By Nick Catoggio
Thursday, April 09, 2026
The war in Iran may not be the last war that America
wages during this presidency, but it will almost certainly be the last challenging
war.
Whether that’s good or bad depends on how you look at it.
Having painted himself into a corner in the Persian Gulf,
the president won’t risk another conflict in which he stands a meaningful
chance of looking weak, I suspect. From here on out, we’re fighting tomato cans
only. And that’s good news: A strongman who’s learned the limits of his
strength will be less likely going forward to put American service members in
harm’s way.
But it’s bad news if you believe U.S. military power is
the only thing limiting the global reach of Chinese totalitarians.
There’s no liberal kinship binding Donald Trump to Taiwan—or Japan
or South Korea, for that matter. If Xi Jinping dares the president to test his
mettle against the People’s Liberation Army, my guess is the commander in chief
will decide that letting China control its own “sphere of influence” is
preferable to rolling the dice on a war that could shatter perceptions of
American (i.e. his) might.
Never mind that ducking a fight with Beijing would itself
go a long way toward doing that.
I could be wrong about all of that, as I’ve underestimated
Trump’s appetite for war before. A strategic defeat in Iran might lead him
to behave more aggressively toward China, not less, by leaving him feeling that
he has something to prove.
But probably not. A bully who’s met unexpected resistance in
the schoolyard will instinctively want to push smaller kids around to
reestablish his dominance, not pick another fight with someone his own size. Just
because I couldn’t wedgie Iran into crying uncle doesn’t mean I can’t do it to
you.
If I’m right, America will spend the next 33 months
preying on nations that can’t fight back while straining to avoid conflict with powers like China and Russia as they go
about preying on our own allies.
How many dependable partners will a country like that
still have when Trump leaves office in 2029?
No allies.
Israel?
Doubtful. The Israelis may want their alliance with
America to continue in its current form, but Americans do not. One of the most
sobering polls I’ve seen this year was this Pew Research survey published on Tuesday gauging U.S.
opinion about the Jewish state. Majorities in both parties between the ages of
18 and 49 now view Israel unfavorably. (Yes, Republicans too.) Democrats 50 and
older also hold an overwhelmingly unfavorable opinion.
Only among Republicans 50 and older—Donald Trump’s
demographic—is negative sentiment toward Israel still a minority view. If the
next president is J.D. Vance, it’s a cinch that Washington’s longstanding
alliance with Tel Aviv will be radically
more ambivalent than it’s been for most of my life. If the next president
is a Democrat, the alliance might exist mostly in name only. There’ll still be
intelligence-sharing, I assume (or hope), but Benjamin Netanyahu’s de facto
political union with Trump has finished off whatever meager affection the
American left still had for his country.
The Gulf states?
A good outcome to the Iran war might have cemented that
alliance, but the window for a good outcome has closed. America’s Arab partners
have been battered by Iranian missile and drone strikes, with Uncle Sam unable
to fully protect them, while the bottleneck in the Strait of Hormuz continues
to strangle their core industry. “The U.S. and Israel went into the war and
didn’t take Gulf interests into account, so we ended up as collateral damage,”
one Kuwaiti academic complained to the Wall Street Journal. “The fear is that being
collateral damage in the war extends into peace, and this is something we
wouldn’t accept and need to work against.”
If the conflict ends with Iran’s terror-supporting regime
still in place, as is all but certain, Gulf nations will need to weigh their
relationship with the U.S. against the risk of further antagonizing that
regime. Forced to live cheek by jowl with Shiite fanatics who’ve proved their
ability to take the region’s energy sector hostage, Sunni powers like Saudi
Arabia and the UAE might conclude that triangulating between Iran and America
is the safer long-term play. Having a friend in Washington is nice, but not as
nice as not having to worry about Iran blowing up your oil fields.
Needless to say, the Gulf states will also pay a steep
political price with the next Democratic administration for their corrupt courtship of Trump. Although maybe they’d
prefer that anyway: At least a Democratic president would know better than to
insult the most powerful Arab leader in the world by accusing him publicly of “kissing
my ass.”
Japan?
Tokyo is probably America’s best bet for an ally who’ll
still be there after the smoke from the Trump conflagration clears, but I
wouldn’t bet heavily on that either. For starters, the Iran war is hitting the
Japanese economy much harder than ours, as Japan gets no less than 93 percent of its crude oil via the Strait of Hormuz.
