War Is Coming Back to Gaza

By Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib

Tuesday, November 04, 2025

 

In a recent interview with the BBC, King Abdullah II of Jordan posed an uncomfortable question. “What is the mandate of security forces inside of Gaza?” he asked. Peacekeeping might be viable, but, he warned, “if it’s peace-enforcing, nobody will want to touch that.”

 

His comments left me feeling deeply conflicted. On the one hand, they echoed an old pattern, in which Arab countries voice their support for the goals of the Palestinian people, such as gaining statehood or disarming Hamas, but show no inclination to do the heavy lifting themselves. On the other hand, King Abdullah is surely correct that no Arab or Muslim country will want to place its soldiers between Hamas and the Israel Defense Forces. Enforcing the cease-fire against Hamas would risk it being cast as the aggressor against the terror organization, which enjoys significant support within these countries’ radicalized populations.

 

The cease-fire process seems to have stalled, especially with respect to Hamas’s disarmament, which is a core component of Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the conflict and transform Gaza. The terror group, which regularly speaks of its unwillingness to disarm, has made clear that it wants to maintain its security dominion over the Strip, even if it does not directly govern it. Hamas has retaken full control of the part of Gaza west of the “yellow line” that marks the extent of the Israeli withdrawal from the coastal enclave.

 

In fact, Hamas lost no time in taking the offensive against clans and any individuals it identified with opposition to its rule, real or perceived. It used obscene public executions and vile displays of violence to instill fear and trepidation among the population. With each passing day, Hamas further re-entrenches its control. The group is collecting unexploded munitions in order to rearm, reestablishing command and control across its different units, repairing damaged tunnels, and ensuring that its grip on power is never threatened from within by Gaza’s exhausted and deeply traumatized population. Furthermore, the terror group is influencing the transitional process by insisting on having a say over appointments to the technocratic committee tasked with administering Gaza’s affairs.

 

Hamas’s intransigence is placing the cease-fire under untenable strain. If Israel becomes convinced that Gaza is headed back to the situation that prevailed on October 7, then no amount of “Bibi-sitting” by U.S. officials will prevent Israel from acting unilaterally. Even Trump himself has signaled that his commitment to the war’s end is contingent on Hamas disarming and sticking to the agreed-upon framework.

 

Yet a return to war by the Israeli military would extend the unimaginable suffering inflicted on the people of Gaza, and the condemnation of the international community. The IDF’s application of overwhelming firepower produces mass casualties, and any resumption of the fighting would endanger what little remains of Gaza’s already heavily damaged infrastructure.

 

***

 

In my conversations with those engaged with the process, I’ve found two schools of thought about disarmament. Some countries believe that a political process must come first, establishing transitional governance to provide legitimacy and cover for disarmament. Other players, however, insist that disarmament must commence first, or else any political process will be subjected to Hamas’s interference, and to arm-twisting by those who can exert influence with their guns and tunnels. The latter have the stronger case. A credible political process cannot be established without first sidelining Hamas’s munitions and armaments, which are the only remaining source of leverage for the terror group and its rule in the Gaza Strip.

 

But if an international stabilization force is a political mirage that has no realistic chance of working as envisioned in Trump’s plan, the Palestinian Authority is incapable of taking on Hamas, local Israeli-backed militias in Gaza are all too weak to prevail without direct Israeli support, and the war-battered population is too afraid and tired to revolt against Hamas, then who could possibly take on what remains of Hamas to disarm it and decommission its extensive tunnel network?

 

Private military contractors are likely the only viable option to make the stabilization force remotely feasible and capable of implementing the mandate everybody wants. They can form the strike component of the force that will be necessary in the initial deployment phase. PMCs can operate free from some political constraints. They can hire individuals with extensive experience in military, policing, and security, and can deploy without requiring a significant footprint. On the ground, they can focus on close-quarters combat without the overwhelming application of firepower by an air force, thereby minimizing civilian casualties.

 

PMCs have a problematic track record, including Blackwater in Iraq and those used in Gaza during the food and aid distribution of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. But PMCs have also been the backbone of numerous operations run by the United States, NATO, Arab and Muslim countries, and nations in the Global South.

 

Furthermore, PMCs that operate in close proximity to civilians typically require personnel to undergo extensive training in human rights, crowd management, anti-trafficking, and anti-exploitation measures, and to abide by a code of conduct. They also vet their operators, and monitor compliance, to ensure that these principles are actually implemented and followed. I saw this firsthand with one of the companies involved in securing the GHF’s distribution sites, and heard how it had addressed some of its initial mistakes and challenges, and many of its operators worked to make it apparent that they were up to the task.

 

PMCs could enter zones still under Israeli control, clearing them of Hamas’s weapons and tunnels, and then Arab and international forces could operate inside those zones to keep the peace once it is established. PMCs could also venture beyond the “yellow line” into areas of Gaza where Hamas is still in control, methodically clearing and then holding territory before handing control over to international forces. Bit by bit, they can clear the Strip. Once secured, these areas can commence clearing rubble, removing unexploded munitions, and restoring basic services. Other local, regional, and international providers can move in to bolster a gradual process of reconstruction.

 

The people of Gaza desperately need pragmatic solutions. PMCs offer the best chance to implement the “clear, hold, and build” strategy that can restore security to the Strip. Only when Hamas is disarmed, and the people of Gaza are freed from its dominion, can they begin to create the future they deserve.