Showing posts with label Civil Rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Civil Rights. Show all posts

Saturday, August 29, 2026

I Don’t Like Flock Cameras, but I Don’t Think They’re Unconstitutional

By Charles C. W. Cooke

Friday, August 28, 2026

 

On today’s episode of The Editors, we discussed Flock cameras. I said that they made me uncomfortable — not because they “don’t work,” but because they work all too well. In other words: While I concede that they will likely reduce crime, I do not consider that to be the end of the matter. Lots of things would reduce crime if implemented. That doesn’t mean that those things are necessarily a good idea in a free republic.

 

One of my co-panelists then suggested that Flock cameras present a Fourth Amendment problem because, in order to benefit from their data, law enforcement is required to use a database, which constitutes a “search.” Despite my general skepticism toward them as a matter of public policy, I disagreed with this position. We began to argue about it, but unfortunately, we ran out of time. So I thought I’d complete my thought here.

 

Simply put: I cannot see a Fourth Amendment problem with Flock cameras, because the data that they collect — and thus the data that is subsequently accessed by the police — is, and always was, presumptively public. The Fourth Amendment holds that:

 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

 

Public roads do not fall under this description. Imagine, if you will, that instead of a series of cameras, a series of police officers were stationed at various points along a public route and tasked with writing down the license plates of all the cars that went by. Obviously, none of them would need a warrant to do this. Then imagine that, having collected this information, they went back to the station and collated it into a book. Would another officer looking at that book constitute a “search”? I cannot see how it would. Police officers are allowed to look at whatever they want in places, such as public roads, where the citizenry lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy. And having looked at whatever they want, those same officers are allowed to share with one another what they have found.

 

If the Flock cameras were being used outside of the public roads, that would be a different story. If, for example, those cameras were being secreted within private homes, or attached surreptitiously to private cars, or put in every hotel room in Nebraska, that would present a problem. So, too, if the cameras boasted X-ray vision or could detect heat signatures, and they were being used to peer into private property. But they aren’t.

 

Nor can the mere act of consulting a database be the key variable. What matters, surely, is what’s in the database? The police are not allowed to read my emails without a warrant, because my emails are part of my “papers” and “effects.” But the police can legitimately read emails that I send them, or listen to speeches I make in public fora, or even track my movements while I am outside. If, for example, my local police department were to compile a database that contained everything I have ever said in public, that wouldn’t magically become a Fourth Amendment problem simply because that database was searchable. The violation attaches to the nature of the contents, not to the act of compiling information per se.

 

If the Fourth Amendment did outlaw Flock cameras, it would not bother me. I find them creepy, and I am not pleased that, because the internet has annihilated distance, they enable police departments thousands of miles from my own to follow me around as I drive. Unfortunately, though, I really cannot see how the Fourth Amendment applies here, and for me, as a constitutional originalist, that is the end of that story. Given its recent jurisprudence, I expect that the courts will agree with my suspicions, and that being so, those of us who do not like the growing surveillance state are going to have to give up on the hope of being saved by judges and do the work via the usual political channels.

Monday, August 24, 2026

Democrats Take Aim at the Civil Rights Act

By Seth Mandel

Wednesday, August 19, 2026

 

Last year, as the Trump administration continued its investigations into anti-Semitism at elite universities, several civil-rights attorneys at the Department of Justice were temporarily transferred to the agency running the anti-Semitism probe to help with the workload. One of those was Haley Van Erem.

 

The events that followed produced lessons in three problems that have held back the government’s attempts to restore the civil rights of America’s Jewish college students:

 

1. The ideological opposition to combating anti-Semitism among career bureaucrats.

 

2. Those same bureaucrats’ resentment at being told to apply civil-rights law, specifically Title VI, to Jews.

 

3. The Trump administration’s aversion to process norms.

 

Van Erem quit and has now filed a “whistleblower” complaint that appears aimed at derailing the application of civil-rights law to Jews, even as she perfunctorily denounces anti-Semitism.

 

Van Erem contends that the administration began the investigation already believing the colleges violated Jewish students’ civil rights. That’s probably true: by the time Van Erem grudgingly joined the inquiry, civil-rights violations had been happening in full view of the public. These included university employees discriminating against Israeli students on the basis of national origin, mobs physically blocking Jewish students from accessing areas of campus, and the uneven application of university codes of conduct to the detriment of Jews.

 

Van Erem also complains that she was given overly strict deadlines that prevented her from dragging out the process to her satisfaction, and that she was often overruled by her superiors—though her complaint actually paints a picture of her bosses being surprisingly receptive and willing to incorporate the objections of an employee who made clear that she didn’t want to be there. Last, Van Erem describes an administration that would launch investigations without evidence of wrongdoing, but because of the sheer volume of anti-Jewish agitation permitted on these campuses, this particular claim is so ridiculous and self-discrediting as to make one question whether Van Erem is engaging in some form of interpretive performance art.

 

The Trump administration’s aversion to process norms is real, but Van Erem vastly inflates their importance because her motive seems to be to fatally undermine federal application of Title VI processes to Jews. Therefore, the occasional example of genuinely inappropriate interference in education—Trump’s team proposing external curriculum monitors at Harvard, for example—must be exaggerated into something that rises to the level of actionable legal reprisals, such as “gross mismanagement, by departing from investigative sequencing and quality controls as required by regulation.”

 

That last point, the desire to put in legal jeopardy those who investigated anti-Semitism at top universities, is key to understanding this whole event.

 

Like clockwork, Jamie Raskin, the Maryland congressman and ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, took the baton handed to him by Van Erem and promised retribution for Trump officials. He called the anti-Semitism investigations a “frame-up operation” and threatened to push changes to the Civil Rights Act itself.

 

Raskin’s promised lawfare against federal employees involved in strengthening the enforcement of civil-rights law is no doubt the goal of complaints like those voiced by Van Erem. Raskin, further, is the perfect receptacle for these complaints. His Jewishness provides cover for Democrats who are, as Raskin presumably is, intent on dismantling federal protections for Jews and insulating the Democratic Party from accountability for its exploding anti-Semitism.

 

Raskin is also a co-sponsor of legislation that would enforce a partial arms embargo against Israel. He has fought anti-Semitism-related legislation and has been critical of Israel’s response to the October 7 massacre since the beginning of the Hamas-instigated war.

 

Raskin also demanded testimony from Harmeet Dhillon, the Justice Department’s assistant attorney general for civil rights, alleging that it was a “a distinct possibility” that Dhillon “deliberately orchestrated a scheme to attack universities, their faculties, and their administrators for political purposes while defrauding the American people and the courts.”

 

If the Democrats, as expected, win control of the House in the midterms, they are vowing to use this power to make government officials pay, and pay dearly, for daring to investigate universities’ discrimination against Jewish students. In the past, this would have struck most observers as a bizarre choice of priorities. In 2026, it’s what the public has come to expect from Raskin and company.


Saturday, July 25, 2026

I Was Targeted by Germany’s Speech Police

By Rainer Zitelmann

Saturday, July 25, 2026

 

Is free speech under threat in Germany? Most conservatives, center-right supporters, classical liberals, and libertarians in the country believe that it is. After facing criminal accusations for violating Germany’s laws limiting free speech myself, I can tell you firsthand that Germany’s free-speech problem is real — and it’s a warning to anyone who cares about the right of free expression.

 

For many years, those on the political left vehemently denied that Germany had a free-speech problem. Their standard argument was: “You can say whatever you want — you just have to expect others to disagree with you.” Yet for years, opinion polls have shown that many Germans no longer feel free to express their views on certain issues without fear. According to a 2025 Allensbach survey, only 46 percent of Germans believe they can freely express their political opinions, while 44 percent say it is better to be cautious about speaking openly.

