presidents are now to be elected by a council representing faculty, employees and students. Predictably, these councils have been taken over by leftist unions who will eliminate all conservative candidates. Privately, the professors' unions exult because nothing has really changed; publicly, they condemn the universities' supposed enslavement to the requirements of capitalism.
Another reform failure: genetically modified organisms (GMOs). France is one of the few countries in which farmers, in the face of a coalition of ecologists and leftists, find themselves denied the right to raise these plants. So what does Mr. Sarkozy do? In the land of Louis Pasteur, one might expect a speech about the glories of progress, an appeal to the French biotechnology industry. Instead, he supports a law that authorizes GMOs but makes their approval conditional on the permission of judges who will see that the environment is respected. Neither side in this fight was satisfied.
On the immigration front, Mr. Sarkozy has managed to antagonize both the right and the left. He provoked an outcry on the left and among human-rights organizations when he proposed to check the DNA of immigrants asking for family reunification. Meanwhile, he angers the right as his campaign promise to shift from spontaneous (often illegal) immigration to a more selective immigration policy remains merely rhetoric.
But perhaps nothing better illustrates Mr. Sarkozy wanting it both ways as his stance toward France's famed 35-hour work week. As a candidate, Mr. Sarkozy repudiated the extravagant law that limited the work week to 35 hours. As president, Mr. Sarkozy maintains the 35-hour limit: the left celebrates; the right is befuddled. But at the same time, Mr. Sarkozy multiplies exceptions to the 35-hour law, as long as the employer respects Byzantine juridical procedures.
One last example: Mr. Sarkozy and globalization. A steel business purchased by the Indian group Mittal risks going out of business. Will Mr. Sarkozy call upon the French to make the transition to activities that are more creative and worthier of the national genius (and of France's high salaries)? No. He hurries to the Lorraine, and swears to workers that he, as president, will not close a single factory.
How can one explain Mr. Sarkozy's refusal to choose, this great capacity to proclaim contradictory imperatives with such enthusiasm?
First, the noble hypothesis: To become the consensus president of all the people when one was elected by just over half of them is a temptation that spares no chief of state. But the allure of consensus, a nice idea in itself, leads to an incapacity to govern.
Another hypothesis: Mr. Sarkozy's inability to choose reflects a postmodern personality detached from all ideological convictions. Thus, President Sarkozy has conserved the whole monarchical protocol established by General de Gaulle in 1959, but he runs around in shorts through the palace grounds.
Mr. Sarkozy calls this collage of opposites "pragmatism." He denies (somewhat like Barack Obama) that there is still a division between right and left, as if there remained only the proponents of change and those of the status quo. But what change?
Without a clear vision, pragmatism à la Sarkozy, like consensus à la Sarkozy, is a recipe not for change but for ambiguity and unpredictability: France has a skipper without a compass.
The French are not pleased.
Sunday, June 1, 2008
Al Qaeda on the Run
Wall Street Journal
Saturday, May 31, 2008
A year ago in July, a National Intelligence Estimate warned that al Qaeda had "protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability," meaning it could be poised to strike America again. The political reaction was instantaneous and damning. "This clearly says al Qaeda is not beaten," said Michael Scheuer, the former CIA spook turned antiterror scold.
What a difference 10 months – and a surge – make.
CIA Director Michael Hayden painted a far more optimistic picture in an interview yesterday in the Washington Post. "On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said. "Near strategic defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al Qaeda globally – and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' – as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam."
What happened? To certain sophisticates, this is all al Qaeda's doing: By launching suicide attacks on Shiite and even Sunni targets, and ruling barbarically wherever they took control, the group has worn out its welcome in the Muslim world.
There's some truth in this. The Sunni Awakening in Iraq was in part a reaction by local clan leaders against al Qaeda's efforts to subjugate and brutalize them. The Arab world took note when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ordered the November 2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in which nearly all of the victims were Sunni Arabs. Extremist Islamic parties took an electoral drubbing in Pakistan's elections earlier this year following a wave of suicide bombings, one of which murdered Benazir Bhutto.
