By Oleksandr Kraiev & Andreas Umland
Sunday, May 17, 2026
Kyiv, the EU, and the coalition of the willing to help
Ukraine must prepare for numerous new challenges once the war ends.
In the spring of 2026, the chances of a cease-fire
between Ukraine and Russia appear as slim as ever. Moscow remains unwilling to
settle for anything less than at least a partial victory, yet it lacks the
military strength to enforce one. A “balance of death” has taken hold on the
front lines, characterized by swarms of drones, attrition, and incremental
territorial gains. On May 13 and 14, Russia launched over 1,400 drones, missiles and decoys on Ukraine — the
war’s largest air attack so far. War, not peace, remains the most likely
scenario.
Yet history rarely ends as expected. Europe cannot afford
to be unprepared for the consequences of a sudden cease-fire. Should the
fighting cease, Ukraine would not face a simple recovery period, but rather the
beginning of a new, multidimensional struggle — one that would simultaneously
test its security, economy, institutions, demographics, and political cohesion.
Winning peace, especially under an imperfect cease-fire agreement, will be just
as demanding as surviving the war.
The first and most important challenge remains the
establishment and sustainability of security. On its own, a cease-fire would
not signal a shift in the Kremlin’s strategic objectives. Without a fundamental
transformation of the Russian regime, Moscow would interpret a cease-fire not
as an endpoint but as a mere pause — an interregnum in Russia’s long imperial
campaign. Reduced activity on the battlefield would likely be accompanied by
intensified hybrid warfare from the Kremlin: cyberattacks, disinformation,
industrial sabotage, and political subversion aimed at undermining the
Ukrainian state from within.
A long-term peace treaty poses its own challenges.
Indeed, the stability of a postwar order depends less on the legal wording of
an agreement than on the balance of power it leaves behind. Pressure on Kyiv to
demilitarize fortified areas in eastern Ukraine would be particularly
dangerous, as such a requirement would pave the way for deeper Russian
incursions and increase incentives for Moscow’s eventual resumption of war to
capture even more territory. For this reason, Western security promises would
only be meaningful if they were backed by concrete capabilities.
Given Washington’s fluctuating stance toward Ukraine
since 2025, the primary responsibility for enforcing a cease-fire or peace
treaty’s provisions will likely lie with Europe. Even once fighting pauses,
military aid and defense cooperation would need to continue almost to the same
extent as during wartime. The most effective deterrent will not lie in
declarations, but in swiftly implemented practical measures, such as
integrating Ukraine’s air defense into NATO’s eastern flank, deploying Western
aircraft to protect Ukrainian airspace, and enabling the resumption of civilian
air traffic. Security integration should also work in both directions:
Ukraine’s battle-tested armed forces could strengthen deterrence against Russia
in the Baltic region and position the country as a pillar of a new European
security architecture.
Once security is established, economic recovery will be
the decisive test. After a GDP slump of over 30 percent in 2022, Ukraine
returned to growth in 2023–25 despite labor shortages and repeated Russian
attacks. Yet the damage wrought has been immense. Direct material destruction
by Russia has amounted to over $195 billion, with the total need for reconstruction over the
next ten years estimated at $588 billion.
Ukraine’s rebirth cannot mean simply restoring the
pre-war economy. Instead, a new approach is necessary: decentralized
infrastructure, modernized institutions, resilient logistics, and a focus on
human capital. Fragmented, privately funded donor projects will not suffice.
Instead, international aid — through the EU’s €50 billion facility for Ukraine
and G7 loans secured by frozen Russian assets — would need to be used to
attract private investment. The extent of investment potential in postwar
Ukraine would, of course, also depend on the security outlook, the state of the
rule of law, and the country’s increasing integration into the EU single
market.
Energy supply will also be a critical bottleneck. After
Russia’s many targeted attacks over the last four years, the Ukrainian energy
system is producing 4 gigawatts less than the country needs, and it remains
vulnerable despite replacement supplies from Europe. A reconstruction of
Soviet-era centralized systems would be both impractical and misguided. The war
suggests a more resilient model: decentralized renewable energy, microgrids,
and diverse storage capacities. Modernizing the energy sector alone will
require over $90 billion in the next ten years and at least $5 billion for
immediate stabilization once the fighting subsides.
The problem beneath Ukraine’s soil is also fundamental.