 

The terms “cancel culture” and “political correctness” have become widely used not only in the United States but also in Germany. Over time, however, these concepts have lost much of their impact. When people not on the left are routinely labeled “Nazis” or “fascists,” such accusations eventually lose their effectiveness. And as those terms lose that power, the next stage in spreading fear and intimidating dissenters has been the increasingly open use of police and the justice system. This is a sign of weakness, reflecting an inability to prevail through argument.

 

The growing restrictions on free speech are now acknowledged even by critical left-wing journalists and legal scholars. Ronen Steinke, a senior political editor at the center-left newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, recently authored a book on the subject, in which he writes: “Germany has always been the Western country with the greatest number of speech taboos and the strictest criminal laws governing mere words.”

 

According to Steinke, between 2015 and 2025, Germany took action to crack down on political speech: “Parliament expanded and multiplied criminal provisions. The offense of incitement to hatred has been broadened in several respects, and the offense of publicly approving criminal acts has been extended to such a degree that people can now be punished for endorsing acts that exist only in the imagination.”

 

In addition, Steinke argues, many public prosecutors have made the fight against so-called hate speech a top priority, creating new and powerful investigative units. His conclusion is unequivocal: “Never before have there been so many criminal investigations in Germany over mere words.” For some offenses, according to Steinke, the number of investigations has increased tenfold, and in extreme cases even a hundredfold.

 

In one widely publicized case, police arrived at a retiree’s home at 6 a.m. to carry out a house search after he had shared on X an image referring to the then–federal minister for economic affairs, Robert Habeck, as “Schwachkopf” (idiot).

 

Another retiree came under criminal investigation after calling Chancellor Friedrich Merz “Pinocchio” on Facebook. That case was later dropped.

 

Such investigations are possible in part because of Section 188 of the German Criminal Code, which grants politicians special legal protection. The number of criminal investigations for insulting politicians has doubled every year since 2021, rising from 748 to 4,439 in 2024, Steinke writes.

 

Well-known classical liberal and conservative journalists have also been reported anonymously to the police through so-called reporting centers.

 

Complaints have repeatedly relied on Section 86a of the German Criminal Code, which prohibits the use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations and provides for penalties of up to three years in prison.

 

At the beginning of February 2026, I too received a letter from the police. For the first time in my life, I was accused of committing a criminal offense. Someone had filed a complaint against me through one of these reporting centers simplybecause I had reposted an image on X that showed a historical photograph of Adolf Hitler on the left and a contemporary photograph of Vladimir Putin on the right. A speech bubble attributed the words, “Give me Czechoslovakia and I won’t attack anyone else,” to Hitler, while Putin was shown saying, “Give me Ukraine and I won’t attack anyone else.”

 

I have never been particularly fond of Hitler analogies. Perhaps that is because I spent ten years of my life studying the subject and earned my doctorate with a dissertation on Hitler. From that scholarly perspective, I see how many such comparisons are historically inaccurate. They often serve more to shut down debate than to illuminate it.

 

Yet since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, I have been struck by clear parallels between the arguments advanced by Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Putin, as well as similarities in the West’s responses to both dictators. During the Sudeten Crisis of 1938, Hitler repeatedly claimed that the Sudetenland was his final territorial demand in Europe. Shortly afterward, the Munich Agreement forced Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland. As is well known, Hitler did not stop there. Only a few months later, he occupied the remaining territories of what had been Czechoslovakia.

 

Numerous media outlets in Germany and abroad reported on my case, and I received a great deal of solidarity. As an entrepreneur who has become financially successful, I was also able to afford the approximately $7,000 required to hire an excellent lawyer. Many others cannot. Two months later, my case was dropped.

 

But even though that legal threat is in the past, the erosion of free speech continues to deeply concern me. I have increasingly come to the conclusion that the danger posed by allowing the state to decide what people may or may not say is far greater than any danger that could arise from the dissemination of even the most absurd opinions.

 

 

Wednesday, July 8, 2026

A Song of FIRE and ICE

By Kevin D. Williamson

Wednesday, July 08, 2026

 

Can we all agree that Todd Lyons is kind of a sissy?

 

The former acting director of ICE, the immigration enforcement agency that Donald Trump uses as his personal, occasionally homicidal goon squad, received an email nastygram from the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut, David Streever, who is exactly the kind of imposing, Jason Statham-esque tough guy you’d figure the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut is going to be. The email was pretty mild stuff—Shame on you, basically. Compared him to a Nazi, etc. Lyons, who has 22,000 armed agents at his disposal, was so freaked out that he sent ICE agents to Streeter’s house and then tracked him down while he was traveling with his 7-year-old daughter. The agents did their best Gestapo bit, informing the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut that his critical email might have violated the law and trying to get him to sign some baloney paperwork.

 

There is no threat in this email. You can read it here. There was no plausible reason for the armed response of a federal law enforcement agency to criticism of its acting director, who is, evidently, kind of sensitive.

 

We’re not talking here about the lunatic ravings of some genuinely scary and dangerous figure, like maybe the author of Best Bike Rides New Jersey. This is the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut.

 

In my work as a journalist, I am routinely threatened with everything from lawsuits to murder, as have many (perhaps most) people who do work similar to what I do. Some of those threats I worry about more than others. In an earlier part of my life, I did some consulting work for a corporate security firm, and I learned a fair bit about who targets business executives, government officials, and similar figures for kidnapping and terroristic violence. I am far from an expert on the subject, but I am pretty sure that the guy who is going to murder you is not the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut, returning from a trip to Finland with his 7-year-old daughter in tow.

 

You pansies.

 

As it turns out, the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut is not the only one ICE has targeted with its imbecilic intimidation tactics following a bit of good old-fashioned American First Amendment-protected criticism.

 

Paigelynne Gonyea, who reviews skincare products on TikTok, is another terrifying figure, apparently. (Perhaps Milla Jovovich will play her in the movie, or maybe Karen Gillan doing some John Wick-style gun-fu.) Along with the author of Best Bike Rides Connecticut, the lady who reviews skincare products on TikTok does not much approve of how ICE goes about its business—as it turns out, lots of Americans disapprove of reckless police violence leaving a trail of blood in the streets of American cities. ICE sent agents after the lady who reviews skincare products on TikTok, too. They showed up with some baloney paperwork in her case as well, and they told her to take down social media posts critical of Jonathan Ross, the feckless ICE thug who gunned down Renee Good. You’ll remember Renee Good of Minneapolis as the kind of terrifying brute that only a 37-year-old lesbian poet in a Honda Pilot can be. (Ronda Rousey will play her in the movie, surely.) And there are several other cases.

 

Our friends over at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), the free speech outfit our colleague David French used to run, have taken up the issue, filing a lawsuit in the case of the bike-rides guy. FIRE and ICE—I like the symmetry.

 

“Americans have a clear right to criticize government officials,” FIRE lawyer J.T. Morris told the Washington Post. “When federal agents come to your door and ask you to stop engaging in political speech,” Morris said, it “is an act of intimidation that the Constitution doesn’t tolerate.”

 

As the great political philosopher Ice-T once put it, the U.S. government cherishes “freedom of speech … just watch what you say.”

 

While I do worry daily about the national debt, I hope that FIRE succeeds in suing the tactical pants off of those sad-sack mall-ninjas over at ICE and then continues to sue their asses some more. I hope they run through a whole box of toner cartridges printing out their lawsuits. A self-respecting republic would put these bullies and incompetents  in jail—or at least in stocks. In the United States, we just sue our already strapped government.