It's also true that al Qaeda finds itself on the ideological backfoot, even in radical circles. As our Bret Stephens reported in March, Sayyed Imam, a founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and once a mentor to Ayman al Zawahiri, has written an influential manifesto sternly denouncing his former comrades for their methods and theology. This was enough to prompt a 215-page rebuttal from Zawahiri, who seems to have time on his hands. Lawrence Wright in the New Yorker and Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank in the New Republic have recently written about similar jihadist defections.
But the U.S. offensives in Afghanistan and especially Iraq deserve most of the credit. The destruction of the Taliban denied al Qaeda one sanctuary, and the U.S. seems to have picked up the pace of Predator strikes in Pakistan – or at least their success rate. This has damaged al Qaeda's freedom of movement and command-and-control.
As for Iraq, Zawahiri himself last month repeated his claim that the country "is now the most important arena in which our Muslim nation is waging the battle against the forces of the Crusader-Zionist campaign." So it's all the more significant that on this crucial battleground, al Qaeda has been decimated by the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad. The surge, in turn, gave confidence to the Sunni tribes that this was a fight they could win. For Zawahiri, losing the battles you say you need to win is not a way to collect new recruits.
General Hayden was careful to say the threat continues, and he warned specifically about those in Congress and the media who "[focus] less on the threat and more on the tactics the nation has chosen to deal with the threat." This refers to the political campaign to restrict wiretapping and aggressive interrogation, both of which the CIA director says have been crucial to gathering intelligence that has blocked further terrorist spectaculars that would have burnished al Qaeda's prestige.
One irony here is that Barack Obama is promising a rapid withdrawal from Iraq on grounds that we can't defeat al Qaeda unless we focus on Afghanistan. He opposed the Iraq surge on similar grounds. Yet it is the surge, and the destruction of al Qaeda in Iraq, that has helped to demoralize al Qaeda around the world. Nothing would more embolden Zawahiri now than a U.S. retreat from Iraq, which al Qaeda would see as the U.S. version of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.
It is far too soon to declare victory over al Qaeda. Still, Mr. Hayden's upbeat assessment is encouraging, and it suggests that President Bush's strategy of taking the battle to the terrorists is making America safer.
Saturday, May 31, 2008
A year ago in July, a National Intelligence Estimate warned that al Qaeda had "protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability," meaning it could be poised to strike America again. The political reaction was instantaneous and damning. "This clearly says al Qaeda is not beaten," said Michael Scheuer, the former CIA spook turned antiterror scold.
What a difference 10 months – and a surge – make.
CIA Director Michael Hayden painted a far more optimistic picture in an interview yesterday in the Washington Post. "On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said. "Near strategic defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al Qaeda globally – and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' – as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam."
What happened? To certain sophisticates, this is all al Qaeda's doing: By launching suicide attacks on Shiite and even Sunni targets, and ruling barbarically wherever they took control, the group has worn out its welcome in the Muslim world.
There's some truth in this. The Sunni Awakening in Iraq was in part a reaction by local clan leaders against al Qaeda's efforts to subjugate and brutalize them. The Arab world took note when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ordered the November 2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in which nearly all of the victims were Sunni Arabs. Extremist Islamic parties took an electoral drubbing in Pakistan's elections earlier this year following a wave of suicide bombings, one of which murdered Benazir Bhutto.
It's also true that al Qaeda finds itself on the ideological backfoot, even in radical circles. As our Bret Stephens reported in March, Sayyed Imam, a founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and once a mentor to Ayman al Zawahiri, has written an influential manifesto sternly denouncing his former comrades for their methods and theology. This was enough to prompt a 215-page rebuttal from Zawahiri, who seems to have time on his hands. Lawrence Wright in the New Yorker and Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank in the New Republic have recently written about similar jihadist defections.
But the U.S. offensives in Afghanistan and especially Iraq deserve most of the credit. The destruction of the Taliban denied al Qaeda one sanctuary, and the U.S. seems to have picked up the pace of Predator strikes in Pakistan – or at least their success rate. This has damaged al Qaeda's freedom of movement and command-and-control.