Having that tap suddenly turned off has wreaked all of the havoc you might expect—a market dip,
declining consumer confidence, and a rising risk of inflation. If our war saddles them with a
recession, Japanese voters might understandably hold a grudge.
Skillful diplomacy could avert that, perhaps, but
Americans opted out of skillful diplomacy when they chose a kakistocracy to
govern them in 2024. Trump has responded to Japan’s economic pain by throwing a jab about Pearl Harbor during a visit by the Japanese
prime minister to the White House last month and then browbeating the government for not helping him clean up the
mess he made in Iran.
If he does anything in the Far East over the next 33
months to signal that his commitment to containing China isn’t ironclad (and
there have already been rumblings to that effect), Japan will find itself in a
position similar to the Gulf states. They can resolve to fight the regional
menace that threatens them or they can move to appease it in hopes that it’ll
leave them alone. But either way, they won’t be able to count on America to do
anything meaningful about it.
Which brings us to Europe.
Enemies, a love story.
Our alliances with Israel, Japan, and the Gulf states
will still exist nominally in 2029 even if there’s little substance to them.
I’m not sure our European alliances will.
“NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE
THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN. REMEMBER GREENLAND, THAT BIG, POORLY RUN, PIECE OF
ICE!!!” That was the president’s message yesterday after meeting with NATO Secretary General
Mark Rutte. Hours earlier, his press secretary conceded that he was considering
leaving the alliance, something he has no legal power to do but which no
longer matters in autocratic America.
“It all began with, if you want to know the truth,
Greenland,” Trump himself told reporters on Monday when asked why he was so angry at Europe for not joining his war. “We want
Greenland. They don’t want to give it to us. And I said, ‘bye, bye.’” It is very
stupid politically to pair those two grievances, as one of them explains
the other: If you want to know why Europeans haven’t behaved like allies lately, consider what sort of
allyship the president showed them when he spent the first month of this year
trying to extort them into coughing up territory.
That’s what NATO is up against. Trump expects Europe to
comply with his individual demands, not necessarily because those demands are
reasonable but because that’s what vassals do. Whether it’s helping in the
Strait of Hormuz or forking over Greenland, European leaders are supposed to
subordinate their national interests—and the will of their voters—to ours when
the president asks them to do so. Because he’s not asking.
I don’t know how an alliance as poisoned as that survives
even nominally for another 33 months. Without a doubt, Trump will continue to
alienate NATO members and Europe by alternately insulting them, shaking them
down, and making toxic demands of them. I expect him to take another run at
muscling them over Greenland too (he might be preparing to do so already), possibly using the current war
as a pretext. “Europe wouldn’t let us use their bases to attack Iran so we
can’t trust that Denmark will always let us use Greenland,” the president could
say.
Simply dwell on this fact: Since January 2025, multiple
NATO members have been forced to plan their response to a
potential U.S. military attack. Say what you want about Vladimir Putin, at
least he doesn’t make Europeans glad-hand him when they’re not busy wargaming
against his army.
A simpler way to put all of that is that the Trump-led
U.S. government isn’t hostile to Israel, Japan, or the Gulf states, but it is,
plainly, ideologically hostile to Europe—to the point that its hostility is now
official
national security policy. In fact, while Trump was meeting with Rutte
yesterday, J.D. Vance was wrapping up a two-day trip to Budapest, where he
attacked the “bureaucrats in Brussels” on behalf of a corrupt
Putin toady whose government has become a sort of Russian catspaw within
the European Union.
Without hyperbole, the White House is momentarily aligned
with the Kremlin in trying to rescue an unpopular Hungarian strongman because
his politics are their mutual best chance of ending liberalism in the West. You
tell me how something like that gets papered over and we end up in January 2029
without the U.S. and Europe in a sort of Cold War.
Even Ukraine, America’s greatest remaining point of
leverage over Europe, might not bind the rest of NATO to us for much longer.
Necessity has led to ingenuity in Kyiv: From drones to missiles to air defense, the Ukrainians have developed formidable
native capabilities. The less they’re forced to rely on weapons purchased from
America, the less leverage Trump will have to extort Ukraine’s allies into doing his bidding by
threatening to cut those weapons off.
Although, ironically, the president’s desire for leverage
might be the last, best hope of preserving the alliance.