 

(It doesn’t cost much to pillory somebody—just sayin’.)

 

But beyond the largely symbolic issue of monetary damages that are paid for by the same taxpayers who are being poorly served by ICE, what these pathetic federal specimens most deserve is Americans’ contempt—for abusing the power of their offices, for trampling on the First Amendment, and, most of all, for being such a bunch of whimpering ninnies. For Pete’s sake: If you’re going to swan around with your guns and your boots and your balaclava and your tactical underpants and whatnot: Cowboy up, Bubba.

 

Or if that’s too much, maybe just glow up. Because I know where you can get some good advice about skincare products and invigorating bicycle rides around the Nutmeg State.

Monday, June 29, 2026

Boko Haram, Beijing-Style

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, June 29, 2026

 

I can think of one good thing—and only one—to say about Boko Haram, the Nigerian jihadist militia: They practice truth in advertising. The Hausa word boko is simply a borrowing of the English word books, while haram is the familiar Arabic word meaning forbidden. What’s meant by the phrase is that Western education—non-Islamist education—is forbidden, but the literal meaning is something like a red interdictory circle: “NO BOOKS!”

 

The soldiers of Boko Haram look and act about like what you’d imagine when hearing the words “Nigerian jihadist militia”—a bunch of guys in camouflage fatigues and balaclava masks riding around in Toyota Hilux pickups with machine guns mounted on tripods in the bed, toting Kalashnikov rifles, raping and pillaging. But book haters come in all styles. There are even Western progressives who think of themselves as good liberals who will hoot and holler about books “banned” in the United States on Monday (there are no books banned in the United States) and then on Tuesday pressure Amazon to disappear books they do not want people to read—campaigns that often achieve shockingly easy success. (And here I will rehearse my observation, probably too often reiterated, about how easy it is to bully some of the planet’s richest men, including Jeff Bezos. What is the point of having “f—k you” money if you never say “f—k you”?) Under the constitutional principle of streitbare Demokratie, it is a crime to sell certain political books in otherwise liberal and open countries such as Austria. The practice in many European countries turns the American ideal expressed in the First Amendment on its head: While our free speech protections are principally about political speech and political publications, which, in theory, enjoy a higher level of protection than does controversial non-political expression (say, pornography), in much of Europe it is only political speech, political journals, political books, and political organizations—including political parties—that are the targets of specific prohibition.

 

Most book haters are bland little men in suits working in fluorescent-lit offices. They may not look like Boko Haram jihadists, but, ultimately, they enforce their diktats by sending out men with guns to shut down the bookstores, to stop the presses, or simply to murder those who say and write that which they do not wish to be said or written. Boko Haram and groups of that nature just cut out a lot of the middlemen.

 

The so-called People’s Republic of China once again has turned its attention to Hong Kong’s bookshops, locking up figures including Leticia Wong, proprietor of the Hunter Bookstore, for the crime of trafficking in “seditious” materials. Books considered seditious include biographies of Jimmy Lai (the businessman, newspaper publisher, and activist), as well as such classics as George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm. I can almost understand, from the point of view of purely calculating totalitarian amorality, the desire to suppress works about Jimmy Lai. But anybody with a lick of public relations sense would immediately see that banning 1984 and Animal Farm is simply a confession that the state has implemented precisely the kind of ghastly, repressive, hypocritical system Orwell was writing about: Yep, Orwell is talking about us. But, in a broader sense, the attempt to ban a book is always a confession of something: guilt, very often, but sometimes weakness. To take an obvious homegrown example: For a guy who claims not to care what the media says about him, Donald Trump sure seems to follow every adjective published in the New York Times and the Washington Post and spends a great deal of time denouncing journalists as “traitors” and “enemies of the people.”

 

(It’s a little like the emails I get from people telling me I am “irrelevant,” which I may very well be—but I don’t think the people writing me to tell me I am irrelevant think I am irrelevant. They aren’t writing to the people they think are irrelevant.)

 

Xi Jinping and his circle (to the extent that he has a circle rather than mere underlings, which is not always clear) often behave in ways that seem inexplicable and self-defeating, from petty things such as suppressing books about Jimmy Lai (not petty to Leticia Wong and others who have been jailed, disappeared, tortured, and murdered) to bigger, geopolitically consequential concerns such as Beijing’s idiotic abuse and betrayal of Hong Kong, which has, among other things, deepened the commitment of those in Taiwan resolved to resist absorption into the so-called People’s Republic. In 1997, the year of the British handover of Hong Kong, the autonomous territory was home to the wealthiest Chinese community in the world—more prosperous even than Singapore. Today, Singapore (which is about 76 percent ethnic Chinese) has a GDP per capita about 1.8 times that of Hong Kong—it is well on its way toward being twice as affluent as Hong Kong. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Beijing could have gone a long way toward effecting de facto unification with Taiwan under a “kill them with kindness” strategy based on the free movement of people, goods, and capital—if not for the fact that the Taiwanese can look to the example of Hong Kong and know that their booksellers would never be safe, that no level of prosperity, security, or fundamental political cooperativeness would ever be enough for Beijing, which demands nothing short of total submission.

 

Xi’s actions often seem perplexing and short-sighted. I am far from being an expert in these matters, but I am persuaded by those experts who argue that the key to understanding Xi’s political leadership is to keep in mind that he is exactly what he says he is: a true-believing socialist, mindful of 21st-century realities but rooted in Marxist-Leninist philosophy and committed to the principle of political control of the economy. Some of our naïve friends continue to tell us—forgive the cliché—that “real socialism has never been tried.” But that is precisely wrong: Real socialism is being practiced in China, just as real socialism was practiced in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Real socialism is here to be seen and examined—it is hypothetical socialism that has never been tried, because it is hypothetical, theoretical, and utopian.

 

Voguish American progressives make a great many arguments in favor of socialism, which is very much in fashion at the moment (not only in New York City), and almost all of those arguments amount to: “The idealized hypothetical version of my policy is preferable to the real-world version of your policy.” Indeed, a great deal of political debate is very little more than that, to the modest extent that policy per se is part of the discussion at all. Fascism is notoriously difficult to define, but probably the best way to think of it is that fascism is what people who think of themselves as fascists do when they have power, and, to the extent that the actions and beliefs of people who do not think of themselves as fascists or call themselves fascists resemble the actions and beliefs of the confessing fascists, these may be understood to a correspondent extent as fascistic or fascist-adjacent. The socialism of theoretical essays is one thing, but the socialism of history is a different thing—and reality isn’t optional.

 

Appending the word democratic in front of the word socialism serves mainly as a reminder that what the genuinely democratic socialist countries largely have in common is that they spent much of the last part of the 20th century using democratic means to drop the socialism: cf. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, etc. Countries that are both democratic and socialist generally stop being one of those things over time. That is not to say that they have, will, or should adopt the American model, which has problems of its own—there is more than one political arrangement consistent with free enterprise, free trade, property rights, entrepreneurship, etc.

 

The hated “neoliberals” were—and are—right that there exists a relationship between economic liberty and wider political liberty, even though it was not the case that the economic reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era and China’s partial economic integration with the rest of the world were in themselves sufficient to secure general political liberty for the Chinese people. The world is complex, but the relationship between economic freedom and intellectual freedom is real and lasting. Those little Hong Kong bookshops are an example of this: Without the freedom to buy and sell, the freedom to write and to speak is a relatively small and constrained thing.