As for Iraq, Zawahiri himself last month repeated his claim that the country "is now the most important arena in which our Muslim nation is waging the battle against the forces of the Crusader-Zionist campaign." So it's all the more significant that on this crucial battleground, al Qaeda has been decimated by the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad. The surge, in turn, gave confidence to the Sunni tribes that this was a fight they could win. For Zawahiri, losing the battles you say you need to win is not a way to collect new recruits.
General Hayden was careful to say the threat continues, and he warned specifically about those in Congress and the media who "[focus] less on the threat and more on the tactics the nation has chosen to deal with the threat." This refers to the political campaign to restrict wiretapping and aggressive interrogation, both of which the CIA director says have been crucial to gathering intelligence that has blocked further terrorist spectaculars that would have burnished al Qaeda's prestige.
One irony here is that Barack Obama is promising a rapid withdrawal from Iraq on grounds that we can't defeat al Qaeda unless we focus on Afghanistan. He opposed the Iraq surge on similar grounds. Yet it is the surge, and the destruction of al Qaeda in Iraq, that has helped to demoralize al Qaeda around the world. Nothing would more embolden Zawahiri now than a U.S. retreat from Iraq, which al Qaeda would see as the U.S. version of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.
It is far too soon to declare victory over al Qaeda. Still, Mr. Hayden's upbeat assessment is encouraging, and it suggests that President Bush's strategy of taking the battle to the terrorists is making America safer.
Labels:
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Recommended Reading,
Terrorism
How Al Gore is Getting Fat off of a Starving World
Jerry Bowyer
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Always read to the end of the report; that’s where the good stuff is. Case in point an obscure little stat was released on Friday with the not-quite-tantalizing title “Agricultural Prices”. Tables and tables of words with numbers after them – soybeans, price per bushel – wheat, percentage change year over year – imported fruits…exported nuts…you get the idea.
If you do the shopping for your family as I do (don’t snicker, I also chop down trees and bench 300), you’re probably not surprised to find out that agricultural prices rose quite rapidly in May. In fact the monthly price changes are beginning to look disturbingly like annual price changes. This is not good. But the really interesting stuff is in the details. Foods seem to be rising in price in direct proportion to their proximity to ethanol subsidies. Feed grain is up an amazing 41% in the past year. Fruit and nuts are down 3% over the same period. Why? Because we turn corn into ethanol, but we don’t do the same with walnuts or bananas.
Here in the center of the world economy, this means high food prices. Out at the edges, it means famine. When food gets expensive here, we tap into a little more credit, or perhaps skip restaurants for awhile. When food gets expensive in Malaysia, they riot in the streets. When food gets too expensive in Cape Town, some men take to the streets in violent roving bands, maiming and murdering refugees who’ve come from other countries in search of something to eat.
You’ve heard the arguments, some put forward, sadly, by some in this administration, by their big business welfare queens in the corn states, and by ultra-smug wing of the environmental movement. They say that very little of the jump in food prices comes from ethanol, that it’s mostly energy prices, or a weak dollar, or general inflation. This is why we have to read to the end of the report, so that we can recognize nonsense when we hear it. Why would general inflation cause corn to a rate of doubling every two years, and yet leave meat, fruit, nut and some vegetable prices dropping? How could high energy prices do that? Don’t vegetable farmers use tractors? Don’t sugar farmers fuel their tractors with the same diesel? Don’t the trucks and trains which deliver almonds run on the same kinds of fuel as the ones which deliver grains?
Of course they do.
It’s not a general inflation problem; it’s a problem of political corruption. America’s first presidential primary happens to be in Iowa. That gives ethanol first dibs at the pork barrel. Add Republican farm voters to Democratic environmentalists, shake vigorously and you get a brew called ethanol. The farmers get rich on taxpayer subsidies, the venture capitalists who focus on alternative fuels (I’m looking in your direction, Mr. Gore) get fat on profits. Good deal for everybody, except people who happen to eat food.