About a quarter of the country — roughly 137,000 square kilometers — is contaminated with unexploded
ordnance. Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country on Earth. The cost of
mine clearance is estimated at $34.6 billion over ten years, while the extent of environmental
damage exceeds $60 billion. Without large-scale clearance and remediation
efforts, reconstruction, agriculture, and the return of refugees will remain
impossible. These are not minor environmental issues — they are a physical
prerequisite for the country’s survival.
Economic recovery will almost certainly be uneven. While
Ukraine’s central and western regions have preserved or resumed much of their
pre-war social and economic life during the war, the devastated frontline areas
in the east and south require tailored strategies to prevent permanent
depopulation and impoverishment.
Parallel to reconstruction is Ukraine’s long march toward
the European Union. Accession is often discussed in political terms, but in
reality, it remains a deeply technical matter. EU accession requires the
implementation of approximately 100,000 pages of EU law — a task that would
constitute an extraordinary endeavor even in peacetime. Corruption remains a
serious obstacle, although recent scandals have also shown that Ukraine’s
post-Euromaidan anti-corruption institutions are becoming increasingly
effective.
The political sustainability of future EU membership will
also depend on the achievement of intermediate steps toward the ultimate goal
of accession. Gradual sectoral integration into the EU single market —
transport, energy, digital services — would yield visible results while
negotiations on full membership continue. Yet Ukraine’s success will also
depend on reforms within the EU. Unanimity rules make enlargement vulnerable to
vetoes, and, absent institutional reforms, the integration of a large agricultural
and industrial country like Ukraine will challenge existing EU policies.
The process of addressing war crimes, meanwhile, will
span decades. By early 2026, Ukrainian authorities had already recorded more
than 213,000 suspected war crimes. Only a fraction of these will
ever be prosecuted. Establishing accountability and justice must therefore be
approached in a nuanced manner. High-ranking Russian officials may one day face
international tribunals; however, most perpetrators will never appear before a
Ukrainian or international court. Trials in absentia, systematic truth-seeking,
and comprehensive commemorative work will therefore be crucial to achieving a
historical reckoning.
Domestically, transitional justice with a nuanced
approach will be necessary. Blanket punishment of all forms of collaboration
with the occupiers would overwhelm the courts and alienate the liberated
territories from the nation. Extrajudicial mechanisms — lustration, conditional
amnesties, and victim-centered reparations — offer more realistic paths to
reconciliation without negating responsibility.
Underlying all these challenges is a demographic shock
unprecedented in Ukraine’s post-World War II history. The population in
government-controlled areas has fallen from around 42 million before 2022 to about 31.5 million today.
Over 6 million Ukrainians are living as refugees abroad; the birth rate has
plummeted to less than one child per woman; and mortality has risen sharply.
Even a permanent peace deal would not automatically
reverse these trends. Some refugees would no doubt return, but the lifting of
martial law could also trigger a new wave of emigration as men join their
families abroad. To rebuild, Ukraine may have no choice but to become a country
of immigration, which would mean a profound transformation for society and
politics alike. Should the war drag on, population decline threatens to become
irreversible, further undermining the country’s economic viability.
Finally, social stability will be put to the test as soon
as martial law ends. Elections will revive political competition and expose
social divisions between various groups: between returnees and those who stayed
behind; between veterans and civilians; and between regions scarred by
occupation and those that have been comparatively spared. Unresolved
territorial issues will remain politically explosive. A new, powerful voter
bloc of war veterans — numbering over 800,000 people — will likely shape politics
for decades to come. Their reintegration is already one of Ukraine’s most
urgent social tasks and, at the same time, one of its greatest potential
strengths.
All of this gives rise to three strategic imperatives.
First, current planning for the “day after” must not distract from sustaining
Ukraine’s defense efforts today; for the time being, military support must
remain the overriding priority. Second, reconstruction and the safeguarding of
human capital must begin now and should not wait for peace. Third, Kyiv and its
partners must prepare intellectually and institutionally for turbulent
developments following the cessation of war.
A Ukrainian victory would consolidate European security
and strengthen the European project. Ukraine’s decline during or after the war,
on the other hand, would grant Russia a belated victory and spur authoritarian
revisionism far beyond Eastern Europe. The end of fighting — whenever it comes
— will be celebrated by Ukrainians, yet will neither reduce Russian imperialism
nor resolve many of Ukraine’s accumulated domestic problems. It will merely
mean the transition to a new phase of intense political developments whose
outcome will continue to significantly impact the future of Europe.
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