 

Again, I do not say that everyone has to do things the American way. Vienna is not some totalitarian hellhole, even if the Austrians do not have a First Amendment or free speech rights that are as expansive as those we enjoy here in the United States. And here in the United States, it is always necessary to keep an eye on our property rights, which is where those who would restrict our speech tend to focus, the First Amendment itself being a mighty bulwark against the traditional kinds of formal censorship. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, we have heard no end of lamentation about the supposed corrupting influence of “money in politics.” But do you know what the Citizens United case was actually about? The question was whether a political group could show a film critical of a major-party presidential candidate before the election. During the course of the oral argument, the justices inquired as to whether the same line of thinking that could empower the government to forbid the showing of a film could be used to forbid the publication of a book or a pamphlet, and the government affirmed that yes, indeed, that was the case. The government in that matter was represented by Elena Kagan, then-solicitor general and now on the Supreme Court. Many of my colleagues over at Advisory Opinions and SCOTUSblog are great admirers of Kagan’s, but I remain suspicious of her. Some things really must remain non-negotiable. I do not put Elena Kagan in the same class as Xi Jinping—obviously, no more than I put today’s German book banners in the same category as the German book banners of 90 years ago. But it remains the case that the regulation of commerce is regulation of writing, speaking, and publishing—it always has been and always will be.

 

I myself would prefer to live in a world in which no boko is haram. Bookshops are civilized and civilizing places. Which is why they always eventually come under the bootheel of those who prefer bayonets to arguments.

 

Words About Words

 

I have been asked to weigh in on this several times, but I don’t think I can improve on Evelyn Lamb writing in Scientific American:

 

There is a phrase, or a type of phrase, that instantly causes me to feel like I’ve stumbled into Wonderland or some other topsy-turvy dream world. “X is n times less than Y” is the basic formulation, where X and Y are quantities that can be compared and n is some number, usually (but not always) a whole number.

 

Most recently, I encountered it in an article that stated that Spain’s maternal mortality rate is five times less than that of the USA. I don’t want to pick on that article alone, both because I don’t want to trivialize the problem of maternal mortality and because I see similar phrases everywhere. Actual growth of energy demand is three times lower than Duke Energy estimates. Graphene paper is six times lighter than steel. Relative risk ratio for immunological graft rejection is 15 times lower than DSEK (whatever that means). YouTube runs five times slower on Chrome than on Firefox. When I read one of these phrases, I can almost feel my brain rejecting it like an ill-fated transplant, perhaps one that used DSEK instead of an immunological graft.

 

…

 

When I first noticed my negative reaction to this type of phrase, I thought I just needed to think through the situations carefully, but I’ve come to the conclusion that my rejection is wholly warranted. Please, stop writing “three times less than” or “six times lighter than” or “twenty times thinner than.” Think of your long-suffering, literal-minded math writer friends and rewrite! “Steel is six times as heavy as graphene paper.” Thank you. Now I can continue my day without a pesky brain reboot.

 

People get funny about numbers, particularly when trying to communicate relative scale or importance. The desire to write something that sounds dramatic leads the clumsy writer astray. For example, you’ll read about a car collector who “owned more than 28 cars.” More than 28? Like, 29? Or like 2,849,999,431,291, which also is more than 28. Check my English-major theoretical mathematics here, but I think there is a whole infinity of numbers more than 28.

 

In Other Wordiness …

 

After? Must have been a heck of a bad day!

 

A woman in her 70s was critically injured after being shot while waiting at a bus stop in Orange County on Monday, according to the Orange County Sheriff’s Office.

 

I wonder what happened between the time she was shot and the time she was critically injured.

 

The New York Times writes that photographer Nancy Sheung “traveled across Hong Kong and East Asia” for her work. Well. I am not sure that traveling across Hong Kong was much of an accomplishment. For one thing, Hong Kong is only 24 miles long from north to south. You can travel across it pretty easily on a bicycle. For another—she lived in Hong Kong. I know what they meant to communicate—that she was a gallivanting free spirit. Just a weird way to write it.

 

In Closing

 

I don’t think I have particularly good manners, but I think about manners a fair bit, because I think they are important. There are two ways to have good manners: One is the kind of easy, natural grace that comes to people like my wife and other natural aristocrats—people who knew William F. Buckley Jr. well remarked about his easy, unshowy cordiality, his way of putting people at ease without making a show of it. The second way of having good manners—which can, for a certain kind of person, be at odds with the first—is knowing and following formal rules of etiquette and conduct. These are enormously important both for the person observing the rule and for the person to whom courtesy is being offered: Having agreed-upon expectations and rules saves us all the stress and anxiety of having to improvise these things in the moment.

 

I think of it like dancing: Whether it is square dancing in Arkansas or waltzing in Vienna, having set steps and forms and rules is, to my mind, vastly preferable to the kind of improvisational, make-it-up-as-you-go nightclub dancing that is what we mostly mean when we talk about dancing now. I think more people probably would dance, and would enjoy dancing, if the dancing were structured and they knew what to do. Certainly that is true for self-conscious types such as myself.

 

(I have square danced; I have never waltzed in Vienna or anywhere else, but I stand by my assumption.)

 

As I wrote above, it is the case that formalism can get in the way of the more genuine kind of courtesy. Allow me to introduce a touchy subject and a possibly unpopular opinion: I think that white people—especially middle-aged white men wearing suits, which is fully me on some days and at least partly me every day—should be like 11 percent more courteous than their baseline when interacting with black people they do not know. Is that condescending? Maybe. Probably. There’s a kind of stereotypical nice liberal who says, “I don’t see race.” I do. Do you know who else sees race? Every single black person I’ve ever asked about it. Admittedly, that’s a limited data set. I don’t think that’s necessarily a good thing or a bad thing—just a thing. A social reality. A little courtesy, gracefully deployed, can go a long way.

 

Many of you will have heard stories from black Americans about being trailed through shops as though they were suspected shoplifters or being treated badly in restaurants, finding it difficult to hail a cab back when hailing a cab was a thing, that sort of stuff. Allow me to introduce another related subject and an even more likely-to-be-unpopular opinion: I don’t think all those stories are true. Not all of them. But they are not based on nothing, either. There are certain social tensions that are simply a fact of life when it comes to race, and it is easy for misunderstandings to happen on either side of an interaction. Conversely, you will sometimes hear white people complain that some black person was rude or intentionally unhelpful to them in some social or commercial setting and that they suspect that race had something to do with this. And maybe they are right, at least some of the time, too. I think that being a little extra polite in such situations is a good idea: Err on the side of making people feel like they’re being treated with respect.

 

I don’t know that I need to rehearse my whole social résumé here, but suffice it to say that I have probably about the kind of racial psychological baggage that you would expect from a conservative white man born in the 1970s in the South (to the extent that West Texas really counts as the South) and had a lot of the characteristic experiences of that time, including being bused to a majority-black school in the third grade as part of a federal desegregation program. I try to be a person of goodwill and to treat people decently, and, of course, I think racism per se is both backward and evil.

 

But I will not claim to be so enlightened as to be free from sneaky little racial assumptions, one of which showed itself in an amusing way last week. (I know this story will not reflect well on me, but I tell unflattering stories about lots of people.) I was staying in a hotel in Baltimore and went to the elevator to go downstairs and get some coffee. A middle-aged black woman approached the elevator from the opposite direction wearing a blue smock and matching pants, kind of like scrubs, with her name printed on the front. I did not pay much attention. I stood aside at the elevator, said “After you,” and let her go in first. Tiny little act of courtesy, the sort of thing one does without really thinking about it. My brain registered that woman as hotel housekeeping staff, which I like to think had more to do with the uniform—the untucked top with the name printed on the front, etc.—than with her race. But, again, who really knows? Anyway, she steps onto the elevator, and there is a young white man wearing the same blue smock and scrub-ish pants who suddenly stands up very straight and says:

 

“Good morning, admiral!”

