The Hurdles to Democracy in Iran

By Jianli Yang

Wednesday, March 04, 2026

 

As the United States and Israel began bombing Iran as part of Operation Epic Fury on Saturday, President Trump laid out an ambitious vision. In a phone interview with the Washington Post, he said, “All I want is freedom for the people,” underscoring that the ultimate aim is not merely deterrence or retaliation, but a political transformation in Tehran. He has spoken in terms that leave little doubt: The desired end state is a change of regime — one that produces a democratic government guaranteeing liberty to the Iranian people.

 

That is an extraordinarily high bar for a military operation. History offers no clear precedent of air strikes alone ushering in a stable democracy in a deeply entrenched authoritarian state. When force has toppled regimes, the aftermath has more often yielded disorder, civil conflict, or a new form of authoritarian rule. In Iran’s case, the structural conditions make democracy perhaps the least likely outcome of a bombing campaign. The death of its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, alone will not simply dissolve the Islamic Republic, a layered system with clerical authority, parallel security institutions, and a deeply embedded Revolutionary Guard — though strikes on dozens of other senior figures certainly help toward that end.

 

Yet the war has begun. Debates about its constitutional footing under American law will continue, but once military action is underway, reversing course becomes politically difficult. Congress may voice concern, but halting operations midstream is rarely easy. Given that reality, those of us who have long opposed dictatorships worldwide and advocated democratic freedom can only hope that the Iranian people find within this perilous moment an opening to advance their own aspirations. If democracy is to emerge from this crisis, the United States and the broader democratic world must think carefully about how to help — and what that truly entails.

 

Scholars often point to social, economic, and cultural preconditions for democratization. These matter, but they seldom determine outcomes in revolutionary moments. Drawing on lived experience from Tiananmen, decades of efforts to advance democratic change in China, and lessons from democratic revolutions across regions and eras, I have come to believe that four concrete conditions are decisive.

 

First, there must be broad and deep dissatisfaction with the existing political order, accompanied by a clear demand for change. Second, a viable democratic opposition must arise from that dissatisfaction. Third, a visible rift must open within the ruling establishment — among elites, institutions, or the security apparatus. Fourth, there must be meaningful international support grounded in liberal values and strategic calculation, based on a belief that the democratic alternative is credible.

 

Iran clearly satisfies the first condition. Years of political repression, economic hardship, corruption, and curtailed personal freedoms have eroded public confidence in the ruling system. Even before the most recent wave of harsh crackdowns on protesters, public sentiment surveys and anecdotal evidence suggested that enthusiasm for the governing structure was thin. Subsequent unrest and the state’s response have further weakened what limited consent the regime could claim. The desire for dignity, opportunity, and accountable governance runs deep across generational and social lines.

 

Iran also partially meets the fourth condition. Democratic governments have spoken with unusual clarity about the Islamic Republic’s abuses. President Trump’s language of “freedom” places the conflict in moral as well as strategic terms. Israel has framed its strikes as defensive but has also underscored the distinction between the Iranian people and the regime that governs them. Across Europe and North America, leaders have repeatedly expressed solidarity with Iranian citizens seeking greater liberty. Such signals are not trivial. They shape internal calculations among authoritarian elites about the costs of repression and the prospects for survival.

 

But the second condition points to a core problem. Protesters’ anger is palpable; organization is not. Courage can fill the streets, yet coordination and leadership are harder to build under surveillance and repression. Iran’s opposition is not a unified, armed, or strategically synchronized force. Activists operate under constant threat. Networks are disrupted. Exiled groups and domestic reformers often distrust one another. In this environment, transforming diffuse discontent into a coherent political alternative is enormously challenging.

 

The third condition — an open split within the regime — has not yet clearly materialized, either. Senior clerics, commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and key political figures have thus far presented a united front in public. Without elite defections or institutional fractures, even large-scale protests encounter a hard ceiling. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use force to maintain control. Moreover, the system does not hinge on a single individual. Even if top leaders are removed, succession mechanisms and parallel power centers remain. Iranian officials have long anticipated external pressure and domestic unrest; contingency planning is part of the regime’s DNA.

 

If the U.S., Israel, and other democratic actors genuinely wish to help Iran avoid chaos and move toward freedom, their efforts must concentrate on strengthening the elements of the second and third conditions. Authoritarian systems rarely fall simply because crowds gather. They falter when loyalty fractures. The task, therefore, is to make defection conceivable and repression costly.

 

That means raising the personal and political price of violence for those who order it, while lowering the risks for those who refuse. Targeted accountability against specific perpetrators — rather than sweeping collective punishment — can sharpen internal divisions. At the same time, credible assurances that individuals who step back from repression will not automatically face collective retribution can alter calculations. International actors should amplify dissenting voices within Iran’s political, clerical, and even security institutions, turning private misgivings into visible disagreement. Just as important is careful signaling that distinguishes between the regime and the nation, reassuring wavering officials that Iran’s sovereignty and dignity will be respected in any transition.

 

The second condition — building a viable democratic opposition — is arguably the hardest. A successful movement does not require a single charismatic leader, but it does require a recognizable leadership core capable of articulating a shared narrative and a plausible post-authoritarian plan. Iran’s opposition is brave but fragmented, divided by ideology, geography, and mutual suspicion between activists inside the country and those abroad. Without at least a minimally agreed roadmap addressing civil liberties, minority protections, transitional justice, and economic stabilization, revolutionary energy dissipates.

 

The Arab Spring offers sobering lessons. In Egypt, mass demonstrations forced an autocrat from office, yet democrats were sidelined in the transition because they were divided and poorly organized. Power first shifted to a disciplined Islamist movement and later to an even more cohesive military establishment. The faces changed; authoritarian rule returned. Revolutions can remove regimes, but organization determines who governs afterward.

 

In Iran, should the clerical system collapse abruptly, the most plausible near-term scenarios are not liberal democracy but state fragmentation or consolidation of power by the IRGC, which possesses organizational coherence, resources, and a nationwide security network. A transition without preparation could empower the most structured actor in the field. For that reason, international efforts should focus not only on uniting democratic opposition forces but also on constraining the coercive capacity of hard-line security institutions.

 

Finally, the Trump administration’s messaging should consider how the Iranian people perceive its calls for “freedom.” Support for Iranians must center on their right to self-government; if democracy is perceived as a vehicle for foreign advantage, it will be rejected as unpatriotic.

 

Moments like this open narrow and dangerous windows in which history accelerates. Public dissatisfaction is clear, and international attention is unusually intense. Whether this episode leads toward freedom or toward deeper tragedy will hinge on organization, elite fractures, and principled international support. Military force alone cannot create democracy. But if wisely aligned with internal agency and genuine solidarity, it might yet widen a path that Iranians themselves choose to walk.