By Micah Ables
Friday, May 15, 2026
In late March, at the height of active hostilities
between the U.S. and Iran, an Iranian drone—likely using Russian targeting data—destroyed a U.S. Air Force E-3 AWACS radar aircraft in Saudi Arabia.
The loss of the $500 million airplane is bad enough, but
the loss of capability is even worse. This aircraft is a command-and-control
node critical for tracking airborne enemy threats and attacks and coordinating
friendly operations across different platforms. There are now only 15 of these
planes in service, and five are deployed
to the Middle East. These aircraft range in age from 32 to 59 years old,
and with many essential parts no longer being made, not all of them are
serviceable. Despite the E-3’s age and critical role in modern operations, its
replacement—the E-7 Wedgetail jet—is still years away after Defense
Secretary Pete Hegseth tried (but failed) to cancel production last year before
Congress overruled him.
Losing one of these systems to an Iranian strike is
embarrassing, but it is also a major blow to operations around the world and at
home. The loss is even more painful when you consider that it could have been
prevented.
The AWACS is exactly the kind of high-value target our
military planners should have anticipated Iran would strike. They could have
used passive defenses like camouflage, hardened structures, and decoys, or more
active measures like interceptors. What they needed—and didn’t have—are drone interceptors.
The loss of the AWACS represents a failure of planning
and defense in an asymmetric fight, but our vulnerability wasn’t just a
tactical problem unique to this conflict. Drones reshaping modern warfare is a
permanent paradigm shift that we should be prepared for in future conflicts
with Iran, Russia, China, or their proxies.
The U.S. and Ukraine are now negotiating a deal to work together on developing and
building attack drones—in exchange for much-needed drone expertise, Ukraine
earns much-needed money to fund its existential fight with Russia. The deal is
a step in the right direction, even if it is focused on offensive drones rather
than addressing the defensive interceptor capability gap that cost us the
AWACS.
But more than a tactical problem, this drone issue is a
strategic and political one—and it is the predictable result of devaluing and
burning the very alliances and relationships that could help us most. It raises
an uncomfortable question: If we hadn’t spent the last year burning our
relationship with Ukraine, how much better could our drone-related capabilities
already be?
***
To understand this issue, we need to understand the
asymmetry of the drone fight. While the United States has missile systems
capable of intercepting drones, we lack the capability to mass-produce cheap,
expendable interceptors.
Iran can produce one Shahed drone for somewhere between $4,000 and $50,000 and easily launch it from a truck. The regime had stockpiled thousands of drones before the war and was able
to make about 10,000 more per month. Recent intelligence estimates assess
that Iran still has “thousands” of drones available and, given the relatively
low-tech facilities needed for production, they have likely maintained a
healthy rate of production even after weeks of sustained bombing.
Meanwhile, it costs roughly $3.7 million for a Patriot missile battery to
intercept a single drone. The 620 missiles produced last year was a record amount, with a
goal of ramping up to making 2,000 missiles per year in 2030. A very finite
number of aging Patriot interceptor batteries can protect only so many
locations, and their ammunition is “worrisomely low.” While the U.S. is researching anti-drone capabilities, the military budget
and acquisitions process is far behind the battlefield technology.
While the U.S. is prioritizing major defense programs like Golden Dome and
space-based early-warning sensors, Ukraine has built an entire defense industry
on cheap and effective anti-drone systems. Necessity is the mother of
invention, and, thanks to the Russians, the Ukrainians have become the world's
foremost experts in drone interception.
In a mission that impressed Trump, Ukraine took out one-third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet with a series
of drone attacks on four airfields in Russian territory in June 2025. When a
high-value target sits undefended against a threat, it gets destroyed.
The Ukrainians have learned that lesson, too. Their
expertise has been hard-earned from four years of defending against daily
barrages of Russian ballistic missiles and Iranian-made drones. Despite thousands of attacks each month, Ukraine is able to intercept more than 90 percent of incoming threats.
As the war in Iran has shown, America needs Ukraine’s
expertise and interceptors. With minimal anti-drone capabilities of its own,
the Trump
administration seems to have forgotten that this is precisely the purpose
of alliances and friendly foreign relations.
***
The United States initiated its bombing campaign in Iran
almost a year to the day after the infamous Oval Office meeting in which Trump
and Vice President J.D. Vance openly sparred with Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky, wherein Vance badgered Zelensky to express gratitude for American aid
and Trump chided him, “With us, you have the cards, but without us, you don't
have any cards."
A year later, it was the U.S. looking for assistance.
Some allies closed their airspace to us, and—much to Trump’s chagrin—no one seemed interested in helping reopen the Strait of
Hormuz. Zelensky was far more willing to help.
Early in the war, amid Iranian retaliatory attacks with
swarms of Shahed drones, the United States requested anti-drone assistance from
Ukraine. Zelensky responded, "Yes, of course, we will send our experts," and a team left Ukraine for
the Middle East the next day.
Within two weeks, Ukrainian teams were “already working
with five countries on countering 'Shahed' drones,” Zelensky announced, “We
have provided expert assessments and are helping build a defense system.” By
the end of April, one American base in Saudi Arabia was already being protected by Ukrainian systems, with others in the works.
Of course, like any other alliance—especially in the age
of Trump—this is not a purely altruistic arrangement for Zelensky. His
interests and ours align: He needs Patriot missiles to defend against Russian ballistic
missile attacks, and we need interceptors to defend against Iranian drone
attacks. If we have anti-drone munitions, we can stop wasting Patriot missiles
and leave more for Ukraine.
The remarkable part is that Zelensky didn’t wait for an
agreement before sending help. Instead, he just said, “Of course, we can help.”
That’s the difference between a leader who understands and builds alliances and
one who squeezes and extorts them.
It’s not too late for the administration to learn the value of alliances. We should appreciate that there are
leaders like Zelensky who are willing to send help without waiting for a quid
pro quo agreement and who are willing to work out deals without holding
grudges. We should take advantage of
Ukraine’s anti-drone expertise and capabilities, and commit to sending more military aid to them in return as
soon as possible.
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