 

Who knew an admiral’s workaday uniform could be so casual?

 

I thought about that admiral for the rest of the morning. And what really stuck in my head wasn’t the question of race or sex—as important as these obviously are in American life—but the uniform. I don’t have any idea what her life has been like, but I’ll bet it was not easy to rise to that rank. I’ll bet she did some real hard things. If I had put in the work and the years to become an admiral, I’d probably dress like Cap’n Crunch. But that is not what her day called for. And, of course, the important stuff—service and sacrifice and honor and all the rest of it—isn’t in the epaulets and the fruit salad, and surely it is the case that an excessive interest in martial plumage and display—as in the case of Pete Hegseth, the secretary of thirst—speaks poorly of a military leader, the ideal type being not the showy and strutting George Patton but the modest, supremely capable Dwight Eisenhower.

 

(One can take that too far, as with the tech moguls who affect a college sophomore uniform of T-shirts and hoodies, albeit $500 T-shirts and $10,000 hoodies. The Silicon Valley sumptuary code is complicated and weird.)

 

I do think that our national racial anguish is often exaggerated, but, then, I don’t know what it looks like, how it feels, on the other side of that line. I know there is a line, and the brute fact of the line matters a great deal as a social reality. (“Thinking of a key, each confirms a prison.”) But I do know how it looks from over here, where, if I’m not paying very close attention and haven’t had my morning coffee, I might mistake an admiral for a housekeeper. There isn’t a thing in the world wrong with being a housekeeper, and a housekeeper is no less deserving of respect and courtesy, but different things are different things.

 

And there is something enviable in military manners: The rules are the rules, everybody knows what the rules are, uniforms are called uniforms for the reason of uniformity, and there is no obligation to pretend that there isn’t a hierarchy. It is an excellent thing to have reasonably well-thought-out rules.

 

And maybe a Cap’n Crunch hat would help out a few of us bleary-eyed and oblivious civilians.

Friday, June 26, 2026

Supreme Court Drives a Stake Through Hawaii’s ‘Vampire Rule’

By Charles C. W. Cooke

Thursday, June 25, 2026

 

In a 6–3 vote, the Supreme Court has struck down Hawaii’s “vampire rule” as a violation of the Second and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This was the right result, and, once again, it is a disgrace that the decision was not unanimous.

 

At stake was a Hawaiian statute, Act 52, that inverted the usual presumption that governs public access to generally accessible private property, but only where firearms are concerned. Prior to the passage of Act 52, Hawaiians who were able to obtain carry permits (which, before Bruen, was effectively impossible) were allowed to enter any generally accessible private space while carrying a firearm — unless the property owner explicitly signaled otherwise. After Act 52, Hawaiians with carry permits were allowed to enter any generally accessible private space while carrying a firearm only if the property had signaled that it was acceptable. (Gothic lore holds that vampires must be explicitly invited to enter one’s home before they may cross the threshold. Hence: “vampire rule.”)

 

As the Court correctly noted, this change — which was made directly after Bruen, and which shifted only the rules governing firearms, and no others besides — was explicitly designed to impede “the ability of law-abiding citizens to exercise the right Bruen recognized as they go about their daily lives.” That being so, it fell.

 

Writing for the majority, Justice Alito recorded that:

 

At common law, opening up private property to the general public implies a “license to all persons to enter,” meaning that “no person is a trespasser by merely entering therein” unless the property owner has given “due notice” that such a person is banned.

 

“Hawaii’s shift from the common-law rule,” Alito concluded, “unquestionably imposes a new and significant burden on the exercise of the right recognized in Bruen.”

 

During briefs and at oral argument, Hawaii offered up three main defenses of its law. The first defense was that it has historically had much stricter firearms laws than much of the rest of the United States. Alito dealt with that one quickly:

 

As the plurality explained in McDonald, the Second Amendment has the same meaning in all parts of the United States. 561 U. S., at 784–785. It cannot give way to “the spirit of Aloha” in Hawaii, contra, State v. Wilson, 154 Haw. 8, 27, 543 P. 3d 440, 459 (2024), any more than it can yield to the spirit of the Big Apple (Bruen) or the Windy City (McDonald).

 

Aloha, “spirit of Aloha.”

 

The second defense was that this wasn’t a Second Amendment case at all, but a property rights issue. This idea was picked up by Justice Jackson, who wrote in her dissent that the majority’s

 

bid to invoke the Constitution stumbles out of the gate—at step one of this Court’s Bruen test. There is no constitutional right to enter private property without the owner’s permission, let alone with a firearm.

 

But, as Justice Barrett responded in her concurrence, this cannot be true, given that the presumptive rule in question was passed by the government:

 

It is irrelevant, for purposes of the Amendment’s plain text, that a property owner has the right to exclude anyone who wishes to enter her property with firearms. No one doubts that all property owners in Hawaii could bar the carry of arms on their respective premises, if they wanted to. But the Second Amendment does not apply to private parties. It does apply to the States. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. And when a State enacts a property law that regulates arms-bearing conduct, that law implicates the Second Amendment.

 

(Barrett also asked the obvious question: If a state passed a law presumptively barring the wearing of a hijab on generally accessible private property, absent the owner’s explicit instructions to the contrary, would anyone seriously contend that that was purely a civil matter?)

 

The third defense — and, really, the only conceptually serious one — was that there are enough similar laws in America’s historical record to render Hawaii’s law acceptable under Bruen. But this, too, collapses once one digs into the details. The examples of supposedly comparable laws that Hawaii raised were:

 

1.      That many of the original states had anti-poaching laws that governed the carrying of firearms onto private property;

 

2.      That at the end of the 19th century, Oregon had a law barring the carrying of firearms onto “enclosed premises”;

 

3.      That — yes, this was really offered up — Louisiana’s postbellum Black Code existed.

 

Justice Kagan, who conspicuously declined to join Justice Jackson’s typically overwrought and overconfident dissent, took up the poaching laws in her own dissent, contending that:

 

That the old laws had a special (though by no means exclusive) concern with poaching does not matter. “The regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied” earlier generations. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 27 (2022). The key question is whether the challenged regulation is “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 692 (2024) (emphasis added). Here, the challenged law is consistent with those principles because it reflects, as the old laws did, the perceived “abuses, damages and inconveniences” that can be caused by persons carrying guns “on other people’s lands.”

 

This is a straightforward and comprehensible argument. But, quite obviously, it does not pass muster. That the poaching laws had a “special concern” is the whole ballgame.

 

As Justice Barrett observed:

 

Rather than identifying a specific threat to public peace and safety, Hawaii admits that it enacted the rule because many of its citizens oppose the public carry of guns. In other words, Hawaii is responding to the general danger associated with the presence of firearms, not to any specific, heightened risk of their misuse.

 

Under our constitutional system — as well as every relevant precedent — only one of these regulatory approaches is permissible. If it were otherwise, governments would enjoy carte blanche to ban guns everywhere. It is true, for example, that, since the revolutionary era, governments have banned firearms from polling places. But it does not follow from this that if the government can do that, it can do anything it likes.

 

What the existence of the anti-poaching laws shows is that governments may pass narrowly tailored laws to address particular problems, not that the government may selectively invert common law standards in retaliation against the enforcement of the Bill of Rights.