Prestige.
I don’t think it would bother Trump as an ideological
matter if America ended up without meaningful allies in 2029. (I doubt very
much that he cares what happens to the country one way or another once it no
longer answers to him.) He might actually prefer it.
Like his boyfriend Kim Jong Un, Trump is an autark at
heart. Our mercantilist leader would be perfectly content, I think, if America
subsisted entirely on homegrown food and domestic goods and exported whatever’s
left over. Self-reliance is the essence of Trump
juche, and self-reliant nations don’t need allies.
Nor, I suspect, does the president discern any reason why
a nation with the greatest military in history should desire partners. That’s
the mafioso in him: If you can impose your will on others (except Iran, I
guess), there’s no need to court them. Eventually they’ll come begging for
something they need, creating an opportunity to extort them, or you’ll take
what you want from them when your own need arises.
“America alone” is an acceptable outcome to him in
principle. But he’d miss all of the bowing and scraping allied leaders have
learned to do to try to satisfy his bottomless need for flattery.
That’s the real risk to him in alienating partners. The
president doesn’t care for NATO in the abstract, but I’m sure he finds it
deeply pleasurable when a figure like Mark Rutte feels obliged to call him “daddy.” If he keeps
threatening Europe, at some point that will stop. The leverage he enjoys over
global elites dissipates every time he forces them anew to question whether
they’re still getting more out of maintaining close ties to the United States
than they’re losing.
“Nobody can understand what America actually is today. It
seems governed by some kind of mad emperor who keeps saying whatever comes to
his mind, something we haven’t witnessed since Caligula or Nero,” an Italian
senator told the Wall Street Journal this week. “The one thing the
Europeans have understood is that we are dealing with a bully. You can give him
everything he wants, you can pretend you don’t hear his insults, but he will
keep trying to bully us, and so at a certain point we must stop him.”
Even the Euroweenies can be pushed only so far.
Eventually the president will threaten for the umpteenth time to quit NATO and
they’ll reply with an exasperated “go ahead.” (Iran’s behavior this week
should have taught Trump a lesson about scare tactics losing their potency.) Then he’ll be alone in
the Oval Office, a global pariah with 36 percent job approval, forced to dial up Delcy Rodríguez
to chat with a world leader who still respects him.
Or pretends to respect him, I should say.
That would be grim for him, which may explain why the
“punishment” the White House is reportedly preparing for NATO over the Iran war
doesn’t seem so punitive. From the Wall Street Journal:
The proposal would involve moving
U.S. troops out of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries deemed
unhelpful to the Iran war effort and stationing them in countries that were
more supportive.
…
Countries that could benefit
because they are viewed as supportive include Poland, Romania, Lithuania and
Greece, the officials said. The Eastern European countries have some of the
highest defense-spending rates in the alliance and were some of the first to
signal they would support an international coalition to monitor the Strait of
Hormuz. After war broke out, Romania quickly approved U.S. requests to allow
its bases to be used by the U.S. Air Force.
Moving U.S. troops from western Europe to eastern Europe
isn’t punishment for NATO, it’s simply good strategic sense. If Russia comes
for the alliance, it’s not going to do so via the Atlantic, with an amphibious
landing in Galicia. Pulling troops from Spain or Germany might be a minor
economic blow to those countries but it won’t weaken NATO’s defense if those
troops end up in the Baltics. On the contrary.
The thought of America alone—of an America with little
remaining international prestige—may ultimately be too unpalatable for a leader
who really, really revels in that prestige. If our alliances with NATO
and its members somehow endure until 2029, that’ll probably be why.
But I’d still bet on America ending up more or less
alone. With the possible exception of Russia, I can’t imagine any government on
Earth living through this period of chaotic, brain-damaged gangster insanity
and ever again wanting to invest heavily in a relationship with the United
States. I’ve made this point many times but it can’t be overstated: A people
capable of electing Donald Trump twice, especially after January 6, is a people
that can never again be trusted to lead the world even after he’s gone.
So they won’t be. Our alliances post-Trump, insofar as they exist, will be of a qualitatively different and less deferential nature than they were for most of our lifetimes. “Still somewhat better than being dominated by Chinese communists” is the most one can say for the Pax Americana anymore. And already, after just 15 months, things are so bleak that some are unwilling to say it.
No comments:
Post a Comment