It’s not the dollar either. Yes, the dollar is a problem; the Treasury Secretary and the Fed have neglected it. But the falling dollar isn’t causing these price spikes. First of all, the world’s hungry don’t trade in dollars. They trade in Ringits, Bahts, Yuan, Rubles and Rands. Foreigners are not starving because the dollar lost value. In fact, the drop in the dollar helps them. And it’s not even the dollar that’s the problem here in America either. We generally export food, especially grains. But Americans are getting hit with the worst price spikes in precisely those agricultural sectors where we supply our own food. We’re the bread basket of the world! I’m sorry, but when I buy high fructose corn syrup from Iowa, it doesn’t involve the foreign exchange markets. The problem isn’t the dollar – the problem is that we’re burning food. We’re taking carbohydrates which would have gone into someone’s stomach, chemically altering them and putting them into our gas tanks instead. One SUV fill-up is roughly the same amount of calories as it takes to sustain a man, woman or a child – for a year. I believe that future generations will look back in history at the hungry of this world, and the preening self-satisfaction of the ethanol lobby and call it what it is, a crime against humanity.
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Always read to the end of the report; that’s where the good stuff is. Case in point an obscure little stat was released on Friday with the not-quite-tantalizing title “Agricultural Prices”. Tables and tables of words with numbers after them – soybeans, price per bushel – wheat, percentage change year over year – imported fruits…exported nuts…you get the idea.
If you do the shopping for your family as I do (don’t snicker, I also chop down trees and bench 300), you’re probably not surprised to find out that agricultural prices rose quite rapidly in May. In fact the monthly price changes are beginning to look disturbingly like annual price changes. This is not good. But the really interesting stuff is in the details. Foods seem to be rising in price in direct proportion to their proximity to ethanol subsidies. Feed grain is up an amazing 41% in the past year. Fruit and nuts are down 3% over the same period. Why? Because we turn corn into ethanol, but we don’t do the same with walnuts or bananas.
Here in the center of the world economy, this means high food prices. Out at the edges, it means famine. When food gets expensive here, we tap into a little more credit, or perhaps skip restaurants for awhile. When food gets expensive in Malaysia, they riot in the streets. When food gets too expensive in Cape Town, some men take to the streets in violent roving bands, maiming and murdering refugees who’ve come from other countries in search of something to eat.
You’ve heard the arguments, some put forward, sadly, by some in this administration, by their big business welfare queens in the corn states, and by ultra-smug wing of the environmental movement. They say that very little of the jump in food prices comes from ethanol, that it’s mostly energy prices, or a weak dollar, or general inflation. This is why we have to read to the end of the report, so that we can recognize nonsense when we hear it. Why would general inflation cause corn to a rate of doubling every two years, and yet leave meat, fruit, nut and some vegetable prices dropping? How could high energy prices do that? Don’t vegetable farmers use tractors? Don’t sugar farmers fuel their tractors with the same diesel? Don’t the trucks and trains which deliver almonds run on the same kinds of fuel as the ones which deliver grains?
Of course they do.
It’s not a general inflation problem; it’s a problem of political corruption. America’s first presidential primary happens to be in Iowa. That gives ethanol first dibs at the pork barrel. Add Republican farm voters to Democratic environmentalists, shake vigorously and you get a brew called ethanol. The farmers get rich on taxpayer subsidies, the venture capitalists who focus on alternative fuels (I’m looking in your direction, Mr. Gore) get fat on profits. Good deal for everybody, except people who happen to eat food.
It’s not the dollar either. Yes, the dollar is a problem; the Treasury Secretary and the Fed have neglected it. But the falling dollar isn’t causing these price spikes. First of all, the world’s hungry don’t trade in dollars. They trade in Ringits, Bahts, Yuan, Rubles and Rands. Foreigners are not starving because the dollar lost value. In fact, the drop in the dollar helps them. And it’s not even the dollar that’s the problem here in America either. We generally export food, especially grains. But Americans are getting hit with the worst price spikes in precisely those agricultural sectors where we supply our own food. We’re the bread basket of the world! I’m sorry, but when I buy high fructose corn syrup from Iowa, it doesn’t involve the foreign exchange markets. The problem isn’t the dollar – the problem is that we’re burning food. We’re taking carbohydrates which would have gone into someone’s stomach, chemically altering them and putting them into our gas tanks instead. One SUV fill-up is roughly the same amount of calories as it takes to sustain a man, woman or a child – for a year. I believe that future generations will look back in history at the hungry of this world, and the preening self-satisfaction of the ethanol lobby and call it what it is, a crime against humanity.
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