 

As for the Black Code argument, I can still scarcely believe that Hawaii — or Hawaii’s lawyer, Neal Katyal — brought them up. As Justice Alito pointedly remarked:

 

The statute Hawaii cites was part of Louisiana’s Black Code, and it provided a tool for disarming blacks and thus leaving them defenseless against attacks. See 125 F. 4th, at 1239 (VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). As we laid out in McDonald, the right to keep and bear arms was crucially important for vulnerable blacks during this period. See 561 U. S., at 757, 771, 776–779; id., at 843– 846 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). And this was well-understood by the Republicans in Congress who were responsible for drafting, approving, and securing the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Republican Party Platforms of 1856 and 1860 called for protection of the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Unless we put history entirely out of our minds, Hawaii’s claim that this tainted artifact illuminates the original understanding of the right to keep and bear arms cannot be taken seriously.

 

Indeed. “Well, your honor, we used to have a bunch of Jim Crow laws that crushed Reconstruction” is, sadly, true. But it is not an argument against the 14th Amendment or the rights that it applies against the states. How impotent and how peculiar progressive jurisprudence has become.

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Hell Is Other People, Especially Diddy

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, June 22, 2026

 

How has American culture changed since the 19th century? Consider this: John Wilkes Booth was a handsome celebrity whose career came to an end when he became an assassin, while Luigi Mangione is a handsome assassin whose career as a celebrity was launched by the assassination. It is, indeed, an upside-down world.

 

When I tell people about Luigi: The Musical—a current off-Broadway production about the handsome young prat who gunned down UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson—I get the same reaction from both sides of the political aisle and especially from the fundamentally apolitical: surprise that such a thing is permitted.

 

In the real world, Luigi Mangione, a morally illiterate, manifesto-writing child of privilege, presented his crime as an act of protest against the domination of the U.S. healthcare system by for-profit private insurance. Incarcerated for a time in the same facility as other high-profile prisoners such as Sean Combs and Sam Bankman-Fried—the situation in this situation-comedy musical—Mangione has become a sort of folk hero among a slice of the Bernie Sanders-aligned left, the intellectually vacuous foot soldiers of which enjoy having the itch of their free-ranging and bloodthirsty resentment scratched by a photogenic if callow young man. Luigi: The Musical aims to scratch that same itch in the pursuit of one kind of profit or another, and many people are understandably scandalized by this.

 

How are they even allowed to do that? people ask. Even here in the United States of America, the land of the First Amendment, the notion that people need permission to speak, to write, and to perform is deeply implanted. Can’t his family stop them from doing that? Aren’t they going to get sued? Who let them do this? Implicit in most of these responses, though not in all of them, is a belief that this performance should not have been allowed.

 

I myself am a partisan of free speech, as close to an absolutist on the issue as you will find. God bless America even if I don’t love the ubiquitous incest porn, etc.

 

So I do not have very much time for the question of whether this sort of thing should be allowed as a matter of law—of course it should. (There’s your line for the poster: “Probably should not be banned outright!” Kevin D. Williamson, The Dispatch. You’re welcome.) Americans do not need anybody’s permission to offer commentary—including stupid and distasteful commentary—about public events, and the assassination of Brian Thompson was a public matter and remains very much a live public controversy: The trial of his killer and the hero (yes, hero) of the new musical is under way even as I write.

 

You can go to the internet and find the worst sort of people making the worst sort of arguments about why Mangione’s murder of Thompson was not only morally permissible but morally necessary. Some of those imbeciles—many of them—are buying tickets to the new show, ensuring that its performances are generally sold out. Some of them wear T-shirts depicting Mangione as a Catholic saint; one fellow, sitting at my table in the cabaret-style (and Cabaret-style) venue wore a T-shirt emblazoned with Mangione’s image over the caption: “But, Daddy, I Love Him!” The number of occasions when a grown man should deploy the phrase, “But, Daddy!” is, in my admittedly conservative view, somewhat limited.

 

One step down from the question of whether such a performance should be allowed is the question of whether staging such a thing at all is in bad taste, which is itself separate from the question of whether this particular work is in bad taste.

 

Luigi: The Musical itself considers the question of whether such a performance might be in bad taste: Informed by a prison guard that he has become a celebrity and that there is even a musical about him, Luigi is offended and incredulous, demanding to know what kind of monsters would buy tickets to such a travesty—a line delivered with an accusing glance at the audience, which, unless I am very much mistaken, was disproportionately peopled by middle-aged gay men of the Very Online variety. There were moments when the mood was very much that of a strip club (there is a fair bit of skin on display, though nothing obscene in that particular sense)  and it seemed to me that the jeering, leering members of the audience were not entirely in on the joke—that they are at least as much an object of criticism here as is the role of for-profit insurance companies in our healthcare system. But, then, people with bad taste rarely are aware that they have bad taste—and the worst of them do not have anybody around who loves them enough to tell them so. There is a reason dictator chic is so tacky.

 

In a similar way, moral monsters always believe that they are the heroes of the story, not the villains. John Wilkes Booth thought he was a patriot and a hero. So did Timothy McVeigh. So, presumably, does Luigi Mangione. Mangione will always have his admirers. So does McVeigh. So does Booth.

 

My instinctive reaction to the question of whether staging such a performance as Luigi is in bad taste was: Yes, of course it is, and this is an example of the sort of thing that should not be done even though it may be, and must be, permitted. But I think my instinct there probably is wrong. There is a long and mostly proud tradition of offering humorous commentary, often dark and satirical, about horrifying events, often published before the blood is even quite dry and with no thought of waiting until the matter is legally resolved or for whatever we might judge to be a decent interval. The Roman pasquinade is one of the foundation stones of modern journalism, and no one seems to be very much upset by headline-driven humor such as Saturday Night Live’s beloved “Weekend Update” feature or the old Colbert Report—we do seem to very strongly prefer that such commentary be packaged as ersatz television news programming, for some reason. Perhaps we find the form psychologically reassuring.

 

But, if you will forgive such obvious and elevated points of comparison, Virgil surely had current imperial affairs in mind when he was writing the Aeneid, and Shakespeare was keenly aware when writing such works as Richard III that his characters represented near relatives of his sovereign and sometime customer, Elizabeth I, some of whom died badly. (Virgil and Shakespeare were involved in broadly identical political projects: legitimizing the regime.) Somewhere between the Aeneid and Luigi we might look to the Å“uvre of Mel Brooks, who was very bold in his treatment of racism, antisemitism, and the career of Adolf Hitler, among other subjects. (“You couldn’t make Blazing Saddles today,” an admirer once told Brooks, who retorted: “You couldn’t make it then.”) The murder of Brian Thompson is not funny, and the Holocaust was not funny—but The Producers is funny.

 

Which raises the real question: Is Luigi: The Musical any good?

 

***

 

Luigi: The Musical has been so roundly denounced as a moral failure that someone must point out—and I suppose it falls to me—that it also is an artistic failure.

 

That isn’t the indictment it might sound like: Most plays and musicals are artistic failures. Even the masters only rarely strike gold. Bob Dylan has written, by some counts, around 1,000 songs, and there’s a reason you know only four of them. Luigi offers several moments of real intelligence, wit, and charm. Unfortunately, these are too few and too far between, the dried cranberries in some otherwise pretty bland trail mix. Every show of this kind is a blend of the real stuff and filler, and the better ones are the ones with the better proportions in the mix. Comedy is very hard to write and harder still to write quickly—there is a reason that so little humor stays funny for more than a few months. And I tip my hat to the authors here for even attempting to write satire in times such as these, which seem to me to be quite beyond parody. I don’t know that even Tom Wolfe would have been up to it.

 

So, a failure. But how and why?

