The West Must Start Preparing for Ukrainian Reconstruction

By Gregory W. Slayton & Sergei Ivashenko

Sunday, January 04, 2026

 

Support for Ukraine has rightly focused on the battlefield. Weapons deliveries, intelligence sharing, sanctions enforcement, and diplomatic pressure have all been framed around a single imperative: ensuring Russia does not succeed in its attempt to conquer a sovereign European nation by force. Yet victory is not defined solely by where the front line ends. A war is truly won only when the peace that follows is durable, which means the West must begin preparing now for Ukrainian reconstruction.

 

For some, this may sound premature. Russia continues to launch major missile and drone attacks almost nightly. The Kremlin continues to trumpet fake victories in long-contested cities such as Kupiansk and Pokrovsk, even though they do not control them and are losing an estimated 1,000 soldiers per day. Elections loom across Europe and the United States, with public patience for continued large-scale support for Ukraine wearing thin in many quarters. But postponing reconstruction planning until after the shooting stops would be a strategic error. History offers a clear lesson: the shape of postwar recovery often determines whether victory endures or collapses into instability.

 

Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign, democratic, Western-aligned state depends on whether the peace can hold after fighting stops so that Ukrainians can rebuild their lives, refugees can return home, the economy can recover, and corruption and oligarchic activity can be kept at bay. If these challenges are mishandled, Russia will not need tanks to undermine Ukraine’s future. It will wait for frustration, poverty, and disillusionment to do the work instead.

 

From a Western perspective, reconstruction is not charity. It is strategy. A functioning Ukrainian state anchored in European institutions is the strongest possible refutation of Russian revanchism. Conversely, a shattered, aid-dependent Ukraine would remain vulnerable to coercion, political sabotage, and renewed aggression. Reconstruction, done properly, locks in the gains made on the battlefield.

 

The scale of this task is enormous. Ukrainian infrastructure has been deliberately targeted: power grids, ports, railways, housing, schools, and hospitals have been damaged or destroyed. Entire cities have been reduced to rubble. Millions of citizens have fled abroad. The World Bank estimates reconstruction costs approaching $1 trillion, and the number rises with every missile strike. This is not a problem that can be solved with ad hoc pledges or donor conferences alone.

 

What is needed is early coordination, clear principles, and institutional discipline by those Western nations who have invested in Ukrainian victory.

 

First, reconstruction planning must be tied explicitly to reform. Ukraine has made significant progress since 2014, but corruption and weak governance remain real concerns. Western taxpayers will not support large-scale investment if funds are perceived to be wasted or siphoned off. More importantly, Ukrainians themselves deserve a system that rewards merit rather than connections. Conditioning reconstruction aid on transparent procurement, judicial reform, and independent oversight is not punitive. It is essential to long-term success.

 

Second, frozen Russian assets should play a central role in funding reconstruction costs.  The moral case is straightforward: the aggressor should bear the cost of the damage it caused. The legal case is more complex, but not insurmountable. Western governments should move beyond endless debate and establish mechanisms to transfer at least a portion of immobilized Russian state assets into a reconstruction fund. Failing to do so risks signaling that aggression carries no lasting financial consequences.

 

Third, the private sector must be involved from the outset. Governments alone cannot rebuild a country of 40 million people. Energy, logistics, agriculture, technology, and manufacturing firms should be encouraged to plan for postwar investment, backed by risk guarantees and political insurance. A reconstruction framework that treats Ukraine as a permanent ward of international donors will fail. One that integrates Ukraine into European supply chains and capital markets can succeed.

 

Fourth, security guarantees and reconstruction are inseparable. No investor will commit capital if Ukraine’s future remains militarily ambiguous. While formal NATO membership may remain politically contentious, the West must provide credible assurances that Ukraine will not be left exposed once fighting ceases. Reconstruction without security is an invitation for renewed Russian aggression.

 

Critics on the right may raise legitimate concerns about the need for the West to support Ukraine’s rebuilding: Western publics are weary of foreign entanglements. Budgets are strained and domestic priorities compete for our government’s attention. There is also a fear of open-ended commitments with no clear endpoint. These objections deserve serious engagement, not dismissal.

 

But the alternative to planned reconstruction is not thrift. It is drift. A ruined Ukraine would generate long-term costs through refugees fleeing the country, repeated aid packages, and chronic instability on Europe’s eastern flank. Worse, it would embolden authoritarian powers by demonstrating that even failed wars can yield strategic dividends through exhaustion and neglect.

 

The Marshall Plan is often invoked, sometimes inappropriately, in discussions of Ukraine. The comparison is imperfect, but the underlying logic still applies. Economic recovery, institutional reform, and security integration transformed a devastated continent into a stable alliance system. That success was not inevitable. It started with early reconstruction planning led by the United States.

 

Preparing for Ukrainian reconstruction does not mean assuming imminent peace. It means recognizing that aiming for victory means looking beyond the next offensive. The West has already invested heavily in Ukraine’s defense. Failing to plan for what comes after would squander that investment.

 

Victory is not just the absence of Russian troops on Ukrainian soil. It is the presence of a functioning, confident Ukrainian state that can stand on its own, trade freely, govern cleanly, and defend itself. Reconstruction is how that victory is secured.

 

If the West believes that Ukraine’s cause is just and that the stakes extend beyond one country’s borders, then it must act accordingly. The time to prepare for peace is before it arrives.