Is Cultural Marxism the Root of Our Problems?

By Megan Dent

Saturday, April 18, 2026

 

Politics would surely benefit from the demise of the echo chamber. Within our political silos, we wander in self-referential logical mazes, convinced of our own righteousness because every sign we pass points to it. We are like the god Narcissus, doomed to forever gaze at his own reflection until he melts from the pressure of a purely interior passion.

 

When I see book titles that reference both the right and the left, then, I harbor a little flicker of hope. Perhaps this author will cross that rickety bridge between the two aisles and come away with the wisdom that we need to combust our implacably partisan moment.

 

Such was my naïve hope when I opened The Cultural Marxism Conspiracy: Why the Right Blames the Frankfurt School for the Decline of the West, by English historian A.J.A. Woods, who uses they/them pronouns. To what extent did academic theorists—Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, Herbert Marcuse, and the like—really instigate the identity politics that the right has historically loathed? A fascinating subject. I opened the book with optimism.

 

Woods begins by defining “cultural Marxism” as “the political right’s attempt to explain why the culture of Western societies has changed over the past sixty years.” It’s a sort of catchall, bogeyman term for the many social convulsions that have upended small-c conservative social mores, from student protests and the Summer of Love in the 1960s, to LGBT and BLM campaign efforts in recent years.

 

The University of Frankfurt base for Marxist scholarship, established in 1923, provides conservatives with a point in time and space where critical theory—a series of disciplinary approaches that draws on Marxist analysis to challenge power inequalities in language, history, and public discourse—was born. Woods suggests that conservatives blame the Frankfurt School for setting progressive identity politics in motion: it was the beginning of what they view as its “long march through the institutions,” shaping public culture from media outlets to educational establishments. So far, this sounds reasonable.

 

How, asks Woods, can we understand the way right-wing figures have used the mantle of cultural Marxism to build a narrative about cultural decline? “What this task requires, I suggest, is a return to Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals,” they answer. Woods will draw on “conjunctural analysis as a method of contextualization,” they explain, which is “a methodological approach that comes from a particular reading of Antononio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks.”

 

To make the case that cultural Marxism is essentially a paranoid fever dream of the political right, Woods will use none other than … Marxist theory. I fear we are back in the maze. And quickly, the extent to which this book is a prolonged period of Woods gazing at their own reflection becomes clear.

 

By the end of the introduction, Woods’ cards are out on the table. The conservatives who talk about cultural Marxism are “reactionary political forces” who “search for new ways to justify their opposition to equality, democracy, and justice.” They seek to “denigrate and disempower certain groups” and we must “resist their attacks and fight for a better future.”

 

The rest of this book unfolds as a—very impressive, at times—textual history of the lunacy of the right from a thoroughly unreflective progressive perspective. This is not a left-wing view that reckons with the weaknesses of identity politics or seeks to understand the right’s instinct—or, as some concede, nostalgia—for a bygone set of social and institutional norms. Woods insists that “the right will not be satisfied until every museum and every university and every street (and every hospital and every library and every pub) is cleansed of wokeness.” This is the replacement of one bogeyman—“cultural Marxism”—with another, the “transnational right.” Woods wants us to believe that one of these is a reactionary hallucination, while the other is totally, definitely real. 

 

To make the case, Woods traces the textual journey of cultural Marxism from the concept’s use by the bizarre then-Trotskyist Lyndon LaRouche in the 1960s, through William Lind at the Free Congress Foundation and figures of the new right such as Paul Weyrich in the 1970s. With scrupulous research, chapters lay out the how the concept was inflected to serve the narratives of a return to “family values” after the social disruptions of the ’60s; to battle the restrictions of “political correctness” in the 1990s; to galvanize the Tea Party movement in the 2000s; and most recently, to undermine contemporary “woke” social justice movements. 

 

Undermining this thorough intellectual history is Woods’ unabashed contempt for their political opponents. They refer to the theorists that they cite regularly as “scholars,” while anyone from the right is a “reactionary.” Everything that the right worries about in society is an “alleged” or “supposed” concept, while the concerns of the left are simply “grassroots struggles” against real problems. Thus what many on the right feel is a university environment dominated by obscure critical analysis and progressive social mandates is a “so-called field of ideologically-motivated scholarship on issues of race, gender, and inequality.” At the same time, “Indigenous and ‘Land Back’ movements, trans liberation, pro-Palestine protests and so on” are simply good-faith efforts to combat injustices. Nothing to see here.

 

With every insult aimed at the right—Tea Party protesters are “balding and bloated businessmen [who] donned tricorne hats and embarrassed themselves by adopting faux-colonial accents and parading down the street with antique muskets”—Woods misses an opportunity to have a much more interesting, and dare I say, adult conversation about the identitarian and political sentiments that have driven an impassable wedge in American politics.

 

This book is strongest when it alludes to the economic fallout that produces cultural discontent, but sadly these are not expanded upon. At a few junctures, Woods hints at the book that I wish they had written, in which Woods put their Marxist bona fides to good use to show that, as Woods argues contra Christopher Rufo, common people are victims not of “elite wokeness,” but of “market forces or systemic shifts.” This could build on the work of the sociologist Musa al-Gharbi’s book We Have Never Been Woke, to show that the right’s culture war hysteria is simply a misdiagnosis of the real ills in American society: economic and class inequality.

 

Along these lines, Woods rightly calls out the tokenism of corporate DEI culture, quipping that “Amazon’s pristine diversity, equity, and inclusion statement has never stopped Jeff Bezos from repressing unionization efforts in his warehouses.” And of Rufo, James Lindsay, and other online right-wing activists, Woods adeptly argues that their “counterrevolution represents nothing but the replacement of a woke ruling class with a conservative one … Rufo’s proposals substitute one type of paternalism for another.”

 

“Whereas the woke restricted free speech to protect the ‘feelings’ of the ‘snowflake left’, Rufo’s counterrevolution prohibits any speech that induces ‘guilt’ or ‘distress’ in white America,” Woods adds.

 

Unfortunately, Woods falls prey to something similar, their book often descending into the type of culture war tract that it decries. After persuading their readers that the right is wrong to imagine a cadre of Marxist academics conspiring to take down the West, Woods introduces a caricature of their own: “a subjective figure that I call the New Right think-tank intellectual.” This shadowy figure “hoped to remake subjectivities to conform to their notion of family values.” In non-Gramsci English, this means something like the new right think-tank intellectual hoping to advance their own policy agendas. Just like Marxists do.

 

Woods’ work is a notable history of an idea and an interesting portrait of the left’s understanding of both the right and of itself. It is written for others on the left who, like Woods, believe that Marxist theory is like air: You don’t have to persuade anyone of its truth, it’s just there, animating everything and shaping everything. For the rest of us, the theories of Marx and Gramsci, while not responsible for the decline of all civilization, are still better described in the words of a former progressive activist whom Woods interviewed: “misguided attempts to ‘shoehorn the square pegs of theory into the round holes of reality.’”