 

T.S. Eliot famously argued (in “Hamlet and His Problems”) that Hamlet is an artistic failure, a result of Shakespeare’s having taken on a theme that he was not capable of adequately treating on stage: maternal sexual guilt. Hamlet the character may be a psychological puzzle, Eliot argues, but Hamlet the play is a dramatic mess, particularly in its treatment of the prince’s neurotic inability to act, which is treated more straightforwardly in the material Shakespeare borrowed from, notably Thomas Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy. (Eliot is among those who hypothesize that Kyd wrote a lost ur-Hamlet.) Luigi: The Musical may not merit so rarefied a line of comparison, but it exhibits much the same problem: The authors are so bewitched by Luigi the character that they treat him as only an object of fascination (albeit a fascination that alternates between admiration and revulsion) rather than as a part of a dramatic whole. There is very much a sense that this is Luigi vs. everybody else, that Luigi is not only the star of the show but effectively in a different show from the rest of the characters. That leaves his sudden final descent into sympathy-forfeiting, plainly stated homicidal megalomania disconnected from the wider arc of the story—which, I probably should mention at this point, contains two musical numbers about McDonald’s hashbrowns, the greasy treat that was the proximate cause of the murderer’s falling into the hands of the law.

 

Our story picks up when Mangione is incarcerated in a special New York facility for high-profile prisoners: a celebrity wing, in effect, where Mangione was, in reality, held for a time alongside crypto fraudster Sam Bankman-Fried and entertainment mogul Sean Combs, aka Diddy. In the real world, Bankman-Fried was convicted of fraud and currently is campaigning for a pardon from Donald Trump, who previously pardoned crypto-criminal Changpeng Zhao after firms controlled by the Chinese billionaire went into business with firms controlled by Trump’s family. Combs was convicted on relatively minor sex crimes (Mann Act offenses) and acquitted of the more serious charges he faced. Combs also is campaigning for a presidential pardon, but Trump says this would be “difficult” given that Combs has said things at times that have hurt the president’s feelings. (Like I said: beyond parody.)  In the musical, both Bankman-Fried and Combs end up pardoned by the president, which is, if unlikely, far from beyond imagining.

 

Mangione is forced into an awkward three-way relationship with Bankman-Fried and Combs, in whom he sees both that which he hates (greed, corruption, exploitation) and that which he is becoming (a celebrity). Mangione is played by Mike Cefalo, who sings well enough and whose comedic gifts are considerable. He begins with a song in which he rehearses, in a musical litany, all the ways in which he is an incompetent criminal: “I shouldn’t have pulled my mask down,” “I shouldn’t have had those hashbrowns,” “I shouldn’t have driven around the country with a backpack full of guns and my manifesto and fake IDs,” etc. It is the best and most memorable song in the show, marked by a pleasing sort of Jim Steinman grandiosity that composer Arielle Johnson applies to most of Luigi’s music—appropriate inasmuch as one of Cefalo’s main jobs in the show is to stand there shirtless as a hunk of meatloaf while the audience hoots and slavers.

 

By contrast, Bankman-Fried’s big number, “Bay Area Baby,” is too long and repetitious. Diddy sniffs at the notion that Bankman-Fried is a celebrity at all: “There’s a reason you have so much more exposition than the rest of us!” he sneers. But it seems to me that the more likely reason is that the character is played by Andre Margatini, one of the show’s principal writers.

 

Cefalo, as the characters in the play observe in a moment of meta-awareness, resembles Mangione. Combs, on the other hand, is played by a woman, Chine Ikoro, while Bankman-Fried is played by the aforementioned Andre Margatini, who uses male pronouns and boasts of being “mid-transish.” Margatini’s Bankman-Fried is a sexless social incompetent whose irritating disquisitions on crypto and repeated rhetorical flights into business-school jargon are announced by the band’s vamping on the soft jazz chords of classic elevator music. One of the show’s (excessively) repeated jokes is his going on about “effective altruism” only to be misunderstood by Combs, who thinks he is talking about autism—“They can test you for that!” Ikoro is pretty good as a louche Combs—whose ecstatic fantasy about a post-prison party with flowing champagne is suddenly sidetracked by a sharp turn into “a room full of goats”—but her role is underwritten, the jokes are superficial and a little obvious, and it is especially disappointing that the only genuinely musical figure in the show gets so little in the way of memorable or inventive music. By contrast, there is a bit too much Bankman-Fried, and his songs could use some merciless editing by someone who is not in love with them.

 

So: Pretty good, at least in spots, but not very good.

 

It is necessary to keep separate the question of the show’s merits as a musical and the question of its morality or propriety. There were many objections to The Death of Klinghoffer, John Adams’ opera about the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship by the Palestinian Liberation Front, during which the terrorists murdered Leon Klinghoffer, a partly paralyzed Jewish American who relied on a wheelchair. If you would like to hear a preview of those who justify Luigi Mangione’s actions, Klinghoffer’s real-world murderers can oblige: “I chose Klinghoffer, an invalid, so that they would know that we had no pity for anyone,” the leader of the group said, “just as the Americans, arming Israel, do not take into consideration that Israel kills women and children of our people.” The complaints about The Death of Klinghoffer were complaints about its propriety and decency, not complaints about its music.

 

My own view is that, in general, there isn’t any point to trying to apply a social or moral criterion to works such as this. What happens in a play or a musical happens within the four corners of the stage just as what happens in a film stays within the four corners of the screen; it may refer to events and people in the real world, but it has no bearing on these as a dramatic work. Oliver Stone’s Nixon is probably the best film to have been made about American politics, but it has nothing to do with the life and times of Richard M. Nixon. Richard III probably was not the kind of villain he is in Richard III, but Shakespeare worked in drama, not in history or in political philosophy.

 

Luigi: The Musical may be different in that it takes as its material events that are still unresolved—as noted, Mangione’s trial is in the news, and the accused recently withdrew his plans to offer a psychiatric defense—and it takes a particular kind of cruelty (cruelty here understood as a species of indifference) to offer up a series of gags based on the assumption that Brian Thompson, husband and father of two sons who were teen-agers at the time, had it coming. And Luigi does lean into that notion when it is convenient, with the audience lustily cheering Luigi’s series of “Dear Manifesto” songs, in which his rationalizations and justifications for the murder are offered as self-evidently legitimate. The show also offers a critique of that notion when convenient, especially in the show’s closing number. That is not necessarily the wrong thing to do, but there is a world of difference between emphasizing and exploring that kind of tension and simply trying to ignore or evade it, which is what it seems to me the authors too often do here.

 

Luigi: The Musical, being dramatically incoherent, wants to have it both ways, offering the murder of Thompson as justifiable and justified while simultaneously presenting Mangione and—especially—his leering admirers as stunted grotesques.

 

The show grows up all of a sudden in its final number, with Bankman-Fried and Combs turning into a kind of AEI-pundit chorus singing about the complexity of policy trade-offs and the difficulty of reforming institutions in meaningful ways while Mangione sings about his plan to shoot people until there is peace and justice and equality upon the land. Why join a movement that is about other people and their boring policy papers when I can do something exciting that is all about me? he asks. The authors of Luigi are not obviously fools, but they do not have the sophistication or the intellectual courage to apply the emotionally organizing wisdom of the climax to the rest of the proceedings, which makes a mess of things.

 

There are those bits of self-awareness, of course: The show has them even if the audience does not. As the people who were seated next to Shia LaBeouf at Cabaret can tell you, it sometimes is the case that the audience is even more disconnected from reality than are the actors on the stage. If I could have waved a wand and disenfranchised the entire audience of Luigi, it would have been an act of democratic hygiene. Unlike the authors of Luigi, they did not seem to have the good sense to be half-ashamed.

 

A little bit of shame is a good thing for moral development, but it is deadly to comedy.

 

***

 

Can one joke about a murder? Can one joke about a murder before the corpse is even cold?

 

Yes. But the joke has to land.

 

Readers of National Review (which was my journalistic home for about 15 years) will know that the magazine begins with a section called “The Week” (a holdover from the brief period during which National Review was a weekly magazine) and that “The Week” begins with a short joke. But the news does not always put one in a joking frame of mind, and that was the case for the issue of December 17, 1963, following on the heels of the assassination of President John Kennedy.

 

The murder itself had caused a great psychological convulsion throughout the country, and the editors of National Review surely were acutely aware that there already was under way an effort to lay Kennedy’s assassination—by a communist—at the feet of the American right, with Dallas—“the city that willed the death of the president”—standing in for anti-Kennedy conservatives at large. Earl Warren, then the chief justice of the Supreme Court, insisted that Kennedy had been killed by “the hatred and bitterness that has been injected into the life of our nation by bigots,” while Mrs. Kennedy is reported to have refused to change out of her blood-stained clothes, insisting: “I want the world to see what Dallas has done to my husband.” Crackpots such as Oliver Stone still insist that the death of Kennedy was a right-wing plot. Making a joke out of that material was a very delicate thing, and the editors settled on what is now one of the magazine’s most famous lines: “The editors of National Review regretfully announce that their patience with President Lyndon B. Johnson is exhausted.”

 

That was, in my judgment, just about perfect. It acknowledges that National Review was a critic of Kennedy and would continue that line of criticism rather than being dishonestly shamed into self-censorship; it invokes the image of Lyndon Johnson, an inherently comical figure; and, like the best of such jokes, it provides a kind of Platonic catharsis, acting to drain the tension out of an emotionally difficult situation.

 

Sarah Silverman’s famous joke about being raped by a doctor—“so bittersweet for a Jewish girl”—works only because it is shameless both in composition and in delivery: economical, shocking, ruthless. Silverman wrote and delivered the line with perfect artistic confidence; for a point of contrast, consider Pete Davidson’s half a dozen never-quite-there attempts to come up with a good joke about the death of his father, a fireman, in the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. Davidson never really lands that one, because there is always a palpable sense—entirely understandable—that he himself thinks it isn’t really funny. National Review’s joke after Kennedy’s death was both a good joke and an announcement that the editors would decline to be blamed for Lee Oswald’s crime.

 

Oswald would go on to become a kind of literary figure. In the early 1990s, there was a play (which even the internet has forgotten) performed in Austin called Texans and Their Guns, a purgatorial conversation among three famous marksmen from the Lone Star State: Oswald, his epigone John Hinckley Jr., and Charles Whitman, the sniper who helped to usher in the modern age of theatrical mass murder from his perch atop the Paul Philippe Cret’s famous clocktower at the University of Texas. (Trivia: It was not Whitman’s homicidal spree that caused the tower to be closed to the general public, a decision that was taken nearly a decade later in response to a string of suicides.) Three horrible men trapped together, each of them forced to see the worst of himself reflected in the others: The structural similarity to Luigi is obvious enough, and the form is not uncommon—No Exit is the textbook example, and few plays have produced an epigram so memorable—or so true—as “Hell is other people.”

 

Oswald is, in the right hands, a character with a good deal of comic potential: See, for example, Don DeLillo’s Libra. (Not a comic novel, but very funny in places.) But I imagine that a jokey play about Oswald looked different to, say, Mike Quinn, who taught media law at the University of Texas when Texans and Their Guns was being performed and who had been present at the assassination as a reporter for the Dallas Morning News. Richard Linklater’s Slacker, a love letter to Austin, contains a comical manic reverie about the Whitman massacre, and surely the 1990 film was seen by at least a few people who had been personally present for that event. I thought the scene was hilarious—maybe those who witnessed Whitman’s murders felt differently.

 

Or maybe they appreciated it all the more.

 

My former National Review colleague Kat Timpf has a book about this subject, titled You Can’t Joke About That: Why Everything Is Funny, Nothing Is Sacred and We’re All in This Together. She has been through some grisly stuff and has written some good jokes about it. Being a comedian herself, she gets to the heart of the matter: You can joke about anything—but make it a good joke.

 

***

 

The tricky part in keeping the moral questions separate from the aesthetic questions is that they are not entirely separate. I do not take very seriously the notion that forms of entertainment such as popular music and video games are morally consequential at the social level—the dumbest version of that argument is that we have so much crime and sexual misbehavior and drug abuse because of music or video games “glorifying” that sort of thing, when the truth is that the music and the video games are the result of the same deep culture that produces the real-world social dysfunction, with entertainment having relatively little power to shape that deep culture. He would never have done that awful thing if he hadn’t seen it on television, or if he hadn’t played at doing it in a video game first, or hadn’t talked to an AI chatbot about it—these are principally psychiatric propositions, medical claims, not moral claims. Even the less dumb versions of the argument do not seem to me very persuasive.

 

But moral tension, moral complexity, and moral coherence are artistic and literary considerations as well: A story that relies on being situated in a particular moral universe has to respect the rules of that moral universe in the same way that a work of science fiction has to follow the relevant rules of science in order to succeed on its own artistic terms. That morality has to be legible enough that characters’ interactions with it—and violations of it—make dramatic sense. Some people will argue that such considerations may be set aside when it comes to light entertainment or to comedy at large, but that gets it exactly wrong: The lighter the entertainment, the more need for sturdy and reliable foundations. The classic comedy of manners, for example, can only succeed where the authors have the necessary moral lucidity to represent the hypocrisy or dishonest social conventions that they are writing about—it is a question of control, the difference between chasing an emotional effect and summoning one. There is a lot of chasing in Luigi. It is uneven in the way sketch comedy shows are uneven, being the work of too many authors with too much time to fill and not enough good ideas to go around. Its occasional slides into didacticism—the smug moral preening about the healthcare industry—are the worst bits, which is no surprise: The authors and their critics predictably fall into the same kind of clumsy moralizing.

 

All that said, I am pleased in a sense that Luigi exists. (Another line for the poster: “Does not merit total ontological erasure!” Kevin D. Williamson, The Dispatch.) It will contribute nothing at all to the debate about healthcare financing in the United States and may very well make that debate a little dumber and angrier, if such a thing is possible. But it is something I would like to see more of: It is, among other things, a work of theater that is not written for theater critics or for theatrical writers, its ambitions being instead genuinely popular. God save us from “relevance” in these things, but, at the same time, it does seem as though the only books of poetry that are bought and read in the United States are bought and read by people who write books of poetry or want to write them, the poets having become a kind of guild and consequently having lost the ability to connect with general readers along with the sense that doing so is either necessary or desirable. There is a liveliness at work in Luigi that I hope will find its way into other, better work.

 

I do not have much hope for the political conversation, such as it is, in the United States. At the risk of sounding as though I have gone Marxist, this is a case in which the means of production is truly the controlling cultural force: As long as social media continues to be the dominant mode of communication and debate, the conversation is going to be stupid. Brevity and immediacy are wondrous weapons for the witty and the wise, but for the demos at large the unfiltered and unconsidered nature of social media discourse makes it the rhetorical equivalent of a crate of hand grenades in the hands of a methed-up chimpanzee. Coriolanus, probably completed sometime in 1608, supposedly was written in part as a response to the Midland Revolt of 1607. Shakespeare was a fast writer, but he probably spent at least a few months working on the great play. Many pasquinades were written in the form of Petrarchan sonnets, which even for the deftest versifier take a little bit of time to write. A half-assed musical is a more considered thing than the typical Bluesky post. It takes a little work.

 

And taking our time, putting in a little work—not the worst thing to do in times such as these, no?